Molotov and the Moscow Conference, October 1943

Introduction

Molotov served as head of NarkomIndel from May 1939 until 1949, and then again in the early Khrushchev era. He is often remembered as being involved in some of the most infamous episodes in the foreign policy of the USSR: the Nazi-Soviet pact, the dismemberment of Poland, the take-over of the Baltic states and the creation of the Soviet satellite empire in eastern Europe after 1945. His style was equally notorious: he was rude and abrupt, and the net over the smallest matter came to represent the inflexible and stubborn nature of Soviet negotiating techniques, at the post-war conferences of foreign ministers. He seemed to be insensitive to and lack understanding of western opinion, which unlike his predecessor Litvinov, and subordinates, like Maiskii, he was not prepared to make any effort to represent to his Kremlin colleagues.¹ There was, however, a much more positive side to Molotov as commissar for Foreign Affairs. If the Triple Alliance negotiations of 1939 with Britain and France failed, their success might have prevented the Second World War; during his visit to Britain and the USA in 1942 the Grand Alliance which was responsible for the defeat of Hitler war was forged; and the Moscow foreign ministers conference of October 1943, which is generally taken as marking the peak of Molotov’s diplomatic career, was crucial in laying the foundations for the post-war world. At this conference he took the lead in establishing the basis for Soviet post-war policy.

This paper aims to re-assess the Moscow Conference in the light of additional archive² and memoir material now available and examine the role of Molotov there. This, the first occasion when the three foreign ministers of the major allied powers were able to meet, was the longest wartime conference, thirteen days compared with Teheran’s five and Yalta’s eight, and the western allies found Molotov more affable

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than at any other time. According to Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, the conference was the ‘high tide if not of good, at least of tolerable relations’ with the USSR.’ In October 1943 the Soviet Union basked in the sunshine of the first major inter-allied conference in its own capital: the foreign ministers of the USA and Great Britain had come to Moscow to negotiate with the USSR on its own ground, and on terms of equality. An editorial in Izvestiya, on the day Eden and Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State, landed, stressed that the USSR had been admitted on equal terms to the politico-military committees on North Africa and Italy, and that Stalin had joined Churchill and Roosevelt in signing a declaration approving Italy’s entry into the war on the side of the allies. It concluded that the USSR’s demand for full equality with Great Britain and the USA had already been granted. This change in status for the USSR led to the conference being marked by sumptuous diplomatic receptions, luncheons and banquets. In addition, Moscow was partially repaired and re-decorated. During the conference, Oliver Harvey, Eden’s private secretary wrote in his diary:

> Our impression is, and it is confirmed by our press people, that the Soviets are determined that this conference shall be a success. . . . Individual Russians all express confidence and pleasure in conversation. For the first time they feel they are being treated as equals and that we are bringing our troubles to them for unprejudiced discussion.

Eden made similar comments immediately after the conference. V. Mastny contends that because, in contrast with the western allies they had as yet made no foreign conquests, the Russians were ‘playing a weak hand’ at the conference. This can be questioned. A major factor influencing the conference was the Soviet victories at Stalingrad in January 1943, at Kursk in July and continuing Soviet military success. There was no doubt now about the outcome of the war, and the precise timing of the American and English cross-channel invasion of Europe was of less importance, although information about the strategy and plans of the western allies was vital. The question at issue was the post-war settlement when Germany was defeated. Soviet military victories meant that Stalin and Molotov were moving into a strong position to dictate this.

**Background**

The origins of the Conference lay in the proposals of Roosevelt, dating back to December 1941, for a personal meeting between himself, Churchill and Stalin to
discuss post-war problems; the American President hoping to persuade the other two leaders of the importance of his plan for a post-war international peace-keeping organisation. Roosevelt believed that he could do much with Stalin through his personal influence, and that he could mediate between Stalin and Churchill who were likely to clash because of conflicting Soviet and British interests in the Near and Middle East, and on India’s North West Frontier.

The reason why the meeting was so long delayed was that there were genuine difficulties in finding a location. In 1942 and 1943 Stalin pleaded that his responsibilities as supreme commander and the grave position of the USSR, meant that it was out of the question for him to leave Moscow, and insisted on a meeting there. This was impossible for Roosevelt, because he could not fulfil his presidential responsibility for returning bills referred from Congress within ten days if he attended a meeting in Moscow, or elsewhere in the USSR. This allowed Churchill, who had flown to Moscow to see Stalin in August 1942, and had travelled to Canada, the USA and North Africa to meet Roosevelt, to act as broker. He did not wish the other two leaders to meet without him as he was not sure that Roosevelt would stand up to Stalin on such matters as Poland, where there was already disagreement between Great Britain and the USSR, leading to Stalin breaking off relations with the Polish government in exile in London in April 1943. The British attitude is reflected in a minute which Eden, the British foreign Secretary wrote to Churchill on 1 March 1943:

It seemed clear to me that our ambassador, on his return from leave ought to make some response to the allusion made by Stalin in his speech of last November regarding future Anglo-American-Soviet collaboration, and that he ought to use this opportunity to discuss with Stalin various specific questions of common interest, e.g. the situation in Yugoslavia, policy towards Romania, the ideas of confederations in eastern and south-eastern Europe, in respect of which Soviet policy seems recently to have been uncertain.

It was, I confess, never my intention that our ambassador should hand any written document to Molotov or to Stalin about the future of Germany, and I hope that the attached telegram. . . will get the talks on the rails again. Actually, in spite of the usual acerbity which distinguishes Soviet communications, I do not think Stalin’s letter too unhelpful, and you will at any rate observe. . . (a) that the Russians are apparently pleased – if bewildered – that we have consulted them on a matter of this importance in advance of the Americans and (b) that there may be some chance of their agreeing to tripartite conversations, if and when we have need of these. In May 1943, Molotov hosted celebrations to mark the first anniversary of the agreements with Britain and the USA, but throughout 1943, relations between Stalin
and his western allies deteriorated, particularly over the failure of the western powers to open a ‘Second Front.’ In January 1943, when Admiral Standley, the American ambassador in Moscow, had delivered the communiqué from the Casablanca conference, Stalin had turned to Molotov and asked ‘No commitment to the Second Front?’ In response Molotov had snarled ‘Not yet; not yet.’ Following their successful North African operation, Britain and America decided in Washington, in May 1943, on the invasion of Sicily, followed probably by an attack on the Italian mainland, delaying a direct invasion of north-west Europe, as desired by Stalin, to spring 1944. It is now clear, however, that the recall of Maisky and Litvinov, Soviet ambassador to Britain and the USA, experienced diplomats sympathetic to the countries in which they were serving was not a protest gesture as argued by some older authorities, nor was it a result of Stalin’s desire to handle relations with his allies personally. Litvinov and Maisky, who were appointed as deputies to Molotov in Moscow, were needed to assist NKID in the end-of-war planning it was undertaking on Politburo orders. Molotov made clear to Clark Kerr, the British ambassador, the need for Maisky in Moscow in an interview in May 1943.

Stalin also believed that he was not receiving information about Anglo-US negotiations for the surrender of Italy after the fall of Mussolini, his suspicions being increased because Britain and the USA were dilatory and confused in informing the USSR. The Arctic convoys were also a growing source of friction. Stalin considered that they were a binding commitment made by the British government to be maintained at all costs. Churchill felt that they should be continued if possible, but not if the cost was too high. The situation was further complicated because of the refusal of the USSR to receive British personnel on its territory to support the convoys, and the convoys were suspended from April 1943. A month before, Standley had publicly criticised the Soviet lack of appreciation of American aid which had led to a protest from Molotov and again increased tension. Molotov insisted to the British ambassador that the convoys be resumed in September 1943, and they were restarted in November after a bitter exchange between Churchill and Stalin, the decision being taken before the Moscow conference.

There was also the question of peace feelers from the hostile powers, and mutual suspicion that one of the allies might make a separate peace. When Clark Kerr raised the issue with Molotov in April 1943, Molotov told him that no one had approached the Soviet government on behalf of Germany with peace suggestions, and
that if anyone did they would ‘send him to all the devils.’ On 27 August 1943, Standley wrote to Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State:

In conversation with Molotov last night the British Ambassador informed the Foreign Minister of certain peace feelers . . . [which] involved an approach . . . by a certain Veres. . . . Molotov appeared to be somewhat suspicious and asked many questions as to who Veres represented and how the British government viewed the matter. . . .

