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

Plato's Ethics

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Republic V–VII

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[–] Abstract and Keywords

This chapter endeavours to demonstrate the relevance of the epistemological and metaphysical doctrines of books V, VI, and VII for Plato's ethics. Firstly, the role played by the analysis of the sight-lovers theory and how it relates with the other aspects of this books is investigated. Secondly, the relevance of the doctrine of the Good as the supreme form and its analogy with the sun is evaluated. Thirdly, how the line and the cave fit with Plato's discussion and the role they play is examined.

Keywords: Cave allegory, Forms, Good, Ideas, Plato, Republic, Sight-lovers

180. Socratic Definition in The Republic

Republic V–VII 180. Socratic Definition in The Republic

In Books V through VII Plato interrupts the argument about justice to emphasize and defend some apparently paradoxical features of the ideal city that has been described.

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He spends the most time on the defence of his claim that the virtue of wisdom ascribed to the rulers of the ideal city must include philosophical knowledge and that therefore the rulers must be philosophers. The argument in Book V seeks to show that knowledge requires the knowledge of the one nonsensible Form of F, in contrast to the many sensible Fs. In Books VI and VII he says more about what this knowledge is like and how it is acquired.

This contrast between the one Form and the many sensibles is relevant to the Socratic search for definitions and hence relevant to the main argument of the *Republic*. In the Socratic dialogues, Socrates looks for definitions of the virtues but does not claim to have found them; in fact, the dialogues normally end with a confession that he is still puzzled. Socrates regularly insists that he does not know the answers to his questions about the nature of the virtues. *Republic* IV, by contrast, presents accounts of the virtues, and they are not accompanied by any of the usual Socratic disavowals or expressions of puzzlement.

To explain this difference, we need to resolve some questions about Socratic definition. At the beginning of Book I the Simonidean view of justice is not refuted, but Socrates and Polemarchus cannot explain it in observational terms that are easily applied to particular situations. If what is 'due' to people is simply what one has taken from them, we can replace 'due' with a term that is easier to apply to particular situations, since it takes less moral judgment to recognize that we have taken something from someone than it takes to recognize what is due to someone. But this attempted replacement of 'due' is unsatisfactory, and Socrates and Polemarchus find no satisfactory replacement.

Thrasymachus deplores this failure; he demands a 'perspicuous and accurate' account that would eliminate terms such as 'due', 'appropriate', or 'beneficial' in favour of terms that allow easy application to particular situations. Thrasymachus' demand corresponds quite closely to criteria that Socrates seems **(p.263)** to accept implicitly in the early dialogues.[1] If Socrates does indeed accept them, it is easy to see why the early dialogues do not find definitions of the virtues that satisfy him; for the demand for elimination of references to moral properties makes it difficult to find acceptable accounts of the virtues. In *Republic* I, however, Socrates does not explicitly accept Thrasymachus' demand for a perspicuous and accurate account; moreover, Glaucon and Adeimantus' demands in Book II would be very difficult to satisfy if Thrasymachus' demand were also accepted.

The middle dialogues give reasons for rejecting Thrasymachus' demand, since they argue that sensible properties provide inadequate answers to the Socratic demand for a definition.[2] These dialogues suggest that something is wrong with the implicit claim of the Socratic dialogues (agreeing with Thrasymachus) that knowledge of the single form of justice, for instance, requires a single account that mentions only sensible properties.

These questions about definition should affect our view of the accounts of the virtues presented in Book IV. For these accounts do not satisfy Thrasymachus' demands, and so they do not seem to satisfy the demands of the Socratic dialogues either. Bravery is

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described as preservation of right belief under the control of the wisdom in the rational part; temperance is concord between the parts under the control of the wisdom in the rational part. Each of these accounts mentions the rational part and its wisdom, which is its knowledge of the good. Similarly, justice consists in each part doing its own work under the control of the wisdom in the rational part. These accounts would eliminate moral terms only if we could specify knowledge of the good in non-moral terms; to do this, we would need an account of the good in non-moral terms. Plato says nothing to suggest that he can provide such an account, nor does he suggest that he needs such an account in order to give an adequate account of the virtues.

Plato does not claim, then, that he can do exactly what Socrates was trying to do in the early dialogues. For Socrates was trying to meet criteria for definition that Plato takes to be misconceived, or at least Socrates did not realize that he ought not to try to meet these criteria. According to Plato, Socrates found it difficult to answer his questions because he had the wrong criteria for an adequate answer. *Republic* IV implicitly draws the conclusion we would expect Plato to draw from his arguments in the middle dialogues about the non-sensible character of Forms.

Perhaps, however, Plato ought not to conclude so readily that the Socratic dialogues went wrong in focussing on sensible properties, and perhaps we ought not to be so easily satisfied with the accounts that he offers in *Republic* IV. We might say that Plato's arguments show that since justice, for instance, is not a single sensible property, it cannot be a single property at all. In that case Plato is wrong to follow Socrates in looking for the single F by which all F things are F (*M.* 72c6–d1).

Plato believes that this would be the wrong conclusion to draw from his arguments about sensible properties; in his view, Socrates' assumption that knowledge of F consists in knowledge of a single form of F is correct, and so we ought to deny that the F can be identified with any sensible property. In the **(p.264)** middle dialogues, however, he does not defend this view of the Socratic project against the more radical view that would reject the single form altogether. It is reasonable, then, that he returns to these questions in *Republic* V.

181. The Philosophers and the Sight-Lovers

Republic V–VII 181. The Philosophers and the Sight-Lovers

In Book V Socrates describes the philosophers as lovers of the truth, in contrast to the 'lovers of sights' who are interested only in sensible things and properties (475d1–e4). The just and the unjust, for instance, are two, and each is one, but each is combined with different bodies and actions. To the extent that the same sensible things are both just and unjust, justice and injustice are combined in these sensible things (475e6–476a8).[3] These facts about the F in contrast to the many Fs explain the difference between the philosophers and the sight-lovers; for, according to Plato, the sight-lovers cannot grasp these facts about Forms.

