

An Operational Measure of Riskiness

Sergiu Hart

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Joint work with

Dean P. Foster

The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania

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Dean Foster and Sergiu Hart "An Operational Measure of Riskiness" (2009) Journal of Political Economy

www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/abs/risk.html



Dean Foster and Sergiu Hart "An Operational Measure of Riskiness" (2009) Journal of Political Economy www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/abs/risk.html

Dean Foster and Sergiu Hart "A Reserve-Based Axiomatization of the Measure of Riskiness" (2008)

www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/abs/risk-ax.html

Papers (continued)

Sergiu Hart "A Simple Riskiness Order Leading to the Aumann–Serrano Index of Riskiness" (2008) www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/abs/risk-as.html

Papers (continued)

- Sergiu Hart "A Simple Riskiness Order Leading to the Aumann–Serrano Index of Riskiness" (2008) www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/abs/risk-as.html
- Sergiu Hart "Comparing Risks by Acceptance and Rejection" (2009) www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/abs/risk-u.html



I: Introduction







$$g = \left< \begin{array}{c} 1/2 \\ +\$120 \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ 1/2 \end{array} -\$100 \end{array} \right.$$

$$\mathrm{E}[g] = \$10$$

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. ACCEPT g or reject g?

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ACCEPT g or REJECT g?
What is the RISK in accepting g?



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 - (σ ? **not** monotonic !)

Seeking a MEASURE OF RISKINESS that is:

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- 9...





Accepting the gamble g when the wealth W is:



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Is there a "cutoff point" ?

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- 1. *Identify* the wealth levels where accepting the gamble g is **RISKY**
- 2. **Define** the **RISKINESS** of the gamble g as:

the CRITICAL WEALTH level

below which accepting g becomes **RISKY**



II: The Bankruptcy Model









• Positive expectation: E[g] > 0



- Positive expectation: E[g] > 0
- Some negative values: P[g < 0] > 0 (loss is possible)



- Positive expectation: E[g] > 0
- Some negative values: P[g < 0] > 0 (loss is possible)
- Itechnical] Finitely many values:
 g takes the values $x_1, x_2, ..., x_m$ with probabilities $p_1, p_2, ..., p_m$

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 - if REJECTED then $W_{t+1} = W_t$

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[technical] G is finitely generated: there is a finite collection of gambles such that every g_t is a multiple of one of them

Critical Wealth

SCRITICAL-WEALTH function Q:









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• s accepts the gamble g at wealth W when $W \ge Q(g)$





BANKRUPTCY:

$W_t = 0$

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BANKRUPTCY:

$\lim_{t \to \infty} W_t = 0$

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NO-BANKRUPTCY:

$\{\lim_{t\to\infty} W_t = 0\}$ has probability 0

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A strategy **GUARANTEES NO-BANKRUPTCY**:

 $\{\lim_{t\to\infty} W_t = 0\}$ has probability 0

for every $G = (g_1, g_2, ..., g_t, ...)$ and every $W_1 > 0$

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Main Result

I		



For every gamble g there exists a unique positive number R(g) such that:

Main Result

Main Result

Main Result

if and only if

Main Result

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 $Q(g) \geq R(g)$ for every gamble g

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Main Result

$\rightarrow W$

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Main Result







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Examples of such strategies:

- $Q(g) = \infty$ for all g: Always reject
- $Q(g) = \mathbf{R}(g)$ for all g: Reject $\Leftrightarrow W < \mathbf{R}(g)$
- Anything in between



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$\mathbf{R}(g)$ = the **RISKINESS** of g



if and only if

One never accepts gambles whose RISKINESS exceeds the current wealth



One never accepts gambles whose RISKINESS exceeds the current wealth

RISKINESS \sim "reserve"

Main Result (continued)

I		



Moreover, for every gamble g, its RISKINESS R(g)is the unique solution R > 0 of the equation



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$$\operatorname{E}\left[\log\left(1+rac{1}{R}g
ight)
ight]=0$$

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X	$\mathrm{E}\left[g ight]$	$\mathbf{R}(\boldsymbol{g})$
\$120	\$10	\$600



