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OKS

HUMANISM AND SCHOLASTICISM IN THE ITALIAN
RENAISSANCE *

Ever since 1860, when Jacob Burckhardt first published his famous book on the civilization of the Renaissance in Italy¹, there has been a controversy among historians as to the meaning and significance of the Italian Renaissance². Almost every scholar who has taken part in the discussion felt it was his duty to advance a new and different theory. This variety of views was partly due to the emphasis given by individual scholars to different historical personalities or currents or to different aspects and developments of the Italian Renaissance. Yet the chief cause of the entire Renaissance controversy, at least in its more recent phases, has been the considerable progress made during the last few decades in the field of medieval studies. The Middle Ages are no longer considered as a period of darkness, and consequently many scholars do not see the need for such new light and revival as the very name of the Renaissance would seem to suggest. Thus certain medievalists have questioned the very existence of the Renaissance and would like to banish the term entirely from the vocabulary of historians.

In the face of this powerful attack, Renaissance scholars have assumed a new line of defense. They have shown that the notion embodied in the term *Renaissance* was not an invention of enthusiastic historians of the last century, but was commonly expressed in the literature of the period of the Renaissance itself. The humanists themselves speak continually of the revival or rebirth of the arts and of learning that was accomplished in their own time after a long period of decay³. It may

* This article is based on a lecture given at Brown University on December 15, 1944. [An Italian version of it appeared in *Humanitas* V 10, Oct., 1950, 988-1015.]

¹ *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien*, Basel, 1860.

² For the controversy about the Renaissance, see H. Baron, "Renaissance in Italian", *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, XVII, 1927, 226-52; XXI, 1931, 95-119. J. Huizinga, "Das Problem der Renaissance", in his *Wege der Kulturgeschichte*, tr. W. Kaegi, Munich, 1930, 89-139. See also the discussion in the *Journal of the History of Ideas*, IV, 1943, 1-74. [See now: Wallace K. Ferguson, *The Renaissance in Historical Thought*, Boston, 1948].

³ K. Burdach, *Reformation, Renaissance, Humanismus*, 2nd ed., Berlin-Leipzig, 1926; Wallace K. Ferguson, "Humanist Views of the Renaissance", *American Historical Review*,

be objected that occasional claims of an intellectual revival are also found in medieval literature.⁴ Yet the fact remains that during the Renaissance scholars and writers talked of such a revival and rebirth more persistently than at any other period of European history. Even if we were convinced that it was an empty claim and that the humanists did not bring about a real Renaissance, we would still be forced to admit that the illusion itself was characteristic of that period and that the term Renaissance thus had at least a subjective meaning.

Without questioning the validity of this argument, I think that there are also some more objective reasons for defending the existence and the importance of the Renaissance. The concept of style as it has been so successfully applied by historians of art⁵ might be more widely applied in other fields of intellectual history and might thus enable us to recognize the significant changes brought about by the Renaissance, without obliging us to despise the Middle Ages or to minimize the debt of the Renaissance to the medieval tradition.

Moreover, I should like to reexamine the relation between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in the light of the following consideration. Scholars have become so accustomed to stress the universalism of the medieval church and of medieval culture and also to consider the Italian Renaissance as a European phenomenon, that they are apt to forget that profound regional differences existed even during the Middle Ages. The center of medieval civilization was undoubtedly France, and all

XLV, 1939-40, 1-28. [Id., *The Renaissance in Historical Thought*, I, c., p. 1 ff.], Herbert Weisinger, "The Self-Awareness of the Renaissance", *Papers of the Medieval Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters*, XXIX, 1944, 561-67. [Id., "Who began the Revival of Learning?", *ibid.*, XXX, 1945, 625-36; Id., "Renaissance Accounts of the Revival of Learning", *Studies in Philology*, XLV, 1948, 105-18; Id., "The Renaissance Theory of the Reaction against the Middle Ages...", *Speculum*, XX, 1945, 461-67; Id., "Ideas of History during the Renaissance", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, VI, 1945, 415-35; F. Simone, *La costanza della Rinascita negli Umanisti francesi*, Rome, 1949; E. Garin, "Umanesimo e Rinascimento" in *Problemi ed orientamenti critici di lingua e di letteratura italiana*, ed. A. Momigliano, vol. III: *Questioni e correnti di storia letteraria*, Milan, 1949, 349-404]. Most of the passages quoted by these scholars are later than the beginning of the fifteenth century. Yet Fraie Guido da Pisa in his commentary on Dante wrote as early as 1330: "Per istum enim poemam resuscitata est mortua poesis... Ipse vero poeticam scientiam suscitavit et antiquos poetas in mentibus nostris rennascere fecit" (O. Bacchi, *La Critica letteraria*, Milan, 1910, p. 163).⁴ Burdack's attempts to derive the concept of the Renaissance from religious or mystical traditions no longer convince me. However, a Carolingian poet has the following line: "Aurea Roma iterum renovata renascitur orbi" (E. K. Rand, "Renaissance, why not?", *Renaissance*, I, 1943, p. 34). Milo Cispinus says in his biography of Lanfranc: "quem Latinus in antiquum scientiae statum ab eo restituta tota supremum debitorum amorem agrosit magister" (Mitgus, P.L., CL, 29). For the political aspect of the conception, see P.E. Schramm, *Kaiser, Rom und Renouveau*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1929. See also Augustin's judgment on Ambrose (Soliloquia, II, 14, 26): "ille in quo ipsam eloquentiam quam mortuam dolebamus perfectam revivisse cognovimus".⁵ E. Panofsky, "Renaissance and Renaissances", *Kennyon Review*, VI, 1944, 201-36.

other countries of Western Europe followed the leadership of that country, from Carolingian times down to the beginning of the fourteenth century.⁶ Italy certainly was no exception to that rule; but whereas the other countries, especially England, Germany, and the Low Countries, took an active part in the major cultural pursuits of the period and followed the same general development, Italy occupied a somewhat peculiar position.⁷ Prior to the thirteenth century, her active participation in many important aspects of medieval culture lagged far behind that of the other countries. This may be observed in architecture and music, in the religious drama as well as in Latin and vernacular poetry in general,⁸ in scholastic philosophy and theology,⁹ and even, contrary to common opinion, in classical studies. On the other hand, Italy had a narrow but persistent tradition of her own which went back to ancient Roman times and which found its expression in certain branches of the arts and of poetry, in lay education and in legal customs, and in the study of grammar and of rhetoric.¹⁰ Italy was more directly and more continually exposed to Byzantine influences than any other Western European country. Finally, after the eleventh century, Italy developed a new life of her own which found expression in her trade and economy, in the political institutions of her cities, in the study of civil and canon law and of medicine, and in the techniques of letter-writing and of secular eloquence.¹¹ Influences from France became more powerful

⁶ E. Gilson, "Humanisme médiéval et Renaissance", in his *Les Idées et les lettres*, Paris, 1932, 171-96. [E. R. Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und Lateinischer Mittelalter*, Bern, 1948, pp. 41 ff. and 387 ff.].

⁷ The isolation of Italy in the Middle Ages and the comparative scantiness of Italian antecedents for Dante has been noted by K. Vossler, *Medieval Culture*, tr. W. C. Lawton, New York, 1929, II, 4 ff. *Die Göttliche Komödie*, v. II, pt. I, Heidelberg, 1908, pp. 582 ff.

⁸ There are notable exceptions, such as Guido of Arezzo, Alfano of Salerno, and Henrius of Schemello, but they do not change the general picture. For the share of Italy in medieval Latin culture prior to the thirteenth century, see F. Novati and A. Monteverdi, *Le Origini*, Milan, 1926; A. Viscardi, *Le Origini*, 1939; M. Manitius, *Geschichte der Lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters*, 3 vols., Munich, 1911-31.

⁹ Although several of the most famous representatives of scholastic theology were Italian, such as Lanfranc, Anselm, Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, and Bonaventura, they did most of their studying and teaching in France. For Lanfranc, see F. Novati, "Rapports littéraires de l'Italie et de la France au XI^e siècle", *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, Comptes Rendus des Séances de l'année 1910*, pp. 169-84. A typical representative of Italian theology in the eleventh century was Peter Damiani, and his background was juristic and rhetorical rather than philosophical, see J. A. Endres, *Petrus Damiani und die weltliche Wissenschaft*, Münster, 1910.

¹⁰ For the history of education in Italy, see G. Manacorda, *Storia della scuola in Italia*, 2 pts., Milan, n. d. Typical representatives of Italian rhetoric in the tenth and eleventh century are Guzzo of Novara and Anselm the Peripatetic. It should be noted that the library of Bobbio in the tenth century was rich in grammatical treatises, but possessed few classical poets (G. Becker, *Katalog Bibliothecarum antiqui*, Bonn, 1885, 64 ff.).

¹¹ Ch. H. Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*, Cambridge, Mass. 1927. For secular eloquence, see below.

only with the thirteenth century, when their traces appeared in architecture and music, in Latin and vernacular poetry, in philosophy and theology, and in the field of classical studies¹². Many typical products of the Italian Renaissance may thus be understood as a result of belated medieval influences received from France, but grafted upon, and assimilated by, a more narrow, but stubborn and different native tradition. This may be said of Dante's *Divine Comedy*, of the religious drama which flourished in fifteenth century Florence, and of the chivalric poetry of Ariosto and of Tasso.

A similar development may be noticed in the history of learning. The Italian Renaissance thus should be viewed not only in its contrast with the French Middle Ages, but also in its relation to the Italian Middle Ages. The rich civilization of Renaissance Italy did not spring directly from the equally rich civilization of medieval France, but from the much more modest traditions of medieval Italy. It is only about the beginning of the fourteenth century that Italy witnessed a tremendous increase in all her cultural activities, and this enabled her, for a certain period, to wrest from France her cultural leadership in Western Europe. Consequently, there can be no doubt that there was an Italian Renaissance, that is, a cultural Renaissance of Italy, not so much in contrast with the Middle Ages in general or with the French Middle Ages, but very definitely in contrast with the Italian Middle Ages. It appears from a letter of Boccaccio that this general development was well understood by some Italians of that period¹³, and we should keep this development constantly in mind if we want to understand the history of learning during the Italian Renaissance.

¹² For French influences in the thirteenth century, see G. Bertoni, *Il Duecento*, 3rd ed., Milan, 1939. Many poems and prose works by Italian authors were written in French, and much of the early vernacular poetry and prose in Italian is derived from French models.

