

March, 1956.

THE NEW SOVIET PLAN

At first sight the Sixth Soviet Five-Year Plan might seem to present "the mixture as before". But a close scrutiny of the details contained in the Draft Directives of the Twentieth Congress does not bear out this contention. The mixture is rather stronger. In 1946 Stalin forecast that it would require three new Five-Year Plans, if not more, to raise production to fifty million tons of pig iron, sixty million tons of steel, five hundred million tons of coal, and sixty million tons of oil⁽¹⁾. The new Plan is a timely reminder that all those targets, considered over-optimistic at the time, are likely to be surpassed substantially in 1960, i.e. at the end of the third post-war Plan. The oil target mentioned by Stalin in 1946 was, in fact, surpassed early in 1955. In these circumstances it would seem dangerous to regard what the new Directives reveal as merely a continuation of traditional production patterns. To put Soviet industrial trends into their proper perspective, it is worth recalling that the Soviet Union was producing less than half the primary energy then produced by Britain when it entered the era of the Five-Year Plans in 1928; today it produces more than half as much again as this country. The increase in steel output is even more formidable. Within the next five years it is to increase by more than the total amount of the annual steel production of Britain.

The momentous rise of Soviet industrial power would not have been possible without the almost uninterrupted preference accorded to the output of industrial raw materials and capital goods. The controversy about the place of consumer goods in society that pre-occupied Soviet planners and economists last year was highly relevant to Soviet plans and achievements, past and present. The second edition, just published, of the standard Soviet text-book on political economy throws some light on the change that has come over the Soviet economy since Malenkov was relegated from his position as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The first edition of the text-book referred (p.417) to 'a vast programme for the rapid development of the light and food industries and of agriculture in order to solve in a short time the task of achieving a steep rise in the production of consumer goods'.⁽²⁾ In the new edition no reference can be found to 'a steep rise in a short time'. On the contrary, the emphasis is once again on the first priority to be given to the expansion of heavy industries (p.430). The statement in the first edition that the output of light industry in 1953 increased faster than that of heavy industry has been eliminated from the second edition.

Perhaps too much was made at the time of the clash between such personalities as Malenkov and Khrushchev whose differences seem, in retrospect, to be a matter of degree rather than of

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- (1) Pravda, 10 February, 1946.
(2) Political Economy, Moscow, 1954.

principle. It was Malenkov, after all, who prefaced his famous request in 1953 for a sharp rise in the production of consumer goods, by words which have been the leit-motiv of Soviet planning for the last twenty-five years: 'We shall continue in every way to develop heavy industry We must always remember that heavy industry is the foundation of foundations'.⁽¹⁾

Some eighteen months later, Shepilov, writing in Pravda destroyed any illusion of a preference being given to consumer goods in Soviet society: 'In some years (he emphasised) it may prove necessary to overcome a lag in the production of consumer goods and to give particular attention to the light and consumer goods industries'.⁽²⁾ A little earlier, Professor Strumilin had similarly stressed, in Voprosy Ekonomiki, that the policy of priority for producer goods must be a permanent characteristic of the Soviet economic system. These views received their most authoritative backing from Khrushchev when, addressing the building workers in December 1954, he said: 'We must continue to develop heavy industry by every means. Heavy industry is the foundation of the national economy, the source of the economic might of the Socialist State and of its defence capacity'.⁽³⁾ Those who had expected some signs of a shift in favour of relaxations at home and abroad may be excused a measure of disappointment.

The Previous Plans

These are more than historical reminiscences. As the achievements of the Fifth Five-Year Plan, as well as the Directives for the Sixth, are now available, it is advisable to analyse the results of the previous Plans before passing judgment on the targets for the new Plan and their chances of being fulfilled.

The first post-war Plan, inaugurated in 1946, was concerned with rehabilitation rather than expansion. When post-war planning began the extent of war-time civilian losses was not known. No labour budget had been drawn up, no inventory was taken either of industrial plants, material resources, or stocks. In these circumstances the Plan could hardly be expected to be more than a list of loosely connected goals in some important sectors of industry. It had been the intention of the planners to rehabilitate the war-damaged economy and to raise the nation's output and income beyond pre-war levels. As it turned out, the Plan did succeed in restoring the Soviet Union to its former economic position, but this was achieved at the expense of urban and rural living standards. While the Plan implied a rise in the standard of living by approximately 50 per cent, in fact by 1950 it was no higher than in 1940 and considerably lower than in 1928. Industrial productivity lagged badly behind the Plan's targets. The failure to increase output per man was compensated for by the influx into industry, beyond what the Plan had contemplated, of millions of peasants and soldiers, who preferred life in overcrowded industrial towns to work in the collectives.