The error of the sight-lovers is described in four ways:

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1. The relations of forms to sensibles causes each of the forms to appear many (476a7). The sight-lovers accept beautiful shapes, colours, and so on, but 'their thought is unable to see and accept the nature of the beautiful itself' (476b6–8), whereas the philosophers are able to see the beautiful itself 'in its own right' (*kath'hauto*, 476b10–11).
2. The sight-lover 'recognizes beautiful things, but neither recognizes beauty itself nor is able to follow if someone leads him towards the knowledge of it' (476c2–4).
3. The philosopher 'thinks there is some beautiful itself, and is able to discern it and the things participating in it, and neither thinks that participants are it nor that it is the participants' (476c9–d3). The philosopher sees the difference between two sorts of things that resemble each other, one of which is a copy and the other the original (the many Fs and the F itself). Since the sight-lover does not see this difference, he is dreaming.[4]
4. The sight-lover 'thinks there is no beautiful itself and no one character (*idea*) of the same beauty that is always in the same condition, but takes the beautifuls to be many'. Hence he 'in no way puts up with it if anyone says the beautiful is one, and the just, and the others in the same way' (478e7–479a5).

The second of these passages, taken by itself, might suggest that the contrast is this: (1) The sight-lovers deny that there is anything properly called 'the beautiful' in contrast to beautiful sights, sounds, and so on. The first passage, however, suggests a different contrast: (2) Both the philosophers and the sight-lovers recognize something properly called 'the beautiful', but the sight-lovers think there are many of these things, and the philosophers think there is just one. This second contrast is also suggested by the third passage.

The fourth passage makes it clear that Plato intends the second contrast rather than the first. He takes the claim that the beautifuls are many to be opposed to the claim that the beautiful is one; the latter claim is clearly his own view that there is one form of beauty. If the former claim is simply that there **(p.265)** are many things (horses, temples, institutions, and so on) properly called 'beautiful' (or 'fine', *kalon*), Plato does not disagree; indeed, he takes the existence of 'many beautifuls' (in this sense) to be obvious. Since he plainly disagrees with the sight-lover's belief that there are many beautifuls, Plato must take the sight-lover to believe that there are many things properly called 'the beautiful', not simply that there are many things properly said to be beautiful.

When the sight-lover affirms that the beautifuls are many, he means that there are many different properties that give equally good answers to the 'What is it?' question, and there is no one property that gives an adequate answer for all cases.[5] The point of saying 'the beautifuls are many', rather than just 'there are many beautifuls' might be clarified by interpreting it as 'the beauties are many'. The sight-lover believes that the right answer to the Socratic question refers to the many different properties that make different things beautiful.[6]

182. The Importance of the Sight-Lovers

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Republic V–VII 182. The Importance of the Sight-Lovers
The sight-lovers' position is worth discussing because it rejects Socrates' standard view, in the early and middle dialogues, about an adequate account of a virtue. The sight-lovers suppose that we have a satisfactory answer to the Socratic question if we say that, for instance, justice in these actions is giving back what you have borrowed, in those actions not giving back what you have borrowed (cf. 331c), or that beauty in this case is bright colour, in that case symmetrical shape, and so on.

On this point the sight-lovers agree with Meno, whose first answer to Socrates' request for an account of virtue is a list of different types of virtue in different sorts of people. They are more persistent than Meno, however, since they firmly reject a Socratic presupposition. Once Socrates explains to Meno the sort of thing he is looking for, Meno agrees (although hesitantly, *M*. 73a1–5) to look for a single form of virtue. The sight-lovers insist that failure to look for a single form may reflect not a misunderstanding of Socrates' method, but a reasonable doubt about the existence of any single form. Plato sees that he has to answer this doubt.

In this passage, but not in the *Meno*, Plato suggests that if we are to turn away from the many Fs to the F itself, we must turn from the senses to reason and reject any accounts mentioning only sensible properties. This difference from the *Meno* is important; for Socrates never suggests (in the *Meno* or in earlier dialogues) that it is wrong to look for sensible properties like those that Meno mentions in his account appealing to the many virtues. On the contrary, Socrates seems to insist that an acceptable definition must satisfy the 'dialectical condition', requiring it to mention only properties that the questioner agrees he knows.[7] This condition implies that no definition can mention any property that is not yet known; although this condition does not actually say that only observable properties can be mentioned, they seem to be the only plausible candidates for being already known.

In *Republic* V Plato suggests that we cannot consistently maintain two **(p.266)** Socratic demands: (1) the demand for the one rather than the many and (2) the dialectical condition requiring previous knowledge of properties mentioned in a definition. Plato suggests that if we insist on the second condition, we will restrict ourselves to sensible properties, and none of these will ever give us an account of the one form. If this is right, then Socrates' failure to find satisfactory definitions is readily explained; it is the result of his combining two incompatible demands. If the sight-lovers were right to suppose that Socrates' question can be answered only by mentioning sensible properties, they would also be right to suppose that each of the relevant predicates ('just', 'beautiful', and so on) corresponds to many properties.

Some remarks in the *Phaedrus* suggest that the sight-lovers have not made much progress in recollection. In this dialogue Plato treats the Theory of Recollection as an account of how we find the 'one' by beginning from the 'many': 'For a human being must understand what is spoken of in accordance with a form, by going[8] from many perceptions to a one that is gathered together by reasoning; and this is recollection of the things that our soul once saw' (*Phdr*. 249b6–c2). This ability to go from the many to the

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one is not explicitly connected with recollection in either the *Meno* or the *Phaedo*. The *Phaedrus* adds a significant point to Plato's previous remarks in connecting recollection explicitly with the Socratic search for the one F explaining the many Fs. We take the first step in this recollection when we see why the sight-lovers are wrong, and why we have to look for the single property F that is not reducible to the many properties that embody it in different situations.

183. Knowledge and Belief

Republic V–VII 183. Knowledge and Belief

In order to show that the sight-lovers are wrong, Plato begins by distinguishing knowledge from belief. Once he has done this, he argues that if we focus on the many sensible Fs, we cannot meet the appropriate conditions for knowledge of the F. The main steps in the argument are these:

1. Knowledge is set over what is true, ignorance over what is not true, belief over what is and is not true.
2. The many Fs (beautifuls, justs, and so on) are both F and not F.
3. The views of the sight-lovers about the beautiful, just, and so on are between being true and not being true: neither wholly true nor wholly false.
4. Hence their views are not knowledge, but belief.

While the argument raises many difficulties of interpretation, we ought to focus on the issues that bear most directly on the questions about knowledge and Socratic definition.

