

**All change? Exploring the changes to World Bank policy and practice
under the Multi Sectoral AIDS Project (MAP)**

Over the last 20 years the World Bank has increasingly been accused of not representing the people it serves, the world's poor. The Bank has been said to lack transparency, accountability and legitimacy. Policies and projects are designed in Washington by Washington based staff members which results in a lack of pro poor policy and projects. These factors have been recognised as key barriers to sustainable development by governments in the developing world, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), and the Bank itself. Subsequently, the Bank has appeared to undergo several key changes in its approach to policy and projects. This paper explores whether such change is substantive and verifiable or mere Bank rhetoric. It does so by concentrating on key areas of change: CSO engagement; government ownership; and effective multi agency working both within the Bank and with its partners, within the context of the World Bank's Multi Sectoral AIDS Project (MAP). The paper's findings are based upon PhD research into the MAP in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The results of these findings suggest that despite the appearance of change in the Bank represented by the MAP, such change is not in any way substantive. Therefore the Bank remains unrepresentative, unaccountable and illegitimate to the people it affects. Ineffective engagement leads to ineffective policies for the poor which in turn hinders sustainable and equitable development outcomes.

The paper explores these issues in the following ways. First, it provides a brief background to change in the Bank, before discussing what is meant by change in this context and the research basis of the paper. Second, the paper explores the evidence for change, focusing on CSO engagement, government ownership and multi agency working in turn. Third, evidence to suggest that such change is not substantive and cannot be verified is discussed. The paper then draws such evidence together and offers some conclusions as to whether change is substantive, and why this matters.

The Rhetoric of Change

Over the last ten years, there has been much said about the change in World Bank policy and practice. This change was to follow years of discontent and criticism levelled against the Bank throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Such discontent was in response to: structural adjustment policies; the environmental impact of Bank sponsored projects; and issues of accountability, transparency and corruption within the Bank. It had become increasingly clear that the Bank had become disconnected from those people, governments and societies it affected. The impact of this criticism marked the increase in organised, mobilised and globalised civil society: their structure, method of campaigning, target groups, and members. As a Bretton Woods institution, during the late 1990s the Bank was targeted alongside the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and newly formed World Trade Organisation (WTO) by the anti globalisation movement and CSOs. Combined with a decade marked by financial crises in Latin America, Asia and potentially the Republics of the former Soviet Union, and a growing disparity between the rich and poor countries and the well off and impoverished, it became clear that current 'Washington Consensus' (Williamson, 1990) policy and practice within the Bank was not working, and that the Bank had become further disconnected from the realities of what was happening both in country and within the global political economy.

The Bank's recognition of the need to reconnect with the people and governments it affects, together with the appointment of James Wolfensohn as President resulted in four key changes within the Bank. The first saw the introduction of new units within the Bank and the restructuring of selected pre-existing sections. New units such as the Development Dialogue on Values and Ethics, Community Foundations, and Voices of the Poor were established in support of the Bank's holistic approach to development issues. As Eleanor Fink, Head of the Foundations unit in the Bank describes, Wolfensohn

felt early on that development challenges are so huge that if you don't bring a variety of stakeholders to the table, each that bring different characteristics and opportunities to address challenges in different ways, you're not going to solve the world's problems, its not just a matter of money, it's a matter of expertise and it's a matter of different skills (Fink, 20/4/06)

This holistic approach led to an expansion in the Bank's mandate as a 'knowledge bank' and its involvement with post conflict reconstruction, health and new methods of flexible lending.

The second key change was the 'opening up' of the Bank to CSOs. The emphasis upon CSO involvement

evolved from 1992 to 2000 and they began to intensify in 1995 when Wolfensohn undertook his first trip to Mali, he asked the Bank office to set up meetings with NGOs for him, but no-one at the Bank knew any NGOs, well he said we need to hire people in our country offices who can be a liaison between the Bank and civil society, and that's when about 70 staff were hired (Garrison, 27/4/06)

The 'World Bank-NGO committee' that existed at the time was facing increased criticism for its lack of national NGO engagement and international NGO (INGO)-only approach to civil society. Staff members were beginning to recognise such criticism and that the World Bank-NGO Committee had outgrown its usefulness. The committee was thus reconfigured to the 'Civil Society Team' which was to engage with CSOs at the national, global and regional level. Engagement at each level was to be based upon: facilitating dialogue and partnership between civil society and governments; talking to and consulting with civil society on a wide range of issues; and partnering civil society in technical assistance, joint managing of projects and funding (World Bank, 2006a). These three methods of engagement were to be mainstreamed through the global, regional and national civil society teams, and throughout the wider Bank institutions. All project proposals, where relevant, were to have a civil society component.

The third change was the role of recipient countries. Countries were to be 'in the driving seat of their own development' and would not be bound by stringent conditionalities, as seen in structural adjustment policies. The Bank was no longer to give rigid guidelines to how a country would use funds to develop, but would engage with countries in a participatory manner. This participatory approach led to a fourth change within Bank practice; effective multi-agency working, both within the Bank and with wider UN agencies. Multi agency working within the Bank was to focus on effective mainstreaming of development issues such as civil society inclusion and gender awareness, as well as recognising different agencies' comparative advantages and capitalising on different strengths and capacities. This method of working was to translate into working relations with other UN agencies, at international and in country level, as well as more effective collaboration with the Bank's sister organisation, the IMF.

Each of these changes was underpinned by a commitment to inclusion (Wolfensohn, 1997, 2), partnerships, sustainability and institutional excellence (Wolfensohn 1996, 4), and are encapsulated within three flagship initiatives: the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC); the Country Assistance Strategies (CAS); and the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and associated Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The proposed outcome of these changes was to: make the Bank more transparent and accountable to those it affects by 'opening up' to all forms of CSOs and other 'key stakeholders'; be more responsive to country's needs by involving them in the design and implementation of Bank financed projects and policy, thus allowing them to control their own development; establish effective working partnerships both within the Bank and with other key stakeholders that would maximise comparative advantages; and make the Bank's lending structures adaptable to individual country's needs. These factors, in turn, would lead to a more transparent, flexible and responsive Bank, that would result in positive practical development outcomes.

