benefits for the subjects. Those cruelties are badly used that, although few at the outset, increase with the passing of time instead of disappearing. Those who follow the first method can remedy their standing, both with God and with men, as Agathocles did; the others cannot possibly maintain their positions.

Hence it should be noted that, in conquering a state, its conqueror should weigh all the injurious things he must do and commit them all at once, so as not to have to repeat them every day. By not repeating them, he will be able to make men feel secure and win them over with the benefits he bestows upon them. Anyone who does otherwise, either out of timidity or because of bad advice, is always obliged to keep his knife in his hand. Nor can he ever count upon his subjects, who, because of their recent and continuous injuries, cannot feel secure with him. Therefore, injuries should be inflicted all at once, for the less they are tasted, the less harm they do. However, benefits should be distributed a little at a time, so that they may be fully savoured. Above all, a prince should live with his subjects in such a way that no unforeseen event, either bad or good, may cause him to alter his course; for when difficulties arise in adverse conditions, you do not have time to resort to cruelty, and the good that you do will help you very little, since it will be judged a forced measure, and you will earn from it no gratitude whatsoever.

IX

Of the civil principality

[*De principatu civili*]

BUT let us come to the second instance, when a private citizen becomes prince of his native city not through wickedness or any other intolerable violence, but with the favour of his fellow citizens. This can be called a civil principality, the acquisition of which neither depends completely upon virtue nor upon Fortune, but instead upon a fortunate astuteness. I maintain that

one reaches this princedom either with the favour of the common people or with that of the nobility, since these two different humours* are found in every body politic. They arise from the fact that the people do not wish to be commanded or oppressed by the nobles, while the nobles do desire to command and to oppress the people. From these two opposed appetites, there arises in cities one of three effects: a principality, liberty, or licence. A principality is brought about either by the common people or by the nobility, depending on which of the two parties has the opportunity. When the nobles see that they cannot resist the populace, they begin to support someone from among themselves, and make him prince in order to be able to satisfy their appetites under his protection. The common people as well, seeing that they cannot resist the nobility, give their support to one man so as to be defended by his authority. He who attains the principality with the help of the nobility maintains it with more difficulty than he who becomes prince with the help of the common people, for he finds himself a prince amidst many who feel themselves to be his equals, and because of this he can neither govern nor manage them as he wishes. But he who attains the principality through popular favour finds himself alone, and has around him either no one or very few who are not ready to obey him. Besides this, one cannot honestly satisfy the nobles without harming others, but the common people can certainly be satisfied. Their desire is more just than that of the nobles—the former want not to be oppressed, while the latter want to oppress. In addition, a prince can never make himself secure when the people are his enemy, because there are so many of them; he can make himself secure against the nobles, because they are so few. The worst that a prince can expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but with a hostile nobility, not only does he have to fear being abandoned, but also that they will oppose him. Since the nobles are more perceptive and cunning, they always have time to save themselves, seeking the favours of the side they believe will prevail. Furthermore, a prince must always live with the same common people, but he can easily do without the same nobles, having the power every

day to make and unmake them, or to take away and restore their power as he sees fit.

In order better to clarify this point, let me say that the nobles should be considered chiefly in two ways: either they conduct themselves in such a way that they commit themselves completely to your cause, or they do not. Those who commit themselves and are not rapacious should be honoured and loved. Those who do not commit themselves can be evaluated in two ways. If they act in this manner out of pusillanimity and a natural lack of courage, you should make use of them, especially those who are wise advisers, since in prosperous times they will gain you honour, and in adverse times you need not fear them. But when, cunningly and influenced by ambition, they refrain from committing themselves to you, this is a sign that they think more of themselves than of you. The prince should be on guard against them and fear them as if they were declared enemies, because they will always help to bring about his downfall in adverse times.

