# An Operational Measure of Riskiness 

## Sergiu Hart

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## Joint work with

## Dean P. Foster <br> The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania

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- Dean Foster and Sergiu Hart
"An Operational Measure of Riskiness" (2009) Journal of Political Economy
www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/abs/risk.html
- Dean Foster and Sergiu Hart "An Operational Measure of Riskiness" (2009) Journal of Political Economy
www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/abs/risk.html
- Dean Foster and Sergiu Hart "A Reserve-Based Axiomatization of the Measure of Riskiness" (2008) www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/abs/risk-ax.html


## Papers (continued)

- Sergiu Hart
"A Simple Riskiness Order Leading to the Aumann-Serrano Index of Riskiness" (2008)
www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/abs/risk-as.html


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"A Simple Riskiness Order Leading to the Aumann-Serrano Index of Riskiness" (2008) www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/abs/risk-as.html
- Sergiu Hart
"Comparing Risks by Acceptance and Rejection" (2009)
www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/abs/risk-u.html


## I: Introduction

## A gamble



## A gamble


$\mathrm{E}[g]=\$ 10$

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- ACCEPT $\boldsymbol{g}$ or REJECT $\boldsymbol{g}$ ?


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- What is the RISKINESS of $g$ ?


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( $\sigma$ ? not monotonic !)


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2. Define the RISKINESS of the gamble $g$ as:
the CRITICAL WEALTH level below which accepting $g$ becomes RISKY

## II: The Bankruptcy Model

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- Some negative values: $\mathbf{P}[g<0]>0$ (loss is possible)
- [technical] Finitely many values:
$g$ takes the values $x_{1}, x_{2}, \ldots, x_{m}$
with probabilities $p_{1}, p_{2}, \ldots, p_{m}$


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NOTE: not i.i.d., arbitrary dependence; non-Bayesian; "adversary"
- [technical] $G$ is finitely generated: there is a finite collection of gambles such that every $g_{t}$ is a multiple of one of them


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- SIMPLE STRATEGY $s \equiv s_{Q}$ :
- $s$ rejects the gamble $g$ at wealth $\boldsymbol{W}$ when $W<Q(g)$
- $s$ accepts the gamble $g$ at wealth $\boldsymbol{W}$ when $W \geq Q(g)$


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$$
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## No-Bankruptcy

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# A strategy GUARANTEES NO-BANKRUPTCY: 

$\left\{\lim _{t \rightarrow \infty} W_{t}=0\right\}$ has probability 0

$$
\text { for every } G=\left(g_{1}, g_{2}, \ldots, g_{t}, \ldots\right)
$$

and every $W_{1}>0$

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Examples of such strategies:

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## REJECT

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\mathrm{R}(g)
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Examples of such strategies:

- $Q(g)=\infty$ for all $g$ : Always reject


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- $Q(g)=\mathrm{R}(g)$ for all $g$ : Reject $\Leftrightarrow W<\mathrm{R}(g)$
- Anything in between


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A simple strategy $s$ guarantees no-bankruptcy if and only if
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RISKINESS ~"reserve"

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Moreover, for every gamble $g$, its RISKINESS $\mathrm{R}(\boldsymbol{g})$ is the unique solution $R>0$ of the equation

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$$
\mathrm{E}\left[\log \left(1+\frac{1}{R} g\right)\right]=0
$$

## The Riskiness of Some Gambles



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| X | $\mathrm{E}[g]$ | $\mathrm{R}(g)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |
| $\$ 200$ | $\$ 50$ | $\$ 200$ |
| $\$ 120$ | $\$ 10$ | $\$ 600$ |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |

## The Riskiness of Some Gambles



| X | $\mathrm{E}[\mathrm{g}]$ | $\mathrm{R}(\mathrm{g})$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\$ 300$ | $\$ 100$ | $\$ 150$ |
| $\$ 200$ | $\$ 50$ | $\$ 200$ |
| $\$ 120$ | $\$ 10$ | $\$ 600$ |
|  |  |  |
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| $\$ 105$ | $\$ 2.5$ | $\$ 2100$ |
|  |  |  |