This paper assesses whether such change has occurred and can be substantiated by exploring the three themes – CSO engagement, government ownership and multi agency working – within the MAP. The paper is based upon extensive research on the three MAP projects - the Kenya HIV/AIDS Disaster Response Project (KHADREP), the Uganda HIV/AIDS Control Project (UACP), and the Tanzania Multi Sectoral AIDS Project (TMAP) in Geneva, Kenya, London, New York, Tanzania, Uganda, and Washington DC. Each of the three projects are at different stages: with the KHADREP ending and being reconfigured into the Total War on AIDS (TWOA), the UACP ending altogether and the TMAP just beginning, having completed one of its three years. The use of three countries at different stages of the project presents comparable data that will allow any measure of change to be verified. The paper's findings are the result of 175 unstructured interviews with national non governmental organisations (NGOs), community based organisations (CBOs), INGOs, National AIDS Councils, District AIDS Councils, World Bank MAP task team leaders, UN agencies both in country and at headquarters, World Bank Global Civil Society Team, AIDS Campaign Team Africa, the Bank's Global AIDS Programme, as well as various World Bank units; 50 questionnaires distributed to District AIDS Councils; participant observation of stakeholder forums and community meetings, and the establishment of an online community forum.

In brief summary, the World Bank has undergone a process of change over the last ten years. Such change is based upon broader partnerships, country ownership of programmes, multi agency working, institutional excellence and flexibility, with the proposed outcome of becoming more transparent and accountable to those its policies and projects affect, and in so doing the realisation of key development objectives through pro poor decision making. This paper utilises the MAP to explore whether such change is as substantive and verifiable as World Bank rhetoric would suggest. Despite evidence for change in theory and approach, such change is undermined in practice, with limited

engagement of poor country governments or people, and therefore limited pro poor policy.

The Case for Change

This section provides evidence to suggest that change within the Bank has occurred. It does so by first demonstrating how the MAP has effectively engaged with CSOs, before focusing upon the positive role of governments in designing and implementing the MAP. The section then explores how the MAP has led to greater multi agency working between the Bank and UN agencies, and within the Bank itself.

Civil Society

The first evidence of change within the World Bank can be seen by its commitment to CSO engagement. The architects of the MAP recognised the work communities had been doing as the main providers of care, prevention, and in some cases treatment of HIV/AIDS, and saw their involvement as being central to success. In effect, the MAP works with CSOs at the national, regional and international levels. At the national level, the MAP directs funds to national NGOs and community groups or CBOs. These groups can range from organised collectives providing treatment to grandparents caring for orphans. The funding did not have a specific selection criterion which allowed communities to identify their own needs. Such funding was seen by the Bank as ‘1000 flowers bloom’ in that people have the knowledge and the Bank has the ability to give them the means to empower them into action. CSOs receiving funding under the MAP are not constrained by any stringent guidelines, unlike those organisations that receive funds from other donors such as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), who are unable to promote the use of condoms, work with commercial sex workers or men who have sex with men. MAP funding is

accessible to the perceived controversial groups in the region, as Adam Lagerstedt, Senior Health Specialist at the World Bank in Kenya states

men having sex with men is one of the target critical groups as well that no one is tackling... the Bank will, as long as it is seen as a joint priority the money can go to support homosexuals, the country, or prevention within the area, if there is a rationale (Lagerstedt, 16/11/05)

Funding is channelled to these groups at the national level through the National AIDS Councils and at the district level by the District AIDS Councils. The amount of money channelled to such groups was unprecedented for the Bank, the countries it worked with, and international commitments to fighting HIV/AIDS. There is no clause within the MAP that states international CSOs cannot be funded, but it is the norm for them not to be.

Dialogue and consultation at the national level occurs through report writing, monitoring and evaluation, and partnership forums. This structured dialogue through report writing occurs between: the Community and the District AIDS Councils; the District AIDS Council and the National AIDS Councils; nationally funded NGOs and the National AIDS Councils; and the National AIDS Councils and the World Bank. Unstructured dialogue takes place through the Joint Annual Progress Review (JAPR) in which the World Bank, requisite UN agencies, PEPFAR, the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (Global Fund)'s Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs), selected INGOs, selected national NGOs and government agencies such as the National AIDS Councils and Ministries of Health participate. These annual meetings are preceded by a series of working groups surrounding each of the key areas: prevention and mitigation of new infections; improvement of quality of life for people infected and affected by HIV/AIDS; mitigation of socio economic impact of HIV/AIDS; support and coordination of the national strategic plan; and civil society and private sector engagement. The purpose of the meeting is to review the year's progress and plan for the future year among all the key stakeholders, which includes a large

CSO presence. It is notable that the MAP engages with international and national CSOs at the national level through National AIDS Council engagement with specific committee groups. For example, Uganda has specific issue based community entities surrounding HIV/AIDS that meet once a month, and combined constitute the Strategic Partnership Committee. All sectors of civil society and the Uganda AIDS Commission are represented on this committee, with the World Bank and other UN agencies often participating in the process.

The Bank is to a degree responsive to dialogue outcomes and engagement both in structuring the MAP and during implementation. This can be illustrated by two key examples. The first is in regard to the TMAP in Tanzania, where the Bank wanted to speed up the disbursement of funds through the introduction of regional facilitating agents (RFAs) that would map, disburse, and monitor funds to CSOs. Mainland Tanzania agreed to the introduction of RFAs, whereas the Zanzibar AIDS Commission (ZAC) was against their use on the archipelago and saw the RFAs as a waste of funds. Despite being central to the TMAP, which included Zanzibar, the Bank agreed to not introduce RFAs in Zanzibar in line with the ZAC's request. The second example of Bank responsiveness is evident in the adaptation of monitoring methods across the region. At the outset, the MAP demanded receipts for everything, from the procurement of ARVs for a central hospital to a bag of maize to feed a few orphans. This system proved impractical as acquiring receipts for a small bag of maize etc was impossible. The Bank therefore adapted its rules concerning receipts and developed a system of 'signing and showing' to indicate purchases and disbursement.