Therefore, one who becomes prince with the support of the common people must keep them well disposed. This is easy for him, since the only thing they ask of him is not to be oppressed. But one who becomes prince with the help of the nobility against the will of the common people must, before all else, seek to win the people's support, which should be easy if he takes them under his protection. Because men who are well treated by those from whom they expected harm are more obliged to their benefactor, the common people quickly become better disposed toward him than if he had become prince with their support. A prince can gain their favour in various ways, but because these vary according to the situation, no fixed rules can be given for them, and therefore I shall not discuss them. I shall conclude by saying only that a prince must have the friendship of the common people. Otherwise, he will have no support in times of adversity. Nabis, Prince of the Spartans, withstood a siege by all of Greece and by one of Rome's most victorious armies, and he defended his native city and his own state against them. When danger suddenly approached, he needed only to protect himself from a few of his

subjects, but if he had had the common people hostile, this would not have been sufficient.

Let no one contradict my opinion by citing that trite proverb, claiming he who builds upon the people builds upon mud; for that is true when a private citizen makes them his foundation, and allows himself to believe that the common people will free him if he is oppressed by enemies or by the public officials. In such a case, a man might often find himself deceived, as were the Gracchi in Rome or as Messer Giorgio Scali was in Florence. When the prince who builds his foundations on the people is a man able to command and of spirit, is not bewildered by adversities, does not fail to make other preparations, and is a leader who keeps up the spirits of the populace through his courage and his institutions, he will never find himself deceived by the common people, and he will discover that he has laid his foundations well.

Principalities of this type are usually endangered when they are about to change from a civil government into an absolute form of government. For these princes rule either by themselves or by means of public magistrates. In the latter case, their status is weaker and more dangerous, since they depend entirely upon the will of those citizens who are appointed as magistrates. These men can very easily (especially in adverse times) seize the state, either by abandoning him or by opposing him. And in such periods of danger the prince has no time for seizing absolute authority, since the citizens and subjects* who are used to receiving their orders from the magistrates are not willing to obey his orders in these crises. And in doubtful times he will always find a scarcity of men in whom he can trust. Such a prince cannot rely upon what he sees during periods of calm when the citizens need his rule, because then everyone comes running, everyone makes promises, and each person is willing to die for him, since death is remote. But in times of adversity, when the state needs its citizens, then few are to be found. And this experiment is all the more dangerous since it can be tried but once. Therefore, a wise prince must think of a method by which his citizens will need the state and himself at all times and in every circumstance. Then they will always be loyal to him.

was out in the country with his friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: 'If the enemy were on that hilltop and we were here with our army, which of the two of us would have the advantage? How could we attack them without breaking formation? If we wanted to retreat, how could we do this? If they were to retreat, how could we pursue them?' As they rode along, he proposed to them every situation in which an army might find itself; he heard their opinions, expressed his own, and backed it up with reasons.* As a result, because of these continuous reflections no unforeseen incident could arise when he was leading his troops, for which he did not have the remedy.

But as for study, the prince must read histories and in them consider the deeds of excellent men. He must see how they conducted themselves in wars. He must examine the reasons for their victories and for their defeats, in order to avoid the latter and to imitate the former. Above all else, he must do as some eminent men before him have done, who elected to imitate someone who had been praised and honoured before them, and always keep in mind his deeds and actions: just as it is reported that Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar imitated Alexander, and Scipio imitated Cyrus.* Anyone who reads the life of Cyrus written by Xenophon* will realize how important in the life of Scipio such imitation was for his glory and how closely in purity,* goodness, humanity, and generosity Scipio conformed to those characteristics of Cyrus about which Xenophon had written.

A wise prince must follow such methods as these and never be idle in peaceful times, but he must turn them diligently to his advantage in order to be able to profit from them in times of adversity, so that when Fortune changes she will find him prepared to resist her.

XV

Of those things for which men, and particularly princes, are praised or blamed

[*De his rebus quibus homines et presertim principes laudantur aut vituperantur*]

Now, it remains to be considered what should be the methods and principles of a prince in dealing with his subjects and allies. Because I know that many have written about this,* I am afraid that by writing about it again I shall be considered presumptuous, especially since in discussing this material I depart from the procedures of others. But since my intention is to write something useful for anyone who understands it, it seemed more suitable for me to search after the effectual truth of the matter rather than its imagined one. Many writers have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen nor known to exist in reality. For there is such a distance between how one lives and how one ought to live, that anyone who abandons what is done for what ought to be done achieves his downfall rather than his preservation. A man who wishes to profess goodness at all times will come to ruin among so many who are not good. Therefore, it is necessary for a prince who wishes to maintain himself to learn how not to be good, and to use this knowledge or not to use it according to necessity.

