Emanuel Kohlscheen is Lecturer in the Department of Economics where he teaches Macroeconomics and International Monetary Economics. He obtained his PhD at Stockholm University. Before that, he worked for the Brazilian Central Bank. His research interests include international finance, political economics, and public finance.

 

Emanuel Kohlscheen’s research has looked at the economic effects of Constitutional rules. In the paper “Sovereign Risk: Constitutions Rule” he shows that democracies in which the executive requires the confidence of the legislature to stay in power rarely default on its external debt obligations. The effect of the confidence requirement is very robust and economically significant. Another paper, “A Sovereign Debt Model with Trade Credit and Reserves” - co-authored with Steve O’Connell – analyses the implications of a cut-off of trade credit during default on the accumulation of borrowed reserves and the relative bargaining power of borrowers and bankers during a debt renegotiation.