Soviet military success as well as deteriorating relations made the western allies redouble their efforts to obtain a meeting. In early August 1943 Eden and Churchill became concerned at Stalin’s unresponsiveness to invitations to tripartite meetings, Churchill, on Eden’s initiative, offering to send his foreign secretary to Moscow ‘to stroke the bristles of the bear,’ as Eden put it. Stalin refused this offer: he had no wish to hear again British excuses about the Second Front and Arctic convoys. He insisted, that a meeting of the three heads of government was ‘desirable at the first opportunity,’ but not possible for him at the moment because, in the current military situation, he could not absent himself ‘even for one week.’ In the meantime, Stalin proposed a meeting of ‘responsible representatives’ of the three powers to prepare the ground. He added

It is necessary beforehand to agree on the scope of the questions to be discussed and the drafts of the proposals which are to be accepted. Without this the meetings will not give any concrete results.

Eden advised Churchill, who was with Roosevelt at Quebec, to accept a meeting on the lines suggested by Stalin, but Roosevelt took longer to make up his mind, and it was not until 18 August that he telegraphed Stalin, on behalf of Churchill and himself, accepting a meeting at foreign minister level. He proposed that the meeting should be exploratory. In response, Molotov, as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, passed Standley a note from Stalin insisting that the meeting ‘should not be of a narrow exploratory character but of a practical preparatory character,’ re-iterating Stalin’s plan that the agenda and draft documents be agreed beforehand.

Two months of discussion to agree time, place and personnel followed. As early as 10 September Churchill and Roosevelt accepted Moscow, and Stalin insisted on this despite a number of alternative suggestions. When, in late September, Roosevelt tried to re-open the matter and have the conference transferred to England, because the elderly Cordell Hull would find the long journey difficult, Stalin was adamant on Moscow, replying:
The situation is that in case the Conference is convened not in Moscow but in England as you propose, Mr. V. M. Molotov, whose presence at the Three Power Conference as representative of the Soviet Union I consider indispensable, would not be able to go to the Conference at the intended time. The departure of V. M. Molotov from the Soviet Union, at least in the near future is impossible since in a short time, as you know, the departure of A. Ya. Vyshinskii, the First Assistant of V. M. Molotov at the Foreign Office, for Algiers is proposed.

Furthermore, it is well known that the press in the United States and in England has already published widely that the forthcoming meeting will take place in Moscow and the selection of a new place of meeting might give rise to undesirable suspicions. That the western powers finally gave way on the location of the conference may well reflect the growing military might of the USSR. The experience of 1939 demonstrated to Stalin that both the proceedings, and his commissar for foreign affairs, would be easier to control in Moscow: the difficulties that had arisen when Molotov visited Great Britain and the USA in 1942, and were to arise in 1945 could be avoided. After his experience in trying to follow Stalin’s wishes in Great Britain and the USA in 1942, it must also have been to the relief of Molotov! When Molotov negotiated abroad, Stalin exercised what one authority has described as ‘a system of remote control.’ In Moscow Stalin’s control could be direct and his appointment diary shows that Molotov met him daily during the conference, after each meeting, except on one day, 22 October, when Stalin appears to have had no appointments. As this was a foreign ministers conference, preparing for a meeting of the three political leaders, Stalin was present only at formal occasions arranged to celebrate the conference.

The Conference

Participants and Priorities

Cordell Hull, the leader of the American delegation, had held his position since the time Roosevelt was first elected president. Over seventy, he was in the tradition of Woodrow Wilson: an internationalist with faith in international covenants and institutions, a respect for national sovereignty and the independence of nations. Collective security and ‘national self-determination’ appealed to him, not the more traditional concepts of ‘balance of power,’ ‘spheres of influence’ and alliances, which he detested. He was not, however, Roosevelt’s first choice. The President would
have preferred Hull’s deputy, Sumner Welles, or the ambassador designate to the USSR, Averell Harriman, with whom he had closer personal ties and for whose negotiating skills he had greater respect. Hull was sent because it was believed that his absence would have been taken as a snub by the Soviet government. Before Hull left for Moscow, Standley the retiring American ambassador told him that

I have always found Mr. Molotov scrupulously polite and correct. At no time do I recall that he treated me unpleasantly, even though he was sometimes called upon to tell me unpleasant things. But he is a completely humourless dedicated man, devoted to Party principles and whole-heartedly loyal to the Boss [Stalin].

Hull may have had an advantage in that Molotov believed him sympathetic to the USSR, for when they met in 1942, Hull told Molotov that he had advocated American recognition of the USSR on taking office in 1933 because of the traditional friendship of the two countries and the need for co-operation in the years ahead..

The American priority for discussion at the conference was Roosevelt’s proposal for post-war international collaboration. It was intended that this and agreement on ‘unconditional surrender’ was to be reflected in a ‘Four Power Declaration,’ to be signed by Chiang-Kai-Shek, for China, as well as the three major allies. Hull had sent the proposal, as agreed by Churchill and Roosevelt at the Quebec Conference 1943, to Molotov, but had received an unfavourable response. The USSR, as well as considering Chiang too weak to be involved and the Chinese Nationalists hostile, was uneasy about the Japanese reaction to the USSR as a co-signatory of such a document alongside its enemy nationalist China. The second priority of the United States was post-war policy towards Germany and other defeated states, but it was also recognised that current problems such as relations with De Gaulle and the question of Italian surrender might need discussion.

Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary was at the height of his powers and his prestige was great. He had made his reputation in the 1930s as a champion of the League of Nations and as an opponent of appeasement, which led to his resignation from the Foreign Office. Churchill had restored him as foreign secretary in 1941, and he had been the first major western politician to meet Stalin in 1935. He visited Moscow and saw him again in December 1941, and had worked alongside Churchill in the Grand Alliance negotiations 1942, having met Molotov on these three occasions.
International co-operation was not a high priority for the British. Churchill and Eden wanted to focus on establishing a machinery for consultation on specific problems connected with the war, mainly European, for example Germany, Italy, Poland, Finand and Eastern Europe, but also the Middle East. They also wished to discuss Turkish entry into the war, which they discovered the USSR was anxious to consider.\textsuperscript{40}

The USSR undertook considerable advanced planning for the conference. As early as January 1942 the Politburo had established ‘a commission for plans for post-war state structure of the countries of Europe, Asia and other parts of the world.’ As part of the its work Molotov chaired a sub-commission to prepare diplomatic materials.\textsuperscript{41} It is not clear how much work these commissions did, but in early September 1943 the Politburo established two further commissions under NarkomIndel auspices (\textit{pri} NarkomIndel): the first chaired by Litvinov on the ‘peace treaties and post-war structure;’ the second, chaired by K. Voroshilov on ‘questions of the armistice.’\textsuperscript{42} Both commissions provided briefing material for Molotov before and during the Moscow conference, particularly that chaired by Litvinov. On almost every agenda item at the conference Molotov followed the line of these briefing papers\textsuperscript{43} and Litvinov was sometimes present in Stalin’s office during the course of the conference.\textsuperscript{44} Among the most important papers are two memoranda from Litvinov: one on mechanisms for permanent consultations among the allies; in the other he argued that any post-war international organisation would not be able to function effectively without a division of the world into Soviet, American and British zones of responsibility, with these powers enforcing decisions, although he also advised the USSR should avoid showing that it advocated a division into spheres of influence.\textsuperscript{45} This reflected the Soviet view that the peace and post-war state structure would be formulated with the USA and Great Britain. On the key question of the future security of the USSR from German aggression, evolving Soviet policy aimed at the long-term occupation of a dismembered Germany, which was to be disarmed and denazified, and from which punitive reparations were to be extracted.\textsuperscript{46} The briefing materials related not only to policy but also to tactics, for example they included plans to defer discussion so that Molotov and his colleagues could discuss matters with the commission.\textsuperscript{47}

Because the British and American agenda items were submitted first, it left Stalin and Molotov in a position to probe on a number of issues. It also left the door
open for Stalin to put forward the topic he knew he could use to put pressure on the western powers. In addition, with Soviet military victories, it is clear that the USSR would be less enthusiastic about discussing such matters as its post-war boundaries, particularly the frontiers of Poland and Romania in dispute with their western allies, which could now be settled without western aid. The Soviet proposals, therefore, submitted over Molotov’s signature to the British ambassador, to the American charge in Moscow, and to the American government by A. Gromyko, the new Soviet ambassador, on 29 September, consisted of one item: ‘Measures for Shortening the War,’ i.e. the question of the Second Front, and specifically a cross-channel invasion by Great Britain and the USA in 1943. The Soviet document stated that the Soviet government accepted the British and American proposals for agenda items, but added that since the conference was three-power, the USSR could no reason to discuss a four-power declaration. It was noted that the conference was to be preparatory. 48