Leaving aside, therefore, matters concerning an imaginary prince, and taking into account those that are true, let me say that all men, when they are spoken of—and especially princes, since they are placed on a higher level—are judged by some of those qualities that bring them either blame or praise. And this is why one is considered generous, another miserly (to use a Tuscan word, since 'avaricious' in our language is still used to mean one who wishes to acquire by means of theft; we call 'miserly' one who is excessive in avoiding using what he has). One is considered a giver, the other rapacious; one cruel, the other merciful;

one a breaker of faith, the other faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, the other fierce and courageous; one humane, the other proud; one lascivious, the other chaste; one trustworthy, the other shrewd; one hard, the other easygoing; one serious, the other frivolous; one religious, the other unbelieving; and the like. And I know that everyone will admit it would be a very praiseworthy thing to find in a prince those qualities mentioned above that are held to be good. But since it is neither possible to have them nor to observe them all completely, because the human condition does not permit it, a prince must be prudent enough to know how to escape the infamy of those vices that would take the state away from him, and be on guard against those vices that will not take it from him, whenever possible. But if he cannot, he need not concern himself unduly if he ignores these less serious vices. Moreover, he need not worry about incurring the infamy of those vices without which it would be difficult to save the state. Because, carefully taking everything into account, he will discover that something which appears to be a virtue,* if pursued, will result in his ruin; while some other thing which seems to be a vice, if pursued, will secure his safety and his well-being.

XVI

Of generosity and miserliness

[*De liberalitate et parsimonia*]

BEGINNING, therefore, with the first of the above-mentioned qualities, I say that it would be good to be considered generous. Nevertheless, generosity employed in such a way as to give you a reputation for it will injure you, because if it is employed virtuously* and as one should employ it, it will not be recognized, and you will not avoid the infamy of its opposite. And so, if a prince wants to maintain his reputation for generosity among men, it is necessary for him not to neglect any possible means of sumptuous display; in so doing, such a prince will always use up all his resources in such displays, and will eventually be obliged, if he

wishes to maintain his reputation for generosity, to burden the people with excessive taxes and to do all those things one does to procure money. This will begin to make him hateful to his subjects and, if he becomes impoverished, he will be held in low regard by everyone. As a consequence of this generosity of his, having injured the many and rewarded the few, he will feel the effects of any discontent and will vacillate at the first sign of danger; recognizing this and wishing to change his ways, he immediately incurs the infamy of being a miser. Therefore, a prince, being unable to use this virtue of generosity in a manner that will not harm himself if he is known for it, should, if he is wise, not concern himself about the reputation of being miserly. With time he will come to be considered more generous, once it is evident that, as a result of his parsimony, his income is sufficient, he can defend himself from anyone who wages war against him, and he can undertake enterprises without overburdening his people. In this way he appears as generous to all those from whom he takes nothing, who are countless, and as miserly to all those to whom he gives nothing, who are few.

In our times we have not seen great deeds accomplished except by those who were considered miserly; the others were all wiped out. Although he made use of his reputation for generosity in order to gain the papacy,* Pope Julius II then decided not to maintain this reputation, in order to be able to wage war. The present King of France* has waged many wars without imposing extraordinary taxes on his subjects, only because his habitual parsimony has provided for the additional expenditures. If he had been considered generous, the present King of Spain* would not have engaged in or successfully carried out so many enterprises. Therefore—in order not to have to rob his subjects, to be able to defend himself, not to become poor and contemptible, and not to be forced to become rapacious—a prince must consider it of little account if he incurs the reputation of being a miser, for this is one of those vices that enables him to rule. And if someone were to say: 'Caesar with his generosity achieved imperial power, and many others, because they were generous and known to be so, achieved very high positions', I would reply: You are either