X	$\mathrm{E}\left[g ight]$	$\mathbf{R}(\boldsymbol{g})$
\$200	\$50	\$200
\$120	\$10	\$600



X	$\mathrm{E}\left[g ight]$	$\mathbf{R}(\boldsymbol{g})$
\$300	\$100	\$150
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\$200	\$50	\$200
\$120	\$10	\$600
\$105	\$2.5	\$2100
\$102	\$ 1	\$5100
The Riskiness of Some Gambles



The Riskiness of Some Gambles



p	$\mathrm{E}\left[g ight]$	$\mathbf{R}(\boldsymbol{g})$
0.5	\$2.5	\$2100
0.6	\$23	\$235.23
0.8	\$64	\$106.93
0.9	\$84.5	\$100.16



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(... more to follow ...)



III: The Shares Model

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 - $\lim_{t\to\infty} W_t = \infty$ (a.s.) for every process $\Leftrightarrow Q(g) > R(g)$ for every gamble g.

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- **•** Theorem Let s_Q be a simple shares strategy.
 - $\lim_{t\to\infty} W_t = \infty$ (a.s.) for every process $\Leftrightarrow Q(g) > R(g)$ for every gamble g.
 - $\lim_{t\to\infty} W_t = 0$ (a.s.) for some process $\Leftrightarrow Q(g) < R(g)$ for some gamble g.

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- Corollary A simple shares strategy S_Q guarantees NO-LOSS
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 - only if $Q(g) \geq R(g)$ for every gamble g









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Example: Q(g) = \$200

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- Assume the critical wealth is Q(g) = \$200
- At time t the gamble $(W_t/200)g_t$ is taken

$$\Rightarrow W_{t+1} = W_t + \left(rac{W_t}{200}
ight) g_t = W_t \left(1 + rac{g_t}{200}
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Example: Q(g) = \$200



• These are the *relative returns* from accepting g at W = \$200

$$W_{t+1} = W_t \left(1 + rac{g_t}{200}
ight)$$

Example:
$$Q(g) = $200$$



- These are the *relative returns* from accepting g at W = \$200
- These relative returns are obtained every period i.i.d.:

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Example: Q(g) = \$200



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Example: Q(g) = \$200



Proof.

Example: Q(g) = \$200



Example: Q(g) = \$200



- about half the days wealth is multiplied by 1.6
- \bullet about half the days wealth is multiplied by 0.5

Example: Q(g) = \$200



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- \Rightarrow A factor of $\approx \sqrt{1.6 \cdot 0.5} < 1$ per period
- $\Rightarrow W_t \rightarrow 0$ (a.s.)

Example: Q(g) = \$1000



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Example: Q(g) = \$1000

 $\frac{g}{1000} =$

 $W_{t+1} = W_t \left(1+rac{g_t}{1000}
ight)$

Example: Q(g) =**\$**1000



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Example: Q(g) = \$1000



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Example: Q(g) = \$1000

$$1/2 + 12\%$$
 -10%
 $1/2$

Example: Q(g) = \$1000



Example: Q(g) = \$1000



Proof.

Example: Q(g) = \$1000

- \square \approx half the days wealth is multiplied by 0.90

Example: Q(g) = \$1000

Proof. The Law of Large Numbers \Rightarrow • half the days wealth is multiplied by 1.12

- \sim half the days wealth is multiplied by 0.90
- \Rightarrow A factor of $\approx \sqrt{1.12 \cdot 0.90}$ per period

Example: Q(g) = \$1000

- \square \approx half the days wealth is multiplied by 0.90
- \Rightarrow A factor of $\approx \sqrt{1.12 \cdot 0.90} > 1$ per period

Example: Q(g) = \$1000

Proof. The Law of Large Numbers \Rightarrow • \approx half the days wealth is multiplied by 1.12 • \approx half the days wealth is multiplied by 0.90 \Rightarrow A factor of $\approx \sqrt{1.12 \cdot 0.90} > 1$ per period $\Rightarrow W_t \rightarrow \infty$ (a.s.)