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| $\$ 200$ | $\$ 50$ | $\$ 200$ |
| $\$ 120$ | $\$ 10$ | $\$ 600$ |
| $\$ 105$ | $\$ 2.5$ | $\$ 2100$ |
| $\$ 102$ | $\$ 1$ | $\$ 5100$ |

## The Riskiness of Some Gambles

$$
g=\begin{gathered}
\frac{p}{1-p}-\$ 105 \\
\frac{100}{}
\end{gathered}
$$

## The Riskiness of Some Gambles



| $p$ | $\mathrm{E}[g]$ | $\mathrm{R}(g)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0.5 | $\$ 2.5$ | $\$ 2100$ |
| 0.6 | $\$ 23$ | $\$ 235.23$ |
| 0.8 | $\$ 64$ | $\$ 106.93$ |
| 0.9 | $\$ 84.5$ | $\$ 100.16$ |

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(... more to follow ...)


## III: The Shares Model

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- Theorem Let $s_{Q}$ be a simple shares strategy.
- $\lim _{t \rightarrow \infty} W_{t}=\infty$ (a.s.) for every process $\Leftrightarrow \quad Q(g)>R(g)$ for every gamble $g$.


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- Theorem Let $s_{Q}$ be a simple shares strategy.
- $\lim _{t \rightarrow \infty} \boldsymbol{W}_{t}=\infty$ (a.s.) for every process $\Leftrightarrow \quad Q(g)>R(g)$ for every gamble $g$.
- $\lim _{t \rightarrow \infty} W_{t}=0$ (a.s.) for some process $\Leftrightarrow \quad Q(g)<R(g)$ for some gamble $g$.


## The Shares Model

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Example


## Example



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## Example: $Q(g)=\$ 200$



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$$
\frac{g}{200}=
$$

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## Example: $Q(g)=\$ 200$



- These are the relative returns from accepting $\boldsymbol{g}$ at $\boldsymbol{W}=\$ 200$
- These relative returns are obtained every period i.i.d.:

$$
W_{t+1}=W_{t}\left(1+\frac{g_{t}}{200}\right)
$$

# Example: $Q(g)=\$ 200$ 

$1 / 2$
$+60 \%$
$-50 \%$
$1 / 2$

# Example: $Q(g)=\$ 200$ 



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Proposition. $W_{t} \rightarrow 0$ (a.s.)
Proof.

## Example: $Q(g)=\$ 200$

$1 / 2$
$\sqrt{\frac{1 / 2}{1 / 2}-60 \%} \quad W_{t+1}=W_{t} \times 1.6$
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1 / 2 & -50 \%
\end{array} W_{t+1}=W_{t} \times 0.5
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Proposition. $W_{t} \rightarrow 0$ (a.s.)
Proof. The Law of Large Numbers $\Rightarrow$

- about half the days wealth is multiplied by 1.6
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Example: $Q(g)=\$ 1000$

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$$
W_{t+1}=W_{t}\left(1+\frac{g_{t}}{1000}\right)
$$

## Example: $Q(g)=\$ 1000$

## $\frac{g}{1000}=$

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## Example: $Q(g)=\$ 1000$

$$
\frac{g}{1000}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\frac{1 / 2}{120}=+12 \% \\
\frac{120}{100}=\frac{100}{1000}=-10 \%
\end{array}\right.
$$

- These are the relative returns from accepting $\boldsymbol{g}$ at $\boldsymbol{W}=\$ 1000$

$$
W_{t+1}=W_{t}\left(1+\frac{g_{t}}{1000}\right)
$$

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$$
\frac{g}{1000}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\frac{1 / 2}{\frac{120}{1000}=+12 \%} \\
\frac{100}{1 / 2}-\frac{1000}{1000}=-10 \%
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- These are the relative returns from accepting $\boldsymbol{g}$ at $\boldsymbol{W}=\$ 1000$
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Proof.