¹³ After having praised Dante and Petrarca as the restorers of poetry, Boccaccio continues: "inspice quo Romanum corruerat imperium... quid insuper philosophorum celeberrimos et poetarum myrthes laetaque seta meditari... quid in memoriam renovare militarem disciplinam... quid legum auctoritatem... quid motuum conspiciam specimen. Haec omnia... una cum Italia reliqua et libertate caelesti a maioribus nostris... neglecta sunt et a nationibus exerts aut subditi aut turpi conquinata labe sordescunt... et si omnia restitui nequeant, hoc saltem poetici nominis fulgore... inter barbaras nationes Roma saltem aliquid veteris maiestatis possit ostendere" (letter to Jacopo Pizzinghi, in: *Le lettere effilite e ineditte di Messer Giovanni Boccaccio*, ed. F. Corazzini, Florence, 1877, p. 197). [See K. Burdach, *Rinascimento und die geistige Wandlung seiner Zeit*, Berlin, 1913-28, pp. 510 f.]. Also Salutati, in his letter to Peter of Mantua, after admitting that Rome now has lost her military power, says that there is no excuse for her being excelled by other nations in literary distinction. "Gaudetiam igitur apud nos emergere qui barbaris illis quondam genibus saltem in hoc palmarum creperet, qualem me tibi (read: te mihi) fama et multorum relato promittit", alluding to the achievements of Peter of Mantua in the field of logic (*Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati*, ed. F. Novati, III, Rome, 1896, 319 f.).

The most characteristic and most pervasive aspect of the Italian Renaissance in the field of learning is the humanistic movement. I need hardly say that the term "humanism", when applied to the Italian Renaissance, does not imply all the vague and confused notions that are now commonly associated with it. Only a few traces of these may be found in the Renaissance. By humanism we mean merely the general tendency of the age to attach the greatest importance to classical studies, and to consider classical antiquity as the common standard and model by which to guide all cultural activities. It will be our task to understand the meaning and origin of this humanistic movement which is commonly associated with the name of Petrarca.

Among modern historians we encounter mainly two interpretations of Italian humanism. The first interpretation considers the humanistic movement merely as the rise of classical scholarship accomplished during the period of the Renaissance. This view which has been held by most historians of classical scholarship is not very popular at present. The revival of classical studies certainly does not impress an age such as ours which has practically abandoned classical education, and it is easy to praise the classical learning of the Middle Ages, in a time which, except for a tiny number of specialists, knows much less of classical antiquity than did the Middle Ages. Moreover, in a period such as the present, which has much less regard for learning than for practical achievements and for "creative" writing and "original" thinking, a mere change of orientation, or even an increase of knowledge, in the field of learning does not seem to possess any historical significance. However, the situation in the Renaissance was quite different, and the increase in, and emphasis on, classical learning had a tremendous importance.

There are indeed several historical facts which support the interpretation of the humanistic movement as a rise in classical scholarship. The humanists were classical scholars and contributed to the rise of classical studies¹⁴. In the field of Latin studies, they rediscovered a number of important texts that had been hardly read during the Middle Ages¹⁵. Also in the case of Latin authors commonly known during the Middle Ages, the humanists made them better known, through

¹⁴ For the classical studies of the humanists, see G. Voigt, *Die Wiederbelebung des klassischen Altertums*, 3rd ed., Berlin, 1893, II, 373 f. Sir J. E. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship*, II, Cambridge, 1908, pp. 1 ff.

¹⁵ These discoveries included Lucretius, Tacitus, Manilius, several plays of Plautus, and several orations and rhetorical works of Cicero. See R. Sabbadini, *Le scoperte dei codici latini e greci nei secoli XIV e XV*, 2 vols., Florence, 1905-14; M. Manitius, *Handschriften antiker Autoren in mittelalterlichen Bibliothekskatalogen*, Leipzig, 1935.

their numerous manuscript copies¹⁶ and printed editions, through their grammatical and antiquarian studies, through their commentaries, and through the development and application of philological and historical criticism.

Even more striking was the impulse given by the humanists to the study of Greek. In spite of the political, commercial, and ecclesiastic relations with the Byzantine Empire, during the Middle Ages the number of persons in Western Europe who knew the Greek language was comparatively small, and practically none of them was interested in, or familiar with, Greek classical literature. There was almost no teaching of Greek in Western schools and universities, and almost no Greek manuscripts in Western libraries¹⁷. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a great number of Greek texts were translated into Latin, either directly or through intermediary Arabic translations, but this activity was almost entirely confined to the fields of mathematics, astronomy, astrology, medicine, and Aristotelian philosophy¹⁸.

During the Renaissance, this situation rapidly changed. The study of Greek classical literature which had been cultivated in the Byzantine Empire throughout the later Middle Ages, after the middle of the fourteenth century began to spread in the West, both through Byzantine scholars who went to Western Europe for a temporary or permanent stay, and through Italian scholars who went to Constantinople in quest of Greek classical learning¹⁹. As a result, Greek language and literature acquired a recognized place in the curriculum of Western schools and universities, a place which they did not lose until the present century.

¹⁶ It is not generally realized that fifteenth century manuscripts of the Latin classics are probably more numerous than those of all previous centuries taken together. These manuscripts are despised by most modern editors, and their value for establishing a critical text may be small. However, their existence is an important phenomenon since it reflects the wide diffusion of the classical authors during the Renaissance.

¹⁷ Louise R. Loomis, *Medieval Hellenism*, Lancaster Pa., 1906.

¹⁸ For the translations of the twelfth century, see Ch. H. Hashins, *Studies in the History of Medieval Science*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Mass, 1927. For the thirteenth century, see M. De Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, 6th, ed., II, Louvain, 1936. A bibliography of Latin translations from the Greek is still a major desideratum, even though some partial contributions have been made recently. [See esp. J. T. Muckle, "Greek Works translated directly into Latin before 1350", *Medieval Studies*, IV, 1942, 33-42; V, 1943, 102-14. A more comprehensive bibliography is now being prepared by a group of scholars. For the study of Greek in the Middle Ages, see now the articles of R. Weiss, cited above, art. 3].

¹⁹ For the study of Greek classical literature in medieval Constantinople, see K. Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur*, 2nd ed., Munich 1897, 499 ff. The direct influence of this Byzantine tradition on the Greek studies of the Italian humanists is beyond any question. There may also have been some indirect Byzantine influence on the Latin studies of the humanists. The range of interest of the humanists resembles that of many Byzantine scholars.

A large number of Greek manuscripts was brought from the East to Western libraries, and these manuscripts have formed the basis of most of our editions of the Greek classics. At a later stage, the humanists published printed editions of Greek authors, wrote commentaries on them, and extended their antiquarian and grammatical studies as well as their methods of philological and historical criticism to Greek literature.

No less important, although now less appreciated, were the numerous Latin translations from the Greek due to the humanists of the Renaissance. Almost the whole of Greek poetry, oratory, historiography, theology, and non-Aristotelian philosophy was thus translated for the first time, whereas the medieval translations of Aristotle and of Greek scientific writers were replaced by new humanistic translations. These Latin translations of the Renaissance were the basis for most of the vernacular translations of the Greek classics, and they were much more widely read than were the original Greek texts. For in spite of its remarkable increase, the study of Greek even in the Renaissance never attained the same general importance as did the study of Latin which was rooted in the medieval tradition of the West. Nevertheless, it remains a remarkable fact that the study of the Greek classics was taken over by the humanists of Western Europe at the very time when it was affected in the East by the decline and fall of the Byzantine Empire.

If we care to remember these impressive facts, we certainly cannot deny that the Italian humanists were the ancestors of modern philologists and historians. Even a historian of science can afford to despise them only if he chooses to remember that science is the subject of his study, but to forget that the method he is applying to this subject is that of history. However, the activity of the Italian humanists was not limited to classical scholarship, and hence the theory which interprets the humanistic movement merely as a rise in classical scholarship is not altogether satisfactory. This theory fails to explain the ideal of eloquence persistently set forth in the writings of the humanists, and it fails to account for the enormous literature of treatises, of letters, of speeches, and of poems produced by the humanists²⁰.

These writings are far more numerous than the contributions of the humanists to classical scholarship, and they cannot be explained as a necessary consequence of their classical studies. A modern classical scholar is not supposed to write a Latin poem in praise of his city, to welcome

²⁰ For the literary production of the humanists, see Voigt, *op. cit.*, II, 394 ff., V. Rossi, *Il Quattrocento*, 2nd ed., Milan, 1933.

a distinguished foreign visitor with a Latin speech, or to write a political manifesto for his government. This aspect of the activity of the humanists is often dismissed with a slighting remark about their vanity or their fancy for speech-making. I do not deny that they were vain and loved to make speeches, but I am inclined to offer a different explanation for this side of their activity. The humanists were not classical scholars who for personal reasons had a craving for eloquence, but, vice versa, they were professional rhetoricians, heirs and successors of the medieval rhetoricians²¹ who developed the belief, then new and modern, that the best way to achieve eloquence was to imitate classical models, and who thus were driven to study the classics and to found classical philology. Their rhetorical ideals and achievements may not correspond to our taste, but they were the starting point and moving force of their activity, and their classical learning was incidental to it.

The other current interpretation of Italian humanism, which is prevalent among historians of philosophy and also accepted by many other scholars, is more ambitious, but in my opinion less sound. This interpretation considers humanism as the new philosophy of the Renaissance, which arose in opposition to scholasticism, the old philosophy of the Middle Ages²². Of course, there is the well known fact that several famous humanists, such as Petrarch, Valla, Erasmus, and Vives, were violent critics of medieval learning and tended to replace it by classical learning. Moreover, the humanists certainly had ideals of learning, education, and life that differed from medieval modes of thinking. They wrote treatises on moral, educational, political, and religious questions which in tone and content differ from the average medieval treatises on similar subjects. Yet this interpretation of humanism as a new philo-

²¹ The link between the humanists and the medieval rhetoricians has been recognized only by very few scholars, such as F. Novati, H. Wieruszowski, and E. Kantorowicz. These scholars, however, chiefly noticed that the medieval rhetoricians show some of the personal characteristics commonly attributed to the humanists. I should like to go further and to assume a direct professional and literary connection, of which the personal similarities are merely a symptom. The common opinion is quite different, and most historians speak of the *ars dictaminis* as if there were no humanist rhetoric, and vice versa. See below.