At the regional level, the MAP engages with CSOs through regional meetings with a cross section of organisations selected as representatives by other in country organisations. These meetings are either a yearly regional review of the MAP or arranged around specific issue areas, e.g. Gender, Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVCs), treatment etc. The 'key stakeholders'

that attend the meetings include those NGOs representative of a certain population, National AIDS Council representatives, the Joint United Nations Programme on AIDS (UNAIDS), other UN agencies where appropriate, and in some, but not all, cases the World Bank's AIDS Campaign Team Africa (ACT Africa) and other Bank agencies. ACT Africa is responsible for organising the annual regional MAP review. Nadeem Mohammed of ACT Africa describes the procedure for such reviews in the following way

we ask them, in all these countries, how many NGOs and civil society organisations are doing what. When you let it happen, its amazing results. We have 34 projects and somebody brings a representative of somebody living with AIDS, somebody brings a co-ordinator of a consortium of NGOs, some bring grassroots, women's groups representatives, so it's a mixed bag, faith based organisations, so at least one, we have 34, and then we invite some heavy weights, there are very few of them because they are right from the grassroots level (Mohammed, 24/4/06)

The purpose of these meetings is to share ideas, experiences and enter into dialogue, with the outcome of setting common objectives and targets. The MAP does not fund regional NGOs at the regional level, but can fund their in country representatives.

At the international level, the MAP engages with CSOs through consultation and dialogue between ACT Africa and in country CSO representatives. Before introducing the first MAPs in Ethiopia and Kenya, ACT Africa established an advisory committee composed of CSOs that met with the Bank to air their views and concerns on the project. A variation of this process occurred in the other 29 countries that received MAP funds. Despite these meetings, there is no clear structure for how CSOs can enter into direct dialogue with the Bank at the international level. Dialogue is through feedback from the AIDS Councils, and the in country Bank Task Team Leaders. Engagement to the Bank's Global, Regional and National Civil Society Teams is possible and encouraged. However this engagement is demand driven and not necessarily a channel for HIV/AIDS specific dialogue.

In brief summary therefore, the MAP presents a change in the Bank's approach by prioritising the role of CSOs in policy and project planning, implementation, feedback and dialogue from large INGOs to the community at the national, regional and international level. The MAP represents CSO funding of an unprecedented scale, and engages with CSOs at all levels of governance. The impact of this involvement is evident in the workings of other large scale donors. The MAP was the first international HIV/AIDS donor project to send funds direct to communities. Since then, PEPFAR, INGOs and Foundations all see community groups and wider CSOs as key to successfully combating the epidemic. The Global Fund has established CCMs to co-ordinate, identify, and fund CSOs, with CSO representatives present on the Board. Therefore, not only does the MAP demonstrate change within the Bank in terms of civil society participation, it also highlights its move towards becoming 'the Knowledge Bank' in terms of development innovation and participatory outcomes.

Government Ownership

The second way in which the MAP reflects change within the Bank is the emphasis it places on governments and state ownership of individual MAP projects. Kenya and Ethiopia approached the World Bank for assistance with HIV/AIDS and were subsequently consulted in the drawing up of the framework of the MAP. Each country works in partnership with the Bank to draw up a country specific MAP to be operationalised and co-ordinated by a National AIDS Council (Kenya – National AIDS Control Council (NACC); Tanzania – Tanzania Commission for HIV/AIDS (TACAIDS); Uganda – Uganda AIDS Commission (UAC)). As Julius Byenka of the Uganda AIDS Commission states

This project was designed in country. I participated in writing the proposal. I wrote the project implementation manual and the team here at the project office, Mr Kiirya wrote all of the CHAI (Community HIV/AIDS Initiative) component, so this project was fully I should say designed by the country

team with the support of the World Bank. So right from the design stage of the project, our team, say the council, was fully in control of the process (Byenka, 11/10/05)

This approach is echoed by the Bank. As Adam Lagerstedt argues

The Bank has no objectives behind the TWOA (Total War on AIDS, Kenya), it is the government, we are supporting a government programme. That's the point and don't forget it. The Bank might have some interest in achieving results and so forth, but it is still very important that the ownership of this Bank funded project was the government, its not with the Bank itself (Lagerstedt, 16/11/05)

The Bank provides institutional support to each of the AIDS councils under the MAP, with consistent engagement with them at National level and annual visits to the District level. TACAIDS is the only council that is government sponsored; all the others are World Bank sponsored. These Councils co-ordinate the national response, liaise with the Bank and other donors, and channel funds to the community. In so doing the Bank facilitates states to control MAP funds, work with CSOs and the community, and recognise HIV/AIDS as a national disaster.

In taking on a leadership role in 'the war on AIDS' the National AIDS Councils are widely recognised by the communities in which they serve. Each of the CSOs interviewed as part of the research were aware of them and their role as co-ordinators of the national response to HIV/AIDS. They are responsive to their needs, listen to criticism and suggestion, and are autonomous from donors. The Councils encouraged those who criticise them to participate in their work. TACAIDS and the UAC were keen to answer all criticisms levelled against them and expressed a genuine interest in the research findings and opinions of the communities. The NACC in Kenya was responsive, but to a degree. Furthermore, in training these councils, the MAP ensures a form of sustainability, that once the Bank and other donors pull out of HIV/AIDS funding, the government has committed to sustaining the process. In sum, the councils and the role of the

government is integral to the effective working of the MAP. They are supported both technically and financially by the Bank, and are the main figureheads for each project.

Multi Agency Working

The third way the MAP reflects change in the Bank is through the emphasis it places upon multi-agency working. As a co-sponsor of UNAIDS, the World Bank is bound to work with the agency as well as its co-sponsors: United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), International Labour Organisation (ILO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), and the World Health Organisation (WHO), at the international and in-country level. This is evidenced at the country level through participation in the Development Partner Groups, and regular UN coordination meetings. Community visits, AIDS Councils meetings and support, monitoring and evaluation, and report writing are often conducted in partnership with multiple agencies. UN agencies are mandated to work together under the Development Assistance Framework, in accordance with UN reform. Since 2006, the WFP, UNICEF, UNFPA and UNDP are *absolutely* mandated to work together at all levels.