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- (1) Pravda, 9 August, 1953.
 - (2) Pravda, 24 January, 1955
 - (3) Pravda, 28 December, 1954

The second post-war Plan was to add expansion to recovery. Once again the main emphasis was on capital goods. The increases contemplated amounted to 90 per cent. in the case of capital construction, 80 per cent. for producer goods, and 65 per cent. for consumer goods. The share of capital goods in the total volume of industrial production, which before the war had accounted for three-fifths and had in the meantime risen to two-thirds, was to increase further to almost three-quarters. It is significant that this ratio between the two main sectors of the economy was not altered when Malenkov introduced his New Economic Policy a few months after Stalin's death. What was intended by the new Soviet leaders was obviously an increase of consumer goods in addition to, rather than in place of, the products of basic and heavy industries. Much progress was expected from increases in production per man and from reductions in waste along the assembly line. Thus a marginal shift of resources was to result in substantial changes in the composition of the national product. To put the new policy into effect, expenditure for investment and working capital was increased in the farming and consumer goods industries. No corresponding downward adjustments were made, however, in the allocations for heavy industry.

Since little room was left for manoeuvre, strains and stresses occurred throughout the economy. Bottlenecks could not be avoided until the traditional pattern of Soviet economics was restored. Early in 1955 Bulganin re-asserted that 'Heavy industry is the foundation of the indestructible defence capacity of our country and the strength of our gallant armed forces'.⁽¹⁾ And in its 1955 mid-year report the Central Committee was able to state that 'The output of the means of production will account, at the end of 1955, for more than 70 per cent. of the entire industrial production of the Soviet Union'.⁽²⁾ The short intermezzo of the New Economic Policy had been brought to a close and the status quo ante had been restored.

As the results of the Plan are now available, it is possible to gauge the extent to which the New Economic Policy affected its outcome. Since so much has been written in recent years about Soviet statistics, it is hardly necessary to stress the danger of possible traps in any quantitative analysis of Soviet planning. It is true that the unrealistic prices of 1926/27, in which all composite indices of the first post-war Plan had been calculated, were replaced by 1951 prices when the second post-war Plan was drawn up. Even so the possibility of certain distortions cannot be ruled out in the case of indices relating to gross industrial output, capital investment and retail trade turnover. It is noteworthy that the output of producer as well as consumer goods is claimed to have exceeded the original targets by approximately 6 per cent., whilst the volume of investment seems to have lagged behind the Plan in three consecutive years. Another unexplained discrepancy appears when the rise in retail trade turnover of 90 per cent. is compared with increases in real wages and national income, amounting to less than 40 and 70 per cent. respectively. The bias caused by double counting in the construction of industrial production indices is too well known to need elaborating, but as

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- (1) Pravda, 10 February, 1955
 (2) Pravda, 14 July, 1955

industrialisation brings in its wake the output of more and more goods that pass through more and more stages of manufacture, the upward bias is likely to grow in the course of time. The retail trade index, which covers State and co-operative trading, is likely to be inflated to the extent of transfers from free to State-controlled marketing.

