"The King of England’s Soldiers"
**Armed Blacks in Savannah and Its Hinterlands during the Revolutionary War Era, 1778–1787**
Timothy Lockley

The Revolutionary War was never simply a struggle between the British on the one side and Americans on the other. Americans themselves were deeply divided about whether a war to achieve independence from Britain was a good, moral, or legal thing to do, and friends, neighbors, and even families split between those loyal to Britain and those supporting the American patriots. Neither was the war of concern only to whites. Southern black people hoped that the war would mean the end of slavery. In December 1778, it was a black man, Quamino Dolly, who guided British troops through the surrounding swamps in their successful effort to capture Savannah. When a joint Franco-American force attempted to recapture the city the following October, their efforts were thwarted because reinforcements from Beaufort, South Carolina, led by sympathetic blacks “plunged through swamps, bogs, and creeks which had never been attempted before but by bears, wolves, and run-away negroes.” About 400 slaves worked on the fortifications of Savannah during the siege, while others, particularly women, worked as cooks and laundresses for the troops. A further 150 enslaved men were organized into two companies and “armed and equipt as infantry.” The loyalist governor James Wright later commented that the black soldiers had “contributed greatly to our defence and safety” during the joint Franco-American assault on the city.

Black troops continued to serve with the British until the evacuations of Savannah (July) and Charleston (December) in 1782. Most frequently, black recruits served as drummers, but a significant number were also used as general laborers, and a few served as musketeers in the infantry. As patriot forces gradually pushed loyalists back to their urban strongholds of Charleston and Savannah in 1781 and 1782, British commanders created a cavalry unit from black volunteers. As late as December 1782, one South Carolina planter complained to the patriot governor about the activities of upward of a hundred mounted "Black dragoons who have been out four times last ten days plundering & robbing... Last r came as high as Mrs Godins where they contri 11 o’clock till 4 this morning, & carried off every! could... all her cattle, sheep, hogs, horses." Although precise figures do not exist, one estimates that roughly ten thousand slaves from Georgia were dislocated during the war. Of these, a small number of loyalist blacks left Charleston with the British. Far more stayed behind the wrath of masters. During the war, with plagues of overseers often absent either on active service, judicial meetings, and the regular slave patrol, the overseers, many slaves left their plantations to relatives and loved ones or travelled to Savannah for paid employment. Moreover, both loyalist forces took slaves from plantations as spoils of war. Slaves trailed behind the armies with the planters expended much effort, often in vain, in thought should have been on their properties.

Some Lowcountry slaves took advantage of the war, however, to create their own distinct communities complete largest of these communities formed on island miles upstream from Savannah. These islands, where it diverts from a direct north-south route, before heading back northwest the eastern side of an oval-shaped area of land that and six miles from west to east at its widest ex Abercorn Creek and Mill Creek (formerly known as) joins the main channel at the top of the oval-shaped this land north to south, and Little Abercorn Cr to create three principal islands. Numerous si
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Although precise figures do not exist, one historian estimates that roughly ten thousand slaves from Georgia were dislocated during the war. Of these, a relatively small number of loyalist blacks left Charleston and Savannah with the British. Far more stayed behind to face the wrath of masters. During the war, with planters and overseers often absent either on active service or at political meetings, and the regular slave patrol system in abeyance, many slaves left their plantations and visited relatives and loved ones or travelled to Savannah to look for paid employment. Moreover, both loyalist and patriot forces took slaves from plantations as spoils of war, and these slaves trailed behind the armies with the equipment and supplies. After the war, planters expended much effort, often in vain, in trying to track down the slaves who they thought should have been on their properties.