At the international level, ACT Africa conducts regular meetings with INGOs, PEPFAR and the Global Fund. The World Bank's Director of the Global HIV/AIDS programme, and architect of the MAP, Debrework Zewdie, sits on the Board of the Global Fund. When embarking on a project, Global Fund project managers identify existing programmes and look at how best to maximise resources in partnership with other donors. For example, in Burkina Faso there was a delay in the deployment of Global Fund money, subsequently the Fund

utilised MAP money in the interim period (Matsha, 25/05/06). Furthermore, the Bank subscribes to common objectives such as UNAIDS' 'three ones' principles - 'one agreed HIV/AIDS action framework that provides the basis for coordinating the work of all partners; one national AIDS coordinating authority with a broad based multi sectoral mandate; one agreed country level monitoring and evaluation system' (UNAIDS, 2006). UNAIDS drives partnership and coordination at each of these levels through the Global Task Team (GTT), and establishes global commitment to fighting the epidemic through the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS) declarations. Overall, through the work of the Bank-established National AIDS Councils, the response to HIV/AIDS has taken on an increasingly coordinated approach, which is in turn replicated at the regional level.

Multi agency working under the MAP is also evident within the Bank itself. The multi-sectorality of the project necessitates inter-departmental workings within the Bank, and there is strong evidence of the Global HIV/AIDS Team mainstreaming HIV/AIDS throughout the Bank, with both in country and headquarters staff being aware of the MAP, its role and impact. The response to HIV/AIDS as a development crisis demonstrates the Bank's change towards a holistic approach to development. Furthermore, it also marks change within the Bank over the last 10 years, to become increasingly African focused in its operations. The Bank remains a global institution, but Africa continues to dominate development work both within the Bank and wider institutions.

The contextual background to the MAP illustrates the change in the Bank's flexibility and responsiveness to development crises and emerging issues, as well as the role of key individuals to affect change. After being approached by the governments of Ethiopia and Kenya for financial assistance to help fight HIV/AIDS, Debrework Zewdie, 'raised the flag' of the crisis to the Board of Directors. At this stage, Zewdie had to convince the Board that: the Bank had done little to fight HIV/AIDS; that the Bank is a development agency and

HIV/AIDS is eroding the past 50 years of development, it is therefore the Bank's business; and that community support was key to tackling the epidemic (Zewdie, 03/05/06). Despite the prevalence of these issues, the Board was not initially forthcoming, as Jacomina de Regt, Sector Lead Specialist for Social Development, Africa Region, describes

it wasn't in the meeting itself but it was after the meeting in the corridors where she was stood with tears in her eyes saying 'I don't think it makes any difference to any of them'. That was something I remember as having an impact on the people who saw her so passionate, so committed and so disappointed by this blah blah blah that we gave her at the end. So we had a regional Vice President who actually did listen to her and did give her more of a leadership role and she also got to Wolfensohn, one way or another... how she got to Wolfensohn I don't know (de Regt, 20/4/06)

Three months later the MAP had been drafted to go to the Board once as an adaptable programme loan where the Bank would commit \$1billion to the overall project and then the Vice President for the region would approve individual credits to individual countries. MAP funds were available to any country in sub-Saharan Africa that had: a national strategic plan to fight HIV/AIDS; a national co-ordinating body; and a commitment to directing 40-60% of funds to CSOs. Countries were able to choose from three types of funding - 100% grant, credit with 0% interest, or a loan with interest. As a result, the MAP currently operates in 28 countries, with 8 further countries awaiting approval. This was an institutional first for the amount of money committed to the project, and demonstrates a new flexibility to funding that is responsive to individual countries needs and pressing issues. An adaptable programme loan would ensure that all countries would have access to the funds, and all subsequent AIDS programmes would follow the same structure. Overall, the MAP presented opportunities for the Bank to work in partnership and collaboration with other UN agencies and departments within the Bank. Furthermore, it represents the flexibility and responsiveness of the Bank.

Summary

Change under the MAP can clearly be seen in its open channelling of funds to CSOs, particularly CBOs; the central role of government in the co-ordination and implementation of the MAP; the flexible funding of the project, and the institution's multi agency working and responsiveness to an emerging issue. A degree of change can therefore be seen within the Bank's practical approach to development. Such change matters, as it is evidence of the Bank becoming more responsive to the people it affects, and that it has developed initiatives that are pro poor as they involve, consult and are driven by the poor. This goes beyond any public relations exercise to present a better Bank; it is instrumental to any lasting sustainable development outcomes. However, as the next section shall discuss, on closer inspection this change is not substantive enough to warrant any real change within the Bank.

What Change?

On face value the MAP does present a significant change to the Bank's working practices. However, on closer inspection such change lacks substance and verification. This section outlines the findings from research on the MAP that undermines any notion of real change. It does so by presenting further evidence of token CSO engagement, the undermining of government ownership, and limited multi agency working. The section argues that despite the appearance of good intentions substantive change is limited at every level of CSO, government and institutional engagement and collaboration. The result of which is Washington dominated approaches to development that lack a true understanding of pro poor policies, and undermine the capacity of developing countries to identify and implement their own programmes. The World Bank therefore lacks any substantive transparency or accountability.

Civil Society

The MAP demonstrates how the Bank has failed to fully engage with CSOs in regards to both funding and dialogue. In regards to funding, CSOs are not empowered to the degree the Bank suggests. CSOs have found MAP funding to be ‘too little, too late’ as most MAP funding to the community lasts one year, with frequent delays in disbursement. In describing their MAP funds a representative of Kenya Voluntary Women’s Rehabilitation Centre (K-VWORC) explains

I think it was approved last year in June and we got the money this year, in for one year. So the grant was supposed to run for one year and then we were told it was going to run for six months. So it is like we have to push, make sure that activities that were going to take one year, six months’ (K-VWORC, 25/11/05)

Research proved this experience to be the norm, with groups often thankful to the Bank for supporting their projects, but frustrated with the process and its lack of longevity. The delay and short term funding resulted in many people either stopping operations or supporting the projects with their limited incomes. The Bank blamed this on the AIDS Councils’ capacity, and the AIDS Councils blamed this on the institutional structures in Washington. Such factors prevent CBOs from making any long term commitment to the communities they serve, often resulting in ‘1000 flowers wilt’ as opposed to ‘1000 flowers bloom’. As a result some communities would rather not apply for MAP funding, and those that do commit a large amount of their time to seeking out alternative funds to sustain their projects.