²² For the contributions of the humanists to philosophy, see: F. Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, III, 12th ed., Berlin, 1924, 6 ff.; G. De Ruggiero, *Storia della Filosofia*, pt. 3, 2nd ed., 2 vols., Bari, 1937; G. Gentile, *La Filosofia*, Milan, n. d.; E. Cassirer, *Individualismus und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance*, Berlin-Leipzig, 1927. For further literature on the entire subject of Renaissance philosophy, see P. O. Kristeller and J. H. Randall Jr., "The Study of the Philosophies of the Renaissance", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, II, 1941, 449-96. [E. Garin, *La Filosofia*, I, Milan, 1947, pp. 169-274; Id., *Der indialektische Humanismus*, Bern, 1947; Id., *Filosofia italiana del Quattrocento*, Florence, 1942; C. Carbonara, *Il secolo XV*, Milan, 1943; G. Satta, *Il pensiero italiano nell'umanesimo e nel rinascimento*, vol. I: *L'Umanesimo*, Bologna, 1949].

ophy fails to account for a number of obvious facts. On one hand, we notice a stubborn survival of scholastic philosophy throughout the Italian Renaissance, an inconvenient fact that is usually explained by the intellectual inertia of the respective philosophers whom almost nobody has read for centuries and whose number, problems and literary production are entirely unknown to most historians. On the other, most of the works of the humanists have nothing to do with philosophy even in the vaguest possible sense of the term. Even their treatises on philosophical subjects, if we care to read them, appear in most cases rather superficial and inconclusive if compared with the works of ancient or medieval philosophers, a fact that may be indifferent to a general historian, but which cannot be overlooked by a historian of philosophy.

I think there has been a tendency, in the light of later developments, and under the influence of a modern aversion to scholasticism, to exaggerate the opposition of the humanists to scholasticism, and to assign to them an importance in the history of scientific and philosophical thought which they neither could nor did attain. The reaction against this tendency has been inevitable, but it has been equally wrong. Those scholars who read the treatises of the humanists and noticed their comparative emptiness of scientific and philosophical thought came to the conclusion that the humanists were bad scientists and philosophers who did not live up to their own claims or to those of their modern advocates. I should like to suggest that the Italian humanists on the whole were neither good nor bad philosophers, but no philosophers at all.^{22a}

The humanistic movement did not originate in the field of philosophical or scientific studies, but it arose in that of grammatical and rhetorical studies^{22b}. The humanists continued the medieval tradition in these fields, as represented, for example, by the *ars dictaminis* and the *ars arengandi*, but they gave it a new direction toward classical standards and classical studies, possibly under the impact of influences received

[^{22a} This statement does not mean, as E. Garin implies (*Giornale Critica*, 1952, p. 99) that I deny the philosophical significance of the Renaissance period, see above, art. 3.]

^{22b} This point has been rightly indicated by R. Mecklen, "Renaissance and Method in Philosophy", *Studies in the History of Ideas*, III, 1935, 37-114. "That shift in the emphasis in the three arts, that subversion of dialectic to grammar, is in itself sufficient to account for the changes which the Renaissance is reputed to have made" (I, c, p. 87). I am not convinced by Mecklen's attempt to distinguish within the Renaissance, as two separate trends, an emphasis on grammar represented by Erasmus, and one on rhetoric represented by Nizolius. [The grammatical character of early Italian humanism and its rise before the time of Petrarch have been illustrated in the recent studies of R. Weiss: *The Dawn of Humanism in Italy*, London, 1947; "Umanesimo per una storia del primo umanesimo fiorentino", *Rivista storica italiana*, LX, 1948, 349-66; *Il primo secolo dell'umanesimo*, Roma, 1949].

from France after the middle of the thirteenth century. This new development of the field was followed by an enormous growth, both in the quantity and in the quality, of its teaching and its literary production. As a result of this growth, the claims of the humanists for their field of study also increased considerably. They claimed, and temporarily attained, a decided predominance of their field in elementary and secondary education, and a much larger share for it in professional and university education. This development in the field of grammatical and rhetorical studies finally affected the other branches of learning, but it did not displace them. After the middle of the fifteenth century, we find an increasing number of professional jurists, physicians, mathematicians, philosophers, and theologians who cultivated humanistic studies along with their own particular fields of study. Consequently, a humanistic influence began to appear in all these other sciences. It appears in the studied elegance of literary expression, in the increasing use made of classical source materials, in the greater knowledge of history and of critical methods, and also sometimes in an emphasis on new problems. This influence of humanism on the other sciences certainly was important, but it did not affect the content or substance of the medieval traditions in those sciences. For the humanists, being amateurs in those other fields, had nothing to offer that could replace their traditional content and subject matter.

The humanist criticism of medieval science is often sweeping, but it does not touch its specific problems and subject-matter. Their main charges are against the bad Latin style of the medieval authors, against their ignorance of ancient history and literature, and against their concern for supposedly useless questions. On the other hand, even those professional scientists who were most profoundly influenced by humanism did not sacrifice the medieval tradition of their field. It is highly significant that Pico, a representative of humanist philosophy, and Alciato, a representative of humanist jurisprudence, found it necessary to defend their medieval predecessors against the criticism of humanist rhetoricians.²³

Yet if the humanists were amateurs in jurisprudence, theology, medicine, and also in philosophy, they were themselves professionals

²³ For Pico's defense of the medieval philosophers against Ermolao Barbaro, see my article, "Florentine Platonism and its Relations with Humanism and Scholasticism," *Church History*, VIII, 1939, 203 f. [Q. Brecon. "Giovanni Pico della Mirandola on the Conflict of Philosophy and Rhetoric," *Journal of the History of Ideas* XIII 1952, 384-426.] For Alciato's defense of the medieval jurists against Valla, see R. Sabbadini, *Storia del Ciceronianismo*, Turin, 1885, pp. 88-92; B. Druggi, *Per la storia della giurisprudenza e delle università italiane*, Milano, 1921, pp. 111 ff.

in a number of other fields. Their domain were the fields of grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and the study of the Greek and Latin authors. They also expanded into the field of moral philosophy, and they made some attempts to invade the field of logic, which were chiefly attempts to reduce logic to rhetoric.²⁴

Yet they did not make any direct contributions to the other branches of philosophy or of science. Moreover, much of the humanist polemic against medieval science was not even intended as a criticism of the contents or methods of that science, but merely represents a phase in the "battle of the arts", that is, a noisy advertisement for the field of learning advocated by the humanists, in order to neutralize and to overcome the claims of other, rivaling sciences.²⁵ Hence I am inclined to consider the humanists not as philosophers with a curious lack of philosophical ideas and a curious fancy for eloquence and for classical studies, but rather as professional rhetoricians with a new, classicist ideal of culture, who tried to assert the importance of their field of learning and to impose their standards upon the other fields of learning and of science, including philosophy.

Let us try to illustrate this outline with a few more specific facts. When we inquire of the humanists, it is often asserted that they were free-lance writers who came to form an entirely new class in Renaissance society.²⁶ This statement is valid, although with some qualification, for a very small number of outstanding humanists like Petrarch, Boccaccio, and Erasmus. However, these are exceptions, and the vast majority of humanists exercised either of two professions, and sometimes both of them. They were either secretaries of princes or cities, or they were teachers of grammar and rhetoric at universities or at secondary

²⁴ This humanist logic is represented by Valla, Agricola, Nizolius, and Ramus. For Nizolius, see R. McKoon, "Renaissance and Method in Philosophy", *Studies in the History of Ideas*, III, 1935, 105 ff. For Ramus, see Perry Miller, *The New England Mind*, New York, 1939, pp. 154 ff.

²⁵ For the battle of the arts, see *The Battle of the Seven Arts...* by Henri d'Andeli, ed. L. J. Paetow, Berkeley, 1914. There was a rivalry between medicine and law, in which the humanists were not directly concerned at all. See L. Thorndike, "Medicine versus Law at Florence" in his *Science and Thought in the Fifteenth Century*, New York, 1929, 24-58. Behind this kind of literature is the rivalry of the various faculties and sciences at the universities, a rivalry that found its expression in the opening lectures delivered every year by each professor in praise of his own field. One such lecture by the humanist Philippus Beroaldus senior, professor at Bologna, is entitled "Declaratio philosophi, medicus et oratoris" (in his *Varia Opuscula*, Basel, 1513). Of course, the prize is given to the orator. [See now Coluccio Salutati, *De nobilitate legum et iudiciorum*, ed. E. Garin, Florence, 1947, p. XLV ff. E. Garin, *La Disputa delle Arti nel Quattrocento*, Florence, 1947].

²⁶ J. Burckhardt, *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien*, 13th ed., Stuttgart, 1921, p. 151.

schools²⁷. The opinion so often repeated by historians that the humanistic movement originated outside the schools and universities is a myth which cannot be supported by factual evidence. Moreover, as chancellor and as teachers, the humanists, far from representing a new class, were the professional heirs and successors of the medieval rhetoricians, the so-called *didatores*, who also made their career exactly in these same two professions. The humanist Coluccio Salutati occupied exactly the same place in the society and culture of his time as did the *didator* Petrus de Vineis one hundred and fifty years before²⁸. Nevertheless there was a significant difference between them. The style of writing used by Salutati is quite different from that of Petrus de Vineis or of Rolandus Passagerii. Moreover, the study and imitation of the classics which was of little or no importance to the medieval *didatores* has become the major concern for Salutati. Finally, whereas the medieval *didatores* attained considerable importance in politics and in administration, the humanists, through their classical learning, acquired for their class a much greater cultural and social prestige. Thus the humanists did not invent a new field of learning or a new professional activity, but they introduced a new, classicist style into the traditions of medieval Italian rhetoric. To blame them for not having invented rhetorical studies would be like blaming Giotto for not having been the inventor of painting.

The same result is confirmed by an examination of the literary production of the humanists if we try to trace the medieval antecedents of the types of literature cultivated by the humanists²⁹. If we leave aside the editions and translations of the humanists, their classical interests

²⁷ For the careers of the humanists, see the works of Voigt and Rossi.

²⁸ For the connection of Salutati with the medieval tradition of the *Ars dictaminis* and *Ars notaria*, see F. Novati, *La giovinezza di Coluccio Salutati*, Turin, 1888, pp. 66 ff. This chapter was reprinted with important omissions in his *Preziosi e nobili del Duecento*, Milan, 1908, pp. 299-328. There is [at Naples] a manuscript of the early fifteenth century transcribed for a young student of rhetoric, which contains the letters of Petrus de Vineis, together with those of Salutati, and of the latter's contemporary Pellegrino Zambonetti (L. Frati, "L'epistolario inedito di Pellegrino Zambonetti", *Atti e Memorie della R. Deputazione di Storia patria per le provincie di Romagna*, Ser. IV, vol. XIII, 1923, pp. 169 ff.). [Another manuscript with the same content is in the Hague (*Epistolario di Pellegrino Zambonetti*, ed. L. Frati, Rome, 1929, pp. XVII ff.). I am indebted for this information to Ludwig Burchard.] Although Burchard's attempt to make of Cola di Rienzo the central figure of the Italian Renaissance must be rejected, it should be noticed that Cola was a notary by profession and owed a good deal of his reputation to the style of his letters and speeches. [Burchard who emphasizes the influence of Joschinite ideas on Cola, fails to meet the objection that Cola became familiar with these ideas only after his flight from Rome (*Rienzo und die gefeierte Wandlung seiner Zeit*, Berlin, 1913-28, p. 101).]