## Example: $Q(g)=\$ 1000$

$\begin{array}{ll}\frac{1 / 2}{\sqrt{1 / 2}}-12 \% & W_{t+1}=W_{t} \times 1.12 \\ & W_{t+1}=W_{t} \times 0.90\end{array}$
Proposition. $W_{t} \rightarrow \infty$ (a.s.)
Proof. The Law of Large Numbers $\Rightarrow$
2 $\approx$ half the days wealth is multiplied by 1.12
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Example: Riskiness $\mathrm{R}(\mathrm{g})=$ ?

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$$
1+\frac{g}{600}=
$$

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$\Rightarrow$ Factor of $\sqrt{\frac{6}{5} \cdot \frac{5}{6}}=1$ per period
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## Example: Riskiness $\mathrm{R}(\mathrm{g})=\$ 600$

$$
1+\frac{g}{600}=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\frac{1 / 2}{\frac{720}{600}=\frac{6}{5}} \\
\frac{500}{1 / 2}=\frac{5}{6}
\end{array}\right.
$$

$\Rightarrow$ Factor of $\sqrt{\frac{6}{5} \cdot \frac{5}{6}}=1$ per period
$\Leftrightarrow \mathrm{E}\left[\log \left(1+\frac{1}{600} g\right)\right]=0$
The RISKINESS of the gamble $g$ is

$$
\mathrm{R}(g)=\$ 600
$$

## The critical wealth level $=\$ 600$

The RISKINESS of the gamble $g$ is $R(g)=\$ 600$

## The critical wealth level $=\$ 600$

- Accepting the gamble $g$ when the wealth is $W<\$ 600$ gives "bad" returns (a regime where $W_{t} \rightarrow 0$ a.s.)

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## The critical wealth level $=\$ 600$

- Accepting the gamble $g$ when the wealth is $W<\$ 600$ gives "bad" returns (a regime where $W_{t} \rightarrow 0$ a.s.)
- Accepting the gamble $g$ when the wealth is $W>\$ 600$ gives "good" returns: (a regime where $W_{t} \rightarrow \infty$ a.s.)

The riskiness of the gamble $g$ is

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$$

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- Example: Probability of no-loss after $t$ periods

| $t$ | $Q(g)$ | $\mathrm{P}\left[W_{t+1} \geq W_{1}\right]$ |
| :---: | :--- | :--- |
| 100 |  |  |
| 100 |  |  |
| 1000 |  |  |
| 1000 |  |  |

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| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 100 | $\$ 200$ | $2.7 \%$ |
| 100 | $\$ 1000$ | $64 \%$ |
| 1000 |  |  |
| 1000 |  |  |

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| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 100 | $\$ 200$ | $2.7 \%$ |
| 100 | $\$ 1000$ | $64 \%$ |
| 1000 | $\$ 200$ | $10^{-7} \%$ |
| $\mathbf{1 0 0 0}$ | $\$ 1000$ | $87 \%$ |

## Finite Time

- Up to now: limit as $t \rightarrow \infty$
- FInite $t$ : the distribution of wealth is quite different in the two regimes
- Example: MED $:=$ Median of $\boldsymbol{W}_{t+1} / \boldsymbol{W}_{1}$

| $\boldsymbol{t}$ | $\boldsymbol{Q}(\boldsymbol{g})$ | $\mathrm{P}\left[\boldsymbol{W}_{\boldsymbol{t + 1}} \geq \boldsymbol{W}_{\mathbf{1}}\right]$ | MED |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{1 0 0}$ | $\$ 200$ | $2.7 \%$ | $0.0014 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{1 0 0}$ | $\$ 1000$ | $64 \%$ | $148 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{1 0 0 0}$ | $\$ 200$ | $10^{-7} \%$ | $10^{-46} \%$ |
| $\mathbf{1 0 0 0}$ | $\$ 1000$ | $87 \%$ | $5373 \%$ |

Properties of $R$

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- Accept $\boldsymbol{g}$ at $\boldsymbol{W}$ if and only if

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- Constant Arrow-Pratt Relative Risk Aversion coefficient $=1$ (CRRA-1)