This is not to say that industrial achievements have not been momentous during the last five years. This is borne out by the increase registered in the output of individual commodities, the records of which are generally believed to be more trustworthy than those of composite indices. Annual increases of 26 million tons of coal, 16,000 million kwh. of electric power, 6.5 million tons of oil, and 3.5 million tons of steel would be formidable achievements even in more advanced industrial countries than the Soviet Union. The overall annual increase of industrial production by 11 per cent. as originally planned, would have been impressive enough. But in fact it was raised to 13 per cent. The increase is said to have been achieved to the extent of one-third by the expansion of the industrial labour force, and of two-thirds by improvements in productivity. The emphasis on producer goods, though not quite as pronounced as during former Plan periods, prevailed throughout the last five years. The extent to which the New Economic Policy was reversed after Malenkov's demotion is demonstrated by the index of consumer goods. This was set in the original Plan at 165 for 1955 (1950 = 100), but was raised to 185 after Stalin's death. In fact, it went up to 176. Whilst important raw materials and producer goods almost invariably surpassed the original targets, vital consumer goods, such as textiles, remained behind the original targets. Even where these were surpassed, as in the case of such a semi-luxury as silk fabrics, the targets set at the time of the New Economic Policy were not reached. The output of durable household goods, though impressive, also fell behind the Plan targets in almost every instance. The most serious failure of all occurred in farming, where production increased at best by some 6 per cent. over five years, compared with a target of 40 per cent. or more. 'This has held up development in branches of the light and food industries and the output of consumer goods.' (1)

The Sixth Five-Year Plan

So much for the last five of twenty-five years of economic planning during which the Soviet Union grew, in spite of the damage caused by collectivisation and war, from a lesser European to a major world Power.

The second quarter-century of industrial planning is being approached by the Soviet Union's political leaders in full confidence at home and in readiness to challenge the one remaining world Power overseas. Their confidence is disclosed by the timing of the new Plan as well as by its contents. The first Plan had

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(1) Pravda, 15 January, 1956.

taken four years to prepare and its publication was delayed six months beyond the date of its official start. The second and third Plans were approved after delays of twenty-two and fourteen months respectively. After the war the fourth Plan was prepared in less than six months; when it appeared it showed all the signs of make-shift. The fifth Plan, though probably prepared in good time, was published eighteen months behind schedule. For the first time in the history of Soviet planning the Directives on the new Plan have been issued within a month of the date at which it was to start.⁽¹⁾

This is not its only notable feature. It is precise and informative. The Plan of 1928 took up four printed volumes, but by 1946 all that was considered worth publishing was compressed into a booklet of a little over a hundred pages. The Draft Directives on the fifth Plan were briefer still: everything was said in 10,000 words and little space was reserved for such matters as the contribution to be made by the individual Republics of the Soviet Union. All this has now been changed. The space devoted to the Directives has been doubled; so have the number of chapters dealing with the general outline of the Plan. Mechanisation, automation and specialisation in industry, capital construction and labour productivity, have been given their own chapters. In addition there is greater precision in the presentation of much of the information contained in the Directives. Whilst Voznesensky gave his first post-war Directives in absolute figures, his successor, Saburov, expressed the goals for 1955 merely in terms of indices, often related to a base unknown. Bulganin gives many of the targets for 1960 both in absolute and in relative terms. The information is not supplied quite so freely in the case of certain products of strategic importance, and the secrecy is almost complete when it comes to the lamentable record of Soviet achievements in agriculture.

Whilst the public at home and abroad are allowed to become acquainted with the main features of Soviet economic design, the Plan is no more subject than its predecessors were to public control. The Budget relating to the first year of the new Plan era was debated and passed by the Supreme Soviet before the Plan was issued, and two months later we are invited to watch the spectacle of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party accepting the Plan, the first year's portion of which had, in fact, been determined by the Budget. So much for public control in the Communist State. But whilst the acceptance of so vital a document does not depend upon preliminary debate, its outline is more clearly discernible than on some previous occasions. Its main features may be gauged from a summary set out in tabulated form.

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(1) (1) Pravda, 15 January, 1956.

U.S.S.R. INDEX OF RATES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

	1950 Base Year	1955 Original Plan	1955 Revised Plan	1955 Actual (Prelim.)	1960 Plan (Prelim.)	1960 Plan (Prelim.)
	-	-	-	1950 = 100	-	-
						1955=100
Gross Industrial Output	100	170	n.a.	185	305	165
Producers' Goods	100	180	n.a.	191	325	170
Consumers' Goods	100	165	185	176	280	160
National Income	100	160	n.a.	168	270	160
Capital Investment	100	200*	n.a.	190*	335**	167**
Labour Force (non-agric.)	100	115***	n.a.	118***	135***	115
Productivity (industrial)	100	150	n.a.	145	220	150
Real Wages (industrial)	100	135	n.a.	139	180	130
Agric. Incomes (collectives)	100	140	n.a.	150	210	140
Retail Trade	100	170	200	190	285	150

* 1951/55 in per cent. of 1946/50

** 1956/60 in per cent. of 1951/55

*** Excl. M.T.S. workers transferred to non-agricultural labour force.

n.a. Not available

Based on Official Soviet Statements.