A further problem in terms of funding is the MAP’s narrow conception of CSOs to only focus on the community based groups. A small percentage of funding is given to national NGOs, but these tend to be community groups working in one or more area. Whilst it is vital to recognise the important role of communities in fighting HIV/AIDS, this narrow conception undermines the multi

sectorality of the MAP. Furthermore, the MAP lacks a clear aim or objectives of CSO funding. Whilst the '1000 flowers bloom' approach does represent a change in Bank practice, the expected outcome and impact of this approach is not clear, and could be interpreted as a token gesture. Sustainability of the project remains 'the big problem' (Okumu, 14/10/05). The procedures in which CSOs are funded under the MAP are further cause for concern. The proposal submission and funding structure is well understood, however the criteria in which proposals are approved remain ad hoc. In the case of nationally funded NGOs, funding in some cases has been allocated based on who you know at the National AIDS Council, rather than the strength of a proposal.

Change in the Bank in terms of CSO engagement is further unsubstantiated when looking at CSO dialogue under the MAP. CSO dialogue under the MAP is restricted at the local, national, regional and international levels. At the national and local level, dialogue is limited to report and proposal writing, and in some cases an ad hoc community visit. There is no decentralised structure for CSO engagement and review, and dialogue at this level occurs on a sporadic basis. The monitoring and evaluation structure is unclear, and there is no defined arena in which people can air their views. Those that participate in committees at the National AIDS Council or the JAPR tend to be 'the usual suspects' known to the Council, or self proclaimed representatives of the wider community, few attendees come directly from the community. The Bank only participates in dialogue at the national level within the JAPR. Dialogue at the JAPR is meant to feedback into policy and planning. However, it is difficult to see how this works in practice. Most of the decisions and final outcomes are decided before the meeting, in the predominantly Nairobi based Monitoring Co-ordinating Groups (MCGs) and in some cases irrelevant to the process. For example, Kenya's JAPR 2005 was supposed to feedback into the Kenya Strategic Plan for the following three years, however said strategic plan had already been written with the proposed launch date set for a few days after the JAPR. Therefore even

though dialogue does occur in this arena, the purpose of this dialogue is not clear.

The lack of dialogue and a clear feedback structure at the national level is a cause of much discontent among the organisations interviewed. There is a strong desire for the World Bank to visit communities, recognise the work they are doing and become more open about the MAP process, as Kathleen Okatcha of Kenya Orphans Rural Development Programme (KORDP) argues the 'World Bank should come and look for us and other small groups... they remain in their ivory towers yet they have so much to offer communities (Okatcha, 16/11/05) and Jemima Ntindo Atiando of St Stephen's Church Widow's Group, Kenya states, 'the international bodies involve people up here who have lost touch with the grassroot' (Ntindo Atiando, 13/12/05). Communities especially feel excluded from decision making and irrelevant in the eyes of international donors. They are aware of the World Bank but at times not familiar with their role in HIV/AIDS. Furthermore, the process of dialogue and feedback is unclear, and when engaging with AIDS Councils at all levels, they do not see the process as being open, responsive or representative.

The issue of dialogue for dialogue's sake can further be seen at the regional level of engagement. Regional dialogue reflects a grander scale of 'the usual suspects' in terms of representation and discussion with little clear outcome. These issues are heightened at the regional level, as CSO representation and clear channels for feedback are increasingly narrowed and blurred. The wider the geographical focus, the less clear the purpose of dialogue, clear channels of Bank feedback and CSO representation becomes. This issue is acute at the international level of dialogue.

At the international level, dialogue with CSOs is limited to the Global Civil Society Team as opposed to the ACT Africa. ACT Africa does engage with CSOs on an ad hoc basis at the international and regional level, but generally maintain

dialogue through the National AIDS Councils. The Global Civil Society Team regularly engages with those CSOs that specifically target the Bank. The majority of their dialogue is reactionary not proactive. Yasmin Tayyab, Senior Civil Society and Partnerships Officer at the Bank characterises engagement as a disproportionate amount of 'jump and respond' on the part of the Bank (Tayyab, 25/04/06). Partnership meetings at the international level, such as the civil society forum at the World Bank-IMF Annual Meetings, are again characterised by the presence of the usual suspects that in this scenario refer to those 50+ groups that specifically target the Bank. There is once more a question over the purpose and outcome of these forums. Attendance at these meetings is possible for anyone who passes the accreditation process, however the majority of people in receipt of MAP funds or affected by the project do not have the means, either financial or access to information, in order to attend such meetings, identify and effectively target the Bank at the institutional level to the same degree as other, larger INGOs such as Save the Children, Oxfam, the Bretton Woods Project and the International Rivers Network. These organisations leverage great influence upon the Civil Society Team within the Bank and specific projects. For example, the International Rivers Network monitors how many projects they have stopped going to the Board, and have consistently delayed projects such as the controversial Bujagali Dam Project in Uganda. Those organisations that the Bank therefore jumps to at the international level, are not those who are affected by Bank policies, but those who claim to represent the poor from their offices in New York, Washington and London. This issue is one that staff in the Bank are largely aware of, as John Garrisson, Senior Civil Society Specialist states

there is an imbalance, especially in Washington, I mean the northern NGOs from the US and Europe of course tend to dominate that space... we're trying to improve, work on that imbalance, on dialogue in Washington, we're doing that through videoconferencing, for the larger annual meetings, there was one in Singapore, one in Dubai, we have raised money to bring CSOs there, but we would like eventually to have funds to bring NGOs to the annual general meetings in Washington (Garrisson, 27/4/06)

Mechanisms such as the one mentioned are being developed, but in the meantime community groups working under the MAP fit into the model of the Bank's traditional view of CSOs: low cost service providers. In summary, therefore, MAP funding is often 'too little, too late' that fails to empower communities to a sustainable level. CSO engagement is based upon representation of key actors that is limited to 'the usual suspects', and is characterised by discussion with no clear outcome or purpose. Engagement with those affected on the ground at the international level is not the norm. CSO engagement remains a 'soft issue' within the Bank, to be conducted when there is money left in the project to do so. Furthermore, international processes of engagement are based upon 'jump and respond' approaches and token inclusion.