²⁹ For the literary production of the humanists, see the works of Voigt and Rossi. For their historiography, see E. Fueter, *Geschichte der neueren Historiographie*, 3rd ed., Munich, 1936.

are chiefly represented by their numerous commentaries on ancient authors and by a number of antiquarian and miscellaneous treatises. Theoretical works on grammar and rhetoric, mostly composed for the school, are quite frequent, and even more numerous is the literature of humanist historiography. Dialogues and treatises on questions of moral philosophy, education, politics, and religion have attracted most of the attention of modern historians, but represent a comparatively small proportion of humanistic literature. By far the largest part of that literature, although relatively neglected and partly unpublished, consists of the poems, the speeches, and the letters of the humanists.

If we look for the medieval antecedents of these various types of humanistic literature, we are led back in many cases to the Italian grammarians and rhetoricians of the later Middle Ages. This is most obvious for the theoretical treatises on grammar and rhetoric³⁰. Less generally recognized, but almost equally obvious is the link between humanist epistolography and medieval *ars dictaminis*. The style of writing is different, to be sure, and the medieval term *dictamen* was no longer used during the Renaissance, yet the literary and political function of the letter was basically the same, and the ability to write a correct and elegant Latin letter was still a major aim of school instruction in the Renaissance as it had been in the Middle Ages³¹.

The same link between humanists and medieval Italian rhetoricians which we notice in the field of epistolography may be found also in the field of oratory. Most historians of rhetoric give the impression that medieval rhetoric was exclusively concerned with letter-writing and preaching, represented by the *ars dictaminis* and the somewhat younger *ars praedicatorii*, and that there was no secular eloquence in the Middle Ages³². On the other hand, most historians of Renaissance humanism believe that the large output of humanist oratory, although of a some-

³⁰ For the grammatical studies of the humanists in their relation to the Middle Ages, see R. Sabbadini, *La scuola e gli studi di Gianrico Ginanni Veronese*, Catania, 1896, pp. 38 ff.

³¹ There are many humanist treatises on epistolography, and many collections of "salutations" in humanist manuscripts. The letters of most major humanists were collected and reprinted primarily as models for literary imitation.

³² Ch. S. Baldwin, *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetics*, New York, 1928, pp. 206 ff. and 228 ff. especially p. 230; R. McKeeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages", *Speculum*, XVII, 1942, 27 f. For the *Ars dictaminis* in Italy, especially during the twelfth century, see Ch. H. Haskins, *Studies in Medieval Culture*, Oxford, 1929, 170-92. See also: E. Kantorowicz, "An 'Autobiography' of Guido Faba", *Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, I, 2, 1943, 253-80. The same, "Anonymi 'Aurea Gemma'", *Medievalia et Humanistica* I, 1943, 41-57. Halene Wieruszowski, "Ars dictaminis in the Time of Dante", *ibid.*, 95-108. For the *Ars praedicatorii*, see H. Caplan, *Medieval Artes Praedicatorii*, 2 vols., Ithaca, N. Y., 1934-36; Th. M. Charland, *Artes Praedicatorii*, Paris-Orawa, 1936. Italy's contribution to the literature on preaching seems to have been small and belated.

what dubious value, was an innovation of the Renaissance due to the effort of the humanists to revive ancient oratory and also to their vain fancy for speech-making³³. Only in recent years have a few scholars begun to realize that there was a considerable amount of secular eloquence in the Middle Ages, especially in Italy³⁴. I do not hesitate to conclude that the eloquence of the humanists was the continuation of the medieval *ars arguendi* just as their epistolography continued the tradition of the *ars didamini*. It is true, in taking up a type of literary production developed by their medieval predecessors, the humanists modified its style according to their own taste and classicist standards. Yet the practice of speech-making was no invention of the humanist, of course, since it is hardly absent from any human society, and since in medieval Italy it can be traced back at least to the eleventh century³⁵.

Even the theory of secular speech, represented by rules and instructions as well as by model speeches, appears in Italy at least as early as the thirteenth century. Indeed practically all types of humanist oratory have their antecedents in this medieval literature: wedding and funeral speeches, academic speeches, political speeches by officials or ambassadors, decorative speeches on solemn occasions, and finally judicial speeches³⁶. Some of these types, to be sure, had their classical models,

³³ Voigt, *op. cit.*, II, 436 ff. Ch. S. Baldwin, *Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice*, New York, 1939, p. 39 ff. [For a typical collection of humanist orations, see L. Beralot, "Eine Sammlung Paduaner Reden des XV. Jahrhunderts," *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* XXXVI 1936, 245-67].

³⁴ See the studies of E. Kantorowicz and H. Wieruszowski, and especially A. Galletti, *L'eloquenza*, Milan, 1904-38, pp. 430 ff.

³⁵ Galletti, *loc. cit.*

³⁶ Some of the rhetorical treatises and models of the thirteenth century are discussed by Galletti, *op. cit.*, 454 ff. Guido Fabra's *Parlamenti ed epistole* (ed. A. Gaudenzi, I snoni, *le forme e le parate dell'odierna dialetto della città di Bologna*, Turin, 1889) include several model speeches. Models for political and funeral speeches are inserted in the anonymous "Oculus Pastoris" and in other treatises written for the instruction of city officials (F. Herter, *Die Pöbelredender Italiens im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert*, Leipzig-Berlin, 1910). For an example of early academic oratory, see H. Kantorowicz, "The Poetical Sermon of a Medieval Jurist," *Journal of the Warburg Institute*, II, 1938-39, 22-41. For the speech of an ambassador, see G. L. Haskins and E. Kantorowicz, "A Diplomatic Mission of Francis Accursus and his Oration before Pope Nicholas III", *English Historical Review*, LVIII, 1943, 424-47. The medieval legal background of the wedding speeches of the humanists has been studied by F. Brandilione Saggi *sulla storia della celebrazione del matrimonio in Italia*, Milan, 1906, but he does not mention any pre-humanistic wedding speeches. Rhetorical rules and samples are included in some of the early instructions for advocates; see M. A. von Boehmann-Hollweg, *Der Civilprozess des gemeinen Rechts in geschichtlicher Entwicklung*, VI, Bonn, 1874, pp. 148-59. Boncompagni's *Rhetorica Novissima* (ed. A. Gaudenzi, *Biblioteca storica medievale*, II, Bologna, 1892) is not a treatise on *didamini*, as most scholars seem to assume, but a rhetorical instruction for advocates. Also the treatise of Jacques de Dinant, published by A. Wilmarit *Analitica Reginensia*, Vatican City, 1933, pp. 113-51, covers judicial oratory. It is often asserted that the humanists did not cultivate judicial oratory (Rossi, 154), yet this is contradicted by a passage of Jovius (Burchardt, 176),

but others, for example, academic speeches delivered at the beginning of the year or of a particular course or upon conferring or receiving a degree, had no classical antecedents whatsoever, and all these types of oratory were rooted in very specific customs and institutions of medieval Italy. The humanists invented hardly any of these types of speech, but they merely applied their standards of style and elegance to a previously existing form of literary expression and thus satisfied a demand, both practical and artistic, of the society of their time. Modern scholars are apt to speak contemptuously of this humanistic oratory, denouncing its empty rhetoric and its lack of "deep thoughts". Yet the humanists merely intended to speak well, according to their taste and to the occasion, and it still remains to be seen whether they were less successful in that respect than their medieval predecessors or their modern successors. Being pieces of "empty rhetoric", their speeches provide us with an amazing amount of information about the personal and intellectual life of their time.

In their historiography, the humanists succeeded the medieval chroniclers, yet they differ from them both in their merits and in their deficiencies³⁷. Humanist historiography is characterized by the rhetorical concern for elegant Latin and by the application of philological criticism to the source materials of history. In both respects, they are the predecessors of modern historians³⁸. To combine the requirements of a good style and those of careful research was as rare and difficult then as it is at present. However, the link between history and rhetoric that seems to be so typical of the Renaissance was apparently a medieval heritage. Not only was the teaching of history in the medieval schools subordinate to that of grammar and rhetoric, but we also find quite a few medieval historiographers and chroniclers who were professional grammarians and rhetoricians³⁹. Even the Renaissance custom of

and there are at least a few examples of judicial speeches composed by humanists) Leonardo Bruni Arezzo, *Humanistische-Philosophische Schriften*, ed. Baron, Leipzig, 1928, p. 179; J. Paquet, *De Philippo Beroldi Junioris vita et scriptis*, Paris, 1900, pp. 96-113). A systematic investigation of the various types of humanist oratory and of their medieval antecedents has not yet been undertaken. It ought to include a study of the mutual relations between sacred and secular eloquence, and of possible Byzantine influences. See Krumpholtz, 454 ff. and 470 ff. I hope to return to this subject in a separate article.

³⁸ I should like to mention Carolus Sigonius for his masterful discussion of the forged charter of Theodosius II for Bologna university (*Opera Omnia*, VI, Milan, 1787, pp. 985 ff.). His remark on the task of history, made in connection with the donation of Constantine, is a quotation from Cicero: "primum legem historie esse ut ne quid falsi audeat, ne quid veri non audeat" (*Offici*, p. 985, cf. *De Oratore*, II, 15, 62).

³⁹ For example, Boncompagni of Sigona (*Libri de obsequio Anconae*, ed. G. C. Zimolo, Bologna, 1937) and Rolandinus of Padua (*Cronica*, ed. A. Donardi, Città di Castello, 1905-08).

princes and cities appointing official historiographers to write their history seems to have had a few antecedents in medieval Italy.⁴⁰

Most of the philosophical treatises and dialogues of the humanists are really nothing but moral tracts, and many of them deal with subject matters also treated in the moralistic literature of the Middle Ages. There are, to be sure, significant differences in style, treatment, sources, and solutions. However, the common features of the topics and literary patterns should not be overlooked either. A thorough comparative study of medieval and Renaissance moral treatises has not yet been made so far as I am aware, but in a few specific cases the connection has been pointed out.⁴¹ Again it should be added that the very link between rhetoric and moral philosophy which became so apparent in the Renaissance had its antecedents in the Middle Ages. Medieval rhetoric, no less than ancient rhetoric, was continually quoting and inculcating moral sentences that interested the authors and their readers for their content as well as for their form. Moreover, there are at least a few cases in which medieval rhetoricians wrote treatises on topics of moral philosophy, or argued about the same moral questions that were to exercise the minds and pens of their successors, the Renaissance humanists.⁴²

Less definite is the link between humanists and medieval Italian rhetoricians in the field of Latin poetry. On the basis of available evidence, it would seem that in the Italian schools up to the thirteenth century versenaking was less cultivated than in France. Throughout the earlier Middle Ages, historical and panegyric epics as well as verse epitaphs were composed abundantly in Italy, yet prior to the thirteenth century her share in rhythmical and in didactic poetry seems to have been rather modest.⁴³ It is only after the middle of the thirteenth century that we notice a marked increase in the production of Latin poetry in

⁴⁰ G. Bertoni, *Il Duecento*, p. 263. Machiavelli was on the payroll of the university of Pisa for writing his Florentine history.