Whilst the rate of growth contemplated in the Plan is slightly retarded compared with the post-war years of rehabilitation and consolidation, it still remains formidable indeed. An average annual increase of 40 million tons of coal, 30,000 million kwh. of electric power, 13 million tons of oil, and 4.5 million tons of steel goes beyond anything ever planned before in the Soviet Union. The balance between producer and consumer goods is of the traditional Soviet pattern which Malenkov described in the presence of Stalin at the Nineteenth Congress, and which he failed to alter after Stalin's death. The gross output of producer goods accounts for more than 70 per cent. of the total output of industry. Although some of this clearly provides the raw material for the manufacture of consumer goods, the emphasis in favour of capital goods is unmistakable. Special priority is given to the development of mineral oils and hydro-electric projects, but in the aggregate the supply of primary energy is unlikely to increase substantially faster than other basic industries. In the long run, power will be provided to an increasing extent in the form of electricity produced in the hydro-electric plants of Soviet Central Asia and the Eastern territories; but during the life-time of this Plan no more than the foundations will be laid of these great projects.

Heavy industries are closely geared to the supply of fuel and power, but some sectors, such as the manufacture of turbines, electric engines, and instruments, are to advance faster than others. The output of cement is related to an ambitious programme of State building which includes, this time, housing projects on State farms and machine tractor stations and thus resists any comparison with past performance. The programme of the engineering industries is slowed down and emphasis is given to the fullest use possible of existing plant capacity. In this connexion it is worth noting

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that the rate of investment also appears to be slowed down substantially. Transport, as measured in terms of railway freight haulage and output of lorries, appears to be neglected once again, but a formidable programme of modernisation providing for a change of the railways to electric and diesel power will improve efficiency.

By comparison, the rise in the standard of living, as visualised by the Plan, is not too impressive, especially so since underfulfilment is customary in this sphere. This applies most of all to the products of farming, which, in spite of many manifestations to the contrary, remains the cinderella of Soviet planning. Although a substantial increase is planned in the output of farm requisites, such as fertilisers and equipment, foodstuffs will not be produced in anything like the quantities planned. This, in turn, will affect internal trade, farm income, and industrial purchasing power. It may well be in recognition of the impossibility of realising the farm programme that the growth of retail trade turnover is calculated at the low rate of 50 per cent. during the next five years, compared with 90 per cent. during the previous Plan period. The textile programme is more than modest. An increase in the output of cotton fabrics by 23 per cent. over the next five years compares with a Plan figure of 61 per cent. during the previous period. The targets for other textile goods hold out no hope of a substantial improvement in the unsatisfactory clothing situation. Against this, durable household goods are planned on a generous scale. By 1960 every workman and soldier may be expected to have his own watch, but there will still be many families without a bicycle or a sewing machine, let alone a refrigerator or washing machine; these will remain the attributes of the upper classes of Soviet society.

As in the past, the Plan is reticent on the subject of foreign trade. Once again it is the work of men who think in terms of domestic production. The bias in favour of autarky has not disappeared from Soviet planning. This does not exclude the possibility of intensified Soviet efforts to infiltrate into foreign markets. Economic as well as political considerations may commend these activities. The need to import foodstuffs will probably continue, whilst increasing quantities of industrial raw materials and equipment are likely to become available for export. This position will lead to Soviet commercial expansion in Asia, Africa and Latin America rather than in the industrialised parts of Europe.

Once again the Plan throws some interesting light on the motives underlying Soviet planning. The most highly developed capitalist countries are taken as the yardstick by which the Soviet leaders measure their own progress. Having succeeded in outgrowing industrialised Europe, the Soviet Union is unwilling to rest until it has caught up with the United States, the last remaining competitor in the drive for economic supremacy. But unless the United States enters upon a period of recessions, in the 'historically very short period of the next Plan' the target of Soviet world supremacy will not be reached. By 1960 the Soviet Union will not even be within sight of American output of fuel and power, of steel or machine production, let alone the supply of consumer goods. In what measure the Plan will succeed will, of course, depend upon many factors the weight of which obviously cannot be gauged at this stage. At home, labour is likely to become a bottleneck and agriculture is bound to remain a child of sorrow. Abroad, the extent to which the Plan will leave its mark will depend upon the political climate it makes and meets. In the uncommitted parts of the world the odds will be in its favour unless the West discovers an effective answer to it.