already a prince, or you are on the way to becoming one. In the first case such generosity is damaging; in the second, it is indeed necessary to be thought generous. Caesar was one of those who wanted to gain the principality of Rome; but if he had survived and had not moderated his expenditures after doing so, he would have destroyed the power he acquired.* And if someone were to reply: 'There have existed many princes who have accomplished great deeds with their armies who have been considered generous', I would answer you: A prince either spends his own money and that of his subjects, or that of others. In the first case he must be economical; in the second, he must not hold back any part of his generosity. For the prince who goes out with his armies and lives by looting, sacking, and ransoms, and who lays hands on the property of others, such generosity is necessary; otherwise he would not be followed by his soldiers. Of what is not yours or your subjects, you can be a more generous donor, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander: spending the wealth of others does not lessen your reputation, but only adds to it. Only the spending of your own is what does you harm. There is nothing that uses itself up faster than generosity; for as you employ it, you lose the means of employing it, and you become either poor or despised or else, to escape poverty, you become rapacious and hated. And above all things, a prince must guard himself against being despised and hated. Generosity leads you both to one and to the other. So it is wiser to live with the reputation of a miser, which gives birth to an infamy without hatred, than to be forced to incur the reputation of rapacity because you want to be considered generous, which gives birth to an infamy with hatred.

XVII

Of cruelty and mercy, and whether it is better to be loved than to be feared or the contrary

[*De crudelitate et pietate; et an sit melius amari quam timeri, vel e contra*]

TURNING to the other qualities mentioned above, let me say that every prince must desire to be considered merciful and not cruel; nevertheless, he must take care not to use such mercy badly. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel; nonetheless, this cruelty of his brought order to the Romagna,* united it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. If we examine this carefully, we shall see that he was more merciful than the Florentine people, who allowed the destruction of Pistoia in order to avoid being considered cruel.* Therefore, a prince must not worry about the infamy of being considered cruel when it is a matter of keeping his subjects united and loyal. With a very few examples of cruelty, he will prove more compassionate than those who, out of excessive mercy, permit disorders to continue from which arise murders and plundering, for these usually injure the entire community, while the executions ordered by the prince injure specific individuals. Of all the types of princes, the new prince cannot escape the reputation for cruelty, since new states are full of dangers. Thus Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, declares: 'Res dura et regni novitas me talia cogunt moliri et late fines custode tueri'* ['The harshness of things and the newness of my rule make me act in such a manner, and to set guards over my land on all sides']. Nevertheless, a prince must be cautious in believing accusations and in acting against individuals, nor should he be afraid of his own shadow. He should proceed in such a manner, tempered by prudence and humanity, that too much trust may not render him incautious, nor too much suspicion render him insufferable.

From this arises an argument: whether it is better to be loved than to be feared, or the contrary. The answer is that one would

like to be both one and the other. But since it is difficult to be both together, it is much safer to be feared than to be loved, when one of the two must be lacking. For one can generally say this about men: they are ungrateful, fickle, simulators and deceivers, avoiders of danger, and greedy for gain. While you work for their benefit they are completely yours, offering you their blood, their property, their lives, and their sons, as I said above, when the need to do so is far away. But when it draws nearer to you, they turn away. The prince who relies entirely upon their words comes to ruin, finding himself stripped naked of other preparations. For friendships acquired by a price and not by greatness and nobility of spirit are purchased but are not owned, and at the proper time cannot be spent. Men are less hesitant about injuring someone who makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared, because love is held together by a chain of obligation that, since men are a wretched lot, is broken on every occasion for their own self-interest; but fear is sustained by a dread of punishment that will never abandon you.

A prince must nevertheless make himself feared in such a way that he will avoid hatred, even if he does not acquire love; since one can very easily be feared and yet not hated. This will always be the case when he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects, and from their women. If he must spill someone's blood, he should do this when there is proper justification and manifest cause. But above all else, he should abstain from seizing the property of others; for men forget the death of their father more quickly than the loss of their patrimony. Moreover, reasons for taking their property are never lacking, and he who begins to live by stealing always finds a reason for taking what belongs to others; reasons for spilling blood, on the other hand, are rarer and more fleeting.