⁴¹ Allan H. Gilbert, *Machiavelli's Prince and the Forefathers*, Durham, N. C., 1938. The question *De nobilitate*, dear to the humanists of the fifteenth century, was already discussed in the thirteenth (G. Bertoni, "Una lettera anatoria di Pier della Vigna", *Giornale storico della letteratura italiana*, LVIII, 1911, p. 33 ff.). The humanist treatises on the dignity and happiness of man also continued medieval discussions (G. Gentile, "Il concetto dell'uomo nel Rinascimento", in his *Il pensiero italiano del Rinascimento*, 3rd ed., Florence, 1940, pp. 47-113).

⁴² Boncompagni of Sigena wrote two moral treatises: *Amicitia* (ed. Sarina Nathan, Rome, 1909), and *De malo senectutis et sanis* (ed. F. Novati, *Rendiconti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei, Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche*, Ser. V, vol. I, 1892, pp. 50-59).

⁴³ Novati-Monteverdi, *Le Origini*; F. Novati, *L'Influsso del pensiero latino sopra la civiltà italiana nel Medio Evo*, 2nd ed., Milan, 1899; U. Ronca, *Cultura medioevale e poesia latina d'Italia nei secoli XI e XII*, 2 vols., Rome, 1892; F. J. E. Raby, *A History of Secular Latin Poetry in the Middle Ages*, 2 vols., Oxford, 1934.

Italy, and the appearance of the teaching of poetry in the schools and universities. This development coincides with the earliest traces of Italian humanism, and it is tempting to ascribe it to French influences.⁴⁴

The same may be said with more confidence of the literature of commentaries on the Latin classics, which are the direct result of school teaching. It is often asserted that Italy throughout the Middle Ages was closer to the classical tradition than any other European country. Yet if we try to trace the type of the humanistic commentary back into the Middle Ages, we find hardly any commentary on a Latin poet or prose writer composed in Italy prior to the second half of the thirteenth century, whereas we find many such commentaries, from the ninth century on, written in France or in the other Western countries that followed the French development.⁴⁵ Only after 1300, that is, after the earliest phase of humanism, did Italy produce an increasing number of such commentaries. Also of antiquarian studies there is very little evidence in Italy prior to the latter part of the thirteenth century.⁴⁶ Whereas we have abundant information about the reading of the Latin poets and prose writers in the medieval schools of France and of other

⁴⁴ The rise of Latin poetry in Italy begins with the Paduan group of "pre-humanists" see G. Bertoni, *Il Duecento*, pp. 272 ff.; N. Sapegno, *Il Trecento*, Milan, 1934, pp. 149 ff.

⁴⁵ A comprehensive study of the literature of medieval and Renaissance commentaries on the classical authors is a major desideratum. Much scattered information may be found here listed in Manitius, *op. cit.* An interesting survey of such commentaries up to 1300, by H. H. Haunke, is hidden in the *Histoire littéraire de la France*, XXXIX (1885) 568-83. Haunke lists only one commentary which he believes to be from Italy: "Of Italian origin are certain legal glosses on Seneca, written in the twelfth century (C. Pascal, *Lectura Martiani Capella*, Catania, 1909, pp. 150-54). There are also some Italian commentaries on "authors". The Paduans began to study Seneca's tragedies, and after that end of the thirteenth century, the number of classical commentaries begins to increase. That these early Italian commentators were acquainted with the work of their French predecessors has been shown in the case of Giovanni del Virgilio by F. Gieselhorst ("Giovanni del Virgilio espositore delle 'Mecanorofosi'", *Giornale Dantesco* XXXIV, 1933, 31 ff.). Relations between medieval and humanistic commentaries are also noticed by Eva M. Sanford ("The manuscripts of Lucan: Accessus and Marginalia", *Speculum* IX, 1934, pp. 278-95). For the history and form of medieval commentaries, see now: E. A. Quain, "The Medieval Accessus ad auctores", *Traditio* III, 1945, 215-64; R. W. Hunt, "The Introduction to the 'Artes' in the Twelfth Century", *Studia Mediaevalia in honorem admodum Reverendi Patris Raymondii Josephi Morlin* (Brugis c. 1949) 85-112; R. D. C. Huygens, "Accessus ad Auctores", *Latomus* XII, 1953, 296-311; 460-84. Cf. also L. Bertalot, *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* XXXVII 1911, 3166-69. An important exception which seems to deserve further study is the ms. 404 of the Pierpont Morgan Library in New York which was written in Italy in the twelfth century and contains the complete works of Horace with early glosses (*Italian Manuscripts in the Pierpont Morgan Library*, by Meta Harrison and George K. Boyce, New York, 1953, p. 6 no. 7). The dating of the manuscript has been confirmed to me by Prof. Luisa Danilj.

⁴⁶ See Sabbadini, *Le scoperte*.

Western countries, and whereas such centers as Chartres and Orléans in the twelfth and early thirteenth century owed much of their fame to the study of the Latin classics⁴⁷, the sources for Italy are silent during the same period and begin to speak only after the middle of the thirteenth century⁴⁸. It was only after the beginning of the fourteenth century that the teaching of poetry and of the classical authors became firmly established in the Italian schools and universities, to continue without interruption throughout the Renaissance⁴⁹. Italian libraries, with the one exception of Monte Cassino, were not so well furnished with Latin classical poets as were some French and German libraries, and it has been noticed that the humanists of the fifteenth century made most of their manuscript discoveries not in Italy, but in other countries. The conclusion seems inevitable that the study of classical Latin authors was comparatively neglected in Italy during the earlier Middle Ages and was introduced from France after the middle of the thirteenth century⁵⁰. The Italian humanists thus took up the work of their medieval French predecessors just about the time when classical studies began to decline in France, and whereas the classical scholarship of the earliest humanists in its range and method was still close to the medieval tradition, that of the later Renaissance developed far beyond anything attained during the Middle Ages. Consequently, if we consider the entire literary production of the Italian humanists we are led to the conclusion that the humanistic movement seems to have originated from a fusion between the novel

⁴⁷ A. Clerval, *Les écoles de Chartres au moyen âge*, Paris, 1895; L. Delisle, "Les écoles d'Orléans au douzième et au treizième siècle", *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de Philologie de France*, VII, 1869, 139-54. See also Pactow, *The Battle of the Seven Arts*. For the contrast of "artes" and "authors", see E. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, II, Leipzig, 1898, pp. 688 ff. and 724 ff. To the well known material on the study of the "authors" in medieval France, I should like to add the following passage from the chronist Landulphus Junior, which seems to have remained unnoticed: "revocare Yordanum de Clivi a provincia que dicitur Sancti Egidii in qua ipse Yordanus legebat lectionem auctorum non divinum sed paganorum" (*Historia Mediolanensis*, ed. C. Castiglioni, Bologna, 1934, p. 18). The event must be dated shortly after 1100 A. D.

⁴⁸ Perhaps the earliest dated evidence of the reading of classical authors in an Italian school of the Middle Ages is the criminal record of the theft of "three books of Ovid" from a teacher of grammar in Bologna (1294), see O. Mazzoni Toselli, *Racconti storici estratti dall'archivio criminale di Bologna*, III, Bologna, 1870, 39 f.

⁴⁹ In 1321, Giovanni del Virgilio was appointed to lecture at Bologna on versification and on Virgil, Statius, Lucan, and Ovid (Ghisalberti, *loc. cit.*, 4 E.). L. J. Pactow comments on this document as follows: "This was a good beginning... but the fair promise had no fulfillment" (*The Arts Course at Medieval Universities*, Urbana-Champaign, 1910, p. 60). Actually, the promise did find its fulfillment in the development of Italian humanism. The teaching of the classical authors never ceased in Italy after that memorable date which coincides with the approximate time when Petrarch was a student at Bologna.

⁵⁰ For French influences on Italian humanism in the fourteenth century, see also B. L. Ullmann, "Some Aspects of the Origin of Italian Humanism", *Philological Quarterly*, XX, 1941, 20-31.

interest in classical studies imported from France toward the end of the thirteenth century and the much earlier traditions of medieval Italian rhetoric.

We have seen that the humanists did not live outside the schools and universities, but were closely connected with them. The chairs commonly held by the humanists were those of grammar and rhetoric⁵¹, that is, the same that had been occupied by their medieval predecessors, the *didatores*. Thus it is in the history of the universities and schools and of their chairs that the connection of the humanists with medieval rhetoric becomes most apparent. However, under the influence of humanism, these chairs underwent a change which affected their name as well as their content and pretenses. About the beginning of the fourteenth century poetry appears as a special teaching subject at Italian universities. After that time, the teaching of grammar was considered primarily as the task of elementary instructors, whereas the humanists proper held the more advanced chairs of poetry and of eloquence. For eloquence was the equivalent of prose writing as well as of speech. The teaching of poetry and of eloquence was theoretical and practical at the same time, for the humanist professor instructed his pupils in vers-making and in speech-making both through rules and through models. Since classical Latin authors were considered as the chief models for imitation, the reading of these authors was inseparably connected with the theoretical and practical teaching of poetry and of eloquence.

Thus we may understand why the humanists of the fourteenth and fifteenth century chose to call their field of study poetry and why they were often styled poets even though they composed no works that would qualify them as poets in the modern sense⁵². Also the coronation of poets in the Renaissance must be understood against this background⁵³. It had been originally understood as a kind of academic

⁵¹ Burchardt, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

⁵² K. Vossler, *Poetische Theorien in der indischen Frührenaissance*, Berlin, 1900.