U.S.S.R. BASIC ECONOMIC DATA

Table 1

(Index of Rates of Growth)

	1950 Base Year	1955 Original Plan	1955 Revised Plan	1955 Actual (Prelim.)	1960 Plan (Prelim.)	1955 Base Year	1960 Plan (Prelim.)
	1950 = 100					1955 = 100	
Gross Industrial Output	100	170	n.a.	185	305	100	165
Producers' Goods	100	180	n.a.	191	325	100	170
Consumers' Goods	100	165	185	176	280	100	160
National Income	100	160	n.a.	168	270	100	160
Capital Investment	100	200*	n.a.	190*	335***	100	167**
Labour Force(non agric.)	100	115***	n.a.	118***	135***	100	115
Labour Productivity(ind.)	100	150	n.a.	145	220	100	150
Real Wages (industrial)	100	135	n.a.	139	180	100	130
Agric.Incomes (coll.)	100	140	n.a.	150	210	100	140
Retail Trade	100	170	200	190	285	100	150

U.S.S.R. BASIC ECONOMIC DATA

(Annual Rates of Growth)

	1951 Actual	1952 Actual	1953 Actual	1954 Actual	1955 Actual	1951/55 Actual	1956/60 Plan
	% per annum					% per annum	
Gross Industrial Output	16.0	11.0	12.0	13.0	13.0	13.0	10.5
Producers' Goods	17.0	12.0	11.0	12.0	17.0	14.0	11.0
Consumers' Goods	16.0	10.5	12.0	14.0	7.0	12.0	10.0
National Income	12.0	11.0	8.0	11.0	13.0	10.5	10.0
Capital Investment	12.0	11.0	4.0	15.0	6.0	9.5	10.5
Labour Force (non agric.)	4.0	2.5	4.0***	4.5***	2.5***	3.0***	3.0
Labour Productivity(ind.)	10.0	7.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	8.0	8.5
Real Wages (industrial)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	7.0	5.5
Agric.Incomes (coll.)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	8.5	7.0
Retail Trade	15.0	10.0	21.0	18.0	5.0	13.5	8.5

U.S.S.R. BASIC ECONOMIC DATA

(Index of Rates of Growth)

	1951 Actual	1952 Actual	1953 Actual	1954 Actual	1955 Actual	1951/55 Actual	1956/60 Plan
	1950 = 100					1950 = 100	1955 = 100
Gross Industrial Output	116	129	145	164	185	185	165
Producers' Goods	117	131	145	163	191	191	170
Consumers' Goods	116	128	144	164	176	176	160
National Income	112	124	134	149	168	168	160
Capital Investment	112	124	129	148	157	157	167**
Labour Force (non agric.)	104	106	110***	115***	118***	118***	115
Labour Productivity(ind.)	110	118	125	134	145	145	150
Real Wages (industrial)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	139	139	130
Agric.Incomes (coll.)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	150	150	140
Retail Trade	115	127	154	182	190	190	150

n.a. Not available

* 1951/55 in per cent. of 1946/50

** 1956/60 in per cent. of 1951/55

*** excl. M.T.S. workers transferred to non-agricultural labour force.
Based on Official Soviet Statements.

U.S.S.R. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

Table 2

(in physical units)