First, we may be surprised that Plato omits one characteristic of knowledge that he emphasizes in the *Meno* and *Gorgias*; he does not say that knowledge differs from belief in its ability to give an account.[9] The *Republic* does not give up this claim about knowledge; Book VII maintains that ability to give an account **(p.267)** is characteristic of dialecticians (531e4–5). Why could Plato not have said in Book V that the philosophers who have knowledge differ from non-philosophers with mere belief because they can give an account of their beliefs? The search for accounts and justifications is an important part of the search for knowledge, and it may well seem strange that Plato is silent about it in Book V.

We can see the point of Plato's silence if we understand the place of this argument in the dialogue. If Book V is meant to take up questions about Socratic definition that have been raised by the dialogue so far, Plato assumes that we already agree that knowledge requires an account. The sight-lovers do not deny that knowledge of beauty requires an account of it; on the contrary, they believe they are giving the correct account when they mention the many sensible properties that, in their view, constitute beauty. If Plato is to refute them, he has to show that not every account gives us knowledge. He assumes that knowledge requires an account, in order to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable accounts. This task occupies him explicitly in the *Theaetetus*; in *Republic* V he implicitly recognizes its importance.[10]

Since Plato cannot argue that the sight-lovers provide no account, he focusses instead on

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the other difference between knowledge and belief, the necessary connexion between knowledge and truth. He expresses this connexion by saying that knowledge is 'set over what is'. By this he means that knowledge of a proposition p implies that p is true, whereas belief that p does not imply the truth of p; whereas it is possible for what is believed to be true or false, it is necessary for what is known to be true.[11]

The point of this description of knowledge and belief is easier to see if we notice that Plato introduces it at the start of an argument that is meant to persuade the sight-lovers of their mistake (476e7–477a5). Plato has already taken it to be obvious—to us, but not to the sight-lovers—that since the sight-lovers believe that the many Fs are all there is to the F itself, they must have belief rather than knowledge about the F. The many Fs resemble the F itself, but the sight-lovers make the mistake of supposing that there is no F itself apart from them; that is why the sight-lovers are similar to dreamers who do not recognize that real trees are different from the apparent trees they are aware of in their dreams (476c2–7). Plato argues that since some of their beliefs about the F are false, they cannot have knowledge of the F. If, then, he wants to persuade them of the soundness of his argument, it is reasonable for him to begin with the uncontroversial assumption that knowledge implies truth.

This explanation of 'is', 'is and is not', and so on, should guide us when 'is and is not' is applied to the contents of belief. The claim that the contents of belief 'are and are not' is readily intelligible if it means that they are and are not true, so that beliefs include both true and false beliefs. The claim that belief is true and false whereas knowledge is always true is equivalent to Plato's claim that knowledge is infallible and belief is fallible (477e6–7). We must suppose that 'is and is not' is applied to the whole set of propositions that are believed; we could also say that what is believed is sometimes (or in some cases) true and sometimes false, whereas what is known is always true. To say that ignorance **(p.268)** is about 'what is not' is not to say that all false belief counts as ignorance rather than belief; it is to say that whereas belief includes both true and false beliefs, ignorance does not include true beliefs.

Once we have distinguished knowing and believing a proposition, we can also say what it takes to have knowledge and belief about some object—about beauty or justice, for instance. If some of what we say about the nature of beauty is true and some is false, then we can have only belief about beauty; if what we say is completely false, then we are ignorant about beauty. If we know about beauty, then our account of the nature of beauty must be true, with no elements of falsity. We are now in a position to see whether the sight-lovers have knowledge, belief, or ignorance about the forms.

184. Plato's Objection to the Sight-Lovers

Republic V–VII 184. Plato's Objection to the Sight-Lovers

Plato now argues that the sight-lovers cannot give the right account of the beautiful if they confine themselves to the many beautifuls. He points out, as he does in the *Phaedo* and the *Symposium*, that the many beautifuls suffer compresence of opposites, since each of them will also appear ugly (479a5–b10). Compresence of opposites disqualifies a property as an explanation, for reasons that Plato gives in the *Phaedo*: if bright colour,

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say, is both beautiful and ugly, it explains why something is beautiful no better than it explains why something is ugly, and so it cannot be the right explanation of why something is beautiful.[12]

The next steps in Plato's argument raise serious questions. (1) After mentioning that the many sensible Fs cannot be thought of firmly either as F or as not F (479b11–c5), he says they should be placed between 'being and not being' (479c6–d1); here it is reasonable to take him to mean 'between being F and not being F'. (2) Then he infers: 'We have found, then, that the many conventional views (*nomima*) of the many about the beautiful and the other things oscillate somewhere between what is not and what fully is' (479d3–5).[13] (3) He remarks that it had been previously agreed that anything of this sort belongs to belief rather than knowledge (479d7–10).

If our previous account of the difference between knowledge and belief was right, then the third step interprets the second step as having said that the views of the many about the beautiful and so on 'oscillate' because they are both true and false; hence 'what is not' and 'what fully is' in the second remark must be taken in the veridical sense. The first remark, however, uses 'to be' in the predicative sense (as in 'is beautiful', and so on). The sense of 'to be' shifts between (1) and (2). Does this introduce a fatal equivocation into the argument?

We must consider what Plato is entitled to say on the basis of the previous argument. In believing that beauty is bright colour, symmetrical shape, and so on, the sight-lovers are right to some degree. This bright-coloured temple, for example, is indeed beautiful, and its bright colour contributes to its beauty. The sight-lovers are right, then, insofar as the many beautifuls all contribute to making things beautiful in the right conditions; but they are wrong in believing that these many beautifuls are what beauty is.

(p.269) If Plato is trying to say this about the sight-lovers in the last part of his argument, then we should not take (2)—the remark that the views of the many are between being completely true and being completely false—to ascribe partial truth to each belief of the sight-lovers. Plato invites us to look at the body of their views about, say, the beautiful, and to ask whether these views constitute belief or knowledge about the beautiful. When we find that their views about the beautiful include both true and false views, we are entitled to infer that, as a whole, their views constitute a body of belief rather than a body of knowledge about the beautiful. Their views are not so far off the mark that they count as complete ignorance about the beautiful, but they cannot count as a body of knowledge either. If this is right, then the earlier description of the content of belief as both true and false can be applied without any equivocation to the views of the sight-lovers about the beautiful, the just, and so on.

We might well suppose that if Plato had been completely clear about his different uses of 'is and is not', he would not have said exactly what he says. We might fairly conclude that he is not completely clear about what he is saying and about the conclusion he needs and intends to draw. Nonetheless, we need not find any damaging equivocation in his argument; his conclusion can be fairly drawn from his account of the sight-lovers and

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their attitude towards the properties that they try to define.