⁵³ The work by V. Lancetti, *Memorie intorno ai poeti laureati d'ogni tempo e d'ogni nazione*, Milan, 1839, is antiquated, but has not been replaced. Important contributions were made by F. Novati, "La suprema aspirazione di Dante", in his *Indagini e possib. didattiche*, Bologna, 1899, p. 83 ff. and by E. H. Wilkins, "The Coronation of Petrarch", *Speculum*, XVIII, 1943, pp. 155-97. I believe that the coronation ceremony developed from the public readings and appropriations of books at the medieval universities (on such appropriations, see L. Thorndike, "Public Readings of New Works in Medieval Universities", *Speculum*, I, 1926, pp. 101-3, and the additional notes by Haskins and Thorndike, *ibid.*, pp. 221 and 445 ff.). The intermediary link is the coronation of the approved book, as in the case of Boncompagni at Bologna 1215 (Novati, *Indagini*, p. 86 ff.). There is definite evidence that Muscato was crowned not only for his tragedy *Euripidis*, but also for his historical work on Henry VIII. Also the diploma of Petrarch's coronation refers to him repeatedly as a

degree, and it was granted not merely for original poetic compositions, but also for the competent study of classical poets ⁵⁴.

History was not taught as a separate subject, but formed a part of the study of rhetoric and poetry since the ancient historians were among the prose writers commonly studied in school. Moral philosophy was always the subject of a separate chair and was commonly studied from the *Ethics* and *Politics* of Aristotle. However, after the beginning of the fifteenth century, the chair of moral philosophy was often held by the humanists, usually in combination with that of rhetoric and poetry ⁵⁵. This combination reflects the expansion of humanistic learning into the field of moral philosophy. The chairs of Greek language and literature which were an innovation of the fourteenth century were also commonly held by humanists. This teaching was not as closely tied up with the practical concern for writing verses, speeches, or letters as was the study of Latin, and it was therefore more strictly scholarly and philosophical. On the other hand, since the fifteenth century we find several cases where humanist teachers of Greek offered courses on Greek texts of philosophy and science and thus invaded the territory of the rivaling fields ⁵⁶.

Later on the fields of study cultivated by the humanists were given a new and even more ambitious name. Taking up certain expressions found in Cicero and Gellius, the humanists as early as the fourteenth century began to call their field of learning the humane studies or the studies befitting a human being (*studia humanitatis*, *studia humaniora*) ⁵⁷. The new name certainly implies a new claim and program, but it covered a content that had existed long before and that had been designated by the more modest names of grammar, rhetoric, and poetry. Although

poet and historian (*Opera Omnia*, Basel, 1581, IV, 6-7), and there are later cases of persons crowned as poets and orators.

⁵⁴ Petrarch was examined by King Robert of Naples and took the king's testimonial letters to Rome, that is, followed much of the procedure that was used for academic degrees in the kingdom of Naples. His diploma resembles doctoral diplomas and grants him the authorization "tam in dicta arte poetica quam in dicta historica arte... legendi, disputandi atque interpretandi veterum scripturas et novae (read: novae) se scriptura... librorum et poemata componendi..." (*loc. cit.*).

⁵⁵ The chair of moral philosophy was held, for example, by Barzizza and by Eliofo. ⁵⁶ Lectures on the Greek or Latin text of Aristotle and other philosophical authors were given at Florence by Marsupini, Argypoulos, and Politian, at Bologna by Codrus Ursicus, and at Padua by Leonicus Rhonaeus. I expect to treat this subject in a future study of the Italian universities.

⁵⁷ On *humanitas* in Roman antiquity, see W. Jaeger, *Humanism and Theology*, Milwaukee, 1943, pp. 20 ff. and 72 f. [W. Schneiderwin, *Die antike Humanität*, Berlin, 1897, pp. 31 ff.; R. Reitzenstein, *Werden und Wesen der Humanität*, Strassburg, 1907; I. Heinemann, "Humanitas" in *Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Supplementband V, 1931, col. 282-310; J. Niedermann, *Kultur*, Florence, 1941, pp. 29 ff.]

some modern scholars were not aware of this fact, the humanists certainly were, and we have several contemporary testimonies showing that the *studia humanitatis* were considered as the equivalent of grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and moral philosophy ⁵⁸.

These statements also prove another point that has been confused by most modern historians: the humanists, at least in Italy or before the sixteenth century, did not claim that they were substituting a new encyclopaedia of learning for the medieval one ⁵⁹, and they were aware of the fact that their field of study occupied a well defined and limited place within the system of contemporary learning ⁶⁰. To be sure, they tended to emphasize the importance of their field in comparison with

⁵⁸ The clearest statement is found in the famous library canon composed by Nicholas V in his youth for Cosimo de' Medici. After having listed many books on theology, then the works of Aristotle in logic, in physics, in metaphysics, and in moralis, the Arabic and Greek commentators on Aristotle, other philosophical works translated from the Greek, and works on mathematics, he continued as follows: "de studiis autem humanitatis quantum ad grammaticam, rhetoricam, historiam et poeticam spectat ac moralium..." (G. Stora, "La patria, la famiglia ed i parenti di papa Niccolò V", *Atti della Reale Accademia Lincea di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti*, XXIII, 1884, p. 380). An educational charter of the Jesuits of 1591 speaks of "studia humanitatis, hoc est grammatica, historiae, poeticae et theoreticae" (quoted by K. Borinski, *Die Antike in Poesie und Kunsttheorie*, II, Leipzig, 1924, p. 327). [Pierre Bersuire calls Petrarch "poetae utique et oratorum egregium in omni morali philosophia nec non et historica et poetica disciplina eruditum" (F. Glisiberti, "L'Yvoldius moralizatus di Pierre Bersuire", *Stiffi Romanzi*, XXIII, 1933, p. 90). After Leonardo Bruni's death, according to his epitaph in S. Croce, "historia luget, eloquentia nuta est, Ferturque Mussus tum Graecae tum Latinae litteras tenera non potuisse". Peter Lindler announced at Heidelberg in 1456 public courses on "studia humanitatis id est poeetrum oratorum ac historiographorum libros", and at Leipzig in 1462 on "studia humanitatis, hystorographos, oratores scilicet et poetas" (L. Bertalot, "Humanistische Vorlesungsanordnungen in Deutschland im 15. Jahrhundert", *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Erziehung und des Unterrichts* V 1915, pp. 3-4)].

⁵⁹ This was attempted, however, in the sixteenth century by *Vives* in his work *De tradendis disciplinis*.

⁶⁰ The humanist Leonardo Bruni, when comparing Dante and Petrarch, attributes greater knowledge in philosophy and mathematics to Dante, "perocché nella scienza delle lettere e nella cognizione della lingua latina Dante fu molto inferiore al Petrarca" (*Le Vite di Dante, Petrarca e Boccaccio*, ed. A. Solerti, Milan, n. d., pp. 292 f.). For Bruni, the learning of Petrarch is not universal and does not include philosophy. [In his early letter to Antonio da S. Miniato, Ficino proposes to abandon his previous rhetorical style and to speak instead as a philosopher ("deinceps philosophorum more loquarum verba ubique contentumque et gravissimas in medium sententias adducentes", Forlì, Biblioteca Comunale, Autografo Placenselli n. 907; see above, art. 7a). In the preface of his *De regimine sanitatis*, Antonio Benivieni relates that he turned from "oratoric artis studia" to philosophy and medicine (ed. L. Belloni, Turin, 1951, p. 19). Almanno Rinuccini, in the letter to his son Filippo which is a tract on education, insists that it is necessary to proceed from the study of grammar and rhetoric ("ubi nostrorum hominum plerique gradum sicut conseruunt") to that of philosophy (*Lettere ad Orziani*, ed. Vito R. Ginsimani, Florence, 1953, p. 97). Pontanus in his dialogue *Adignitas* speaks of the decline of eloquence after the end of the Roman Empire, "cum tamen disciplinae ipsae in honore essent habitae, id quod physicorum theologorumque multitudo quae post Doctum exitit plane declarata, tum in Hispania, tum in Gallis Britannisque ipsaque in Germania" (*Itinerarium logii*, ed. C. Previtara, Florence, 1943, p. 259)].

the other sciences and to encroach upon the latter's territory, but on the whole they did not deny the existence or validity of these other sciences. This well defined place of the *studia humanitatis* is reflected in the new term *humanista* which apparently was coined during the latter half of the fifteenth century and became increasingly popular during the sixteenth century. The term seems to have originated in the slang of university students and gradually penetrated into official usage.⁶¹ It was coined after the model of such medieval terms as *legista*, *jurista*, *canonista*, and *artista*, and it designated the professional teacher of the *studia humanitatis*. The term *humanista* in this limited sense thus was coined during the Renaissance, whereas the term *humanism* was first used by nineteenth century historians.⁶² If I am not mistaken, the new term *humanism* reflects the modern and false conception that Renaissance humanism was a basically new philosophical movement, and under the influence of this notion the old term *humanist* has also been misunderstood as designating the representative of a new *Weltanschauung*. The old term *humanista*, on the other hand, reflects the more modest, but correct, contemporary view that the humanists were the teachers and representatives of a certain branch of learning which at that time was expanding and in vogue, but well limited in its subject matter. Humanism thus did not represent the sum total of learning in the Italian Renaissance.

⁶¹ Rossi (*op. cit.*, 6 and 15) cites a poem of Ariosto (1523) for the earliest appearance of the term *humanista* in Italian, and an epigram of the late fifteenth century for the earliest appearance of the term *humanista* in Latin. I have not been able to verify the latter passage, but I found the following passage in a vernacular letter written in 1490 by the rector of Pisa university to the officials in Florence: "avendo le S. V. condotto quello Humanista che non è venuto", this will be a disappointment for many foreign students who have come, "per udire humanita" (Angelus Fabronius, *Historia Academicæ Pisanae*, I, Pisa, 1791, pp. 369 f.). [The original letter (Archivio di Stato, Florence, *Studio Fiorentino e Pisano*, XI, f. 14) was sent by Andrea dal Campo notarius studii to the Officiali dello Studio on Dec. 4, 1490. The original has "non essendo venuto", and some other variants not relevant to our problem]. During the sixteenth century, the Latin term *humanista* appears in the university documents of Bologna and Ferrara. John Florio in his Italian-English dictionary has the following entry: "Humanista, a humanist or professor of humanitie." (*A Worlde of Worlde*, London, 1598, 164). [Other examples of this usage are given by A. Campana ("The Origin of the Word 'Humanist'", *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, IX, 1946, 60-73) who arrives at the same conclusion as to the origin and meaning of the term. The term occurs repeatedly in the *Epistole obscurorum virorum* (K. Brandl, *Das Werden der Renaissance*, Goettingen, 1908, p. 23). The original meaning was still alive in the eighteenth century. S. Salvini (*Prati Consolati dell'Accademia Fiorentina*, Florence, 1717, p. XIV) mentions Francesco da Buti as a "doctore in grammatica, come allora si dicevano gli Umanisti". And Leibniz states of Vala "qu'il n'étoit pas moins Philologue, qu' Humaniste" (*Essais de Théodicée*, § 405)].