 $1 + \frac{g}{600} =$







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$$1 + \frac{g}{600} = \sqrt{\frac{1/2}{600}} = \frac{720}{600} = \frac{6}{5}$$
$$1 + \frac{g}{600} = \sqrt{\frac{500}{1/2}} = \frac{500}{600} = \frac{5}{6}$$
$$\Rightarrow \text{Factor of } \sqrt{\frac{6}{5} \cdot \frac{5}{6}} = 1 \text{ per period}$$
$$\Leftrightarrow \text{E} \left[\log \left(1 + \frac{1}{600} g \right) \right] = 0$$

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The **RISKINESS** of the gamble g is $\mathbf{R}(g) = \$600$

The critical wealth level = \$600

- Accepting the gamble g when the wealth is W < \$600 gives "bad" returns (a regime where $W_t \rightarrow 0$ a.s.)
- Accepting the gamble g when the wealth is W > \$600 gives "good" returns: (a regime where $W_t \to \infty$ a.s.)

The RISKINESS of the gamble g is R(g) = \$600

• Up to now: limit as $t \to \infty$

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- Example: Probability of no-loss after t periods

t	Q(g)	$\mathbf{P}[W_{t+1} \geq W_1]$
100		
100		
1000		
1000		

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1000	\$200	$10^{-7}\%$
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- FINITE t: the distribution of wealth is quite different in the two regimes
- Example: MED := Median of W_{t+1}/W_1

t	Q(g)	$P[W_{t+1} \geq W_1]$	MED
100	\$200	2.7%	0.0014%
100	\$1000	64%	148%
1000	\$200	$10^{-7}\%$	$10^{-46}\%$
1000	\$1000	87%	5373%

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Utility function u(x)

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Accept g at W if and only if

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Expected Utility

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Accept g at W if and only if $E\left[u(W+g)\right] \geq u(W)$

LOG UTILITY:

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• Constant Arrow–Pratt Relative Risk Aversion coefficient = 1 (CRRA-1)

$$\operatorname{E}\left[\log\left(1+rac{1}{\operatorname{R}(g)}g
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 $\mathrm{E}\left[\log(\mathrm{R}(g) + g)\right] = \log(\mathrm{R}(g))$

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OUR RESULT:



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No-bankruptcy is guaranteed

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LOG UTILITY \Leftrightarrow relative risk aversion $\equiv 1$



OUR RESULT:

No-bankruptcy is guaranteed

- \Leftrightarrow reject when $W < \frac{R(g)}{2}$
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\thickapprox relative risk aversion ≥ 1

LOG UTILITY \Leftrightarrow relative risk aversion $\equiv 1$

No-bankruptcy and Risk Aversion



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LOG UTILITY \Leftrightarrow relative risk aversion $\equiv 1$



IV: Reserve







Every gamble g has a **RESERVE** Q(g) > 0
• **DISTRIBUTION**: If g and h have the same distribution then Q(g) = Q(h)

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 \blacksquare $g, h_1, h_2, ...$ independent gambles

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- $g, h_1, h_2, ...$ independent gambles
- ${\scriptstyle
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- for every i: $Q(h_i) = Q(g) + x_i$





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The minimal reserve function Q that satisfies the four axioms DISTRIBUTION, SCALING, MONOTONICITY, COMPOUND GAMBLE



The minimal reserve function *Q* that satisfies the four axioms DISTRIBUTION, SCALING, MONOTONICITY, COMPOUND GAMBLE is the riskiness measure **R**



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$\mathbf{P} = \mathbf{R}$ satisfies the four axioms

If $Q \neq \mathbf{R}$ satisfies the four axioms then $Q(g) > \mathbf{R}(g)$ for every gamble g



• CRRA(γ): Utility function u_{γ} with constant relative risk aversion = γ



• CRRA(γ): Utility function u_{γ} with constant relative risk aversion = γ • $u_{\gamma}(x) = -x^{-(\gamma-1)}$ for $\gamma > 1$ • $u_{\gamma}(x) = \log(x)$ for $\gamma = 1$ • $u_{\gamma}(x) = x^{1-\gamma}$ for $0 < \gamma < 1$



