# The effect of information constraints on decision-making and economic behaviour 

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# Introduction: Choice under Uncertainty 

Paradoxes of Expected Utility

## Optimisation of Information Utility

Results

Example: SPB Lottery<br>References106

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## Learning Systems

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## Performance <br> 

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Information


## Learning Systems



- Performance and information have orders, and the relation between them is monotonic.


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- Complete partial orders, domain theory.


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## Learning Systems



- Performance and information have orders, and the relation between them is monotonic.
- Complete partial orders, domain theory.
- Utility theory, information theory
- Allows for treating both deterministic and non-deterministic case:

$$
x=f(\omega), \quad x=f(\omega)+\operatorname{rand}()
$$

## Expected Utility Theory

- $f: \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ a utility function.


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Question (Why expected utility?)
(1) $\mathbb{E}_{y}\{f\}=f(\omega)$ if $y\left(\Omega^{\prime}\right)=\delta_{\omega}\left(\Omega^{\prime}\right)$.
(1) $x \lesssim y \quad \Longleftrightarrow \quad \lambda x \lesssim \lambda y, \forall \lambda>0$
(0) $x \lesssim y \quad x+z \lesssim y+z, \forall z \in Y$.

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- To enter the lottery, you must pay a fee of $£ X$
- How much is $£ X$ ?


## Why is it a paradox?

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- Let $p(n)$ be the probability of $n \in \mathbb{N}$

| head | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | $\cdots$ | $n$ | $\cdots$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| win | $£ 2$ | $£ 4$ | $£ 8$ | $£ 16$ | $\cdots$ | $2^{n}$ | $\cdots$ |
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- It is easy to see that

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\mathbb{E}_{p}\{\operatorname{win}\}=2 \cdot \frac{1}{2}+4 \cdot \frac{1}{4}+8 \cdot \frac{1}{8}+16 \cdot \frac{1}{16}+\cdots=\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{2^{n}}{2^{n}}=\infty
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- One cannot buy what is not for sale.


## Classical solutions

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- Note that for any $f(n)$ we can introduce a lottery $p(n) \propto f^{-1}(n)$ :

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- Some suggest to use only $f$ such that

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\|f\|_{\infty}:=\sup |f(\omega)|<\infty
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- How much would you borrow? $(£ X=$ ? $)$


## The Allais (1953) paradox

Consider two lotteries:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\text { A }: p(£ 300)=\frac{1}{3} \quad\left(\text { and } p(£ 0)=\frac{2}{3}\right) \\
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## Remark

Safety is preferred (i.e. risk averse).

## The Allais (1953) paradox (2)

Consider two lotteries:

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## Remark

Risk is preferred (i.e. risk taking).

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## Remark

Any linear functional (e.g. $\mathbb{E}_{p}\{x\}$ ) has parallel level sets. If people use expected utility to make choices, then they are either risk-averse or risk-taking, but not both.

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## Remark

This theory is not normative (i.e. it is not derived using rational approach).

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More information is preferred.

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- Sufficient if $K(y, \alpha):=f(y)+\alpha[\lambda-g(y)]$ is concave.


## Representation in Paired Spaces

- $x \in X, y \in Y,\langle\cdot, \cdot\rangle: X \times Y \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

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\langle x, y\rangle:=\int_{\Omega} x(\omega) d y(\omega)
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- Expected value

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\mathbb{E}_{p}\{x\}=\left.\langle x, y\rangle\right|_{\mathcal{M}}
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## Information

Definition (Information resource) a closed functional $F: Y \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \cup\{\infty\}$ with $\inf F=F(z)$.

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## Example (Relative Information (Belavkin, 2010b))

- For $z>0$, let

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F(y):= \begin{cases}\left\langle\ln \frac{y}{z}, y\right\rangle-\langle 1, y-z\rangle, & \text { if } y>0 \\ \langle 1, z\rangle, & \text { if } y=0 \\ \infty, & \text { if } y<0\end{cases}
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- $\partial F(y)=\ln \frac{y}{z}=x \quad \Longleftrightarrow \quad y=e^{x} z=\partial F^{*}(x)$
- The dual $F^{*}: X \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \cup\{\infty\}$ is

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## Utility of Information

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- Related functions

$$
\begin{aligned}
-U_{-x}(I) & :=\inf \{\langle x, y\rangle: F(y) \leq I\} \\
I_{x}(U) & :=\inf \left\{F(y): U_{0} \leq U \leq\langle x, y\rangle\right\} \\
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## Information Bounded Utility

Definition (Information Bounded Utility)
A function $f: \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that admits a solution to the utility of information problem $U_{f}(I)$ for $I \in(\inf F, \sup F)$

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A solution to $U_{f}(I)$ and $I_{f}(U)$ exists if and only if set $\left\{x: F_{q}^{*}(x) \leq I^{*}\right\}$ absorbs function $f$ :

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Remark (Separation of information)
For all $I \in(\inf F, \sup F)$ there exist $\beta_{1}^{-1}, \beta_{2}^{-1}>0$ :

$$
F_{q}\left(\partial F_{q}^{*}\left(\beta_{1} f\right)\right)<I<F_{q}\left(\partial F^{*}\left(\beta_{2} f\right)\right)
$$

## Information Topology (Belavkin, 2010a)



- The topology is defined using an information resource:

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F: L \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \cup\{\infty\}, \quad \inf F=F\left(y_{0}\right)
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## Parametrisation by the Expected Utility



Let $F(y)$ be negative entropy (i.e. $F(y)$ is minimised at $y_{0}(\omega)=$ const)

$$
\begin{aligned}
x: \Omega \rightarrow\{c-d, c+d\} & U(\beta) & =\Psi^{\prime}(\beta)=c+d \tanh (\beta d) \\
x: \Omega \rightarrow[c-d, c+d] & U(\beta) & =\Psi^{\prime}(\beta)=c+d \operatorname{coth}(\beta d)-\beta^{-1}
\end{aligned}
$$

## Parametrisation by Information



## Parametric Dependency



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## A Solution of the SPB Paradox

- $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is information bounded iff for some $\beta^{-1}>0$ :

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- For $f(n)=n$, we have $\beta<1$.


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- Using $U=\Psi_{f}^{\prime}(\beta)$ obtain

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U=\frac{1}{1-e^{\beta-1}}, \quad U_{0}=\frac{1}{1-e^{-1}}
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## A Solution of the SPB Paradox

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- Change $e$ to 2 ( $\ln$ to $\log _{2}$ ).
- For the information amount of 0 bits, the optimal entrance fee is $c \leq U_{0}=2$.


## SPB Lottery



## SPB Lottery



## SPB Lottery



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