Some Lowcountry slaves took advantage of the confusion caused by the war to flee into swamps. This was the point at which runaway slaves became maroons, intending to create their own distinct communities completely separate from white society. One of the largest of these communities formed on islands in the Savannah River, about eighteen miles upstream from Savannah. These islands are located within a large kink of the river, where it diverts from a direct north-south route to meander northeast toward Purrysburgh before gently heading back northwest. The main channel of the river forms the eastern side of an oval-shaped area of land that is roughly nine miles from north to south and six miles from west to east at its widest extent. The western boundary is formed by the Abercorn Creek and Mill Creek (formerly known as Clark Creek), which eventually rejoins the main channel at the top of the oval shape. Big Collis Creek and Bear Creek split this land north to south, and Little Abercorn Creek links Abercorn Creek and Bear Creek to create three principal islands. Numerous smaller islands bounded by small shallow
In the United States, white citizens rarely made the connection between their struggle for freedom and that of slaves, though the language of slavery had often been invoked by the founding generation to express their perceived mistreatment by the British government. But the Haitian Revolution had an important, though rarely told, connection to the U.S. struggle for freedom: many of the future Haitian revolutionaries had first gained valuable fighting experience through their participation in the American Revolution.

In December 1778, well-equipped British soldiers led by Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell took the city of Savannah, Georgia, hoping eventually to capture nearby Charleston and then the greater Carolinas. Strong loyalist support in Georgia, coupled with unremarkable resistance by the colonists and a floundering militia and Continental army, made the British army’s successful siege of Savannah a foregone conclusion. In early September 1779, black and mixed-race soldiers of Saint-Domingue joined American colonists and French troops in a failed effort to retake the city. The total number of Saint-Domingue troops who sojourned to Georgia remains contested, but estimates place the number at 500–800. The Saint-Domingue fighters, who were known as free people of color (gens de couleur libre), constituted the Chasseurs-Volontaires de Saint-Domingue (volunteer light infantry). Led by the French general and admiral Charles-Hector, count d’Estaing, the infantrymen joined regular French metropolitan troops stationed in Saint-Domingue and a host of smaller volunteer units from across the island when they set sail for Georgia in some twenty-five warships.

Arriving in the waters off the coast of Georgia by September 11, 1779, General d’Estaing had moved his troops, which included members of the chasseurs, into Savannah by September 16. Despite pounding the city heavily with cannon fire for weeks, d’Estaing’s forces failed to cripple entrenched British defenses surrounding the city. And even though illness ran rampant among his troops and hurricane season was quickly approaching, d’Estaing stubbornly ignored advice from subordinates to call off the siege. Instead, he mounted a highly secretive and bloody ground assault on the morning of October 9 at Spring Hill. He hoped to finish the job quickly and return to the Caribbean and then to France. Poor weather and scattered enemy forces, however, hindered his troops’ best efforts. In the morning fog and swamp-like conditions, General d’Estaing was injured and the famed Polish cavalry officer Casimir Pulaski killed; countless chasseurs fought valiantly at the Spring Hill redoubt, though many perished. As fighting intensified into the third week of October, the death count rose on the Franco-American side. The British suffered only minimal losses. Realizing that victory was impossible, d’Estaing ordered
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Back on Saint-Domingue, some black soldiers continued to serve in the Chasseurs-Volontaires until the unit disbanded in the early 1780s. But their experiences in Savannah provided them with useful fighting tactics. In a sense, the siege of Savannah was their rehearsal for revolution.

Though historians have yet to identify and account for most of the Saint-Domingue fighters or the scope of their involvement during the siege of Savannah, legend has it that Henri Christophe, a future king of Haiti, was among them, perhaps as a drummer boy. He became a leading figure during the Haitian Revolution, serving as a general under Toussaint Louverture and ruling as king from 1811 until 1820.

A monument honoring the contributions and bravery of the Chasseurs-Volontaires who fought on behalf of Savannahians and the American colonists sits in downtown Savannah in Franklin Square. Dedicated in 2007, the monument pays homage to the long-ignored efforts of Saint-Domingue soldiers to secure American freedom—and by implication, honors their struggle for freedom from slavery as well.