The Soviet proposal caused consternation in London and Washington. Raising the question of the Second Front, particularly as it was a military question, initially caused speculation that the USSR wished the conference to be abandoned. It was then suggested that, since in his initial proposals for the conference Stalin had indicated that he was prepared to discuss other matters, the USSR was not prepared to discuss these until there was a firm assurances on the cross-channel invasion. 49 Whether or not the reference to ‘questions concerning European countries,’ in Molotov’s documents to the Americans, was intended to be provocative, referring to the west’s delay in invading the European mainland, or if western politicians read it that way is not clear, but Molotov had used similar ploys in earlier negotiations. 50 It is also evidence of Molotov’s interest in the peace settlement with Italy. If the Soviet view appeared intransigent and self-centred to the western powers, the view from Moscow was conditioned by prolonged hardship and suffering following the Nazi invasion, and suspicions because of the failure of the western powers to launch a cross-channel invasion.

Preliminaries

On 1 October, the day that the conference was announced, Molotov was awarded the title of ‘Hero of Socialist Labour.’ 51 Admittedly, this was for ‘increasing tank production,’ not for achievements in the field of foreign policy, but as the British
Ambassador commented, it was the ‘rarest award in the USSR,’ and obviously increased his status for the forthcoming negotiations. On 12 October Molotov saw Clark Kerr to discuss arrangements for the forthcoming conference after which the British ambassador wrote to Eden:

Yesterday I tried to make Molotov say that he had great expectations of the conference, but he would not go beyond a very sober expression of hope saying that it had many difficult problems to deal with and that if one of these were settled it would be good, if several were settled that would be better still. We should all have to work like Stakhanovites.

Eden had proposed to Hull that they met at Cairo for preliminary talks en route to Moscow. This suggestion was rejected by Hull as it might be ‘misconstrued’ by the Soviet Union, but they did meet briefly in Teheran on the outward journey, and at the American embassy before the opening of the conference proper. On arrival in Moscow, Molotov met both Hull and Eden. Hull and Molotov joked about the number of press cameramen present. Eden found Molotov ‘very affable,’ and talked to him about ‘harmony’ and the need to ‘keep in step’ (suggested by the guard of honour). Hull and Eden called on Molotov for a preliminary meeting in the evening of 18 October, to discuss announcements to the press, personnel to attend, and time of the first meeting of the conference proper. No doubt, to the surprise of Eden and Hull, who expressed a desire that only three representatives of each power should be present at the main sittings, Molotov stated that the full seven man delegation of the USSR would represent the USSR at the formal sessions. After this meeting Molotov called on Hull and responded sympathetically to Hull’s complaints about Soviet press censorship and to the hope of close co-operation he expressed.

**Proceedings**

On 19 October, the first formal session of the conference took place. Meetings were held in the huge, ornate Spiridonovka Palace. Diplomatic uniforms had been reintroduced in the USSR specifically for the conference and initially Molotov was in some difficulty. He looked somewhat ridiculous. The uniform was black trimmed in gold, with a small dagger at the belt. To me, the uniform looked much like that of Hitler’s elite S.S. troops. The Russians were inordinately proud of their new dress. By the end of the war, Soviet diplomats seldom wore the uniform. I imagine they began to hear some derisive comments made by foreigners and quietly dropped the idea.
After a show of reluctance, expressing a preference for a rotating
chairmanship, arguing that the difficult position should be shared, Molotov accepted
the chair on a permanent basis.\textsuperscript{64} This placed the full responsibility for the success of
the conference on his shoulders. A brief discussion of the role of the conference as
‘preparatory,’ and the power of its members, followed. Molotov was clearly not
satisfied with the limited powers of Eden and Hull to take decisions without
consulting their governments\textsuperscript{65} He then submitted an agenda prepared by the Soviet
dellegation. It included the Soviet item ‘Measures for Shortening the War’ as the first
item, then one which, it was claimed, was British: ‘an exchange of opinions on the
position in Italy and the Balkans,’ followed by all the items proposed by the USA and
Great Britain, except the proposed ‘Four Power Declaration.’\textsuperscript{66} Molotov stated that as
a result of the correspondence between the three governments it was not clear if this
item was to be included or not. On Hull’s insistence, it became the second item on the
agenda, and Molotov was able to secure modifications during the discussions to make
the Declaration acceptable to the USSR.\textsuperscript{67}

Molotov now presented the Soviet proposals on item 1 – ‘Measures for
Shortening the War,’ the chief of which stated:

(1) That the governments of Great Britain and United States take in 1943 such
urgent measures as will ensure invasion of northern France by Anglo-
American armies and, coupled with powerful blows of Soviet troops on the
main German forces on Soviet-German front, will radically undermine the
military-strategical situation of Germany and bring about a decisive shortening
of the duration of the war.
(2) that the three powers suggest to the Turkish government that Turkey
should immediately enter the war.

and that Sweden be asked to place air bases at the disposal of the allies.\textsuperscript{68} Turkish
entry into the war clearly meant that Germany would have to divert forces already
fighting the USSR. The Soviet leaders also probably hoped that it would allow Soviet
warships passage through the Straits into the Mediterranean and strengthen the
position of the USSR with regard to the western military campaign in Italy. There
seems no evidence to support Mastny’s argument that the Soviet desire for Turkey to
enter the war indicated that the USSR did not wish to monopolise the liberation of the
Balkans.\textsuperscript{69}

Eden concluded his report to Churchill on this meeting:
On the whole we all felt that the opening exchanges may have been worse. The atmosphere was distinctly cordial. . . .

Adding,

You will note that the Russians do not specifically state that the invasion of Northern France by the Anglo-American armies should take place this year. To this extent it is I suppose an advance on what might be expected. . . .

One may ask if Eden realised the significance of reduced Soviet pressure for a Second Front.

Before the second session Molotov hosted a hearty luncheon at which there were a profusion of toasts. Then, after protests from the western delegates about the heat of the room, Molotov having arranged for its temperature to be increased because Hull had felt cold and sent for his coat during the first session, the meeting commenced. Seeking room to manoeuvre Molotov protested vociferously but un成功fully about chairing it, because the Soviet agenda item, ‘Measures for Shortening the War,’ was to be discussed. General Ismay, the British military representative, supported by General Deane, the American military specialist, then made detailed statements about preparations for the invasion of France in 1944, including bombing raids carried out and the number of troops and aircraft that it was proposed to utilise. This was a tactic by the western powers to convince the Soviet representatives that they were serious about the ‘Second Front.’ Molotov and Voroshilov asked ‘a number of pertinent and reasonable’ questions. There was no acrimony, clearly a reflection that the Soviet need for a continental invasion had declined since 1942.

Discussion then passed to Turkish entry into the war, Eden and Molotov agreeing that it was desirable, but Hull, particularly according to the Soviet version of the conference proceedings, was less committed. Molotov asked Eden if his statement was a personal view or the view of the British government, and Eden replied that it was the view of the British government, although not a strongly held one. According to Eden’s personal report to Churchill on this discussion, Molotov supported him when he sounded a warning note about Turkish aspirations in the Balkans, but this is not apparent in any of the formal records of the proceedings. A discussion on the Soviet proposal for air bases in Sweden followed, Hull and Eden acknowledging their desirability, but pleading that it was necessary to refer the matter to their governments. The session concluded with an attempt by Molotov, not recorded in the
British report of the discussions, to obtain information about the precise timing of the invasion of north-west Europe in 1944. He noted the Quebec Conference statement that it would be in the spring, but failed to get a satisfactory response, Eden referring him to General Ismay’s statement that was to appear in written form on the next day. Despite this, Eden reported to Churchill, ‘for the moment we are in exceptionally smooth waters.’