185. Are the Sight-Lovers Refuted?

Republic V–VII 185. Are the Sight-Lovers Refuted?

The argument might still appear to be unfair to the sight-lovers. Admittedly, they must agree that since bright colour makes some things beautiful and others ugly, 'bright colour' cannot be the right account of beauty in all cases. This agreement would embarrass the sight-lovers if they claimed that bright colour is the property that makes all beautiful things beautiful. But this is precisely what they deny; in their view, bright colour makes some things beautiful, symmetrical shape makes other things beautiful, and so on. The fact that each of the many beautifuls suffers from compresence of opposites is precisely the sight-lovers' reason for supposing that there are many properties of which each is the beauty in a given kind of thing, and that there is no one property that is the beauty in all beautiful things. Plato might seem to have missed this point; his objection, we might suppose, would be fair only if the sight-lovers were trying to give a single account of beauty.

This defence of the sight-lovers suggests that we must distinguish two claims about the compresence of opposites. Suppose that the sight-lovers claim that bright colour is beauty in statues. In reply, Plato might say: (1) Bright colour is beautiful in statues but not in, say, Leonardo's cartoons. (2) Bright colour is beautiful in some statues but not in others. The first claim is harmless to the sight-lovers. The second claim, however, damages their case, for it suggests that within the restricted range of cases in which they believe bright colour can be identified with beauty, it is sometimes not beautiful, and so it cannot be the beauty in statues.

(p.270) Which of these two claims does Plato intend when he says that each of the many beautifuls will also appear ugly?[14] The many beautifuls are the many properties that the sight-lovers identify with beauty; these properties are not bright colour, symmetrical shape, and so on, without qualification, but bright colour, and so on, in specific circumstances. Unless Plato is confused, he is claiming that such things as bright colour in statues (not simply bright colour without qualification) are beautiful and ugly. In that case he makes the second claim about compresence of opposites; if this claim is true, it damages the sight-lovers' case.

Is Plato entitled to the second claim in all the relevant cases? *Republic* I shows how he might defend it. 'Returning what one has borrowed' (as opposed to what one has been given as a gift) is a description of one of the many justs, but Socrates shows Polemarchus that it is not specific enough to avoid the compresence of opposites; for sometimes it would not be just to return what one has borrowed. If this is so, then justice, even in this restricted area, cannot be identified with returning what one has borrowed.

This objection leads Plato to a crucial question: how do we judge that bright colour makes this statue beautiful and that one ugly, or that returning what you have borrowed is just in this case and not in that case? Two answers seem to be possible: (1) Our judgment rests on nothing further; we simply remember a list of properties that make certain

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objects beautiful or just and a list of cases in which these properties do not make something beautiful or just. It is a brute fact that these items and no others are on the list. (2) There is some further reason underlying our judgment about the many Fs in these different cases, and this further reason leads us back to the one Form, the single property that really explains our judgments about rules and exceptions to rules.

The sight-lovers are committed to the first answer, but it does not seem plausible for the cases that display, or might display, the compresence of opposites. For we can surely explain why we think it would not be just to return a gun we have borrowed from our neighbour, if he has gone mad and threatens his own and other people's lives. We normally expect just actions to benefit rather than to harm the people primarily affected by them; this general expectation underlies both our conviction that normally it is just to return what we have borrowed and our conviction that sometimes doing so is not just. Our reasoning in such a case would be difficult to understand if the sight-lovers were right and our conception of justice rested on nothing more basic than our recognition of the many types of just actions.[15]

This line of objection to the sight-lovers explains why Plato believes they display another frequent characteristic of people who have belief without knowledge: they lack a rational basis for criticism of conventional views. Although they try to give an account of, for instance, justice they simply identify justice with the commonly recognized features of just actions (people, laws). Plato tries to show that this is a superficial reaction to the defects of conventional rules of justice; and so he suggests that failure to recognize non-sensible Forms imprisons us in conventional rules, preventing us from understanding their inadequacies **(p.271)** and, equally important, the extent to which they are defensible (493e2–494a4). This aspect of the sight-lovers' attitude is discussed further in the image of the Cave.[16]

186. The Sun

Republic V–VII 186. The Sun

The argument of Book V says something about what knowledge is by saying what Socratic definitions are not; since Socratic definitions cannot be confined to sensible properties, knowledge must be knowledge of non-sensible Forms. It is reasonable to ask Plato to say more about what this knowledge is like. In Books VI and VII he turns to this task by offering the three connected images of the Sun, the Line, and the Cave.[17]

The Sun tells us something more about the connexion between knowledge of the Forms and awareness of the Good. It describes two conditions of sight that illustrate two cognitive conditions of the soul:[18]

> s1. Sight in the dark without sunlight looks at visible things.
> s2. Sight in sunlight looks at visible things (508c4–d2).
> S1. The soul looks at the many Fs without reference to the Form of the Good, and has only belief (508d6–9).
> S2. The soul looks at the Forms, referring to the Form of the Good, and has knowledge (508d4–6, 508e1–509a5).

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The contrast between S1 and S2 is meant to be the contrast that was drawn in Book V, between the sight-lovers who appeal to the many Fs and the philosophers who appeal to the Forms (507a7–b11). The Sun begins to explain that contrast, by insisting that an appeal to the Forms requires reference to the Good.

Socrates reminds Glaucon and Adeimantus that they accepted an account of the tripartite soul and the cardinal virtues that fell short of completeness and accuracy (504a4–b8). A complete and accurate account requires arguments and proofs that can be reached only by the 'longer way', which requires knowledge of the Form of the Good (504e7–505a4).[19] Since justice and the other virtues are essentially good and beneficial (505a2–4), knowledge of these virtues requires knowledge of the Good.[20]

The Sun makes it clear, however, that appeals to the Form of the Good are not confined to those who have mastered the longer way and have achieved knowledge of the Good. Plato insists that some appeal to the Good guides everyone who succeeds in turning from the many sensible Fs towards the Form of F; for it is the Good in S2 that makes us recognize the Forms, just as the sunlight in s2 illuminates visible objects for us. Although he may insist that complete knowledge of any Form requires knowledge of the Good, he must allow Forms to be grasped by some cognitive state, superior to mere belief, that does not require knowledge of the Good. Indeed, he must claim that the moral theory of the *Republic* rests on some such cognitive state. For since he claims to have given definitions of the virtues, he must claim to have discerned some of the features of the relevant Forms; but he denies that he has knowledge of the Good.