⁶² Apparently the term *Humanismus* was coined in 1808 by F. J. Nechtammer to denote the educational theory that tried to defend the traditional place of classical studies in the school curriculum (W. Rieggs, *Cicero und der Humanismus*, Zuerich, 1946, pp. 2 ff.). Goethe (*Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Bk. XIII, published 1814) uses the term in the sense of humanitarianism (my attention was called to this passage by Prof. Dino Bigongiar).

If we care to look beyond the field of the humanities into the other fields of learning as they were cultivated during the Italian Renaissance, that is, into jurisprudence, medicine, theology, mathematics, and natural philosophy, what we find is evidently a continuation of medieval learning and may hence very well be called scholasticism. Since the term has been subject to controversy, I should like to say that I do not attach any unfavorable connotation to the term scholasticism. As its characteristic, I do not consider any particular doctrine, but rather a specific method, that is, the type of logical argument represented by the form of the *Questio*. It is well known that the content of scholastic philosophy, since the thirteenth century, was largely based on the writings of Aristotle, and that the development of this philosophy, since the twelfth century, was closely connected with the schools and universities of France and England, especially with the universities of Paris and of Oxford. The place of Italy is, however, less known in the history and development of scholastic philosophy. Several Italians are found among the most famous philosophers and theologians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but practically all of them did their studying and teaching in France. Whereas Italy had flourishing schools of rhetoric, of jurisprudence, and of medicine during the twelfth and early thirteenth century, she had no native center of philosophical studies during the same period. After 1220 the new mendicant orders established schools of theology and philosophy in many Italian cities, but unlike those in France and England, these schools of the friars for a long time had no links with the Italian universities. Regular faculties of theology were not established at the Italian universities before the middle of the fourteenth century, and even after that period, the university teaching of theology continued to be spotty and irregular.

Aristotelian philosophy, although not entirely unknown at Salerno toward the end of the twelfth century, made its regular appearance at the Italian universities after the middle of the thirteenth century and in close connection with the teaching of medicine.⁶³ I think it is safe to assume that Aristotelian philosophy was then imported from France

⁶³ For the relation between theology, medicine, and philosophy in Italy, see H. Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. by F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, Oxford, 1936, I, 261 ff. There is some Aristotelianism in the writings of Ugo of Salerno (early thirteenth century), and there was a group of theologians and canonists at Bologna in the twelfth century who were influenced by Abelard. Yet the regular connection between medicine and Aristotelian philosophy, which was to become characteristic of Italian science, appears for the first time in the writings of Taddeo of Florence (late thirteenth century). [See now B. Nardi, "L'averroismo bolognese nel secolo XIII e Taddeo Alderotto", *Rivista di Storia della Filosofia*, IV, 1949, 11-22].

as were the study of classical authors and many other forms of intellectual activity⁶³. After the beginning of the fourteenth century, this Italian Aristotelianism assumed a more definite shape⁶⁴. The teaching of logic and natural philosophy became a well established part of the university curriculum and even spread to some of the secondary schools. An increasing number of commentaries and questions on the works of Aristotle reflect this teaching tradition, and numerous systematic treatises on philosophical subjects show the same general trend and background. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, further influences were received from Paris in the field of natural philosophy and from Oxford in the field of logic⁶⁵; and from the latter part of the fourteenth century on we can trace an unbroken tradition of Italian Aristotelianism which continued through the fifteenth and sixteenth century and far into the seventeenth century⁶⁶.

The common notion that scholasticism as an old philosophy was superseded by the new philosophy of humanism is thus again disproved by plain facts. For Italian scholasticism originated toward the end of the thirteenth century, that is, about the same time as did Italian humanism, and both traditions developed side by side throughout the period of the Renaissance and even thereafter.

⁶³ The influence of the school of Paris upon the earliest Italian Aristotelians ought to be further investigated. The earliest tangible fact seems to be the notice that Gentile da Cingoli, who became a teacher of logic and philosophy at Bologna around 1300, attended a course on Aristotle by Johannes Vate who appears at Paris around 1290 (M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, II, Munich, 1936, pp. 265 f.). It is well known that Peter of Abano, the supposed founder of the school of Padua, studied at Paris and was in personal relations with Jean de Jandun. As late as 1340 the physician Gentile da Foligno is reported to have advised the ruler of Padua to send twelve youths to Paris to study the arts and medicine (H. Denifle and E. Châtaignier, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, II, Paris, 1891, p. 558).

⁶⁴ M. Grabmann, "Studien über den Averroisten Taddeo da Parma", *op. cit.*, 239-60; Id., "Der Biologener Averroist Angelo d'Arezzo", *ibid.*, pp. 261-71. Peter of Abano and Gentile da Cingoli belong to the same period. Urbano of Bologna would seem to belong to the second half of the fourteenth century. [Annaliese Maier, "Eine italienische Averroisten-schule aus der ersten Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts", in her *Die Vorläufer Gailtels im 14. Jahrhundert*, Rome, 1949, pp. 251-78; M. Grabmann, "Gentile da Cingoli, ein italienischer Aristoteleslehrer aus der Zeit Danes", *Strunungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Abteilung*, Jahrgang 1940, Heft 9 (published 1941)].

⁶⁵ P. Duhem, "La tradition de Duridan et la science italienne au XVI siècle", in his *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci*, II, Paris, 1913, pp. 113-259; Id., "La dialectique d'Oxford et la scolastique italienne", *Bulletin Italien*, XII, 1912, and XIII, 1913.

⁶⁶ For this Italian Aristotelianism, see Ueberweg, *op. cit.*, pp. 22 ff. J. Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae*, IV, pt. I (Leipzig, 1743), 148 ff. K. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, IV, Leipzig, 1870, pp. 118 ff.; pp. 176 ff.; pp. 232 ff. E. Renaud, *Averroès et l'averroïsme*, Paris, 1882, 2nd rev. ed., Paris, 1861. [M. Chaggett, *Giovanni Maritani and Late Medieval Physics*, New York, 1941; E. Garin, *La filosofia, Milan, 1947*, vol. I, 338-52; II, 1-65. B. Nardi, *Storici di Brabantie nel pensiero del Rinascimento italiano*, Rome, 1945].

However, the two traditions had their locus and center in two different sectors of learning: humanism in the field of grammar, rhetoric, and poetry and to some extent in moral philosophy, scholasticism in the fields of logic and of natural philosophy. Everybody knows the eloquent attacks launched by Petrarch and Brunni against the logicians of their time, and it is generally believed that these attacks represent a vigorous new movement rebelling against an old entrenched habit of thought. Yet actually the English method of dialectic was quite as novel at the Italian schools of that time as were the humanistic studies advocated by Petrarch and Brunni⁶⁷, and the humanistic attack was as much a matter of departmental rivalry as it was a clash of opposite ideas or philosophies. Brunni is even hinting at one point that he is not speaking quite in earnest⁶⁸. Such controversies, interesting as they are, were mere episodes in a long period of peaceful coexistence between humanism and scholasticism. Actually the humanists quarreled as much among each other as they did with the scholastics. Moreover, it would be quite wrong to consider these controversies as serious battles for basic principles whereas many of them were meant to be merely personal feuds, intellectual tournaments or rhetorical exercises. Finally, any attempt to reduce these controversies to one issue must fail since the discussions were concerned with many diverse and overlapping issues⁶⁹. Therefore, we should no longer be surprised that Italian Aristotelianism quickly and forcefully survived the attacks of Petrarch and his humanist successors. But the Aristotelianism of the Renaissance did not remain untouched by the new influence of humanism. Philosphers began to make abundant use of the Greek text and of the new Latin translations of Aristotle, of his ancient commentators, and of other Greek thinkers. The revival of ancient philosophies that came in the wake of the humanistic movement, especially the revival of Platonism and of Stoicism, left a strong

⁶⁷ Usually the introduction of English dialectic in Italy is attributed to Paul of Venice at Padua about 1400. Yet Peter of Mantua, whom Prantl and Duhem treat as an author of the fifteenth century because of the publication date of his treatise, lived during the fourteenth century and probably died in 1400 A.D. He taught at Bologna and may have been the first Italian follower of the Oxford school. See the letter addressed to him by Salutati (note 13 above), and Novati's footnote which gives several biographical data and references to manuscripts, all unknown to historians of philosophy. A manuscript with logical works of Peter is at Columbia University Library. The text of the "logica Fesburgh" appears in the library of the Franciscans in Assisi as early as 1381 (Mannacorda, *op. cit.*, pt. II, p. 361).

⁶⁸ "Et quid Coluclui ut haec ioca ornitiam quid est inquam in dialectica quod non Britannicis sophismatibus conturbatum sit?" (*Leonardi Brunni Aretini Dialogus de tribus vitiis Florentinis*, ed. K. Wörke, Vienna, 1889, p. 16).

⁶⁹ For some of the humanist controversies see R. Sabbadini, *Storia del ciceronianismo*.

impact upon the Aristotelian philosophers of the Renaissance 70. Yet in spite of these significant modifications, Renaissance Aristotelianism continued the medieval scholastic tradition without any visible break. It preserved a firm hold on the university chairs of logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics, whereas even the humanist professors of moral philosophy continued to base their lectures on Aristotle. The literary activity of these Aristotelian philosophers is embodied in a large number of commentaries, questions, and treatises. This literature is difficult of access and arduous to read, but rich in philosophical problems and doctrines. It represents the bulk and kernel of the philosophical thought of the period, but it has been badly neglected by modern historians. Scholars hostile to the Middle Ages considered this literature an unfortunate survival of medieval traditions that may be safely disregarded, whereas the true modern spirit of the Renaissance is expressed in the literature of the humanists. Medievalists, on the other hand, have largely concentrated on the earlier phases of scholastic philosophy and gladly sacrificed the later scholastics to the criticism of the humanists and their modern followers, a tendency that has been further accentuated by the recent habit of identifying scholasticism with Thomism.

Consequently, most modern scholars have condemned the Aristotelian philosophers of the Renaissance without a hearing, labeling them as empty squibblers and as followers of a dead past who failed to understand the living problems of their new times. Recent works on the civilization of the Renaissance thus often repeat the charges made against the Aristotelian philosophers by the humanists of their time, and even give those attacks a much more extreme meaning than they were originally intended to have. Other scholars who are not favorable to the humanists either include both scholastics and humanists in a summary sentence that reflects the judgments of seventeenth-century scientists and philosophers. Only a few famous figures such as Pietro Pomponazzi seem to resist the general verdict.