At the third session, on 21 October, Molotov attempted unsuccessfully to probe for detail on the previous day’s military statements. He was then insistent in trying to establish how firm was the decision to invade Northern France in the spring of 1944, asking if this was a ‘definite’ decision. In response, Eden again referred him to the relevant paragraph in Ismay’s report, which did not specify a specific time in 1944. Molotov’s effort to commit the western powers, by insisting that the military reports were written into the protocol of the Conference, together with the record of discussions: the Soviet view on one side of the page, the Anglo-American on the other, was unsuccessful. He then asked for any response regarding the Soviet proposals on Turkey and Sweden, but agreed to defer further discussion until Hull and Eden had received a response from their governments. He was clearly irritated, asking on a number of occasions if there were further proposals for shortening the war.

Following this difficult stage discussion of the Four Power Declaration began. Molotov welcomed Hull’s proposal saying that it was generally supported by the USSR, but immediately raised the question of China, and asked if it was possible to amend the document at the conference when China was not present. During a break in the conference proceedings, Hull threatened Molotov that if China were not allowed to sign, the USA might have to make ‘readjustments’ to keep the political and military situation in the Pacific ‘properly stabilised.’ He concluded that Molotov had seen ‘the reasonableness’ of what he said. If that was the case, when the meeting resumed, Molotov’s response was to press for the Declaration to be finalised and signed at the conference, the Chinese then being asked to sign the document. It was agreed, however, to consider the substance of the document, before taking a final decision on this. The Soviet record of the discussion makes far clearer than the British and American record that Molotov’s amendments to point 2 pledged the USSR to ‘joint action in imposing surrender terms,’ but not to ‘subsequent joint action.’ It also shows that on point 7 there were Soviet objections to ‘joint consultations and agreement’
(‘agreement’ eventually deleted as a result of Molotov’s pressure) before using their forces within the territory of other states in the ‘post-war period’ (already amended at Molotov’s request from ‘following the defeat of the enemy’). Molotov was seeking a free hand for Soviet forces in the post-war world in territories it had re-conquered, and testing the west to see if it would acquiesce to an enormous expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence, although he gave excuses for his amendments, which now seem transparent.

Finally, during the discussion of clause 6 which established a military technical commission Molotov forcibly pointed out:

The Soviet government fully understood that their allies were fighting the Japanese and, speaking in secret, he sympathised with them. But if China was going to take part [in the commission] there might be trouble for the Soviets.

The meeting on 22 October first discussed the main British proposal, for a ‘politico-military commission’ (to become known as the European Advisory Commission) for three-power discussion of current problems. Molotov soon discovered that Eden had amended his earlier proposals, and there was to be a separate body for Italy, the Italian Advisory Council. He immediately referred back to an earlier British document of 1 July, which envisaged a body that would supervise the military government of former enemy territory. This, he said, had been acceptable to the USSR. On his suggestion, even after a fifteen-minute adjournment, discussion on the matter was deferred to allow the Soviet delegation time to study the proposals, although Molotov attempted to see if a suggestion by Hull, for consultation between the powers using regular diplomatic machinery, would provide an alternative. He was clearly seeking maximum freedom for the USSR to exercise its increased power.

There was now an exchange of views on Italy and the Balkans during which Molotov immediately made clear the dissatisfaction of the USSR. Eden tried to pacify him by saying that the establishment of the Italian Advisory Council should satisfy the Soviet desire for information, and that Fascism was being rooted out in Italy. In response, Molotov immediately displayed the strength of the Soviet feeling. He proposed a declaration committing the allies to ‘democratisation’ of the Italian government, the liquidation of all Fascist organisations and the arrest of war criminals. Eden and Hull tried to be conciliatory. They said that the military government in Italy was operating on these principles and agreed to study the Soviet
proposal. Molotov appeared to be placated but went on to argue that part of the surrendered Italian navy should be allocated to the Soviet Union, specifying the numbers and types of warships and merchant tonnage. Eden and Hull agreed that their governments would study the Soviet statement and Molotov said that ‘his government’ did not expect an immediate decision. During these exchanges Hull declared:

If he had his way he would take Hitler and Mussolini and Tojo and their arch accomplices and bring them before a drumhead court-martial and at sunrise on the following day there would occur a historic incident.

Only the American account records a Soviet response: ‘the statement was greeted with great satisfaction by the Soviet delegation.’ Molotov met Eden that evening to discuss the question of the Italian surrender, but no progress was made.

Prior to the next day’s formal proceedings Molotov had a private meeting with Hull, where, after an initial exchange of courtesies, he said that he was satisfied with the progress of the conference, but its participants had not yet completed their ‘very great task.’ When he registered his discontent because the ‘Soviet Government was forced to rely on third, fourth and even tenth-hand reports’ on the Italian situation, Hull tried to placate him and went on to press for the Soviet Union to participate in discussions on economic questions currently taking place between Great Britain and the USA in Washington. Molotov stated that the Soviet government would soon respond to the invitation. Conversation then passed to general issues. After touching on the need for co-operation between the great powers, Hull raised the questions of the USSR trying to spread communism in the USA, and of religious freedom for Soviet citizens. On the first issue, Molotov smiled and said that he did not think the USA had anything to fear. Hull, however, pressed the matter referring to external interference in American domestic affairs by communists who claimed they were acting on orders from outside the country, which was seized upon by some newspapers. Molotov’s replied that he did not think the opinion of the newspapers referred to was significant, but that it was important that the leaders of the two governments should give general guidance. If Hull was expressing general principles, dear to his heart, Molotov must have been astounded to discuss what he regarded as trivia when the fate of Europe was at stake.

Initially, the formal session, on 23 October, was occupied with an exchange of opinions on the Balkans, Eden beginning with Yugoslavia, and raising the question of
the need of the Partisans and Mikhailovich to co-operate. Hull appeared disinterested, and with the USSR as unenthusiastic about Tito, who was too independent, as about Mikhailovich. Molotov managed to get an issue on which there was as yet no clear Soviet policy deferred, on the grounds that a separate agenda item covered it. Brief statements by Eden on the other Balkan countries (Bulgaria, Greece and Romania) again provoked little response from Molotov, who again achieved postponement of the subject, and discussion of the ‘politico-military commission’ was renewed. Molotov now secured assent to Soviet representation on the separate commission for Italy, and went on to use Eden’s earlier document of 1 July against him: the powers of the European Advisory Council being limited to dealing with the end of hostilities and the immediate post hostilities period. He resisted the commission having wider powers to consider current European questions, as suggested by Eden, who gave as an example peace feelers from enemy states. Molotov said that this would leave little room for the foreign ministers to use regular diplomatic machinery, as proposed by Hull the previous day. With Hull’s support these matters were passed to the drafting committee that the conference had established. Molotov had played off Eden against Hull and achieved a notable success. In addition, at the close of the session, he obtained deferment of discussion of Germany, to give time for the Soviet delegation to study the proposals that Hull had given him informally at a meeting the previous evening. These recommended unconditional surrender, total disarmament and occupation by the three powers, going at least part of the way to meet Soviet requirements as formulated by the Litvinov commission. Molotov must have been delighted to take these proposals to Stalin whom he saw that night, with Litvinov and Voroshilov his fellow delegates.

At the beginning of the sixth full meeting, on 24 October, discussion of Germany was again postponed at Molotov’s request, although according to Hull’s account of the meeting, Molotov was ‘radiant,’ and stated that Stalin’s first response to the American proposals on Germany had been enthusiastic. V. Berezhkov, who was acting as an interpreter for Molotov at the conference was more guarded and reported that Molotov told Hull:

I showed you paper to Premier Stalin and his reaction was on the whole favourable. In essence the proposal corresponds to Soviet ideas about the treatment of Germany once we have achieved victory. Thus we are willing to support this proposal as a foundation for further work on an appropriate document.
He was going to press the western powers for more concessions.

Eden’s plan, which he described as the ‘self-denying ordinance,’ was now considered. The subject of negotiation between Great Britain and the USSR since Molotov’s 1942 visit to London, this was a scheme for neither power to make agreements with smaller states about the post-war world without the approval of the other party, and its aim was quite clearly to check Soviet expansionist aims. Molotov’s particular interest in this matter was the Soviet-Czech treaty awaiting signature, on which, he claimed, Edward Benes, the head of the Czech government in exile, had taken the initiative. Eden was unwilling to agree to this as an exception because the exiled Polish government had not been consulted, but when Molotov tried to enlist Hull’s support, he found the American Secretary of State unwilling to become involved, which was as unhelpful to Eden as to him. Molotov used this indifference to ask if the USA would accept whatever Britain and the USSR agreed. He also had ready a Soviet government statement, amending the draft ‘self-denying ordinance,’ to allow its signatories to conclude agreements with bordering states, on the security of their frontiers, without consulting the other party. In these circumstances Eden agreed to the Soviet-Czech treaty and the matter of a general declaration was passed to the drafting committee. Molotov later confided to Benes that he was surprised at the lack of debate on the Czech Treaty. This may have been because during this discussion the famous exchange between Molotov and Eden, not recorded in any of the official reports of the conference, took place, Eden saying ‘I may be mistaken, but...’ and Molotov leaning across the table interrupting, ‘You are mistaken.’ It is not clear if Eden was unnerved by this ‘undiplomatic’ behaviour, but he had suffered a major defeat. It is, however, too much to claim that this marked a turning point in the conference after which Molotov had the upper hand over Eden.