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• γ -CRITICAL WEALTH $R_{\gamma}(g)$ of the gamble g:



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- $R_{\gamma}(g)$ increases with γ

THEOREM

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The reserve function Q satisfies the four axioms

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- **•** THE MINIMAL RESERVE
 - = the critical wealth R_1 for CRRA(1)
 - = THE RISKINESS MEASURE \boldsymbol{R}


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V: Connections



Index of Riskiness Q



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DUALITY: For gambles g, h and agents u, v

Index of Riskiness Q

- DUALITY: For gambles g, h and agents u, vIf
 - ${\scriptstyle
 m \ }$ ${\scriptstyle u}$ is uniformly more risk-averse than v
 - ${\scriptstyle
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$${\scriptstyle
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 Let $R^{AS}(g)=1/lpha^{*}$

 $R^{AS}(g)$ is the unique solution R > 0 of

$$\mathrm{E}\left[\exp\left(-rac{1}{R}g
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ight]=\exp(0)=1$$

Theorem



Theorem

Q satisfies **DUALITY** and **HOMOGENEITY** *if and only if*



Theorem

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Theorem

Q satisfies **DUALITY** and **HOMOGENEITY** if and only if Q is a positive multiple of \mathbf{R}^{AS} :

There is c > 0 such that $Q(g) = c \, \mathbb{R}^{AS}(g)$ for every gamble g



u accepts g

v accepts h









 $u \triangleright v = "u$ is uniformly more risk-averse than v"





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Alternative approach:

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Define a "more risky than" ORDER between gambles

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Represent it by an "INDEX"

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- Define a "more risky than" ORDER between gambles ↔ preference order
- Represent it by an "INDEX" → utility function



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 - If u accepts a gamble g at wealth W
 - Then u accepts g at any wealth W' > W



- An agent u is MONOTONIC if his decisions are monotonic relative to wealth:
 - If u accepts a gamble g at wealth W
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An agent u is MONOTONIC if his decisions are monotonic relative to wealth



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- An agent u TOTALLY REJECTS g if u rejects g at every wealth W



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 $oldsymbol{g} \succsim oldsymbol{h}$



Theorem. The riskiness order is represented by the Aumann–Serrano index of riskiness:

$$oldsymbol{g} \succsim oldsymbol{h} \quad \Longleftrightarrow \quad R^{AS}(oldsymbol{g}) \geq R^{AS}(oldsymbol{h})$$



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Corollary

 \blacktriangleright is a *complete* order

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Corollary

- \blacksquare \succeq is a *complete* order
- RAS is unique up to a monotonic transformation
- Together with homogeneity: RAS is unique up to multiplication by a positive constant

 $R^{AS}(g)$ is the unique solution R > 0 of $E\left[1 - \exp\left(-\frac{1}{R}g\right)\right] = 0$

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$$\mathbf{R}(g)$$
 is the unique solution $\mathbf{R} > 0$ of
 $\mathbf{E}\left[\log\left(1 + \frac{1}{\mathbf{R}}g\right)\right] = 0$

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Comparing R and R^{AS}

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$$\log(1+x) = x - \frac{x^2}{2} + \frac{x^3}{3} - \dots$$
$$1 - \exp(-x) = x - \frac{x^2}{2} + \frac{x^3}{6} - \dots$$

Proposition

If $\mathrm{E}[g]$ is small relative to g then $\mathrm{R}(g) \sim R^{AS}(g)$

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 $\mathbf{R}(g) = \$2100$

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Comparing R and R^{AS}



Comparing R and R^{AS}

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- continuity and "black swans"

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 R^{AS}: critical risk aversion for any wealth
- R: measure (one gamble)
 R^{AS}: index (comparing gambles)
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Nevertheless: similar in many respects !!



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- what is "wealth"?

What is Wealth?

1		

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(Proof: replace 0 with \underline{W})

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Summary

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 - Sharpe ratio: $E/\sigma \rightarrow E/R$
- may replace reserve measures (VaR, ...)





"We're recommending a risky strategy for you; so we'd appreciate if you paid before you leave."