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    Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy

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    • CAGE Working Papers
    University of Warwick

    CAGE Online Working Paper Series

    Recent working papers by members of the CAGE team, or associates of the centre can be found here.

    Copies of the all CAGE Research Papers are all available on line in the archive. Hard copies of earlier papers are available free of charge, if you wish to obtain a copy, please contact cage dot centre at warwick dot ac dot uk, quoting the Research Paper number.

    To view, download or print the paper itself using Adobe Acrobat Reader (available free from the Adobe site), click on the Research Paper title.

    These papers are also available via the RePEc archive

    Number Title Author
    88/2012 Productivity and Growth in UK Industries: An Intangible Investment Approach

    This paper tries to calculate some facts for the “knowledge economy”. Building on the work of Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (CHS, 2005,9), using new data sets and a new micro survey, we (1) document UK intangible investment and (2) see how it contributes to economic growth. Regarding investment in knowledge/intangibles, we find (a) this is now greater than tangible investment at, in 2008, £141bn and £104bn respectively; (b) that R&D is about 11%
    of total intangible investment, software 15%, design 17%, and training and organizational
    capital 22%; (d) the most intangible-intensive industry is manufacturing (intangible
    investment is 20% of value added) and (e) treating intangible expenditure as investment raises
    market sector value added growth in the 1990s due to the ICT investment boom, but slightly
    reduces it in the 2000s. Regarding the contribution to growth, for 2000-08, (a) intangible
    capital deepening accounts for 23% of labour productivity growth, against computer hardware
    (12%) and TFP (40%); (b) adding intangibles to growth accounting lowers TFP growth by
    about 15% (c) capitalising R&D adds 0.03% to input growth and reduces lnTFP by 0.03%
    and (d) manufacturing accounts for just over 40% of intangible capital deepening plus TFP.

    Click here to download (PDF Document)
    Mariela Dal Borgo, Peter Goodridge, Jonathan Haskel and Annarosa Pesole
    87/2012 Incumbent Eff ects and Partisan Alignment in Local Elections: a Regression Discontinuity Analysis Using Italian Data

    This paper provides a simple model to explain effect of political alignment between
    different tiers of government on policy choices and election outcomes. We
    derive precise predictions that, as long as voters attribute most of the credit for
    providing public goods to the local government: (i) aligned municipalities receive
    more grants, set lower taxes and provide more public goods, (ii) that the probability
    that the local incumbent is re-elected is higher in aligned municipalities compared
    to not aligned ones. Our empirical strategy to identify the alignment effects is built
    upon the fact that being or not aligned changes discontinuously at 50% of the vote
    share of local parties. This allows us to use sharp regression discontinuity design.
    Our theoretical predictions are largely confirmed using a new dataset on Italian
    public finance and electoral data at the central and local level.

    Click here to download (PDF Document)
    Emanuele Bracco, Michela
    Redoano and
    Francesco Porcelli
    86/2012

    Life Satisfaction, Household Income and Personality Traits

    We show that personality traits mediate the e ect of income on Life Satisfaction. The effect is strong in the case of Neuroticism, which measures the sensitivity to threat and punishment, in both the British Household Panel Survey and the German Socioeconomic Panel. Neuroticism increases the usually observed concavity of the relationship: Individuals with higher Neuroticism score enjoy income more than those with lower score if they are poorer and enjoy income less if they are richer. When the interaction between income and neuroticism is introduced, income
    does not have significant effect on his own.

    To interpret the results, we present a simple model where we assume that (i) Life Satisfaction is dependent from the gap between aspired and realized income, and this is modulated by Neuroticism and (ii) income increases in aspirations with a slope less than unity, so that the gap between aspired and realized income increase with aspirations. From the estimation of this model we argue that poorer tend to overshoot in their aspiration, while rich tend to under-shoot. The estimation of the model also shows substantial effect of traits on income.

    Click here to download (PDF Document)

    Eugenio Proto and Aldo Rustichini

    85/2012

    Strategic Budgeteering and Debt Allocation

    This paper analyzes how opportunistic governments choose between alternative fiscal policies in order to increases their chances of re-election. To increase the provision of public goods shortly before elections – and thus, to generate a fiscal political business cycles – governments may either increase deficits or redistribute governmental resources from longterm efficient sources to short-term efficient public programs. We argue that incumbents who face highly competed elections principally have an incentive to spend more on public goods even though these investments are not efficient in the long term. In principal, they would do so by increasing the deficits (with re-balancing the budget after the election). However, our model demonstrates that incumbents would even electioneer at the cost of long-term investments if the extent of fiscal transparency does not allow them to finance the provision of public goods with higher deficits. In other words, if elections are close and voters may observe the governmental deficit, then governments tend to increase the provision of public goods – and consequently, their electoral prospects – by a redistribution of budget resources from long-term efficient investment to a short-term provision of public goods. We test the predictions with new data on the composition of government consumption for 17 OECD countries over 35 years. The preliminary findings suggest that governments indeed reshuffle resources from long-term efficient investment to short-term public goods before electionsespecially if elections are contested.