The talks now moved on to ‘Common Policy towards Iran.’ Initially Molotov raised a legalistic objection because there was no Iranian representation at the Conference, saying that the Iranian ambassador had reminded him of Soviet obligations under the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of January 1942. As with his objections to discussion of the Four Power Declaration in the absence of China, this was clearly a tactic when the USSR was not enthusiastic about the item. Under pressure from Eden, however, Molotov withdrew his objections and agreed to a subcommittee discussing
the matter. The day’s proceedings ended with a brief reference to the agenda item on ‘Confederations and Spheres of Influence.’ When Hull requested more time for the USA to study the proposal, and Eden protested that Hull had received the document on 3 October, Molotov promptly suggested that discussion should be deferred. Divisions between the western powers had given him the opportunity to delay consideration of another difficult item.

The main item on the next day, 25 October, was Germany, discussion being based on Hull’s proposals. Molotov, early on made a tactical interruption to report further Soviet military victories, then immediately tried to gain agreement to further punitive measures against Germany. He emphasised the importance of reparations for the USSR, and stated that the Soviet Union would not oppose the dismemberment of Germany by force, telling Eden that he was less resolute towards Germany than the US. When Hull tried to moderate the attack, saying that the USA was looking less favourably on dismemberment, Molotov was clearly annoyed, saying that the USSR was backward in the study of the question because of the military preoccupations of its leaders. This may have meant that there was as yet no final agreement among the Soviet leadership. Molotov went on to insist that Germany must be restored to her pre-Anschluss frontiers, and found that this view was supported. This allowed the Austrian question to be referred directly to the conference’s drafting committee. Here the Soviet delegates insisted on inserting reparations claims, the controversy over these in which Molotov was involved, contributing to the delay in the Austrian peace treaty until 1955.

The other item considered at this session was the question of peace feelers from enemy states on which there was a British resolution committing the powers to report and consult on approaches. Molotov made clear that the USSR was interested only in unconditional surrender. He was particularly concerned with Hungary, Rumania and Finland: countries that had voluntarily supported Hitler. His suspicions of the western powers were obvious. He also insisted that there should be no negotiations with opposition groups prior to unconditional surrender, a strategy aimed at preventing the west from restoring ‘bourgeois’ governments.

Molotov found Hull unsympathetic when he approached him informally on 25 October on the Soviet proposal for Turkish entry into the war. On 26 October, he therefore secured the deferment of this item, and the conference discussed Eastern Europe, ‘spheres of influence’ and confederations. This was Eden’s proposal for a
joint declaration committing the signatories to the restoration of freedom and self-determination to countries conquered by the Nazis; to encourage larger grouping of states provided they were not hostile to other states; and to the renunciation of any intention to create ‘spheres of influence.’ The Wilsonian principles were dear to Hull’s heart, but he believed that the basis of three-power co-operation should be established first, and he was also wary of US involvement in British schemes for Eastern Europe, particularly if they were likely to arouse Soviet hostility. Hull’s lukewarm support (he indicated that this was mainly a British and Soviet matter as it applied to Europe), allowed Molotov to dispose of the awkward proposal. Having stated that the Soviet government had no interest in dividing Europe into separate zones or spheres of influence, he argued that commitment to respect self-determination and renunciation of ‘spheres of influence,’ being general principles, should be included in the Four Power Declaration. This was embarrassing to Great Britain in view of the British Empire, and to the United States in the light of the Monroe Doctrine, and was probably why Eden did not persist with the proposal, which was perhaps not much more than his pious hopes. Molotov’s main attack was focused on the idea of confederations in Eastern Europe. He argued that the present governments-in-exile were so provisional that they did not have the authority to pursue schemes that might lead to the Allies treating them better than other ex-Axis states, and Eden was forced to concede the strength of Molotov’s arguments. Clearly the real Soviet objection was the formation of a bloc of states in Eastern Europe hostile to the USSR. Molotov referred to a cordon sanitaire (sanitarnyi kordon), an issue that Soviet diplomats had frequently raised with Eden in discussions about confederation prior to the conference. Eden hastened to reassure Molotov, saying that Britain was interested in a cordon sanitaire against Germany, not against the USSR, and when he did not persist with his proposals Molotov had scored another notable victory. Harriman, alone, from the western delegates, seems to have been suspicious that Stalin wanted a Europe in which there was no strong country but the USSR.

The meeting now turned to the Four Power Declaration. Molotov again queried the question of China signing, but did not make a major objection on this point. He was most concerned about Article 6, defining when military forces might be used ‘within the territory of other States,’ already modified at his request. Having defeated British plans for federation in Eastern Europe Molotov was not likely to
accept American proposals that might limit Soviet action. With reassurances, however, from Eden, on air and naval bases in these countries, he responded to a general plea from Hull to accept the article in the general spirit of the Declaration, particularly when Hull proposed that a further article about which Molotov was suspicious should be removed altogether. Molotov went on to say that he believed that the Conference had accepted the general text of the Declaration and he proposed an additional resolution that the three powers should appoint representative for preliminary discussions of the proposed international organisation. He suggested meetings in any one of the three capitals, with invitations to other allied powers if necessary. Hull called Molotov’s proposal a ‘practical step,’ but it was eventually agreed that the best results would come from informal meetings of the three heads of state.

During a break in the proceedings, according to Hull, Molotov probed him on his plans for post-war international co-operation. In response Hull claims that he had said:

After the war, you can follow isolationism if you want and gobble up your neighbours. But that will be your undoing.

Hull did not record Molotov’s response, but this had been a triumphant day for him. The new power of the USSR was clear. Not only had Molotov put an end to British aspirations for eastern Europe and secured a free hand for the USSR, but he had also secured the modification of the Four Power Declaration where it appeared to limit Soviet freedom of action. Eden, who already felt that he had been defeated, had received a message from Churchill asking him to tell Stalin that the cross-channel invasion might have to be postponed a little. This clearly further weakened his negotiating position: with the delay in the Second Front Eden was left practically without a bargaining weapon. He asked for an interview with Stalin to which Molotov reluctantly agreed.

Before the proceedings opened on 27 October, Molotov had agreed to postpone discussion on ‘Measures for Shortening the War,’ pending Eden’s interview with Stalin. The foreign ministers therefore discussed Italy again. Although Hull and Eden had issued a note accepting the basis of the proposed Soviet declaration, both were now very cautious, which may have alarmed Molotov. He therefore called for a simple resolution affirming agreed principles, saying there was no intention of ‘evaluating’ existing policy. Hull and Eden agreed that the relevant documents should
be sent to the drafting committee to see if a resolution could be formulated.\textsuperscript{122}

Molotov now enquired about Soviet claims to Italian ships, and when Hull and Eden claimed they had not heard from their governments, he pressed for an answer before the end of the conference.\textsuperscript{123} His disappointment was to become apparent later, but for the time being, he moved on to the question of the Balkans.

Molotov now passed to Eden and Hull the Soviet analysis of the situation in Bulgaria, a country at war with the western powers, but not with the USSR. This implied that the Allies could not rely on moderate elements for assistance against the Germans\textsuperscript{124} – an indirect criticism of western policy in Italy. There was, however, no discussion, and the meeting considered Eden’s proposal for a declaration of allied policy in liberated territories. This sought to extend to the smaller countries in Europe the principles of democracy and self-determination on which the conference already had proposals for liberated France, Germany and Italy.\textsuperscript{125} Eden tactfully referred to Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, but Molotov could have had little doubt that his real concern was Poland and other eastern European countries that the USSR was likely to re-conquer. Eden suggested referring the matter European Advisory Commission, and with little support from Hull who accepted Eden’s suggestion, Molotov was able to make a formal proposal to this effect.\textsuperscript{126} He had again managed to protect Soviet interests.