(p.272) 187. The Form of the Good

Republic V–VII 187. The Form of the Good

Why should it be easier to give accounts of the virtues than to give an account embodying knowledge of the Good? Plato answers this question when he considers different attempts to say what the good is.[21] The 'many' identify the good with pleasure, but they have to admit that there are bad pleasures, so that they are compelled to admit that 'the same things are good and bad' (505b1–2, 505c6–11). As usual, the claim about compresence of opposites must be applied to types rather than tokens; Plato objects that since pleasures are sometimes good, sometimes bad, simply achieving pleasure cannot be identified with achieving the good.

The difficulty in identifying the good with wisdom is presented differently. Plato suggests that people who say that the good is wisdom or knowledge 'cannot show what sort of wisdom it is, but in the end are compelled to say that it is wisdom about the good' (505b8–10). The difficulty is not that their account applies to the wrong cases, but that it appeals all over again to the good, instead of explaining what it is.

The two rejected accounts present a dilemma. We might try to defend the account of the good as wisdom by identifying it with knowledge in general, not with knowledge specifically about the good; but then we would have to allow that some kinds of knowledge without knowledge of the good are bad for us. In that case we would have introduced something that is both good and bad, so that the objection urged against the

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hedonists would also apply to us. Alternatively, we might defend the hedonist account by identifying the good only with good pleasure; but then we would have appealed to the good instead of explaining it, and the objection urged against the account of the good as wisdom would apply to us. The two rejected accounts offer us the unwelcome choice between an account that is too broad and an account that presupposes what is to be explained.[22]

Plato chooses the second horn of this dilemma. In Book IV he has shown that accounts of the virtues can be useful even if they appeal to evaluative properties that are not wholly reduced to non-evaluative properties. The claim in Book V that knowledge requires reference to non-sensible Forms in contrast to sensible properties defends the type of account offered in Book IV. In Book VI Plato claims that an ideal definition of the virtues cannot be expected to rely on a definition of the good that avoids appeal to the evaluative properties that are to be explained. When he says the Good is 'beyond being', not itself one of the beings whose reality and knowability come from it (509b6–10),[23] he implies that it is not identical to any of the other Forms; but in denying that it is itself a being, he suggests that it is not a Form that is independent of the totality of the Forms whose goodness it explains. We insist on pursuing other things only insofar as they are good and beneficial (505d5–10), but this does not mean that we pursue them for the sake of some good that is independent of them.

To defend his claim, Plato can turn to his views about the value of justice; we do not value justice because of its contribution to a good that is independent **(p.273)** of it, but because it partly constitutes the achieving of the good. The good, then, may be understood not as something independent of the virtues and other specific goods, but as the appropriate combination and arrangement of them. This is why Plato believes the Good is not a 'being' in its own right, but beyond being; while the good is superior to the different specific goods that constitute it, it cannot be understood, defined, or achieved without reference to them.

Plato has already argued that justice is not purely instrumental to happiness, but a dominant component of it, so that the good cannot exist without justice. Even if this is so, it does not follow that the good cannot be understood independently of justice (even if, for instance, the healthy condition of the body is a certain balance of the four elements, I could understand what health is even if I had never heard of the four elements); in fact, however, Plato also denies the independent intelligibility of the good. Our understanding of the human good is not completely prior to our understanding of the nature of the different virtues; it consists in our understanding of the connexions between the virtues, not in our understanding of some good that could be understood without seeing the value of the virtues.

If this is what Plato means by his claim that the Good is beyond being and is not a being in its own right, then this claim fits his practice in the *Republic*. His accounts of the virtues have not tried to meet the conditions that were apparently imposed on adequate definitions in the Socratic dialogues. His claims about the goodness of justice did not try to show how justice contributes to some good that can be understood independently of

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it. His remarks about the Form of the Good show why it was reasonable for him to present his ethical argument in this way. Plato warns us that if we look for a 'perspicuous and accurate' account (as Thrasymachus puts it) of the Good, we will find a false account.

Plato makes Socrates insist that he cannot appeal to knowledge of the Good in support of his argument about the virtues (506b2–e5). When Glaucon and Adeimantus ask for an account of the Good parallel to the accounts that Socrates gave of the virtues, he professes inability to give such an account (506d2–8). His inability is intelligible if we take account of the connexion between the good and order and system. We will begin to form an adequate conception of the good once we understand the virtues and other goods well enough to see how they fit together and how they should be combined with each other. The accounts in Book IV, Plato suggests, do not give us this degree of insight into the virtues and other goods; they are simply the starting points for such insight. The political analogy allows us to form a conception of the rational part of the soul and its ends and so allows us to form conceptions of the virtues, but these conceptions are imperfect. If we understand the rational part and its aims better, then we will also understand the virtues better, and we will see how they combine with each other and with other goods to constitute the good.

In these remarks Plato suggests that we can have something more than mere belief about Forms even if we lack the sort of knowledge that requires knowledge of the Good. This suggestion is explained in the image of the Divided Line.

(p.274) 188. The Divided Line

The Line presents four cognitive states:

L1. Imagination (*eikasia*): awareness of images of sensible things.
L2. Confidence (*pistis*): recognition of the sensible things of which the items in L1 are images.
L3. Thought (*dianoia*): reliance on assumptions and on the use of sensible things as images.
L4. Intelligence (*noēsis*): dispensing with assumptions and images by finding the first principles underlying assumptions.

Plato devotes the most space to explaining the top two stages of the Line, but some difficulties about these are easier to solve if we consider the point of the image as a whole.[24]

The four segments of the line result from subdivision of the two cognitive states (S1 and S2) mentioned in the Sun (509d1–8). In that case both L1 and L2 (which divide S1) are correlated with sensibles, while both L3 and L4 (which divide S2) are correlated with Forms; indeed, Plato makes it clear that the objects about which we lack intelligence when we are at L3 are the very objects that are objects of intelligence at L4 when we find the appropriate principle (511d1–2).[25]

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In assigning to L3 the arguments that rely on assumptions, Plato relies on his discussion of assumptions or 'hypotheses' in the *Phaedo*. The description of hypothetical method in the *Phaedo* follows the argument to show that sensible properties give an inadequate account of Forms.[26] Similarly, the *Republic* introduces L3 after Plato has argued—more fully than in the *Phaedo*—that sensible properties cannot give an account of the Forms and, in particular, cannot give an account of the Form of the Good. In both dialogues Plato appeals to the hypothetical method to show why his rejection of definitions by sensible properties does not make the search for definitions futile.