Government Ownership

The second example of unsubstantive change within the Bank can be seen when looking at the rhetoric on government ownership. As previously outlined, governments are central to effective CSO dialogue and multi agency co-ordination, however governments do not own the mechanism of such engagement. The MAP demonstrates a lack of government ownership in the following ways. First, the only governments involved in the drawing up of the MAP were the governments that sit on the Board of Executive Directors: France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and United States. Countries affected by the MAP were not consulted. Kenya and Ethiopia were engaged after the framework of the MAP had been designed. Such engagement was therefore limited to a questions and answers session on the project. CSOs and even the Bank in-country recognise this as an issue, as Emmanuel Malangalila, the MAP's task team leader in Tanzania states

the preparation has to be with the country. Actually the project should be prepared, ideally it should be prepared by the government, ideally, you know, we are not preparing the project as a Bank, but in most cases you

find that it is the Bank preparing, doing most of it. It is supposed to be the government preparing a project and the Bank assisting, providing you know, assisting the country to prepare a project so that there is ownership of that project, right from the word go and throughout the implementation and even after implementation. So that is how it should look like but for most of the projects of the Bank you will find that because of the capacities of the country a lot is being done by the Bank (Malangalila, 20/1/06)

Second, the MAP had three prominent conditionalities that undermined state sovereignty. The first was that each state had to have one strategic plan. Each of the three countries' plans replicated their requisite MAPs. The second was that a country had to have one co-ordinating body. Each of the countries had a pre-existing HIV/AIDS specific body in the Ministry of Health. However the Bank argued that there needed to be a multi-sectoral body in the Office of the President/Prime Minister that would signal a large scale multi sectoral commitment to the fight against HIV/AIDS. In so doing, each country established their National AIDS Council *after* agreeing to receive MAP funds. This resulted in questions over state sovereignty and conflict between the National AIDS Councils and the HIV/AIDS sections of the Ministries of Health over role, status and legitimacy. The existence of two agencies undermines and confuses notions of one co-ordinating body. For example, PEPFAR channels funds through the Ministries of Health and does not work with the National AIDS Councils; and the World Bank channels funds to the National AIDS Councils and not the Ministries of Health. Both agencies are receiving large sums of money which in practice and government logic infers legitimacy over the other. The third conditionality of the MAP was the channelling of 40% of funds to civil society. Having not worked with CSOs previously, and distrusting of such organisations, most governments were not happy with this part of the MAP

there is a huge aversion between governments and civil society in general. So to break that and to search, for the Bank to say not only do we want you to engage them, we want you to channel 40-60% of the resources and that is something the countries were not used to, and that was something the Bank was not used to (Zewdie, 03/05/06)

Despite this aversion, in order to receive MAP funds governments had to agree to the conditionality. Nadeem Mohammed of the AIDS Campaign Team Africa argues that this was not a conditionality but a 'ruthless reminder' that the CSOs were 'the mechanics' of the MAP, not governments (Mohammed, 24/04/06).

A third issue facing governments under the MAP was the institutional problems within the AIDS Councils. Each of the National AIDS Councils suffered from one or more of the following: under funding, under training, lack of dialogue, and in the case of Kenya, corruption. When asked their feelings on their respective AIDS councils, CSOs would give one of two answers 'they are trying' or 'they are too political'. Since their inception, the National AIDS Councils have faced unprecedented demand and in some cases have been faced with the challenge of 'reinventing the wheel'. In the first instance, National AIDS Councils and District AIDS Councils were unsure of their roles and how to engage with civil society. Staff underwent training sessions by the Bank, but the training sessions were not followed up sufficiently. In each case, the Councils would have two or three members of staff that were seen by donors, INGOs, and government line ministries as key to making progress and leading the fight against change. Other members of staff, when asked, would answer questions on issues such as gender and civil society in a parrot form from their training. For example, when asked how they were involved in the drawing up of their MAP, members of the National AIDS Council and District AIDS Council would consistently answer 'it is a Kenyan/Tanzanian/Ugandan owned programme, therefore we were involved' but when pressed on who's idea it was to include CSOs 'it was the Bank's'. This was evident in discussions on MAP design with each of the AIDS Councils interviewed. AIDS councils would consistently state that their role is to co-ordinate not implement, but would then often use the two terms interchangeably in the same sentence.

The issue of corruption was only seen within the Kenyan NACC. Once discovered, the structure of funding was adapted to remove funding decisions

Sophie Harman – University of Manchester

from the Council, and new staff were hired through a fair and competitive process. However, the community remained unsure and wary as to the new structure, and the Council suffered a lack of trust, that a widespread ‘Maisha!’ (‘Life!’) Campaign concerning the role of the NACC, did not alter. The corruption issue highlighted a further problem with the National AIDS Councils, and that was that in selecting those CSOs to receive funds, they had become the implementers of the project. This posed a conflict of interest with their role as co-ordinators, as they were meant to be free from any key decision making, and on an equal level with their partners.

Therefore, in summary, government ownership of their respective MAP projects is a falsehood. Governments were not involved in the initial construction of the MAP and limited by three large conditionalities when structuring their individual response. Furthermore, the implementation of new government institutions has undermined state sovereignty, as well as leading to conflicts in governments, institutional strain and a conflict of interests.