    Click here to download (PDF Document)

    Vera E. Troeger and C Schneider

    84/2012

    De Facto Capital Mobility, Equality, and Tax Policy in Open Economies

    This paper attempts at giving theoretical and empirical answers to the remaining puzzles in the literature on tax competition: the persistently high tax rates on mobile capital and the large variation in domestic tax systems. I argue that governments face a political trilemma, in which they cannot maintain the politically optimal level of public good provision, reduce capital taxes to competitive levels and implement a political support-maximizing mix of tax rates on capital and labour simultaneously. In particular, while legal restriction on capital flows have been eliminated by virtually all OECD countries, de facto capital mobility falls short of being perfect. Limits to full capital mobility result from ownership structures: the higher the concentration of capital, the higher the de facto mobility of capital and the lower the equilibrium tax rate. Second, the demand for the provision of public goods further constraints governments’ choices of the capital tax rate. If revenue from taxation of mobile factors declines, politicians cannot necessarily cut back spending without losing political support. Policy makers, accordingly, do not face a simple optimization problem when deciding on capital taxation. Rather, they have to choose a tax system which allows them to supply an appropriate level of public goods. Policy makers finally face a trade-off resulting from the redistributive conflict between capital-owners and workers. This conflict does not resemble a mere zero-sum game, because lower levels of capital taxation are likely to improve aggregate welfare, but the decision on capital taxation also cannot be analyzed in isolation from the distributive effects of reducing taxes on mobile factors. This political logic of tax competition generates important predictions which are tested empirically for 23 OECD countries over 30 years within a spatial econometrics framework

    Click here to download (PDF Document)

    Vera E. Troeger

     

    83/2012

    Tax Competition and Income Inequality: Why did the Welfare State Survive

    Contrary to the belief of many, tax competition did not undermine the foundations of the welfare state and did not even abolish the taxation of capital. Instead, tax competition caused governments to shift the tax burden from capital to labor, thereby increasing income inequality in liberal market economies that traditionally redistribute income by relatively high effective capital taxes and relatively low effective labor taxes. In contrast, income inequality did increase little or not at all in social welfare states that dominantly use social security transfers to redistribute income. Governments in social welfare states found it easy to maintain high social expenditures because they increasingly taxed labor, which is relatively immobile, to finance social security transfers. We test the predictions of this theory using a simultaneous equation approach that accounts for the endogeneity of tax policies, fiscal policies, and deficits

    Click here to download (PDF Document)

     

    Thomas Plümper and
    Vera E. Troeger

    82/2012

    Monetary Policy Flixibility in floating Exchange Rate Regimes: Currency Denomination and Import Shares

    This paper argues that the degree of monetary flexibility a government enjoys does not only depend on the implemented monetary institutions such as exchange rate arrangements and central bank independence but also on the economic and financial relationships with key currency areas. I develop a formal theoretical framework explaining the degree of monetary independence in open economies under flexible exchange rate regimes by trading relations and financial integration. The model suggests that a) higher import shares from the key currency area increase the imported inflation when monetary authorities try to offset an exogenous shock by cutting back the interest rate while the base country does not encounter a similar shock, and b) the more cross border assets of a country are denominated in the base currency the higher the exchange rate effects of interest rate differences to the interest rate of the key currency area. The presented empirical evidence largely supports the theoretical predictions.

    Click here to download (PDF Document)

    Vera E. Troeger

    81/2012

    India and The Great Divergenace: An Anglo-Indian Comparison of GDP per capita, 1600 -1871

    This paper provides estimates of Indian GDP constructed from the output side for the pre-1871 period, and combines them with population estimates to track changes in living standards. Indian per capita GDP declined steadily during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before stabilising during the nineteenth century. As British living standards increased from the mid-seventeenth century, India fell increasingly behind. Whereas in 1600, Indian per capita GDP was over 60 per cent of the British level, by 1871 it had fallen to less than 15 per cent. As well as placing the origins of the Great Divergence firmly in the early modern period, the estimates suggest a relatively prosperous India at the height of the Mughal Empire, with living standards well above bare bones subsistence.

    Click here to download (PDF Document)

    Stephen Broadberry and Bishnupriya Gupta


    Please click here to access past working papers

    Click here to access all CAGE Working Papers

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    Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE), Department of Economics,
    University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL

    Tel: +44 (0)24 7615 1176
    Email: cage.centre@warwick.ac.uk

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    Page contact: Helen Neal Last revised: Thu 24 May 2012
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