During the final discussions on this day, on the French Committee of National Liberation, Molotov made quite clear that the USSR endorsed the decisions of its western allies to liquidate the Vichy regime, but succeeded in embarrassing Eden because of British backing of de Gaulle and the Free French, for which there was little American support.\textsuperscript{127} In a break the proceedings during which Hull and Molotov chatted very amiably, Hull indicated that he would have to leave on 31 October. Molotov, in response agreed that conference could work to that timetable,\textsuperscript{128} and the tempo of proceedings increased from this point.

The meeting between Stalin and Eden that evening, at which Molotov was also present, was amicable, Stalin accepting as short a short delay as possible in the cross-channel invasion because of the military situation in Italy.\textsuperscript{129} This is hardly surprising. The western powers were surrendering their bargaining position. Stalin and Molotov probably realised Britain and the USA would have to accept what the USSR offered on post-war eastern Europe.
As a result, when, on 28 October, ‘Measures for Shortening the War,’ was discussed again, Molotov pressing for reassurance that the decision taken at Quebec on the invasion of France in the ‘early spring’ of 1944 was still valid, and trying to have the statements of the western military representatives included in the conference protocol, Eden could say only that he felt sure that ‘a generally accepted agreement’ could be worked out.\(^{130}\) On Turkey, Eden was more encouraging than Hull, but his suggestions were limited to bringing Turkey into the war by stages, both Hull and Eden warning against the diversion of resources to Turkey. They were equally unenthusiastic about Soviet air bases in Sweden, and Molotov noted that no decision had been taken on the Soviet proposals for shortening the course of the war.\(^{131}\) This was the most unsatisfactory day for him.

On 29 October, the penultimate day of the conference, Molotov found that he could let Hull argue his point opposing Greek and Yugoslav membership of the Italian Advisory Council, but found himself opposed to Hull and Eden in pressing for a broader membership of the European Advisory Commission than the three allies. He did not fail to point out that Eden’s original proposal had not excluded other states, and he was intent on restricting the powers of the Commission, eventually accepting Eden’s compromise proposal that its brief should be limited to ‘questions connected with the ending of the war.’ Having achieved as much as he could, Molotov proposed that these questions should be referred back to the Drafting Committee.\(^{132}\)

After a break, the conference discussed post-war economic co-operation, about which Hull was especially enthusiastic. Molotov was encouraging on the question of US aid to the USSR for reconstruction, but on long-term assistance to other countries would only agree that negotiations would be desirable, in due course. He was not enthusiastic about the establishment of an international lending agency for this purpose. The US record of this discussion suggests a more encouraging response by Molotov than the British. It omits his remark, on the proposal for joint assistance to other countries, that he was not interested in detailed consideration at the present. Molotov stated that the USSR would not agree to any commission being set up until the three powers had agreed the general principles. The American memorandum on this subject had stressed that reparations should not be allowed to impede European recovery or permanently lower the German standard of living. The British and Soviet account of the discussion show that Molotov was particularly concerned with reparations, insisting they be punitive in character. He did not want these restricted to
Germany alone, but applied to countries that had supported her. He specifically stated that the living standards and the general interests of Germany’s victims should be regarded as equally important to those of the Germans.\textsuperscript{133} This discussion was a portent for the future: American economic strength was to be confronted by Soviet military power.

At this point Hull introduced an American memorandum on ‘dependent’ (i.e. colonial) territories, aimed particularly at the British system of imperial preference, a document which, as early as March 1943, Eden had indicated to him was unacceptable to the British government. Eden refused to discuss the document – it was not on the conference agenda. Molotov said it was an important question,\textsuperscript{134} but tactfully passed to the next question: Poland. Clearly, he did not want one difficult issue for the USSR before a second, and on Poland he and Eden had apparently already clashed during a visit to the opera arranged for the visiting foreign ministers.\textsuperscript{135}

Introducing the Polish issue, Eden regretted that there was no diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Polish government-in-exile, and asked about aid to the Polish resistance. This produced a hostile response from Molotov. He said that arms should only be put into safe hands, and there were none in Poland. He emphasised that since Poland was the neighbour of the USSR, the question of good relations was primarily the concern of those two countries. The Soviet Union wanted to see an independent Poland, but a Poland with a government friendly to the USSR. Molotov was equally unresponsive to further pressure from Hull and Eden on this matter. He quoted a Russian proverb about a chariot remaining in the same place, saying that General K. Sosnkowski, who had replaced Sikorski as leader of the Polish government in exile, was hostile to the USSR.\textsuperscript{136} Molotov stood his ground and the situation was not resolved. The day’s proceedings ended with brief references to the Four Power Declaration, to be signed the next day, and to the Soviet request for Italian ships. On this matter, Molotov showed his annoyance, noting the unsatisfactory nature of the American response to the Soviet request, although both Hull and Eden tried to placate him. They were sympathetic but had received an unfavourable response from their governments.\textsuperscript{137}

After the formal sessions on this day Molotov saw Eden and Hull individually. At the meeting with Eden, the latter, having received a telegram from Churchill was able to be conciliatory on the question of Italian ships, on Turkish entry into the war,
A further meeting between Eden and Molotov on 1 November also failed to resolve the questions of Turkish entry into the war and Italian ships. The meeting with Hull was more general, Hull complimenting Molotov on the success of the conference, suggesting that Stalin should openly approve its work. When Hull went on to talk of the three heads of state meeting, suggesting that Molotov might deputise for Stalin, Molotov instantly dissented from this suggestion by saying that he was in no sense a military man and would not fit into that sort of situation.

At the final session of the conference, on 30 October, Eden noted Molotov’s ‘business-like’ approach, believing it to be a response to orders from Stalin after his interview. It resulted in the completion of the foreign ministers’ business. Molotov used Litvinov to repel a further attempt by Eden to secure a declaration in favour of democracy and independence in Europe and against spheres of influence, and was skilful in glossing over the differences between the three ministers to secure the signing of the documents. At the conclusion of the session Eden and Hull complimented Molotov on his chairmanship.

Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador reported to the Foreign Office:

Molotov conducted the proceedings with sustained tact and skill and growing good humour, deferring any matter that seemed to threaten prickliness and only reverting to it when its thorns had been drawn by talks over food and wine. The way he handled the debates compelled our respect and in the end our affection also. He has travelled a long way during the last year and a half. . . We must also commend Molotov for the dexterity with which, having reached agreement with the Secretary of State, he swept Mr. Hull with all deference into acquiescence in the decisions which had been taken.

He seems to have failed to realise the extent of Molotov’s success and the crushing blow to British aims for eastern Europe. In the House of Commons Eden stated:

I have yet to sit under a chairman who showed greater skill, patience and judgement than Mr. Molotov, and I must say that it was his handling of a long and complicated agenda that must go to a large measure of the success we achieved.

Hull made a similar acknowledgement in his report to Congress. There was no indication of a diplomatic defeat, although comments in the American press recognised the potential future dominance of eastern Europe by the USSR, and later, in his memoirs, Eden was to note that during the conference, for the first time, he became uneasy about Soviet ambitions.
Conclusion

The conference was far more elaborate than the ‘preparatory meeting’ proposed. It produced more detailed agreement than any previous wartime conference. This was because Stalin had stipulated that the powers should submit detailed agendas and proposals in advance and the British and American foreign secretaries were anxious that the conference should achieve concrete results. One authority claims:

The Moscow meeting stands out as the only one where issues were clearly defined, systematically discussed, and disposed of through genuine bargaining. . . . Molotov was at his very best at Moscow – a compliment which can hardly be made to his British, much less to his American counterparts. It was because of the superior Soviet diplomacy . . . that Stalin could look forward with confidence to his impending talks with Roosevelt and Churchill at Teheran. 147

This was the last international conference where Britain took the lead for the western powers rather than the USA, and it was dominated by exchanges between Eden and Molotov. Molotov had gained little on the Second Front, despite reports in the Soviet press afterwards, 148 but this was now a much lower priority. Indeed it was now a good stick with which to beat his western allies and it was becoming in the Soviet interest to delay it as long as possible. In other spheres: blocking a Balkan confederation; achieving maximum freedom of action for the USSR by blocking Eden’s ‘self-denying ordinance;’ establishing the European Advisory Commission with strictly circumscribed powers; seeing the question of Poland was left to the USSR to settle; and laying the basis for the new international order in the Four Power Declaration, Molotov’s achievements were considerable, as Harriman was to acknowledge. 149

If Hull’s Memoirs are to believed, at the dinner on the last night, he claimed that in conversation with Stalin when he was pressing him to attend a meeting with Churchill and Roosevelt, now proposed for Basra, Stalin said that he could not leave the ‘military-emergency situation’ at present, but he then said he would send Molotov in his stead, since under Soviet law Molotov was his duly constituted second-ranking man in the Government, designated to take his place when he himself might be absent . . . 150

Eden claimed that Stalin made the same offer to him, but he rejected it, saying that the other two heads of government would make long journeys only to meet their opposite number. 151
At the dinner Stalin also gave Hull confidentially a commitment to Soviet entry into the war in the Pacific, to pass on to Roosevelt. Charles Bohlen who interpreted for Hull at the conference wrote:

Hull told several of us and maintained in his memoirs that the commitment was given without any *quid pro quo* . . . and Hull did not ask what the conditions were for Soviet entry into the Asian war. The fact that the dictator did not mention any did not mean that conditions were not in his mind.