But when the prince is with his armies and has a multitude of soldiers under his command, then it is absolutely necessary that he should not worry about being considered cruel, for without that reputation he will never keep an army united or prepared for any action. Numbered among the remarkable deeds of Hannibal is this: that while he had a very large army made up of all kinds of

men that he commanded in foreign lands, there never arose the slightest dissension, either among themselves or against their leader, both during his periods of good and bad luck.* This could not have arisen from anything other than his inhuman cruelty, which, along with his many other virtues, made him always venerable and terrifying in the eyes of his soldiers. Without that quality, his other virtues would not have sufficed to attain the same effect. Having considered this matter very superficially, historians on the one hand admire these deeds of his, and on the other condemn the main cause of them.

That it is true that his other virtues would not have been sufficient can be seen from the case of Scipio, a most extraordinary man, not only in his time but in all of recorded history, whose armies in Spain rebelled against him. This came about from nothing other than his excessive compassion, which gave his soldiers more licence than is suitable to military discipline. For this he was censured in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, who called him the corruptor of the Roman army. When Locri was destroyed by one of his legates,* the Locrians were not avenged by him, nor was the arrogance of that legate corrected, all this arising from his easygoing nature. Someone in the Senate who tried to excuse him declared that there were many men who knew how not to err better than they knew how to correct their mistakes. In time such a character* would have damaged Scipio's fame and glory if he had long continued to command armies, but, living under the control of the Senate, this harmful quality of his was not only concealed but also contributed to his glory.

Let me conclude, then—returning to the issue of being feared and loved—that since men love at their own pleasure and fear at the pleasure of the prince, the wise prince should build his foundation upon that which is his own, not upon that which belongs to others: only he must seek to avoid being hated, as I have said.

nature inclined, and also because he cannot be persuaded to depart from a path after having always prospered by following it. And therefore, when it is time to act impetuously the cautious man does not know how to do so, and is ruined as a result; for if he had changed his conduct with the times, Fortune would not have changed.

Pope Julius II acted impetuously in all his affairs, and he found the times and circumstances so suitable to this method of procedure that he always achieved felicitous results. Consider the first campaign he waged against Bologna while Messer Giovanni Bentivoglio was still alive.* The Venetians were unhappy about it and so was the King of Spain. Julius still had negotiations going on about it with France. Nevertheless, he started personally on this expedition with his usual ferocity and impetuosity. Such a move astonished Spain and the Venetians and stopped them in their tracks, the latter out of fear and the former out of a desire to recover the entire Kingdom of Naples. On the other hand, Julius involved the King of France, for when the King saw him move, and wishing to make him his ally in order to defeat the Venetians, the King decided that he could not deny the Pope the use of his troops without openly injuring him. Therefore, with his impetuous move, Julius accomplished what no other pontiff would ever have achieved with the greatest of human prudence. For if he had waited until he could leave Rome with agreements settled and everything in order, as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded, because the King of France would have found a thousand excuses and the others would have aroused in him a thousand fears. I wish to leave unmentioned the other deeds of his, since all were similar and all succeeded well. The brevity of his life* did not allow him to experience the contrary; since if times that required proceeding with caution had arrived, his ruin would have followed, for he would never have deviated from those methods to which his nature inclined him.

I therefore conclude that, since Fortune varies and men remain obstinate in their ways, men prosper when the two are in harmony* and fail to prosper when they are not in accord. I certainly believe this: that it is better to be impetuous than cautious,

because Fortune is a woman, and if you want to keep her under it is necessary to beat her and force her down. It is clear that she more often allows herself to be won over by impetuous men than by those who proceed coldly. And so, like a woman, Fortune is always the friend of young men, for they are less cautious, more ferocious, and command her with more audacity.

