My Way to Phenomenology

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The problem of knowledge and its relation to the external world is a central theme in the philosophy of Husserl. His work, particularly in *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy* (1913), has been influential in the development of contemporary philosophy.

In *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, Husserl argues that traditional philosophical methods are inadequate for understanding the nature of reality. He contends that our ordinary experiences are distorted by the influence of concepts and language, which prevent us from accessing the true nature of things. Husserl's phenomenological reduction, which seeks to overcome these conceptual barriers, is a key aspect of his philosophy.

Husserl's phenomenological method involves a fundamental transformation of how we think about the world. It is a process of bracketing, in which we set aside assumptions and prejudices in order to gain a pure awareness of the phenomena themselves. This pure awareness, or *Eidos*, is the foundation of all knowledge.

Husserl's influence is evident in the works of many contemporary philosophers, who have sought to develop and apply his ideas in new directions. His emphasis on the importance of phenomenological experience and the role of consciousness in understanding the world has had a lasting impact on the field of philosophy.
rightly expressed today. Husserl’s own programmatical explanations and methodological presentations rather strengthened the misunderstanding that through “phenomenology” a beginning of philosophy was claimed which denied all previous thinking.

Even after the _Ideas_ was published, I was still captivated by the never-ceasing spell of the _Logical Investigations_. That magic brought about anew an unrest unaware of its own reason, although it made me suspect that it came from the inability to attain the act of philosophical thinking called “phenomenology” simply by reading the philosophical literature.

My perplexity decreased slowly, my confusion dissolved laboriously, only after I met Husserl personally in his workshop.

Husserl came to Freiburg in 1916 as Heinrich Rickert’s successor. Rickert had taken over Windelband’s chair in Heidelberg. Husserl’s teaching took place in the form of a step-by-step training in phenomenological “seeing” which at the same time demanded that one relinquish the untested use of philosophical knowledge. But it also demanded that one give up introducing the authority of the great thinkers into the conversation. However, the clearer it became to me that the increasing familiarity with phenomenological seeing was fruitful for the interpretation of Aristotle’s writing, the less I could separate myself from Aristotle and the other Greek thinkers. Of course I could not immediately see what decisive consequences my renewed occupation with Aristotle was to have.

As I myself practiced phenomenological seeing, teaching and learning in Husserl’s proximity after 1919 and at the same time tried out a transformed understanding of Aristotle in a seminar, my interest leaned anew toward the _Logical Investigations_, above all the sixth investigation in the first edition. The distinction which is worked out there between sensuous and categorial intuition revealed itself to me in its scope for the determination of the “manifold meaning of being.”

For this reason we—friends and pupils—begged the master again and again to republish the sixth investigation which was then difficult to obtain. True to his dedication to the cause of phenomenology, the publisher Niemeyer published the last chapter of the _Logical Investigations_ again in 1922. Husserl notes in the preface: “As things stand, I had to give in to the wishes of the friends of this work and decide to make its last chapter available again in its old form.” With the phrase “the friends of this work,” Husserl also wanted to say that he himself could not quite get close to the _Logical Investigations_ after the publication of the _Ideas_. At the new place of his academic activity, the passion and effort of his thought turned toward the systematic development of the plan presented in the _Ideas_ more than ever. Thus Husserl could write in the preface mentioned to the sixth investigation: “My teaching activity in Freiburg, too, furthered the direction of my interest toward general problems and the system.”

Thus Husserl watched me in a generous fashion, but at the bottom in disagreement, as I worked on the _Logical Investigations_ every week in special seminars with advanced students in addition to my lectures and regular seminars. Especially the preparation for this work was fruitful for me. There I learned one thing—at first rather led by surprise than guided by founded insight: What occurs for the phenomenology of the acts of consciousness as the self-manifestation of phenomena is thought more originally by Aristotle and in all Greek thinking and existence as _aletheia_, as the unconcealedness of what-is-present, its being revealed, its showing itself. That which phenomenological investigations rediscovered as the supporting attitude of thought proves to be the fundamental trait of Greek thinking, if not indeed of philosophy as such.

The more decisively this insight became clear to me, the more pressing the question became: Whence and how is it determined what must be experienced as “the things themselves” in accordance with the principle of phenomenology? Is it consciousness and its objectivity or is it the Being of beings in its unconcealedness and concealment?

Thus I was brought to the path of the question of Being, illuminated by the phenomenological attitude, again made uneasy in a different way than previously by the questions prompted by Brentano’s dissertation. But the path of questioning became longer than I suspected.
It demanded many stops, detours and wrong paths. What the first lectures in Freiburg and then in Marburg attempted shows the path only indirectly.

"Professor Heidegger—you have got to publish something now. Do you have a manuscript?" With these words the dean of the philosophical faculty in Marburg came into my study one day in the winter semester of 1925-26. "Certainly," I answered. Then the dean said: "But it must be printed quickly." The faculty proposed me unico loco as Nicolai Hartmann's successor for the chief philosophical chair. Meanwhile, the ministry in Berlin had rejected the proposal with the explanation that I had not published anything in the last ten years.

Now I had to submit my closely protected work to the public. On account of Husserl's intervention, the publishing house Max Niemeyer was ready to print immediately the first fifteen proof sheets of the work which was to appear in Husserl's Jahrbuch. Two copies of the finished page proofs were sent to the ministry by the faculty right away. But after some time, they were returned to the faculty with the remark: "Inadequate." In February of the following year (1927), the complete text of Being and Time was published in the eighth volume of the Jahrbuch and as a separate publication. After that the ministry reversed its negative judgment half a year later and made the offer for the chair.