JERMAINE THIBODEAUX
 creeks also exist. Modern maps tend to overemphasize the main channel of the river at the expense of the other creeks, but a map of 1780 shows more clearly that Abercorn Creek was navigable by smaller boats and could be used as an alternative to the main channel of the river.

These river islands were particularly attractive to maroon groups for several reasons. First, being surrounded by water, they were defensible, and all were heavily forested with cypress trees, which provided natural cover. The ground was often more swamp than terra firma, and in the spring, when river levels were generally higher than normal, the islands became impassable other than by boat.

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the islands became impassable other than by boat. Maroon settlements were most likely located on the highest, and therefore driest, places, and dwellings might well have been raised up on stilts. The islands were also home to alligators, water moccasins, and eastern diamond rattlesnakes, which deterred any casual visitors.

Second, the islands, being roughly thirty square miles in area, were large enough to support a significant population of maroons. Aside from the dangerous fauna mentioned above, the islands were home to turtles and birds, such as geese and ducks, and the creeks offered the opportunity to catch fish. Lowcountry slaves were well accustomed to supplementing their diet by hunting in nearby swamps. The naturalist William Bartram, visiting Jonathan Bryan’s plantation about eight miles north of Savannah in 1770, observed that “several of his servants came home with horse loads of wild pigeons (Columba migratoria), which it seems they had collected in a short space of time at a neighbouring bay swamp.” For slaves skilled in such techniques, surviving in the swamp for longer periods of time was certainly viable. Small plots of cleared land could be planted with vegetables, corn, and rice, all of which slaves had grown on plantations, and in the virtually frost-free climate the crops could be harvested for much of the year.

Third, the maroons had found a location that was sufficiently distant from white settlement to ensure their isolation. Ebenezer was eight miles to the north, while Purrysburgh was four miles to the east on the South Carolina bank of the main channel of the Savannah River. Neither town was of any size. The 1780 map marked a road that crossed the river at Zubley’s ferry, eventually meeting the Savannah–Ebenezer road on the other side of the swamp. No other contemporary map showed this road, and it does not exist now, suggesting that it might have been a military road used solely during the Revolutionary War. One British force had crossed the Savannah River very close to where maroons later took up residence. It is entirely possible that black troops gained firsthand knowledge of the islands while still in the king’s service. The twin roads that ran parallel to the river on either side were at least a mile, and often several miles, from the river itself, and the plantations that could be accessed from the roads were few and far between. For the most part, the land between the river islands and the roads, especially on the South Carolina side, was simply an extension of the same low, swampy ground that characterized the islands. Furthermore, the size of the river islands meant that settlements could be constructed and land cleared and planted with crops without sacrificing secrecy. Even when whites were aware of a maroon settlement on the Savannah River islands, they had
to find the precise location by searching an inhospitable environment and navigating almost impassable terrain.

Fourth, the river islands were positioned on a boundary between South Carolina and Georgia, meaning jurisdiction over them was unclear. The Savannah River, which forms most of the boundary between South Carolina and Georgia, flows into numerous channels as it nears the sea. The exact demarcation of authority over the marsh lands and islands in the river was unclear; not until the signing of the Treaty of Beaufort, in April 1787, did South Carolina and Georgia come to an agreement on the boundary line. Since any military action against the maroons would involve public expense, each state government probably hoped that the other would take the initiative and thus pay the bill. It is possible that military authorities on both sides were cautious about violating the sovereignty of a neighboring state by sending troops in pursuit of maroons without express permission. The maroons’ location in the Savannah River exploited this jurisdictional confusion.

Further confirmation that the Savannah River islands west of Purrysburgh were an ideal location for a maroon settlement: the islands have not been settled or built on in contemporary times. Their remote and inaccessible location meant that even planters of the antebellum era never drained and divided them up, as they did with similar islands nearer Savannah. The pristine landscape became part of the Savannah River National Wildlife Refuge in 1927 and has remained undisturbed by people ever since.