The *Republic* marks more sharply two approaches to a hypothesis that are distinguished in the *Phaedo*: (1) We defend a hypothesis against one sort of objection by showing that its consequences are acceptable in the light of our other beliefs. (2) We defend it by appealing to a higher hypothesis until we 'come to something adequate' (*Phd*. 101d5–e1). In the Line the first approach is characteristic of people at L3; they examine the consequences of their assumptions, but do not give any further defence of the assumptions themselves. They appeal to images and analogies to make the assumptions seem plausible, but such appeals do not count as a defence from a higher principle. A defence from a higher principle is characteristic of L4. Plato amplifies the remark in the *Phaedo* about 'something adequate', by arguing that the adequate basis will be a principle that is not itself an assumption (511b3–c2). The discovery of this non-hypothetical principle and the tracing of its consequences are tasks for dialectic.

This description of L3 and L4 tells us rather schematically how the account of the virtues offered in Book IV takes us beyond mere belief, but not as far as the complete knowledge that is achieved at L4. But how are we to advance from one **(p.275)** of these stages to the other? Plato cannot tell us precisely, since a precise account would require the knowledge of the Good that he disavows. Since he cannot reach L4, he uses one of the devices characteristic of L3, relying on images to convey his point. To describe progress towards the Good he introduces the image of the Cave.

189. The Cave on Belief

Republic V–VII 189. The Cave on Belief

Just as the Line divides each of the two states illustrated in the Sun (S1, divided into L1 and L2, and S2, divided into L3 and L4), the Cave divides the two illustrative states in the Sun (s1, divided into c1 and c2, and s2, divided into c3 and c4). The Cave, therefore, differs from the Line in that the four conditions it describes are purely illustrative, not necessarily examples of the states that they illustrate. The four stages of the Cave are these:

c1. Illustration of imagination: the prisoners in the cave look at shadows, reflexions, and so on.
c2. Illustration of confidence: the prisoner is released and recognizes the dummies as the source of the shadows.
c3. Illustration of thought: the released prisoner is outside the cave and discovers the visible objects that are the source of the dummies, first by looking at images of them, and then by looking at the objects themselves, eventually by

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sunlight.
c4. Illustration of intelligence: he looks at the sun and recognizes it as the source allowing him to see the visible objects he has seen.

The Cave also differs from the Line in being explicitly progressive; it sets out to show how someone can progress through the different stages it distinguishes, and so it ought to illustrate how someone can progress through the different stages of the Line.[27]

The Cave tells us more than the Sun and the Line tell us about the two lower cognitive conditions (L1 and L2). Socrates explains that the Cave illustrates 'our nature, as far as education and the lack of it are concerned' (514a2, 515a5). Most people remain in the condition illustrated by the inhabitants of the cave, and at least some people remain in the condition illustrated by the prisoners (516e8–517a7); for someone who appears in a court of justice has to deal with 'the shadows, or the figures (*agalmata*) behind the shadows, of the just' (517d8–

9). Even in the ideal city, most people are in the condition of the inhabitants of the cave; for when the philosophers rule, they have to 'descend into the cave' (520c1–6, 539e2–3).

From these points about the Cave, some conclusions about imagination can be inferred: (1) Imagination cannot be defined as a state in which we are literally confronted with nothing but shadows and images of sensible objects, for everyone is literally confronted with actual sensible objects, and not just with their shadows and images, and yet many people fail to progress beyond imagination in the area Plato is concerned with. (2) The area he is concerned with is morality, both in actual cities and in the ideal city.

(p.276) These features of imagination are intelligible if imagination about Fs is the condition of someone who lacks standards for distinguishing real Fs from mere likenesses of Fs. Someone who has only imagination about horses draws no distinction between horses, pictures of horses, shadows of horses, and images of horses appearing in dreams. The prisoners in the cave suppose that (what are in fact) the images appearing to them are actual horses, because they cannot distinguish what looks like a horse from what really is a horse; that is why they suppose that 'horse' is the name for a certain sort of appearance (which, unknown to them, is just a shadow).[28] We would be in this condition if we were looking at a real horse, but had no idea of how to distinguish it from other things that look like horses.

This is a plausible account of imagination because it fits the moral case well, as Plato clearly intends. Even though everyone passes beyond the condition of imagination in their relation to horses, tables, and chairs, not everyone passes beyond it in relation to morality. If we simply accept, without question or criticism, the views we have been brought up with or have absorbed from our social environment, we cannot distinguish appearance from reality in this area. Plato takes this to be the condition of the sight-lovers in Book V; it is also the condition of the sophists who simply repeat and elaborate popular views without any criticism (493a6–c8). In this condition, people will not listen to any talk of the just itself in contrast to the many justs (493e2–494a3), because they have not

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recognized that the many justs yield no understanding of justice.

This account of imagination shows why the beliefs of people at this stage need not be largely false; indeed, they may be largely true. Plato shows that this is his view, since he implies that in the ideal city those who have had no philosophical training are still in the condition illustrated by prisoners in the cave (519d5, *desmōtas*). Since they have been brought up to have true beliefs, as far as they are capable of grasping them, it must be their lack of critical understanding that places them at the lowest stage of the Line.

Once we have seen the nature of imagination, the Cave gives us a clearer understanding of confident belief. It tells us (as the Line does not) that we make progress from the first stage to the second stage by undergoing Socratic elenchos (515d1–8). We are not to suppose that at c2 elenctic inquiry has completely reached its goals, for since the released prisoner cannot see the real horses outside the cave, he cannot say correctly what the dummies are; still, he can see enough to recognize that what he had previously called horses are in fact distorted and imperfect likenesses of the originals he now sees.

Plato implies that a Socratic elenchos can improve an interlocutor's beliefs even if it does not lead to an answer to the Socratic question; for when we compare, say, our initial attempts to say what bravery is, or our initial beliefs about the sorts of actions that are brave, with our firm intuition that bravery must be fine and beneficial, we have some basis for assessing and criticizing our initial beliefs. We could not do this if our initial beliefs did not have the right sort of implicit rational structure, and if we were not capable of following Socrates' suggestions about the right direction for the revision of our initial beliefs.[29]

These remarks about the beneficial effects of Socratic elenchos must be compared **(p.277)** with Plato's objections to its harmful effects (537e1–539d2). Plato argues that in some young people the effect of elenchos is scepticism about the moral principles they have learned, and this scepticism undermines any moral beliefs that restrain them from following their tastes and appetites. This is the effect of practice in being refuted and in refuting other people; after this, some people form a taste for destructive argument and use it to undermine conventional moral beliefs.