		1940 Actual	1950 Actual	1955 Orig. Plan	1955 Rev. Plan	1955 Actual Prelimin.	1960 Plan
<u>PRODUCER GOODS</u>							
Coal	mill.m.tons	166.0	260.0	372.0	375.0	390.0	593.0
Oil	mill.m.tons	31.0	37.8	70.0	70.0	70.6	135.0
Electric Power	000 ml. Kwh	48.3	90.3	163.0	165.0	170.0	320.0
Pig Iron	mill.m.tons	15.0	19.4	34.0	34.0	33.3	53.0
Crude Steel	mill.m.tons	18.0	27.3	44.0	44.0	45.2	68.3
Rolled Metal	mill.m.tons	13.1	20.8	34.0	34.0	34.7	52.7
Cement	mill.m.tons	5.8	10.3	22.7	22.7	22.5	55.0
Mineral Fertilisers	ml.m.tons	2.6	5.1	9.6	9.6	9.6	19.6
<u>CONSUMER GOODS (essential)</u>							
Cotton Fabrics	mill.metres	3,835	3,815	6,150	6,267	5,910	7,270
Woollen Fabrics	mill.metres	120	165	255	271	250	363
Silk Fabrics	mill.metres	70	125	400	573	526	1,074
Leather Shoes	mill. pairs	205	205	318	318	297	455
<u>CONSUMER GOODS (non-essential)</u>							
Radio & T.V.Sets	(000)	200	1,080	n.a.	4,527	4,000	10,200
Domestic Refrigerators	(000)	n.a.	n.a.	200	330	151	635
Sewing Machines	(000)	170	510	n.a.	2,615	1,610	3,780
Washing Machines	(000)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	296	86	528
Clocks & Watches	(000)	2,550	7,200	n.a.	22,000	19,600	33,600
Bicycles	(000)	270	660	n.a.	3,445	2,875	4,230
<u>FOODSTUFFS (processed)</u>							
Grains(biological)	ml.m.tons	119.0	124.5	180.5	n.a.	(133.0)	180.0*
Meat (incl.poultry)	000 m.tons	1,185	1,250	2,400	2,550	2,220	3,950
Fish(landed wt.)	000 m.tons	1,300	1,700	2,690	3,190	2,675	4,200
Sugar (gran.)	000 m.tons	2,150	2,530	4,500	4,800	3,420	6,530
Butter (comm.wt.)	000 m.tons	220	320	550	560	n.a.	n.a.
Vegetable Oil	000 m.tons	725	775	1,370	1,500	1,115	1,840

* Probably not comparable with previous grain data

n.a. Not available

Based on Official Soviet Statements, partly estimates.

(Index of Rate of Increase)

	1950 Actual = 100	1955 Original Plan	1955 Revised Plan	1955 Actual Prelimin.	1955 Actual = 100	1960 Plan
<u>PRODUCER GOODS</u>						
Coal	100	143	144	150	100	152
Oil	100	185	185	187	100	191
Electric Power	100	180	183	188	100	188
Pig Iron	100	175	175	172	100	159
Crude Steel	100	162	161	166	100	151
Rolled Metal	100	164	164	167	100	152
Cement	100	220	220	219	100	245
Mineral Fertilisers	100	188	188	188	100	204
<u>CONSUMER GOODS (essential)</u>						
Cotton Fabrics	100	161	164	155	100	123
Woollen Fabrics	100	154	164	151	100	145
Silk Fabrics	100	320	458	420	100	204
Leather Shoes	100	155	155	145	100	153
<u>CONSUMER GOODS (non-essential)</u>						
Radio & T.V.Sets	100	n.a.	419	370	100	255
Domestic Refrigerators	100	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	100	420
Sewing Machines	100	n.a.	513	316	100	235
Washing Machines	100	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	100	610
Clocks & Watches	100	n.a.	306	272	100	171
Bicycles	100	n.a.	522	435	100	147
<u>FOODSTUFFS</u>						
Grains	100	152	n.a.	112	100	(180)*
Meat	100	192	204	178	100	178
Fish	100	158	187	157	100	157
Sugar	100	178	190	135	100	191
Butter	100	172	175	n.a.	100	156
Vegetable Oil	100	177	194	144	100	165

* Probably not comparable with previous grain data
n.a. Not available
Based on Official Soviet Statements, partly estimates.