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$\Leftrightarrow$
LOG UTILITY rejects $g$ when $W<\mathrm{R}(g)$
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No-bankruptcy

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## OUR RESULT:

# LOG UTILITY rejects $g$ if and only if $W<R(g)$ 

## OUR RESULT:

## No-bankruptcy is guaranteed

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LOG UTILITY $\Leftrightarrow$ relative risk aversion $\equiv 1$

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# No-bankruptcy and Risk Aversion 

## LOG UTILITY rejects $g$ if and only if $\boldsymbol{W}<\mathrm{R}(\boldsymbol{g})$

## OUR RESULT:

No-bankruptcy is guaranteed
$\Leftrightarrow$ reject when $W<\mathrm{R}(g)$
$\Leftrightarrow$ reject at least as much as LOG UTILITY
$\approx \quad$ relative risk aversion $\geq 1$

LOG UTILITY $\Leftrightarrow$ relative risk aversion $\equiv 1$

## IV: Reserve

Reserve

## Reserve

## Every gamble $g$ has a RESERVE $Q(g)>0$

## Reserve: Axioms

Every gamble $\boldsymbol{g}$ has a Reserve $Q(g)>0$

- DISTRIBUTION: If $\boldsymbol{g}$ and $\boldsymbol{h}$ have the same distribution then $Q(g)=Q(h)$


## Reserve: Axioms

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Reserve

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- $Q=\mathrm{R}$ satisfies the four axioms
- If $Q \neq \mathrm{R}$ satisfies the four axioms then $Q(g)>\mathrm{R}(g)$ for every gamble $g$


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- $u_{\gamma}(x)=x^{1-\gamma}$ for $0<\gamma<1$


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## V: Connections

## Aumann \& Serrano (2008)

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There is $c>0$ such that $Q(g)=c R^{A S}(g)$ for every gamble $g$

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Theorem. The riskiness order is represented by the Aumann-Serrano index of riskiness:

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## Corollary

- $\succsim$ is a complete order
- $R^{A S}$ is unique up to a monotonic transformation
- Together with homogeneity: $R^{A S}$ is unique up to multiplication by a positive constant


## Comparing R and $R^{A S}$

$R^{A S}(g)$ is the unique solution $R>0$ of

$$
\mathrm{E}\left[1-\exp \left(-\frac{1}{R} g\right)\right]=0
$$

## Comparing R and $R^{A S}$

$\mathrm{R}(g)$ is the unique solution $R>0$ of

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$$
\begin{aligned}
\log (1+x) & =x-x^{2} / 2+x^{3} / 3-\ldots \\
1-\exp (-x) & =x-x^{2} / 2+x^{3} / 6-\ldots
\end{aligned}
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$$
g=\begin{array}{cc}
\frac{1 / 2}{\frac{1 / 2}{}}-\$ 105 \\
-\$ 100
\end{array}
$$

$$
\mathrm{R}(g)=\$ 2100 \quad R^{A S}(g)=\$ 2100.42 \ldots
$$

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Nevertheless: similar in many respects !!

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(Proof: replace 0 with $\underline{W}$ )

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## Summary

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- is independent of utilities, risk aversion, ...
- has a clear operational interpretation


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- may replace measures of risk ( $\sigma$-based, ...)
- Markowitz, CAPM, ... : E vs $\sigma \rightarrow$ E vs R
- Sharpe ratio:
$\mathrm{E} / \sigma \quad \rightarrow \mathrm{E} / \mathrm{R}$


## The Riskiness measure $\mathbf{R}$

- is objective and universal
- is independent of utilities, risk aversion, ...
- has a clear operational interpretation
- has good properties (e.g., monotonic with respect to first-order stochastic dominance)
- may replace measures of risk ( $\sigma$-based, ...)
- Markowitz, CAPM, ... : E vs $\sigma \rightarrow$ E vs R
- Sharpe ratio: $\mathrm{E} / \sigma \rightarrow \mathrm{E} / \mathrm{R}$
- may replace reserve measures (VaR, ...)


## The End


"We're recommending a risky strategy for you; so we'd appreciate if you paid before you leave."