Multi Agency Working

Bank rhetoric of institutional excellence and effective multi agency working is unsubstantiated by working practice under the MAP in three ways. Firstly within the Bank, the civil society team and other key agencies were not consulted in the drawing up of the MAP. Other agencies are aware of the MAP and its impact, but those agencies that enter into dialogue with ACT Africa or the National AIDS Councils do so through their own initiation. Eleanor Fink characterises inter agency working as ‘a nightmare to get anything done’ due to the scale and scope of the Bank and its operations (Fink, 20/04/06). Various agencies and units within the Bank are not utilised to their full comparative advantages in HIV/AIDS work. Units such as Community Foundations met with ACT Africa to see how they could work together, but the scales and method in which they fund are not compliant – the MAP requires rapid deployment of funds

from the top down, Community Foundations require slow mobilisation of community funds, from the bottom up, an altogether 'different funding philosophy' (Mesik, 24/04/06). The Participation and Civic Engagement Group encourage people to hold their governments to account, but fail to encourage them to do the same to the Bank. HIV/AIDS is mainstreamed throughout the Bank in terms of awareness, and token mention in policy, but not necessarily operational in practice. Furthermore, despite demonstrating a long term commitment to fighting HIV/AIDS within the MAP, the issue can be seen to take on vogue-esque connotations, with the Bank currently planning to pull out of any further MAP projects. As Jacomina de Regt, Sector Lead Specialist for Social Development Africa Region, states

I doubt we'll ever get a MAP 3 now...our commitment is basically not there. Not in terms of advocacy but in terms of money, our commitment is going way down the hill. It is very much on that slide. It is because there's so much money from PEPFAR, there's so much money from the Global Fund and we're supposed to be the lenders of last resort. In our Articles of Agreement we're supposed to come in last when a country can't find funds for something, so our proper role is not to come in with money, and if you don't come in with money you don't have a seat at the table, that's the way we usually talk among ourselves, so basically we're losing our seat at the table by no doubt (de Regt, 20/04/06)

However, when asked, other World Bank agencies, specifically ACT Africa and the Global HIV/AIDS Programme Team were unaware of this fact.

Multi-agency working within the UN is not holistic or as level as the Bank's rhetoric would suggest. The Bank's working relations with UNAIDS and its co-sponsors is dependent upon the individual personalities of in country Task Team Leaders and Project Managers, and the agenda of each agency. These relations vary between countries, agencies and different levels of governance. In all three countries the WFP and the ILO was locked out of critical engagement with the Bank. The WFP in Uganda describe how they have tried to engage with the World Bank but that it 'is in a world of its own' (Kashyap, 07/10/05), Peter Okwero

of the World Bank in Uganda responded to this claim by the WFP by saying 'I know they want to support nutrition but exactly how that fits into HIV/AIDS as a programme is not very clear' (Okwero, 1/11/05). Involvement of other key agencies such as UNFPA depended upon their engaging with the Bank, not the other way around. In some cases the division of power was unclear, this is often the case between UNDP and its sub agency, UNAIDS, and UNDP and the World Bank. Despite the appearance of collaboration, agencies often compete to be the authority on the epidemic and to receive UN funds. Oscar Avalor, the World Bank Special Representative to the UN points out that inter agency co-operation is working within a system marked by scarce resources, where agencies are 'falling over themselves' to get funding for 'sexy issues' (Avalor, 4/5/06). UN agencies find it difficult to agree and the countries that fund them even more so, hence the narrow scope of the 2006 UNGASS declaration which directly avoids any contentious issues.

As joint co-sponsors of UNAIDS, each agency should have equal influence, however such influence depends on the amount of money an agency is committing to fighting the epidemic. As a large sponsor and the first of its kind, the World Bank is of greater influence as a direct result of the amount of money it has invested in fighting the epidemic. The clearest example of such influence is within UNAIDS' 'Three Ones' principles for international co-ordination. Each of these three principles reflects the central tenets of the MAP.

The issue of sponsorship further undermines effective international agency working with non-UNAIDS sponsors such as the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). Whilst such agencies are able to participate in certain meetings at the international, regional, and national level they do not have a permanent seat at the table, or incur any financial legitimacy as they lack co-sponsor status. As Nazneen Damji, HIV/AIDS Advisor, UNIFEM states

in some cases our officers have no problem, they can have a meeting, everyone will be there, things are collaborative and then suddenly you'll be like ok everyone else leave, only co-sponsors...Its only if you feel an issue is not going to be raised if you're not in the room, but unfortunately in some cases issues do not get raised if UNIFEM is not in the room and that's the difficult part and that's when you feel like its important to be a part of that sort of joint programme because it will make sure that issue stays on the table (Damji, 10/05/06)

This issue reflects a greater problem within UN agency workings. UNIFEM and UNAIDS are part of UNDP. UNDP is a co-sponsor of UNAIDS. The Global Fund is a UN agency with its own co-ordinating body in the CCMs, but is independent of UNAIDS. The World Bank is a UN agency and a co-sponsor of UNAIDS with its own co-ordinating body, the National AIDS Councils. The Global Fund sees the CCMs as key to kick-starting in country co-ordination, the World Bank sees this as the role of the AIDS Councils. PEPFAR do not subscribe to the 'three ones' and evidence would suggest that they are viewed with suspicion by the AIDS Councils. Each of these agencies should therefore overlap and work together in some way. At national level, the Development Partner Groups are supposed to co-ordinate this multi agency working, however not all partners attend regularly, and some, for example the Global Fund, do not even have an in country presence. Governments are meant to co-ordinate and direct the response to HIV/AIDS, but they are dependent on the financial backing of competing donors. Inter-agency workings at international, regional, and national level are therefore mainly conditioned by competition, funding and whose gang you are in. This in turn leads to duplication, confusion, ineffectual coordination, and in turn limited progress in the fight against HIV/AIDS.

In sum, multi agency working is marked by competition for funds, status and authority. Collaboration is dependent upon individual countries, task team leaders or in country representatives and the amount of funding committed to HIV/AIDS. The Bank's internal co-ordination is limited to token mainstreaming and awareness of the MAP and involvement of HIV/AIDS in development strategies, but is limited by a lack of dialogue and communication.

Conclusion

This paper has used PhD research findings into the MAP in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda as a mechanism in which to explore the substance and verification of the World Bank's change rhetoric. It has outlined the meaning of change and why it matters, and provided evidence both for and against the existence of change. The paper has argued that despite the existence of strong change rhetoric, good intentions, and concrete measures in which to enact such change, in practice this change is not substantive. In so doing, the following conclusions can be drawn.