For former slaves who had fought for the British at the siege of Savannah and during the ensuing four years, but had been left behind by the British after the war, finding a secure refuge where they could maintain their freedom was evidently preferable to the alternative—a return to enslavement on a rice plantation. Since so many slaves were missing after the war, or had been removed by the British, planters set about restocking their estates with slaves, partly by direct importation from Africa and partly by transshipment from the Caribbean. One estimate suggests that by 1787 the black population of the Lowcountry had already reached, and most likely exceeded, prewar levels. The slavery experienced by the newly imported was just as harsh, unremitting, and soul destroying as it had been before the war. The act of 1770 that set out how slaves were to be controlled continued to be the basis of slave law after the Revolution, and indeed remained largely unchanged until 1865; little to no amelioration for the condition of Georgia slaves came out of the American war for liberty. Johann David Schoepf, a German visiting the Lowcountry in 1784, believed that the troubles than that of their northern brethren: “Of food, they are allotted more work; and the treatment of their overseers and owners is capricious and often most Lowcountry slaves endured, it is not surprising was an attractive proposition.

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ving the Lowcountry in 1784, believed that the lives of slaves were “harder and more troubling than that of their northern brethren”: “On the rice-plantations, with wretched food, they are allotted more work; and the treatment which they experience at the hands of their overseers and owners is capricious and often tyrannical.” Given the regimes that most Lowcountry slaves endured, it is not surprising that a separate maroon community was an attractive proposition.

Later sources confirm that black loyalists first took up residence on the Savannah River islands shortly after the British left in 1782, yet little is known about them until late in 1786. Some whites knew, or suspected, the existence of a maroon settlement near Savannah as early as 1783; James Houstoun’s advertisement for two fugitive slaves, Peter and Jupiter, both cooperers, stated: “There is great reason to believe they are harboured by the Abercorn negroes.” In general, however, it seems likely that the settlements remained secret and hidden from white eyes for four years, and that maroons kept a low enough profile not to arouse attention or anger from neighboring planters. Perhaps four years of tranquility made the maroons overconfident, or perhaps the original group of former soldiers became augmented by new fugitives who lacked the same cautious approach, but by 1786 the maroons were committing “robberies on the neighboring planters” and clearly causing enough trouble to be noticed. On October 3, 1786, the grand jury of Chatham County, Georgia, brought the activities of the maroons into the spotlight by complaining about “large gangs of runaway Negroes” who were “allowed to remain quietly within a short distance of this town, without an attempt of the Militia Officers in the districts where they are ... to subjugate them.”

The grand jury’s complaint spurred those in charge of local military units into action. Just over a week later, a combined force of militia units and the Savannah Light Infantry were involved in a skirmish with the maroons. This encounter, which occurred on October 11, 1786, ended inconclusively, with “three or four” maroons reportedly killed while a similar number of the militia were wounded. Later the same day, a new assault on the “out-guards” posted by the maroons was repulsed after “the Negroes came down in such numbers that it was judged advisable to retire to their boats, from which the Negroes attempted to cut them off.” Only the discharge of an artillery piece from one of the militia’s boats held back the maroons long enough for the soldiers to escape. Clearly, the maroons were well armed, aware of the need to post sentries, and sufficiently numerous—“supposed upwards of 100”—as well as brave enough to counterattack against armed
white soldiers. Realizing the strength of the militia maroons decided to abandon their camp and retreat. General James Jackson led another sortie against the settlement empty but well stocked. The maroons lured with corn and "green rice," giving them a steady fishing from the "14 or 15 boats" that Jackson captured "as much rough rice as would have made 25 barrels bushels of corn," were either destroyed or taken. Houses and huts, thus rendering the site uninhabitable, the camp, it clearly was no longer suitable as a settlement.

