Stoking old flames in new Japan

By William Choong

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During the International Monetarist Fund annual meetings in October, some Japanese were distributing pamphlets to delegates at the Tokyo International Forum, a convention center in downtown Tokyo.

As a journalist, I had become accustomed to writing about periodic tensions between China and Japan. Even so, the contents of the pamphlet — which was published by Japan’s Happiness Realization Party (HRP) — were inordinary.

China’s claims on the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are tantamount to an “invasion of Japan,” it said. World War II events such as the 1937 Nanjing Massacre and Japan’s use of comfort women were ‘‘fabrications.’’

Thankfully, the right-wing HRP did not win any seats in December’s general election.

The problem, however, is that Shinzo Abe — whose Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won by a landslide last month and which installed him as premier the second time — has been adept at capitalizing on growing nationalist sentiments.

It is no secret that Abe, who first served as premier from September 2006 to September 2007, is revisionist views of Japan’s history.

During his term as prime minister, the LDP passed a law stipulating detailed procedures for a national referendum to revise Japan’s pacifist Constitution. It called for a departure from Japan’s “post-war consensus” — which the party said had shackled Japan on issues such as visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors the country’s war dead, comfort women and the Tokyo war tribunal.

So at first glance, Abe looks like a dyed-in-the-wool right-winger. That said, Shinzo Abe might also become Shizuo Abe — that is, in the short term at least, he might tolerate or even encourage his leavings to maintain good relations with Beijing and Seoul.

There is some basis for this. When he was last premier, Abe sought to improve relations with Beijing by putting on hold visits to Yasukuni. He agreed to a joint China-Japan study of wartime history. During the election campaign, Abe shelved his call to station government officials on the Senkakus.

He also put off plans for the central government to commemorate Japan’s 1905 incorporation of the Takeshima/Dokdo islands, to which Seoul also lays claim.

And the fact that Abe would seek to resuscitate the moribund Japanese economy — he has pressured the Bank of Japan to adopt inflation targeting — might also mean that he would have his hands full.

In short, fears that Japan might move further to the right might simply mean that Japan would merely move to the right of center, not the extreme right.

This means that in the long run, Japan will become a “normal” country — it will retain the right to wage war, assemble a standing army dedicated to Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and contribute substantially to the provision of regional security. That said, there are deeper trends that are worth watching.

Embedded in the Japanese psyche is an acute sensitivity to dignity and honor. With each perceived slight that Japan suffers, the profile of the country’s right wing increases.

This could push the Japanese military into uncharted waters — be it the adoption of nuclear weapons or an SDF that is more independent of its American ally.

The critical question now is whether Abe manages to rein in his right wing — even extremest — elements.

After all, he learned all his conservation from Nobushige Kishi, his maternal grandfather.

Kishi served as one of Japan’s wartime military ministers. When he was prime minister in 1957-1960, he sought but failed to do several things — revise Japan’s 1947 Constitution, make Japan an equal partner of the U.S. and conduct a more muscular diplomacy.

During the Liberal Democratic Party’s Grand National Diet elections in 1996, Abe said, "We hereby declare we will resolutely seek to overthrow the Kan administration, which has damaged our nation’s interest, trust and dignity," the group, which was named Seiioi Nihon (or Creation Japan), said in a statement. They were referring to Mr Naoto Kan, the premier who was leading a Democratic Party of Japan government at the time.

The same revisionist strains are carried by the LDP’s rank and file.

Like the HRP, Hakubun Shimomura, the LDP’s new education minister, has argued that the Senkakus and Takeshima islands were "stolen" from Japan.

In an interview with Apple Town, a right-leaning magazine, Shimomura stressed that the previous Abe administration had sought to relook at all aspects of Japan’s history. This included the Koro and Marusama statements, which had expressed remorse for Japan’s wartime activities.

And Abe and Shimomura are not alone. Abe’s new Cabinet includes other revisionists, such as Tomomi Kikuchi, the minister for administrative reform, who is known to be in favor of revising the nation’s SDF act.

What worries me is a movement to have populist, domestic-oriented and exclusion-type nationalisms,” he said in a recent interview. In addition to revisionism, there are other worrying trends.

In the past decade, Japan’s security environment has deteriorated. It has clashed with Russia over the Kurile island chain, and with South Korea and China over the Takeshima and Senkaku islands respectively.

North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is a constant worry. This has stoked concerns in Japan over the U.S.’ extended nuclear deterrent.

In 1996, Michael Green — a Japan watcher who later served in George W. Bush’s National Security Council — wrote that Japan had become more hard-nosed when it came to China. Tokyo’s China policy, he added, had moved from “commercial liberalism” to “retransparent realism.”

Fast-forward 16 years, and Japan watchers such as Professor Christopher Hughes at the University of Warwick are now warning that Japan might manifest a “realist realism.”

Japan might exhibit some “unpredictable behavior” stemming from its frustration at not being treated seriously either as a potential adversary or as an ally.

"I call this a sort of ‘realist realism,’” where Japan takes umbrage in its lack of international status,” said Professor Hughes.

It shows what kind of unpredictable security behavior Abe’s Japan could be tempted to conduct.

But history has already shown what Japan could do if pushed into a corner, Imperial Japan’s decision to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941 was an exercise in vindictiveness, given America’s prowess then. But Japanese leaders decided to proceed anyway, raising from bizarre calculations about honor.

One can only hope that Abe would exercise pragmatism over ideology in the years ahead.