In addition, Molotov agreed to drink a toast proposed by Harriman to their fighting together against Japan, saying ‘Why not – gladly – the time will come.’ Harriman also claims that Stalin repeated the story he had told Eden and Churchill about Molotov’s visit to Berlin in November 1940, when, taken into a shelter because of a bombing raid and being assured by Ribbentrop that the British were finished, he had asked ‘Why then, are we in this shelter and whose bombs have put us here?’ He continued:

Eden assured Stalin that his confidence in Molotov was not diminished by the Soviet Foreign Minister’s past associations. Stalin, who appeared to enjoy ridiculing Molotov before foreign visitors, responded that his Foreign Minister was really responsible for Neville Chamberlain’s behaviour in the Munich crisis, although ‘not 100 per cent.’

It is not clear if there was more in Stalin’s comment than ridicule of his lieutenant, or if he was reminding him that he had fallen into disgrace in 1936 by pressing for friendly relations with Germany. This comment must have more than offset any compliment made in offering to send Molotov as his deputy to a meeting with Churchill and Roosevelt. Elsewhere Harriman noted;

It was interesting to watch how Molotov expanded as the days passed. As he began to realise more and more that we had not come with a united front against him and were ready to expose frankly our preliminary thoughts, he showed increasing enjoyment in being admitted for the first time into the councils as a full member with the British and ourselves.

But the real reason for Molotov’s growing confidence must have been the success he was achieving for Soviet policy at the Conference. In contrast, Bohlen’s comment on Molotov was more perceptive:

Like almost all Soviet leaders a man of mystery, Molotov maintained that air at the conference. Although he was trying to be affable, he had a hard time smiling, and his face remained impassive through most of the talks. The first close-up impression of Molotov as a careful, sober negotiator, the epitome of an intelligent Soviet bureaucrat, deepened the more I came in contact with him, and I had many an hour with him over the next dozen years.
There is very little evidence that Molotov did anything else but adopt Stalin’s line and follow the brief provided by NarkomIndel for the conference. It might also be asked how Molotov felt with Litvinov, who he had displaced as head of NarkomIndel in 1939, who thought he was a fool and was prepared to say so quite openly, providing the briefing material for him at the conference.\textsuperscript{160}
Endnotes


2 The American record of the conference was published as early as 1963 (*Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1943, Vol. 1, General*, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963) and the Soviet record in 1978, (Gromyko, A. A. *et al.* eds., *Sovetskii Soyuz na mezhdunarodnykh konferentsiyakh perioda velikoi otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945gg.*, T. I, Moskovskaya konferentsiya ministrov inostrannykh del SSSR, SSIA i Velikobritanii (19-30 oktyabrya 1943g.): sbornik dokumentov, (hereinafter *Moskovskaya konferentsiya*) M: 1978). For this paper I have used these printed sources and compared them with the British record at Public Record Office (hereinafter *PRO*), FO371/37031, together with additional material from the *Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossisskoi Federatsii* (hereinafter *AVPRF*), against which the published record has been checked. I have also used other archive sources, particularly the Avon Papers, (the papers of Anthony Eden) Birmingham University Library. I am indebted to Lady Avon for allowing me to use the Avon Papers.


4 *Izvestiya*, (hereinafter *Iz*) 16 October 1943.


7 *PRO* FO371/37030, f. 107.

8 Mastny, V., ‘Soviet War Aims at the Moscow and Teheran Conferences of 1943,’ *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 47, 1975, p. 493. The section of this article dealing with the Moscow Conference is summarised in Mastny, V., *Russia’s Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy. Warfare and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945*, (New York, 1979), pp. 111-121.


11 Avon Papers, AP20/10, f. 38.


13 ‘This term of Russian origin, had come to signify in Moscow parlance an Anglo-American invasion of France across the English channel; it carried the insulting connotation that the Soviet Union alone was really fighting,’ Mastny, *Russia’s Road to the Cold War*, p.46.


20 Churchill, *The Second World War, Closing the Ring*, pp. 213-9. Controversy over British personnel in the USSR still continued whilst the convoys were suspended, see *PRO*, FO 371/36950, ff. 2, 5.

21 Avon Papers, AP20/10, f. 198.

22 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1*, pp. 497-8. In November 1943 Molotov informed the American Ambassador that the Soviet embassy in Sweden had been approached by a German citizen who had been told:

that there could be absolutely no question of contact with Soviet representatives and that they refused to carry on any conversations whatsoever or to have any further meetings. . . *Ibid.*, pp. 502-3.

23 Avon Papers, AP20/10, f. 250.

24 *Moskovskaya konferentsiya*, pp. 41-42.


26 *Moskovskaya konferentsiya*, p. 43; *Foreign Relations of the United States 1*, pp. 515-6.
27 Sainsbury, The Turning Point, pp. 8-11; Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 518-531; Moskovskaya konferentsiya, pp. 43-53.
29 Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 518-20.
30 Ibid., p. 531; Moskovskaya konferentsiya, pp. 52-3.
34 PRO FO371/37031, f. 171.
36 Standley, Admiral Ambassador, p. 497.
38 Hull, Memoirs, p. 1256.
40 Ibid., pp. 21-31, 43-4; Eden Memoirs, pp. 410-411. For the Soviet desire to discuss Turkish entry into the war see below pp. 12, 19.
41 Iz, 1 October 1943.
43 Many of these documents are published in Kynin, and Laufer, SSSR i Germanskii Vopros, pp. 236-329. I am indebted to Dr. Geoffrey Roberts for drawing my attention to them.
46 Ibid., pp. 252-265, 286-312, 320-327.
48 Moskovskaya konferentsiya, pp. 53-6; Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 534-5.
49 Ibid., pp. 535-6; Sainsbury, The Turning Point, pp. 31-2.
50 See Watson, ‘Molotov’s Apprenticeship in Foreign Policy’ p. 699; Watson, ‘Molotov, the Making of the Grand alliance and the Second Front’ p. 64.
51 Iz, 1 October 1943.
52 PRO FO371/36951, 213.
53 AVPRF, 6/5/17/160, 1.
54 Ibid., FO371/37029, 115.
55 Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 538-9.
57 Foreign Relations of the United States 1, p. 568; Eden Memoirs, p. 410. Oliver Harvey recorded in his diary: ‘A guard of honour. . . did a little march up and down, terrific smartness and precision including goose-step,’ The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey, p. 309.
58 Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 562-4, 574-5; PRO FO371/37031, f. 84. The seven Soviet representatives were Molotov, A.Ya. Vyshinskii (first deputy NarkomIndel), K. E. Voroshilov, (Vice-chairman of Sovnarkom), M. M. Litvinov (deputy NarkomIndel), V.A. Sergeyev (deputy NarkomVneshTorg), General A.A. Gryzlov, and G.F. Saksin (adviser NarkomIndel).
59 Hull, Memoirs, p. 1279.
60 Moskovskaya konferentsiya, p. 65; Foreign Relations of the United States 1, p. 547.
61 Marion, Ministers in Moscow, p. 69.
62 Pravda, 9 October 1943; PRO, FO371/36951, f. 77. for Molotov’s comments on the uniform see Chuev, F., Molotov: poluderzhavnyi vlastelin, M: Olma-Press, 2000, p. 151.
63 Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 130. Later photographs of Molotov show that this uniform was modified after 1943, the belt and dagger being discarded. I would like to acknowledge the help of David King on this matter. Ranks for diplomatic workers in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs had been reintroduced on 14 June 1943, Molotov being designated ‘ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary,’ Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 17 June 1943; PRO FO371/36950, ff. 11-12.
The powers of the delegates had proved a problem for Molotov at the Triple Alliance negotiations in 1939, see Watson, ‘Molotov’s Apprenticeship in Foreign Policy,’ p. 714.