On the occasion of the strange publication of Being and Time, I came first into direct relationship with the publishing house Max Niemeyer. What was a mere name on the title page of Husserl's fascinating work during the first semester of my academic studies became evident now and in the future in all the thoroughness and reliability, generosity and simplicity, of publication work.

In the summer of 1928, during my last semester in Marburg, the Festschrift for Husserl's seventieth birthday was in preparation. At the beginning of this semester Max Scheler died unexpectedly. He was one of the co-editors of Husserl's Jahrbuch where he published his great investigation Formalism in Ethics and Material Ethics of Value in the first and second volume (1916). Along with Husserl's Ideas, it must count as the most significant contribution to the Jahrbuch. Through its far-reaching effects, it placed the scope and effectiveness of the Niemeyer publishing house in a new light.

The Festschrift for Edmund Husserl appeared punctually for his birthday as a supplement to the Jahrbuch. I had the honor of presenting it to the celebrated teacher within a circle of his pupils and friends on April 8, 1929.

During the following decade all more extensive publications were withheld until the publishing house Niemeyer dared to print my interpretation of Hölderlin's hymn "As on a Holiday" in 1941 without giving the year of publication. I had given this lecture in May of the same year as a public guest lecture at the university of Leipzig. The owner of the publishing house, Mr. Hermann Niemeyer, had come from Halle to hear this lecture. Afterward we discussed the publication.

When I decided twelve years later to publish earlier lecture series, I chose the Niemeyer publishing house for this purpose. It no longer bore the designation "Halle a.d. Saale." Following great losses and manifold difficulties, and visited by hard personal suffering, the present owner had re-established the firm in Tübingen.

"Halle a.d. Saale"—in the same city, the former Privatdozent Edmund Husserl taught during the '90's of the last century at that university. Later in Freiburg, he often told the story of how the Logical Investigations came to be. He never forgot to remember the Max Niemeyer publishing house with gratitude and admiration, the house which took upon itself the venture of publishing, at the turn of the century, an extensive work of a little-known instructor who went his own new ways and thus had to estrange contemporary philosophy, which ignored the work for years after its appearance, until Wilhelm Dilthey recognized its significance. The publishing house could not know at that time that his name would remain tied to that of phenomenology in the future, that phenomenology would soon determine the spirit of the age in the most various realms—mostly in a tacit manner.
The summary of the seminar on the lecture "Time and Being" was "

"The absence of Time (1965) by the philosopher Martin Heidegger, which was issued under the title "The Essence of Time," has become a central theme in contemporary philosophy. This absence is not due to the absence of time itself, but rather to the way in which it is perceived and used by human beings." Heidegger's work has been widely discussed and interpreted, and its influence can be felt in various fields of philosophy and beyond."

References

ON TIME AND BEING

1965

Supplement 1969
Expression of perceptions

The question now is: How can we express the perception of a chair? Can the assertion 'I see a chair' express a clear perception of the actual chair? How can we express the fact that there is an actual chair?

Let us find our notion of perception to be fulfilled in the same way it is in the assertion 'I unperceived the chair'. The expression 'I unperceived the chair' fulfills the condition of a concrete and actual perception. We can formulate by the expression 'I unperceived the chair' that the expression 'I see the chair' is fulfilled by the assertion 'I see a chair'.

There is a possibility that the expression 'I unperceived the chair' may be true. But this is no longer the case. The expression 'I unperceived the chair' no longer expresses the perception of the chair. The expression 'I unperceived the chair' no longer expresses the perception of the chair.

But giving expression to a perception may not signify giving no

And as I see the chair.

But I do not have to say the chair.

In the full perceptual assent to the chair.

And as I see the chair.
The concept of consciousness is not clear, nor is it understood. Hence, it is one of the major fields of study in the sciences.

The problem of consciousness lies in the realm of perception, as well as in the level of information. Understanding consciousness requires the integration of various disciplines, including psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy.

The mind's ability to perceive and process information is directly related to the structure of the brain. This is evident in the way the brain processes sensory information, creating a representation of the world. The neural connections that form these representations are complex and not fully understood.

Consciousness is not just a state of awareness; it is a dynamic process involving the interplay of various factors. These factors include the environment, cognition, and the individual's experiences.

The study of consciousness is crucial for understanding human behavior and mental processes. It opens up avenues for exploring the nature of reality and the human experience.
In simple terms, the concept of perfection in art is a complex one. It involves the idea of 'perfecting' or 'improving' something to the point of excellence. This can be achieved through various techniques and methods, such as repetition, refinement, and innovation. The goal is to create a finished product that is flawless and meets the highest standards of quality.

In the realm of art, the concept of perfection is often discussed in terms of technique and execution. Artists strive to achieve a level of mastery that allows them to create pieces that are both technically proficient and artistically satisfying. This often involves a great deal of practice and dedication, as well as a deep understanding of the medium and its possibilities.

Perfection is not always achievable, however. There are inherent limitations to the human body and the materials used in art. Additionally, an artist's vision may be subject to external influences, such as the tastes and preferences of others. Despite these challenges, the pursuit of perfection remains a driving force in the world of art, inspiring artists to push the boundaries of what is possible and create works that are truly exceptional.

In conclusion, the concept of perfection in art is a multifaceted one, involving a combination of technical skill, artistic vision, and a commitment to continuous improvement. It is a concept that continues to evolve and inspire artists, even as it remains elusive and subject to the ever-changing demands of the art world.