With their settlement destroyed, the maroons \whence they carry off whole stacks of rice at a tin their incredible magazine of provisions... destroy\nNovember 1786, they attacked several plantations leading one observer to describe them as "much when we routed them." On November 29, 1786, "tacked the house of Mr. Wolmar, with an intention of a valuable he possessed. Fortunately for himself he w could not allow such actions to continue, not just breaking, but also because of the example they were setting. The freebooty they reap, and the independent state of the maroons, of course, their numbers are daily increasing. In October 1786, they had been led by units from Georgia in South Carolina, "from whence they frequently in free to "range at large" on the South Carolina side, having seen a few days since, between Purisibber, General Jackson wrote to the governors of South Carolina in order "to put several examples." As if to illustrate Jackson casually mentioned that the head of one man had been "fixed on the western road." Jackson feared done, I dread the consequences — they are as distant state, from the ease they enjoy in S. Carolina, forbic
white soldiers. Realizing the strength of the military forces ranged against them, the maroons decided to abandon their camp and retreat farther into the swamp. When General James Jackson led another sortie against the maroons two days later, he found their settlement empty but well stocked. The maroons had planted several acres of the island with corn and “green rice,” giving them a steady food supply that could be augmented by fishing from the “14 or 15 boats” that Jackson captured. All these supplies, amounting to “as much rough rice as would have made 25 barrels or more if beat out, and... about 60 bushels of corn,” were either destroyed or taken. Jackson also “burnt a number of their houses and huts,” thus rendering the site uninhabitable, though since whites had been to the camp, it clearly was no longer suitable as a secret refuge for former slaves.15

With their settlement destroyed, the maroons were forced to raid plantations, “from whence they carry off whole stacks of rice at a time to compensate, as they term it, for their incredible magazine of provisions... destroyed at their camp.” During October and November 1786, they attacked several plantations on both sides of the Savannah River, leading one observer to describe them as “much more troublesome to the citizens than when we routed them.”16 On November 29, 1786, “upwards of twenty of them armed, attacked the house of Mr Wolmar, with an intention of taking his life & robbed him of every valuable he possessed. Fortunately for himself he was not at home.” The white authorities could not allow such actions to continue, not just because of the havoc the maroons were wreaking, but also because of the example they were setting for the enslaved population: “The freebooty they reap, and the independent state they are in, have strong charms of allurement, of course, their numbers are daily increasing.” The attacks on the maroons in October 1786 had been led by units from Georgia, and therefore the maroons settled in South Carolina, “from whence they frequently make irruptions unto Georgia,” but felt free to “range at large” on the South Carolina side: “Nigh one hundred of them armed having been seen a few days since, between Purisburgh & the Union.” In early December, General Jackson wrote to the governors of South Carolina and Georgia urging concerted action against the maroons in order “to put a stop to their marauding, as well as to make some severe examples.” As if to illustrate what he meant by “severe examples,” Jackson casually mentioned that the head of one maroon, killed during a plantation raid, had been “fixed on the western road.” Jackson feared that “if something cannot be shortly done, I dread the consequences—they are as daring as any & from their independent state, from the ease they enjoy in S. Carolina, forbode what I dread to express, a capital
insurrection.” Jackson, who had fought in the Revolutionary War, also warned that the maroons should not be underestimated, since “their leaders are the very fellows that fought, & maintained their ground against the brave lancers at the siege of Savannah, & they still call themselves the King of England’s soldiers.” The governor of Georgia, no doubt alarmed that runaway slaves “have with arms opposed the Militia that have been ordered out to suppress them,” responded immediately to Jackson’s letter with an offer of a £10 reward for each maroon captured or killed, but his South Carolina counterpart made no immediate response.19

In March 1787, the maroons raided the home of the South Carolina planter John Lewis Bourquin, wounding him in the process, and departed with one of his drivers and “ten barrels of clean rice.” Bourquin reported to his representative in the South Carolina legislature that “they have in my hearing threatened the lives of many of the citizens,” and he requested that the state take immediate action. In particular, he pointed out that the militia were “not willing to go after them . . . As it will require more than a few days to have them entirely extirpated they say there ought to be provisions ordered to be provided for them by the public.” Bourquin also hinted at the connections that most likely existed between maroons and those who remained enslaved. Plantation slaves often supported maroons with food, weaponry, and information. Most plantations were too large to be monitored constantly and therefore slaves were able to contact maroons at night on distant parts of the plantation, especially where there was river access. Bourquin feared that if the maroons were not suppressed, then the real danger would come from “our own indoor domesticks,” emboldened by white inaction and maroon success.20