There has been a tendency to present Pomponazzi and a few other thinkers as basically different from the other Aristotelians of their time and as closely related with the humanists or with the later scientists. This is merely an attempt to reconcile the respect for Pomponazzi with modern preconceptions against the Aristotelians of the Renaissance. Actually Pomponazzi does not belong to the humanists or to the later

scientists, but to the tradition of medieval and Renaissance Aristotelianism. The number of modern scholars who have actually read some of the works of the Italian Aristotelians is comparatively small. The most influential comprehensive treatment of the group is found in Renan's book on Averroes and Averroism, a book which had considerable merits for its time, but which also contains several errors and confusions which have been repeated ever since 71. If we want to judge the merits and limitations of Renaissance Aristotelianism we will have to proceed to a new direct investigation of the source materials, instead of repeating antiquated judgments. It will be necessary to study in detail the questions discussed by these thinkers, such as the doctrine of immortality and its demonstrability, the problem of the so-called double truth, and the method of scientific proof 72. Due consideration should also be given to the contributions made by these Aristotelian philosophers to medicine and natural history, and to the influence they exercised upon such early scientists as Galilei and Harvey 73. Current notions about the prevalence of Thomism among the Aristotelians, about the controversy of the Averroists and the Alexandrists, about the continuity and uniformity of the school of Padua, and even the very concept of Averroism will have to be reexamined and possibly abandoned. Also the widespread belief that

71. E. Renan, *Averroès et l'averroïsme*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1861. Renan's work has been superseded for the thirteenth century by P. Mandonnet (*Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIII^e siècle*, 2nd ed., 2 vols., Louvain, 1908-11). There is a widespread belief that Renan has been entirely superseded by Mandonnet, but this is obviously not true for the fourteenth and later centuries. The recent article by M. M. Gorcé, "Averroïsme", *Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Géographie Ecclésiastique*, V, 1931, 1032-92, does not supersede Renan either, although it supplements him in a few details; Gorcé largely follows Renan for the later period and does not correct any of his major mistakes. There is a fairly large literature on Pomponazzi, and a monograph on Cesare Cremonini by L. Mabillon, *Étude historique sur la philosophie de la Renaissance en Italie*, Paris, 1881. [See now Nardi, *op. cit.*].

72. An important contribution to the latter problem has been published by J. H. Randall Jr. ("The Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, I, 1940, 177-206).

73. For the contributions of the Aristotelians to sixteenth-century science, see L. Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science*, vols. V-VI, New York, 1941. For Galilei's connection with Italian Aristotelianism, see Randall, *loc. cit.* I should like to add the following detail: Everybody knows Galilei's statement that the nobility of a science depends on the certainty of its method rather than on the dignity of its subject matter (*Opere*, Edizione Nazionale, VI, 1896, p. 237; VII, 1897, p. 246). Remembering this statement, I was surprised to find among Pomponazzi's Questions on the first book of Aristotle's *De anima* the following one: "Nobilitas scientiae a quo sumatur. Quae est a quo sumatur magis nobilitas scientiae, an a nobilitate subiecti an a certitudine demonstrationis vel a qualitate ab ambobus" (L. Ferri, "Intorno alle dottrine psicologiche di Pietro Pomponazzi", *Atti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei*, Ser. II, vol. III, 1875-76, pt. III, p. 423). Pomponazzi does not give a clear answer as does Galilei, but it is obvious that Galilei's statement is not an isolated aphorism, but a conscious answer given to a traditional question raised in the Aristotelian schools of philosophy. [See E. Garin, *La Disputa delle Arti nel Quattrocento*, Florence, 1947, pp. XIII ff.]

70. For Stoic elements in Pomponazzi, see L. Zanta, *La rinascita dei Stoicismi au XVI^e siècle*, Paris, 1914. For Platonic elements in Pomponazzi see above, art. 14.

the Italian Aristotelians were atheists and free-thinkers who merely did not dare to say what they thought to be investigated in its origin and validity ⁷⁴.

Thus we may conclude that the humanism and the scholasticism of the Renaissance arose in medieval Italy about the same time, that is, about the end of the thirteenth century, and that they coexisted and developed all the way through and beyond the Renaissance period as different branches of learning. Their controversy, much less persistent and violent than usually represented, is merely a phase in the battle of the arts, not a struggle for existence. We may compare it to the debates of the arts in medieval literature, to the rivaling claims of medicine and of law at the universities, or to the claims advanced by Leonardo in his *Paragone* for the superiority of painting over the other arts. Humanism certainly had a tendency to influence the other sciences and to expand at their expense, but all kinds of adjustments and combinations between humanism and scholasticism were possible and were successfully accomplished. It is only after the Renaissance, through the rise of modern science and modern philosophy, that Aristotelianism was gradually displaced, whereas humanism became gradually detached from its theoretical background and evolved into modern philology and history.

Thus humanism and scholasticism both occupy an important place in the civilization of the Italian Renaissance, yet neither represents a unified picture, nor do both together constitute the whole of Renaissance civilization. Just as humanism and scholasticism coexisted as different branches of culture, there were besides them other important, and perhaps even more important branches. I am thinking of the developments in the fine arts, in vernacular literature, in the mathematical sciences,

⁷⁴ Most of these notions go back to Renan and have been repeated ever since, especially by French scholars. As I hope to show in a forthcoming study, there is no evidence for the existence of an Alexandrist school in the sixteenth century; there is hardly a uniform Averroist tradition, especially not in the sense used by Renan, who fails to distinguish between the use made of Averroes as a commentator and the adherence to specific Averroist doctrines such as the unity of the intellect; there was no distinctive school of Padua, especially not in the fourteenth century, but merely a broad movement of Italian Aristotelianism in which the university of Padua came to play a leading role during the sixteenth century; many philosophers listed by Renan as representatives of the Paduan school actually never lived in that city; the tradition that the Paduan Aristotelians were atheists and free-thinkers is mainly based on unverified anecdotes and insinuations and developed in France during the seventeenth and eighteenth century when the free-thinkers of that period were looking for forerunners whereas their orthodox opponents had no reason to defend the memory of thinkers who had tried to compromise between reason and faith in a way that was no longer considered permissible or possible by either side. [P. O. Kristeller, "Averroists", *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance* XIV (*Adlanges Augustin Renaudet*) 1952, 59-65. Id., "El Mito del Ateísmo Renacentista y la tradición francesa del *librepensamiento*", *Notas y Ensayos de Filosofía* IV 13 (1953) 1-14].

and in religion and theology. Many misunderstandings have resulted from the attempts to interpret or to criticize humanism and scholasticism in the light of these other developments. Too many historians have tried to play up the fine arts, or vernacular poetry, or science, or religion against the "learning of the schools." These attempts must be rejected. The religious and theological problems of the Protestant and Catholic Reformation were hardly related to the issues discussed in the philosophical literature of the same time, and supporters and enemies of humanistic learning and of Aristotelian philosophy were found among the followers of both religious parties. The development of vernacular poetry in Italy was not opposed or delayed by the humanists, as most historians of literature complain. Some humanists stressed the superiority of Latin, to be sure, but few if any of them seriously thought of abolishing the *volgare* in speech or writing. On the other hand, many humanists are found among the advocates of the *volgare*, and a great number of authors continued to write in both languages. Again, modern historians have tried to interpret as a struggle for existence what in fact was merely a rivalry between different forms of expression ⁷⁵.

The admirable development of the fine arts which is the chief glory of the Italian Renaissance did not spring from any exaggerated notions about the creative genius of the artist or about his role in society and culture. Such notions are the product of the Romantic movement and its eighteenth-century forerunners, and they were largely foreign to the Italian Renaissance ^{75a}. Renaissance artists were primarily craftsmen, and they often became scientists, not because their superior genius anticipated the modern destinies of science, but because certain branches of scientific knowledge, such as anatomy, perspective, or mechanics were considered as a necessary requirement in the development of their craft. If some of these artist-scientists were able to make considerable contributions to science, this does not mean that they were completely independent or contemptuous of the science and learning available in their time.

⁷⁵ On the question of Latin and *volgare* as discussed by the humanists, see R. Sabbadini, *Storia del *decretamentum**, 127-36. I do not agree with his presentation of the problem. The orations of Romolo Amaseo, and the similar one of Sigonius, were primarily defenses of Latin as a field of study, without any intention to abolish the *volgare*. We still need a history of the Italian literary language that would show its gradual expansion, at the expense of Latin and also of local dialects, according to the various regions of Italy as well as to the various branches of literary expression. The problem was formulated by Burckhardt (13th ed., p. 418). [See above, art. 23].

^{75a} P. O. Kristeller, "The Modern System of the Arts", *Journal of the History of Ideas* XII 1951, 496-527; XIII 1952, 17-46].

Finally, mathematics and astronomy made remarkable progress during the sixteenth century and assumed increasing importance in their practical applications, in the literature of the time, and in the curriculum of the schools and universities. If this development did not immediately affect philosophy, this was due not to the stupidity or inertia of contemporary philosophers, but to the fact that physics or natural philosophy was considered as a part of philosophy and that there was almost no traditional link between the mathematical sciences and philosophy. Galileo was a professional student and teacher of mathematics and astronomy, not of philosophy. His claim that physics should be based on mathematics rather than on logic was not merely a novel idea as far as it went, but it revolutionized the very conceptions on which the curriculum of the schools and universities was based. It is hence quite understandable that he was opposed by the Aristotelian physicists of his time who considered his method as an invasion of their traditional domain by the mathematicians. On the other hand, there is no evidence that Galileo met with any serious resistance within his own field of mathematics and astronomy in which the main chairs were soon occupied by his pupils. If we want to understand and to judge these developments we must know the issues and the professional traditions of the later Middle Ages and of the Renaissance.

Modern scholarship has been far too much influenced by all kinds of prejudices, against the use of Latin, against scholasticism, against the medieval church, and also by the unwarranted effort to read later developments, such as the German Reformation, or French liberalism, or nineteenth-century liberalism or nationalism, back into the Renaissance. The only way to understand the Renaissance is a direct and, possibly, an objective study of the original sources. We have no real justification to take sides in the controversies of the Renaissance, and to play up humanism against scholasticism, or scholasticism against humanism, or modern science against both of them. Instead of trying to reduce everything to one or two issues, which is the privilege and curse of political controversy, we should try to develop a kind of historical pluralism. It is easy to praise everything in the past which happens to resemble certain favorite ideas of our own time, or to ridicule and minimize everything that disagrees with them. This method is neither fair nor helpful for an adequate understanding of the past. It is equally easy to indulge in a sort of worship of success, and to dismiss defeated and refuted ideas with a shrugging of the shoulders, but just as in political history, this method does justice neither to the vanquished nor to the victors. Instead

of blaming each century for not having anticipated the achievements of the next, intellectual history must patiently register the errors of the past as well as its truths. Complete objectivity may be impossible to achieve, but it should remain the permanent aim and standard of the historian as well as of the philosopher and scientist.