First, CSO partnerships remain constrained to the role of low cost service provision, implementation and limited dialogue. Despite a uniquely open approach to CSO funding, such funding is limited in its scope and longevity. These issues cannot be fed back into the Bank, as they are faced by small community groups, and the Bank is only responsive to those organisations with high level campaigns and lobbying capacity, and 'the usual suspects' who are supposedly representative of key demographics. It does not directly engage in dialogue with the actors it affects, namely CBOs and national NGOs. Any CSO engagement is characterised by tokenism, 'jump and respond' measures, a lack of consistency and dialogue for dialogue's sake. There is no clear feedback structure between the CSOs receiving funds, namely the community, and the requisite agency within the Bank, ACT Africa. The Bank's HIV/AIDS policy is therefore not answerable to the people it affects, but those who say they represent such people. Such policy therefore remains stagnant and unresponsive to specific community needs, an issue that has increasingly been recognised as central to the fight against HIV/AIDS.

Second, government ownership means little more than Bank benevolent control. It is true to a degree that some governments lacked the capacity to deal

with HIV/AIDS at the outset of the MAP. However, instead of the Bank building government capacity and supporting its independent HIV/AIDS strategic plan, the Bank did the opposite; it undermined capacity and designed the strategic plan. In the face of an epidemic, governments were dependent upon these funds and therefore bound to the conditionalities therein. The Bank reconfigured conditionalities as 'ruthless reminders', the Washington designed MAP as 'government owned' and implementation as 'co-ordination'.

Third, multi agency working under the MAP is limited to individual personalities, and how much money and influence each agency brings to the table. Competition for funding, authority, influence and the need to fulfil project objectives hinders effective multi-agency working. Despite the amount of money going into the fight against HIV/AIDS, the money will never work until these obstacles are addressed. Inter agency working within the Bank is limited; comparative advantages of various units have not been recognised, there is a lack of communication between agencies, and collaboration is often the result of pro-active individuals in a large bureaucracy. This is in part due to the scale and scope of the Bank's mandate, the workload of its staff members, and the bureaucratic workings of the institution.

In overall conclusion, the MAP demonstrates the potential and willingness for revolutionary change within the Bank. However such change is not substantive or verifiable, it is stuck in old institutional problems of bureaucracy and procedure. The need to change is self reinforcing, the wider the Bank enacts change, the thinner its flexible and responsive capacity to do so. The Bank therefore remains unaccountable, unrepresentative and illegitimate to the people it serves – the poor. This should matter to the Bank, as if it fails to fully engage with the poor and the governments of the poor, it will fail to articulate pro poor policy outcomes. In terms of the MAP, this will restrict progress in fighting HIV/AIDS, which will have a gross knock on impact to the poverty and

Sophie Harman – University of Manchester

development of East Africa. The dream of a world free from poverty will therefore remain just that, and the World Bank will have failed.

Bibliography

Avalle, Oscar. *Interview*. 04/05/06. Special Representative to the United Nations, World Bank

Byenka, Julius. *Interview*. 11/10/05. Uganda HIV/AIDS Commission

Damji, Nazneen. *Interview*. 10/05/06. HIV/AIDS Advisor, UNIFEM

Fink, Eleanor. *Interview*. 20/04/06. Foundations Unit, World Bank

Garrison, John. *Interview*. 27/04/06. Senior Civil Society Specialist, World Bank

Kashyapp, Purnima. *Interview*. 07/10/05. World Food Programme

Kenya Voluntary Women's Rehabilitation Centre. *Interview*. 25/11/05

Lagerstedt, Adam. *Interview*. 16/11/05. Senior Health Specialist, World Bank

Malangalila, Emmanuel *Interview*. 20/01/06. Senior Health Specialist, Tanzania. World Bank

Matsha, Ntombekhaya. *Interview*. 25/05/06. In- Country Support for Civil Society, Global Fund

Mesik, Juraj. *Interview*. 24/04/06. Community Foundations, World Bank

Mohammed, Nadeem. *Interview*. 24/04/06. ACT Africa, World Bank

Ntindo Atiendo, Jemima. *Interview* 13/12/05. St Stephen's Church Widow's Group, Kenya

Okatcha, Kathleen. *Interview*. 16/11/05. Executive Director, Kenya Orphans Rural Development Programme (KORDP),

Okumu, Robert. *Interview*. 14/10/05. Tororo District AIDS Council

Okwero, Peter. *Interview*. 01/11/05. Senior Health Specialist Uganda, World Bank

de Regt, Jacomina. *Interview*. 20/4/06. Sector Lead Specialist for Social Development Africa Region, World Bank

Sophie Harman – University of Manchester

Tayyab, Yasmin. *Interview*. 25/04/06. Senior Civil Society and Partnerships Officer, World Bank

Williamson, 1990. 'What Washington Means by Policy Reform' in John Williamson (ed) Latin American Adjustment: How much has happened? Washington DC: Institute for International Economics

Wolfensohn, James. 1996. 'People and Development'
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/PRESIDENTEXTERNAL/0,,contentMDK:20025269~menuPK:232083~pagePK:159837~piPK:159808~theSitePK:227585,00.html>

Wolfensohn, James. 1997. 'The Challenge of Inclusion: 1997 Annual Meetings Address,'
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/PRESIDENTEXTERNAL/0,,contentMDK:20040629~menuPK:232083~pagePK:159837~piPK:159808~theSitePK:227585,00.html>

World Bank, 2006a. 'Partnering with Civil Society'
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK:20094287~menuPK:220444~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~theSitePK:228717,00.html>

UNAIDS. 2006. 'The Three Ones'
http://www.unaids.org/en/Coordination/Initiatives/three_ones.asp

Zewdie, Debrework. *Interview*. 03/05/06. Director Global HIV/AIDS Programme, World Bank

Sophie Harman
PhD Student
GIPP, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, Oxford Road,
Manchester, M13 9PL, UK
+447779111715
sophie.harman@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk
Supervisor: Dr Rorden Wilkinson