U.S.S.R. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

Table 4

(Rates of Increase)

		1955 over 1950		1960 over 1955	1955 over 1950 1950 = 100		1960 over 1955 1955=100
	Units	Plan	Actual	Plan	Plan	Actual	Plan
		- -	(in units)	- -	- -	- (%)	- - -
<u>PRODUCER GOODS</u>							
Coal	mill.m.tons	115.0	130.0	203.0	144	150	152
Oil	mill.m.tons	32.2	32.8	64.4	185	187	191
Electric Power	000 ml. Kwh.	74.7	79.7	150.0	183	188	188
Pig Iron	mill.m.tons	14.6	13.9	19.7	175	172	159
Crude Steel	mill.m.tons	16.7	17.9	23.1	161	166	151
Rolled Metal	mill.m.tons	13.2	13.9	18.0	164	167	152
Cement	mill.m.tons	12.4	12.2	32.5	220	219	245
Mineral Fertilisers	mill.m.tons	4.5	4.5	10.0	188	188	204
<u>CONSUMER GOODS (essential)</u>							
Cotton Fabrics	mill.metres	2,452	2,095	1,360	164	155	123
Woollen Fabrics	mill.metres	106	85	113	164	151	145
Silk Fabrics	mill.metres	448	401	548	458	420	204
Leather Shoes	mill. pairs	113	92	158	155	145	153
<u>CONSUMER GOODS (non-essential)</u>							
Radio & T.V.Sets	(000)	3,447	2,920	6,200	450	370	255
Domestic Refrigerators	(000)	n.a.	n.a.	484	n.a.	n.a.	420
Sewing Machines	(000)	2,105	1,100	2,170	513	316	235
Washing Machines	(000)	n.a.	n.a.	442	n.a.	n.a.	610
Clocks & Watches	(000)	14,800	12,400	14,000	306	272	171
Bicycles	(000)	2,785	2,215	1,355	522	435	147
<u>FOODSTUFFS</u>							
Grains	mill.m.tons	n.a.	9	80*	n.a.	(112)	180*
Meat	000 m. tons	1,300	970	1,730	204	178	178
Fish	000 m. tons	1,490	975	1,525	187	157	157
Sugar	000 m. tons	2,270	890	3,110	190	135	191
Butter	000 m. tons	240	n.a.	n.a.	175	n.a.	156
Vegetable Oil	000 m. tons	725	340	725	194	144	165

* Probably not comparable with previous grain data
n.a. Not available
Based on Official Soviet Statements, partly estimates.

(per head of population)

	1940 Actual	1950 Actual	1955 Orig. Plan	1955 Rev. Plan	1955 Actual	1960 Plan
<u>PRODUCER GOODS</u>	-	-	-	kilos per head of population		-
Coal	850	1,300	1,730	1,745	1,815	2,580
Oil	160	190	325	325	326	587
Electric Power*	250	450	755	767	790	1,390
Pig Iron	75	95	158	158	155	230
Crude Steel	95	135	205	205	210	297
Rolled Metal	65	105	158	158	161	229
Cement	30	50	105	105	105	239
<u>CONSUMER GOODS (essential)</u>	-	-	-	metres per head of population		-
Cotton Fabrics	19.7	19.0	28.6	29.1	27.5	31.6
Woollen Fabrics	0.6	0.8	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.6
Silk Fabrics	0.3	0.6	1.7	2.7	2.4	4.7
Leather Shoes**	1.0	1.0	1.5	1.5	1.4	2.0
<u>CONSUMER GOODS (non-essential)</u>	-	-	-	units per 1,000 persons		-
Radio & T.V. Sets	1.0	5.4	n.a.	21.0	18.6	44.0
Domestic Refrigerators	n.a.	n.a.	0.9	1.5	0.7	2.7
Sewing Machines	0.9	2.6	n.a.	12.2	7.5	16.4
Washing Machines	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1.4	0.4	2.3
Clocks & Watches	13.1	36.0	n.a.	102.3	91.0	146.0
Bicycles	1.4	3.3	n.a.	16.0	13.3	18.4
<u>FOODSTUFFS</u>	-	-	-	kilos per head of population		-
Grains (biological)	610.0	623.0	837.0	n.a.	(618.0)	782.0***
Meat (incl. poultry)	6.1	6.3	11.1	11.8	10.3	17.2
Fish (landed weight)	6.7	8.5	12.5	14.8	12.4	18.2
Sugar (gran.)	11.0	12.6	20.9	22.3	15.9	28.4
Butter (comm. weight)	1.1	1.6	2.6	2.6	n.a.	n.a.
Vegetable Oil	3.7	3.9	6.4	7.0	5.2	8.0

* Kwh

** Pairs

*** Probably not comparable with previous grain data

n.a. Not available

Based on Official Soviet Statements, partly estimates.