XXVI

An exhortation to seize Italy and to free her from the barbarians

[*Exortatio ad capessendam Italiam in libertatemque a barbaris vindicandam*]

THEREFORE, considering all of the matters discussed above, and wondering to myself whether at present in Italy the times are suitable to honour a new prince, and if there is the material that might give a prudent and virtuous prince the opportunity to introduce a form that would do him honour and bring benefit to the people of Italy, it seems to me that so many circumstances are favourable to such a new prince that I know of no other time more appropriate to this. And if, as I said, it was necessary for the people of Israel to be enslaved in Egypt to make known the virtue of Moses, and it was necessary for the Persians to be oppressed by the Medes to make known the greatness of spirit in Cyrus, and it was necessary for the Athenians to be scattered to make known the excellence of Theseus, then at present, to make known the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary for Italy to be reduced to her present conditions, and that she be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more servile than the Persians, and more scattered than the Athenians: without a leader, without order, beaten, despoiled, ripped apart, overrun, and having suffered every sort of ruin.

And even though, before now, some glimmer of light may have shown itself in a single individual,* so that it was possible to believe that God had ordained him for Italy's redemption, yet

afterwards it was seen how, at the height of his deeds, he was rejected by Fortune. Now Italy, left as if lifeless, awaits the man who may heal her wounds and put an end to the plundering of Lombardy,* the extortions* in the Kingdom of Naples and in Tuscany, and who can cure her of those sores that have been festering for so long. Look how she now prays to God to send someone to redeem her from these barbaric cruelties and insults. See how ready and willing she is to follow a banner, provided that someone picks it up. Nor is there anyone in sight, at present, in whom she can have more hope than in Your Illustrious House, which, with its fortune and virtue, favoured by God and by the Church, of which it is now prince,* could place itself at the head of this redemption. This will not be very difficult if you keep before your eyes the deeds and the lives of those named above. Although those men were rare and marvellous, they were nevertheless men, and each of them had poorer opportunities than are offered now: for their undertakings were no more just, nor easier than this one, nor was God more a friend to them than to you. This is a righteous cause: 'iustum enim est bellum quibus necessarium et pia arma ubi nulla nisi in armis spes est'* ['Only those wars that are necessary are just, and arms are sacred when there is no hope except through arms']. Here circumstances are very favourable, and where circumstances are favourable there cannot be great difficulty, provided that you imitate the institutions of those men I have proposed as your target. Besides this, we now see here extraordinary, unprecedented signs brought about by God: the sea has opened up; a cloud has shown you the path; the rock has poured water forth; here manna has rained; everything has converged for your greatness.* The rest you must do yourself. God does not wish to do everything, in order not to take from us our free will and part of the glory that is ours.

It is not a marvel if some of the Italians mentioned previously were not capable of achieving what it is hoped Your Illustrious House may achieve, or that, during the many revolutions in Italy and the many wartime campaigns, it always seems that Italy's military skill has been wiped out. This arises from the fact that her ancient military practices were not good, and that there has

existed nobody capable of inventing new ones. Nothing brings so much honour to a man newly risen up than the new laws and new institutions discovered by him. When these are well founded and have greatness in them, they make a man revered and admirable; and in Italy there is no lack of material for introducing every form there. Here there is great virtue in the limbs, were it not for the lack of it in the heads.* Observe how in duels and skirmishes Italians are superior in strength, dexterity, and resourcefulness. But when it comes to armies, they are not a match for others. All this comes from the weakness of her leaders, for those who know are not obeyed; and of each who thinks he knows, there has not been one up to the present day who has known how to set himself above the others, either because of virtue or fortune, so that others might yield to him. As a consequence, during so much time and so many wars waged during the past twenty years, whenever there has been an army made up completely of Italians it has always made a poor showing. As proof of this, there is Taro; then Alexandria, Capua, Genoa, Vailà, Bologna, and Mestre.*