People who react to the elenchos in this way have evidently failed to learn that Socratic elenchos is a method for improving as well as rejecting beliefs. Plato does not imply that Socrates did anything wrong in practising the elenchos on young Athenians, some of whom would fail to listen to everything he had to say.[30] Nor does Plato imply that he himself will not engage young people in the elenchos. If Socrates or Plato had confined the elenchos to Athenians over the age of thirty, their interlocutors would have been so set in their erroneous conventional beliefs and practices that there would have been little hope of freeing them from their errors. In the ideal city the elenchos is not needed to free people from grossly false beliefs (since they have been educated correctly), and therefore people need not be taught to practise it at a dangerous age.

Does this imply that in the ideal city people do not move to the stage of confident belief

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until they reach the age of thirty? Plato need not go quite so far. Elenchos may point out to us the inadequacy of our initial beliefs and stimulate us to improve them, without teaching us to practise elenchos ourselves. This is the condition of Nicias, for instance, who reflects constructively on his beliefs without going in for Socratic inquiry or cross-examination himself (*La.* 187e6–188c3). We may learn, for instance, to distinguish the various behavioural rules we may have been trained to follow from the deeper intuitions that underlie them; we learn that our belief that a virtue is fine and beneficial is more important than our belief that, say, bravery requires us to stand firm in battle. Since we can learn this from the elenchos without ourselves being equipped to refute others, a prohibition on young people practising refutation does not imply a prohibition on the use of the elenchos. And so we need not infer from the later passage on the elenchos that Plato advocates the postponement of all use of the elenctic method until the age of thirty.

Since the historical Socrates used the elenchos constructively without finding definitions of the virtues, does Plato intend us to put Socrates at L2? This is unlikely. For the released prisoner who has reached c2 does not suspect that there is anything outside the cave; Socrates, however, looks for the accounts that will explain his moral beliefs, and so he recognizes the existence of forms beyond the 'many Fs'. On this important point he is beyond the second stage.

190. The Cave on Knowledge

Republic V–VII 190. The Cave on Knowledge

In contrast to the Line, the Cave describes the first two stages in some detail, allowing us to see what states Plato has in mind and how we progress from one to the other. He uses the description of the first two stages to clarify the upper **(p.278)** two stages as well. At the upper two stages, we continue the search for explanation that we began at the second stage. When we see the dummies clearly, we understand better why the shadows are as they are; when we reach the world outside the cave, we gradually come to understand why the dummies are as they are, because we recognize the originals of the dummies. Eventually, this process of seeking explanations is complete, once we look at the sun and come to see why the living creatures in the outside world have the sort of life they have (516b4–c6).

This part of the Cave makes it easier to see the difference between L3 and L4. Plato wants us to see that at L3 accounts of the virtues resting on assumptions explain the beliefs about the virtues that have survived critical scrutiny at L2, even though we do not yet understand why these accounts are the right ones. We understand why they are the right accounts only when we reach L4 and see how they combine systematically to give us knowledge of the good.

In the Line, Plato told us that to pass from L3 to L4 we must go beyond assumptions by looking for their principle. Here he tells us again that this task belongs to dialectic, and specifically that it requires the practice of the elenctic method, carrying out an elenchos 'not in accordance with belief but in accordance with reality' (534c2). This dialectical cross-examination is systematic, seeing what things have in common with each other (531c9–d4) and seeking a synoptic view of things (537c6–7). The result of this is that

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dialecticians 'give an account' of what they study, and so meet a necessary condition for knowledge (531e4–5, 534b3–6).

These remarks about dialectical method suggest how dialectic is supposed to 'remove' assumptions and, at the same time, to 'confirm' them (533c7–d1). Plato assumes that we have found accounts of the virtues that fit the well-founded beliefs elicited at L2. We now try to see the systematic connexion between these different accounts, so that we can eventually give an account of the good that modifies these previous accounts and confirms the revised accounts. Each account of a virtue rests on some assumptions about the good, since we assume that each virtue promotes the good; to see if our accounts are satisfactory, we need to see whether they all agree about the nature of the good. When we have examined the implications of our accounts of the virtues for our views about the good, we may find that the implications conflict; if so, we must modify our accounts. When we have an adequate account of the good that is the goal of the different virtues, we will also have adequate accounts of the virtues. In doing this we will have 'confirmed' our assumptions, insofar as we have confirmed the claims we previously put forward as assumptions. Having confirmed them in this way, we will no longer need to treat them as assumptions, and so we will have 'removed' the assumptions.

Plato does not say much about this sort of dialectical inquiry, but consideration of Book IV suggests what he intends. We might be persuaded that both bravery and temperance promote the good, but unable to give a unified account of the good that they both promote; for we might say that temperance promotes placidity, and bravery promotes aggressiveness, and that these two tendencies often clash.[31] If we reach this result, Plato suggests, we must reconsider the **(p.279)** accounts we have given of the virtues to see whether we can modify them to yield a more coherent account of the good. Similarly, if we suppose that wisdom requires selfishness and justice requires unselfishness, we introduce a conflict into our account of the good, and we ought to reconsider our account of these virtues to see whether we can remove the conflict. If we have absorbed the argument of *Republic* V and the discussion of the Good in Book VI, we will not seek an account of the good that is independent of our accounts of the virtues; nor will we simply accept our initial accounts of the virtues uncritically.

Since Plato does not claim to have completed this critical examination of the accounts of the virtues, he does not claim to have reached an account of the Good, and so he does not claim to have reached L4, the state that is properly called 'intelligence' or complete knowledge. He seems closer to L3, where we rely on assumptions. And yet, just as Socrates (as presented in the early dialogues) could not be placed at L2, Plato, as the writer of the *Republic*, does not belong at L3.

As examples of people at L3, Plato mentions mathematicians; they rely on assumptions that need further justification, but they do not recognize they are doing this, because they take their assumptions to need no further justification, and they reason from them as if they were genuine principles (510c1–d3). As mathematicians, they do not need to look beyond their starting points; it is left for the dialectician to see that the mathematicians make assumptions that need (for philosophical, not mathematical, reasons)

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further justification.