Galvanized into action, the governor of South Carolina ordered that a hundred “minute men” be engaged, at a salary of one shilling a day, for a full month, with rations and ammunition provided by the state. For each maroon captured or killed, a £10 reward would be payable, matching the proclamation made by the governor of Georgia the previous December.21 To augment the minutemen, the South Carolina government also recruited twenty Catawba Indians. The Catawba had been used to hunt maroons before, since their “manner of hunting renders them very sagacious in finding an Enemy by their Track,” and also because they were able to “hunt the Negroes in their different recesses almost impervious to White people at that season of the year.”22 Once his forces were assembled, the leader of the expedition, Colonel Thomas Hutson, faced an obvious problem: how to locate and destroy the maroons? He must have had some intelligence on the movements of

the maroons, since on April 21, 1787, he was able to set maroons in Collin’s Creek (probably Big Collis Creek) was not until May 6, however, that the main encampment was on the lower side of Bear Creek.” The camp itself was “700 and contained twenty-one houses, few enough: maroons are mentioned by name in the records. Land was planted in rice and potatoes.” This camp was previous October and is evidence of the speed with which the camps moved. Surrounding the camp was “a kind of breach out of "logs & cane that came out of the cleared ground would admit but one person to pass at a time." One sentry was posted, and “about two miles below their creek in order to prevent boats passing up small The maroons were well versed in defensive tactics, as England’s soldiers” who had successfully defended Shiloh, historians have observed that the use of fortified canals, and since much of the enslaved population are plausible to argue that the Savannah River maroons would defend their settlements.26 Once their defenses had a spirit of the maroons quickly evaporated, and most few shot at random.” Six maroons were reported killed few days later, the Effingham County, Georgia, milito maroons “on their way to the Indian nation” and captives saw the capture of Lewis, one of the maroon leaders, as on trial.27

Lewis’s trial record provides a vast amount of information of the maroon camp and, uniquely, of the personal For instance, Lewis stated that he joined the maroon White Overseer used him ill,” an indication that not River islands had necessarily served with the British as a not a static institution. Rather, it grew as children were and shrank as members sickened and died, or even styled leader of the maroons was Sharper, who “was
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the maroons, since on April 21, 1787, he was able to send three boats to "waylay" a party of
maroons in Collin's Creek (probably Big Collis Creek) and succeeded in killing several. It
was not until May 6, however, that the main encampment of the maroons was located, "on
the lower side of Bear Creek." The camp itself "was 700 yds in length, & about 120 in width"
and contained twenty-one houses, enough to house up to two hundred people, though far
fewer maroons are mentioned by name in the records. In addition, "the whole of the cleared
land was planted in rice and potatoes." This camp was larger than the one destroyed
the previous October and is evidence of the speed with which maroons could construct settle-
ments. Surrounding the camp was "a kind of breek work about 4 feet high" constructed
out of "logs & cane that came out of the cleared ground," while the single narrow entrance
"would admit but one person to pass at a time." One hundred fifty yards down the creek a
sentry was posted, and "about two miles below their camp they had fallen large logs across
the creek in order to prevent boats passing up (small canoes might pass at high water)."
The maroons were well versed in defensive tactics, as one might expect from "the King of
England's soldiers" who had successfully defended Savannah in 1779. Moreover, several
historians have observed that the use of fortified camps was a common tactic in African
warfare, and since much of the enslaved population of the Lowcountry was African, it is
plausible to argue that the Savannah River maroons were using traditional knowledge to
defend their settlements. Once their defenses had been breached, however, the fighting
spirit of the maroons quickly evaporated, and most escaped "into the swamp firing a
few shot at random." Six maroons were reported killed and their camp was destroyed. A
few days later, the Effingham County, Georgia, militia encountered a group of eighteen
maroons "on their way to the Indian nation" and captured nine of them. A week later
saw the capture of Lewis, one of the maroon leaders, who was taken to Savannah and put
on trial.

