Quassim Cassam

 

I've been at Warwick since 2009. Before coming to Warwick I was Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge (2007-8) and Professor of Philosophy at UCL (2005-6). However, most of my career was spent at Oxford, where I read Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) as an undergraduate at Keble College. I went on to do a B.Phil. and then a D.Phil., supervised for the most part by Sir Peter Strawson. My first job in philosophy was at Oriel College, Oxford, as Fellow and Lecturer. I moved to Wadham College, Oxford, in 1986 and spent 18 happy years there as Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy before my move to UCL.

My D.Phil. thesis was on transcendental arguments, and I have retained an interest in Kantian themes and topics. My first book, Self and World (Oxford University Press 1997) argued for the thesis that consciousness of self requires awareness of one's body. My next book, The Possibility of Knowledge (Oxford University Press 2007) was an account of how-possible questions in epistemology (questions of the form 'how is knowledge of such-and-such a kind possible?'). The book gives an account of how such questions arise and how they should be answered. You can hear me discussing the main ideas of the book in this podcast recorded at the University of Chicago in 2010: http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/podcasts/elucidations.html#23

I am currently writing my contribution to a co-authored book on Berkeley's Puzzle. John Campbell (University of California, Berkeley) is the other author. The puzzle is: we seem to have concepts of mind-independent objects, and our concepts are grounded in sensory experience. But (at least according to Berkeley) sensory experience can't ground concepts of mind-independent objects. In his contribution Campbell argues that we can only understand howsensory experience can ground concepts of mind-independent objects if we have what he calls a Relational View of experience. In my contribution I criticize Campbell's relational solution and defend a representational approach.

In 2012-13 I will be on leave, to take up a Senior Research Fellowship awarded by Mind. The plan is to write a book on self-knowledge. The book will focus on forms of self-knowledge which have been neglected in the philosophical literature , such as knowledge of one's character, abilities and values. It will also look into whether and why these and other forms of self-knowledge matter. Another theme will be the connection between self-knowledge and rationality;I contend that standard philosophical accounts of knowledge of our own beliefs, desires, and other attitudes exaggerate the role of reason and reasoning in the acquisition of self-knowledge.

Publications:
 
(a) Books:
  • Self and World (Oxford University Press 1997).
  • The Possibility of Knowledge (Oxford University Press 2007; paperback 2009).
(b) Edited volumes:
  • Self-Knowledge (Oxford University Press 1994).
(c) Articles:
 
(i) On Kant and transcendental arguments:
  • Transcendental Arguments, Transcendental Synthesis and Transcendental Idealism', Philosophical Quarterly, 37 (1987).
  • 'Kant and Reductionism', Review of Metaphysics, 43 (1989).
  • 'Inner Sense, Body Sense, and Kant's "Refutation of Idealism"', European Journal of Philosophy, 1 (1993).
  • La unidad transcendental de la apercepción' in Laura Benítez and José Robles (eds.) El problema de la relación mente-cuerpo (UNAM 1993).
  • Mind, Knowledge, and Reality: Themes from Kant', in Anthony O'Hear (ed.) Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998).
  • 'Self-Directed Transcendental Arguments', in Robert Stern (ed.) Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects (Clarendon Press 1999).
  • Can Transcendental Epistemology be Naturalized?', in Philosophy 78 (2003).
(ii) On knowledge and perception:
(iii) On the self, self-knowledge and the first person: 
  • 'Kant and Reductionism', Review of Metaphysics , 43 (1989).
  • 'Reductionism and First-Person Thinking', in David Charles and Kathleen Lennon (eds.) Reductionism, Explanation, and Realism. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992).
  • 'Self-Knowledge', in Q. Cassam (ed.) Self-Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1994).
  • 'Transcendental Self-Consciousness', in P.K.Sen and R. R. Verma (eds.) The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson (New Delhi: Indian Council for Philosophical Research 1995).
  • 'Introspection and Bodily Self-Ascription', in J. Bermudez, A. Marcel and N. Eilan (eds.) The Body and the Self (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1995).
  • 'Self-Reference, Self-Knowledge and the Problem of Misconception', European Journal of Philosophy 4 (1996).
  • 'Subjects and Objects', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997).
  • 'Representing Bodies', Ratio 15 (2002), reprinted in M. Proudfoot (ed.) The Philosophy of Body (Oxford: Blackwell 2002).
  • 'Introspection, Perception, and Epistemic Privilege', The Monist 87 (2004).
  • 'How We Know What We Think' in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 2010, special issue on the self edited by B. Longuenesse.
  • 'Judging, Believing and Thinking', Philosophical Issues , 20 (2010).
  • 'The Embodied Self', in S. Gallagher (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011).
  • 'Knowing What you Believe', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2011), reprinted in G. Abel and J. Conant (eds.) Rethinking Epistemology , vol. 2 (Berlin: De Gruyter 2012).
  • 'Epistemic Self-Audit and Warranted Reasons', forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

(iv) On personal identity:

  • 'Parfit on Persons', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93 (1993).

(v) On a priori knowledge and a priori concepts:

  • 'Rationalism, Empiricism and the A Priori', in C.Peacocke and P. Boghossian (eds.) New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000).
  • 'A Priori Concepts', in Hans-Johann Glock (ed.) Strawson and Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

(vi) On necessity and essentialism:

  • 'Science and Essence', Philosophy 61 (1986).
  • 'Necessity and Externality', Mind 95 (1986).

(vii) On realism and anti-realism:

  • 'Realism, Meaning and Truth', Philosophical Books 30 (1989).
  • 'La Philosophie britannique contemporaine', in R. Klibansky and D. Pears (eds.) La philosophie en Europe (Paris: Gallimard 1995).

(viii) On Descartes:

(ix) On Berkeley:

  • 'Tackling Berkeley's Puzzle', in N. Eilan, H. Lerman and J. Roessler (eds.) Understanding Perception, Causation and Objectivity (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011).