Although Plato also uses assumptions, he sees that they are assumptions and that they need further justification; since he understands the character and limitations of L3, he cannot himself be at L3. Similarly, he uses images derived from visible things, as people at L3 do. The Sun, Line, and Cave are themselves examples of Plato's resort to images; the analogy between the city and the soul is the image on which he rests his account of the virtues. But since Plato not only recognizes that he uses images but also points out their limitations, he cannot himself be at the uncritical cognitive state that he describes.[32]

191. Epistemology and Moral Theory

Republic V–VII 191. Epistemology and Moral Theory

The Sun, Line, and Cave complete the explanation of the division between knowledge and belief that is marked at the end of Book V. Plato has a good reason for inserting this discussion of epistemology and metaphysics immediately after his first answer to Thrasymachus. For that answer rests on the definitions of the virtues, especially of justice; Plato recognizes that someone who examines these definitions in the light of the Socratic dialogues might well be dissatisfied with them. The point of Books V–VII is to remove this dissatisfaction.

In arguing that the Forms are non-sensible and that they cannot be known by people who confine their accounts to sensible properties, Plato discourages us from seeking accounts that would satisfy Thrasymachus' demand for something 'perspicuous and accurate'. In rejecting accounts of the Good that attempt to break out of the circle of evaluative properties, he rejects attempts to support **(p.280)** accounts of the virtues by an appeal to some conception of the good that can be accepted independently of our beliefs about the virtues. We saw why it was reasonable to believe that Socrates aimed at some such independent conception of the good. Since the *Republic* rejects any such conception, it rejects the restrictions that prevented Socrates from offering accounts of the virtues.

Still, Plato does not want his claims about the Forms to be primarily negative. He insists that rejection of an independent account of the Good still allows the appeal to the Good to play an important role in defending an account of the virtues. We can reasonably expect our views about the virtues to reveal some systematic goal of the virtues, and we ought to modify our accounts of the virtues until they reveal a suitable goal. Does this advice help to strengthen the main ethical argument of the *Republic*?

Notes:

(1.) On Thrasymachus' demand, see §§120, 141.

(2.) On sensible properties, see §112.

(3.) On the 'combination' referred to in this passage, I agree with Owen [1957], 174 and note, against Adam [1902], ad loc.

(4.) This feature of the sight-lover is discussed by Austin [1979], 205.

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(5.) Aristotle describes the sight-lovers' view by saying that it involves predicating the F itself homonymously. See Alexander, *in Met*. 83.7–11; Fine [1993], 150–55.

(6.) Adam [1902] explains the point well: '*ta kala* is here [sc. 479a3] the plural, not of *kalon ti*, but of *to kalon*; and Plato means that the *philotheamōn* has many *standards* of beauty'.

(7.) On the dialectical condition, see §107.

(8.) I read <*to*> *kat'eidos legomenon*, and *iont'*, with Hackforth [1952]. He cites *R*. 476b10, a telling parallel (but not in favour of Hackforth's general interpretation, as Scott [1987], 361f., points out).

(9.) On giving an account, see §100.

(10.) Questions about the nature of the 'account' required for knowledge are raised in the last part of the *Tht*., from 201c8.

(11.) This line of interpretation is presented in detail by Fine [1978; 1990]. Some aspects of it are defended by Kahn [1981b], 112–15. Doubts about it are raised by Annas [1981], chap. 8.

(12.) On explanations, see §109.

(13.) The many *nomima* about F are the many standards of F-ness; the *nomima* refer to the many Fs, but are not themselves the many Fs. Contrast Penner [1987b], 236.

(14.) I take 'appear' to be veridical. See chap. 10, note 13.

(15.) On the many types of just action, see §217.

(16.) The conventional and uncritical character of the sight-lovers' outlook is emphasized by Nettleship [1901], 196f.; Bosanquet [1906], 215.

(17.) I use initial capitals for the names of the images, and lowercase letters for the items (the sun, etc.) mentioned in the description of the images.

(18.) I use lowercase letters ('s1', etc.) for the states mentioned in the illustration, and capitals ('S1', etc.) for the states illustrated by the states with the corresponding number.

(19.) On the longer way, see §192.

(20.) On the Form of the Good, see especially Shorey [1895]; Joseph [1948]; Gosling [1973], 62–71; Santas [1980; 1985]. The connexion of the Form of the Good with questions raised in the Socratic dialogues about the good is especially emphasized by Shorey [1895], 39–41.

(21.) I use an initial capital for the Form of the Good, but a lowercase initial letter for the

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good that is an object of pursuit. The virtues promote the good (= happiness), not the Form of the Good, which, as Aristotle remarks (*EN* 1096b31–35; see Kraut [1992c], 335 and note 29) is not an object of pursuit. But the good that they do promote has the goodness it has because it participates in the Form of the Good.

(22.) Pleasure and wisdom as candidates for being the good are discussed further in the *Phil.*; see §§215, 226.

(23.) On *epekeina tēs ousias*, see Joseph [1948], 23f.

(24.) An idea of some difficulties in the interpretation of the Line and the Cave may be gathered from Joseph [1948], chap. 4; Ross [1951], chap. 4; Cross and Woozley [1964], chap. 9; Irwin [1977a], 334–36; White [1979], 184–86; Strang [1986]; Fine [1990].

(25.) Questions about the objects assumed at L3 are succinctly discussed by Ross [1951], 58–65. Among later contributions see Annas [1975], 160–64; Burnyeat [1987].

(26.) On hypotheses, cf. §116.

(27.) Issues about the Cave and *eikasia* are discussed by Ross [1951], 68, 77f.; Malcolm [1981]; Karasmanis [1988], 159–62.

(28.) In 515b4–5 perhaps *tauta hēgē(i) an ta parionta onta nomizein onomazein* should be read and translated: 'Don't you think they would suppose they were naming the passing things [sc. the shadows] as beings [sc. being a horse etc.]?'

(29.) The relation of c2 to Socratic elenchos is discussed by Wilson [1976b], 119–22; Malcolm [1981], 65f.; Fine [1990], 103.

(30.) The view that this passage expresses Plato's criticism of Socrates' use of the elenchos is maintained by Ryle [1966], 11, 18, 155f.; Nussbaum [1980], 87f. (esp. note 87); Vlastos [1991], 110.

(31.) On conflicts between bravery and temperance, see §228.

(32.) The relation of the *R.* itself to the Line is discussed by Gallop [1965], 121–24; [1971], 195–98; Cooper [1966]; Austin [1979].

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