Moskovskaya konferentsiya, pp. 386-7.

The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey, p. 310; Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 589-90.


Foreign Relations of the United States 1, p. 590; PRO FO371/37030, f.34.


Ibid; Moskovskaya konferentsiya, pp. 98-106; Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 583-4, 778-781.

This was particularly noted by Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under-secretary of State at the British Foreign Office, PRO FO371/37030, f.100.

Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 585; PRO FO371/37030, ff. 235-6; Moskovskaya konferentsiya, pp. 109-111. Some members of the British cabinet felt that it would lead to the diversion of resources away from the cross-channel invasion. Eden, apparently, also feared that Churchill, who had reservations about the cross-channel invasion, might see it as an opportunity to extend the Mediterranean strategy. See Sainsbury, The Turning Point, p. 64.

PRO FO371/37030, f 34.

Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 577-8; Moskovskaya konferentsiya, pp. 113-4.

PRO FO371/37031, f. 17.

Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp.656-9; Moskovskaya konferentsiya, pp. 115-117, 372.

Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 602-3; Hull, Memoirs, p. 1282.


Ibid., pp. 596-8; Moskovskaya konferentsiya, pp. 123-8; PRO FO371/ 37031, ff. 241-3; cf. Sainsbury, The Turning Point, p. 68; Marion, Ministers in Moscow, pp. 135-6. There seems to have been a further attempt by Soviet representatives in the Drafting Committee to rephrase this to increase freedom for the use of Soviet forces even further, Marion, Ministers in Moscow, p. 137.

Article 2, as drafted, he argued, might make the conduct of military actions against states not yet defeated dependent on allied agreement, and article 7, he claimed, might limit the freedom of each state to enter into agreements with other countries to station forces at bases within occupied or liberated countries.

PRO FO371/ 37031, f. 242; Foreign Relations of the United States 1, p. 598; Moskovskaya konferentsiya, p.127. Eden met Stalin in the evening of 21 October, the question of convoys being the main issue discussed, although Eden did attempt to probe Stalin on the question of Turkish entry into the war, ibid., pp. 130-132.


Moskovskaya konferentsiya, pp. 141-8; PRO FO371/ 37031, ff. 247-9; Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 609-13.

Ibid., p. 612.

AVPRF, 6/5/17/160, 5.

For these talks see Marion, Ministers in Moscow, pp. 236-7. Russian observers joined the discussion in January 1944.

Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 613-616; Moskovskaya konferentsiya, pp. 148-152.

Marion, Ministers in Moscow, p. 223; Mastny, ‘Soviet War Aims’, p. 485.

Moskovskaya konferentsiya, pp. 153-164; Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 617-621; PRO FO371/ 37031, ff., 249-253; Hull, Memoirs, p. 1285. The British has been consulted on these proposals.

See above p. 9.


Hull Memoirs, p. 1285.

The term is a reference to a law passed during the English Civil War.

Harriman and Abel, *Special Envoy*, p. 245.

This was a mutual aid treaty for the post war period and aimed at dealing with new aggression from Germany.

PRO FO371/ 37031, ff. 254-7; *Foreign Relations of the United States 1*, pp. 624-7; *Moskovskaya konferentsiya*, pp.164-172. Cf. Sainsbury, *The Turning Point*, pp.74-75, 80-81. The point at which Molotov made known the Soviet statement differs between the three records of the conversations and one is led to the conclusion that the authors of the British account were trying to conceal the defeat that Eden had sustained.


PRO FO371/ 37031, ff. 257-8; *Foreign Relations of the United States 1*, p. 627; *Moskovskaya konferentsiya*, pp.172-4. The Soviet delegates appear to have blocked progress in the sub-committee, which failed to agree, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1*, pp. 645-9; cf. Sainsbury, *The Turning Point*, p.82; Marion, *Ministers in Moscow*, p. 193.

*PRO FO371/ 37031*, f. 258; *Foreign Relations of the United States 1*, pp. 627-8; *Moskovskaya konferentsiya* pp.174-6.

For changing US views on German dismemberment see Mosely, *The Kremlin and World Politics*, p. 137 et seq. Molotov’s views were fully in accord with the proposals propounded by the Litvinov commission, see Roberts, G., ‘Ideology, Calculation and Improvisation: Spheres of Influence and Soviet Foreign Policy 1939-1945,’ *Review of International Studies*, vol. 25, 1999, p. 666.


*Moskovskaya konferentsiya*, pp. 176-185; *PRO FO371/ 37031*, ff. 259-62; *Foreign Relations of the United States 1*, pp. 629-33. The US and Soviet records of this session are far more detailed than the British.

Marion, *Ministers in Moscow*, pp. 221-2.

*Foreign Relations of the United States 1*, pp. 633-4; *Moskovskaya konferentsiya*, pp. 185-9; *PRO FO371/ 37031*, ff. 263-4.

*Foreign Relations of the United States 1*, pp. 634-5.


Marion, *Ministers in Moscow*, p.205.

*Foreign Relations of the United States 1*, pp. 637-9, 762-3; *PRO FO371/ 37031*, ff. 265-6; *Moskovskaya konferentsiya*, pp.189-195. It should perhaps be noted that the same states would be involved irrespective of the purpose of the *cordon sanitaire*.

Harriman and Abel, *Special Envoy*, p. 144.

This was the former clause 7 where ‘agreement’ had been deleted, only ‘consultation’ being required. See above p. 21.

*Moskovskaya konferentsiya*, pp. 196-203; *PRO FO371/ 37031*, ff. 266-7; *Foreign Relations of the United States 1*, pp.639-42. The Soviet record of these discussions is again fuller than the American or British.


See above p. 15; *Foreign Relations of the United States 1*, pp.718-9.

Ibid., pp. 650-651; *PRO FO371/ 37031*, ff. 268-9; *Moskovskaya konferentsiya*, pp. 203-5. When the draft was produced on the last day of the conference Vyshinskii had so persistently pressed the Soviet point of view that Eden and Hull were forced to propose amendments, some of Eden’s being directed at removing phrases that were implied censures of allied policy in Italy. See Marion, *Ministers in Moscow*, pp. 179-80

*Moskovskaya konferentsiya*, p. 206; *Foreign Relations of the United States 1*, p. 651; *PRO FO371/ 37031*, f. 269.

*Foreign Relations of the United States 1*, p.712.

Ibid., pp. 738-9; Sainsbury, *The Turning Point*, pp. 94-5.
126 Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 651-2; PRO FO371/37031, ff.269-70; Moskovskaya konferentsiya, pp. 206-9.
127 Ibid., pp. 209-12; Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 652-3; PRO FO371/37031, ff.270-71.
128 Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 653-4.
129 Ibid., pp. 659-62; Moskovskaya konferentsiya, pp. 212-220.
131 Ibid., pp. 662-5.
135 Berezhkov, History in the Making, p. 209.
136 Moskovskaya konferentsiya, pp. 252-4; Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 667-8; PRO FO371/37031, ff. 279-81.
137 Ibid., f. 281; Moskovskaya konferentsiya, pp.254-5; Foreign Relations of the United States 1, p.669; Marion, Ministers in Moscow, pp. 245-6.
139 AVPRF, 6/5/17/160, 21-5.
140 Hull Memoirs, pp. 1306-7; Foreign Relations of the United States 1, pp. 670-71.
141 Eden, Memoirs, p. 415.
143 PRO, FO371/37031, f. 12.
144 Ibid., f. 97.
145 Ibid., f. 192.
146 Mastny, Russia’s Road to the Cold War, p. 121; Eden Memoirs., p. 565.
147 Mastny, V., ‘Soviet War Aims’ p. 493.
148 See P and Iz. 2 November 1943.
152 Berezhkov, History in the Making, p. 231.
153 Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 128.
154 Harriman & Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, p. 243.
156 Harriman & Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, p. 247.
158 Foreign Relations of the United States 3, p. 589.
159 Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 130.