Therefore, if Your Illustrious House desires to follow these excellent men who redeemed their countries, it is necessary before all else, and as a true basis for every enterprise, to provide yourself with your own soldiers, for one cannot have more loyal, or truer, or better soldiers. Although each one of them may be good individually, united together they will become even better, when they see themselves commanded, honoured, and well treated by their own prince. Therefore, it is necessary to prepare yourself with such soldiers as these, so that with Italian virtue,* you will be able to defend yourself against foreigners. Although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered terrifying, nevertheless both have defects, so that a third kind of military organization could not only oppose them but also be confident of overcoming them. For the Spanish cannot withstand cavalry, and the Swiss have to fear infantry, when they discover those who are as stubborn in combat as they are. Therefore, it has been seen, and experience will show, that the Spanish cannot withstand French cavalry and that Spanish infantrymen can destroy the Swiss. Although this last weakness has not yet been seen, there

was nevertheless a taste of it at the battle of Ravenna,* when the Spanish infantry met the German battalions that employ the same order of battle as the Swiss. Aided by bucklers* and their own agility, the Spanish got in between and underneath the Germans' long pikes and were able to hurt them at their pleasure, without the Germans having any remedy. And had it not been for the cavalry charge that broke them, the Spaniards would have slaughtered them all. Therefore, as the defects of both these kinds of infantry are recognized, a new type can be organized that is able to withstand cavalry and has no fear of foot-soldiers. This will occur with the way the armed forces are created and a change in the order of battle. These are among those matters that, from their novel organization, give reputation and greatness to a new prince.

This opportunity, therefore, must not be allowed to pass by, so that Italy may behold her redeemer after so long a time. Nor can I express with what love he will be received in all those territories that have suffered through these foreign floods; with what thirst for revenge, with what stubborn loyalty, with what devotion, with what tears! What doors will be closed to him? What people will deny him their obedience? What envy could oppose him? What Italian could deny him homage? This barbarian dominion stinks in everyone's nostrils! Therefore, may Your Illustrious House take up this task with the spirit and the hope with which just enterprises are begun, so that under your banner this country may be ennobled, and under your auspices those words of Petrarch may come true:

> Virtue will seize arms
> Against frenzy, and the battle will be brief:
> For ancient valour
> Is not yet dead in Italian hearts.*

EXPLANATORY NOTES

Information on historical figures mentioned in the text will be found in the Glossary of Proper Names.

5 *the Magnificent Lorenzo de' Medici*: not Lorenzo the Magnificent (1449–92) but Lorenzo, Duke of Urbino (1492–1519).

iuniori salutem: no manuscripts of *The Prince* in Machiavelli's hand have survived. The manuscripts upon which contemporary critical editions are based come, therefore, from copies of copies. There is every reason to believe that Machiavelli's autograph manuscript employed Latin chapter titles, and we have retained the original Latin titles in this translation. Chapter numbers, however, were not included in the oldest extant manuscripts of the work and have been added over the centuries by editors and translators when the first editions of *The Prince* were printed in Italian or in translation.

will most please him: the opening lines of Machiavelli's dedication recall the classical oration *To Nicoles* composed by the Greek rhetorician Isocrates. This work was popular among Italian humanists, many of whom owned manuscript copies of it, and Latin translations were published in Italy in 1482 and 1492 that Machiavelli no doubt read. For the rhetorical structure of *The Prince*, see Maurizio Viroli, *Machiavelli* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

to their greatness: as Giorgio Inglese notes in his critical edition (*De Principatibus* (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo, 1994), 11), a manuscript entitled the *Excerpta Riccardi* reports that Lorenzo was far more pleased by the gift of a pair of hunting dogs than by the manuscript of *The Prince* that Machiavelli presented to him at the same time. This *Excerpta Riccardi* manuscript has been dated around 1580, and therefore the anecdote is probably apocryphal.

a long experience in modern affairs and a continuous study of antiquity: the combination of practical political experience of current affairs and a more erudite study of classical antiquity—its history and its political theory—is what makes Machiavelli's approach to statecraft so original. Though he worked in the Florentine Chancery from 1498 to 1512, often observing many of the key figures discussed in *The Prince* (Louis XII, Cesare Borgia, Pope Alexander VI, Pope Julius II, Pope Leo X, the Emperor Maximilian, and a host of other minor figures), he believed that contemporary events could be explained by reference to the greatest figures from the ancient past. During his second encounter with Cesare Borgia in 1502, for example, he asked his friend Biagio Buonaccorsi to send him a copy of Plutarch's *Lives*. Having under his very eyes the