Lewis's trial record provides a vast amount of information about the internal organi-
ization of the maroon camp and, uniquely, of the personalities of the maroons them-
seled. For instance, Lewis stated that he joined the maroons in 1785, only after "his Masters
White Overseer used him ill," an indication that not all the maroons on the Savannah
River islands had necessarily served with the British army. The maroon community was
not a static institution. Rather, it grew as children were born or as new recruits arrived,
and shrank as members sickened and died, or even returned to plantations. The self-
styled leader of the maroons was Sharper, who "was called Captain Cudjoe," most likely
after the leader of the Jamaican maroons who had successfully negotiated in 1739 a treaty with British authorities that recognized maroon freedom on the island. Sharper had been taken from a plantation in Colleton District, South Carolina, by British forces under General Provost during a raid into South Carolina in the spring of 1779. Evidently left behind after the British evacuation, Sharper had remained at large in the Lowcountry. At one time he was detained in Sunbury, twenty miles south of Savannah, before at some point taking up residence in the Savannah River. Lewis was second in command of the maroons, calling himself “Captain Lewis,” but he and Sharper clearly had an uneasy relationship, with Lewis refusing to follow Sharper’s orders on more than one occasion. According to two female maroons who testified at Lewis’s trial, the two leaders “frequently quarrelled,” with one suggesting that it was because Lewis suspected “he did not get his share of plunder,” while the other thought that “Lewis wanted his own people as Sharper took all his men.” Sharper and Lewis “disagreed and Separated” after a local white man, John Casper Hirschmann, was murdered by the maroons.

Hirschmann had encountered the maroons more than once, once stopping to talk to them from a boat in the Savannah River. The day before he died, Hirschmann met Lewis and two other maroons in the swamp and “begged” them “to carry him to the Camp . . . as he wanted Victuals of which he was in search.” Little is known about Hirschmann’s circumstances, but evidently he was not above trading with maroons, and if he was aware of their raids on nearby plantations, it did not prevent him trying to make contact. Lewis made Hirschmann wait overnight at a campfire before taking him to the main camp at first light. Sharper was outraged, saying that “Lewis had no business to bring White people to camp,” and ordered Hirschmann be killed immediately. Chicheum, a maroon with possible Native American ancestry, judging by his name, shot Hirschmann and dumped his body “in to a pond.” After the murder, Lewis “Separated camp with Sharper.”

Other information about maroon life can be gleaned from the record of Lewis’s trial. The maroons grew rice and corn on the island, but for meat they raided nearby plantations, taking sheep and cattle with apparent impunity. At least eight of the maroons had guns, which they used mainly for killing livestock but which, of course, could also be used to defend the camp and to threaten adversaries. Lewis stated that he had “called on Mr Thomas Polhill and told him to take Care of the runaway Negroes, or by’e and by’e, they would Come and hurt him.” Raids on plantations not only netted maroons food, but also were opportunities to restock their powder. Lewis for example had “a great Coat which he srecruit more slaves. The first skirmish between th1786, had prevented “Sharper and Lewis going to they tthough it is not clear whether these recruits were joining the maroons.

The two women who testified against Lewis, Jtheir plantations together with their husbands wit hand, “a stout, strong made wench, . . . about 28 yeCcashall-Hall plantation in 1783, taking her once she Dasher captured her in 1787, she still had the boy gesting that his father might have been the maroo was clearly gendered: “all the women Stayed in Ct conduced raids on nearby plantations and organiz of the women had guns, and when the militia atta send “all the women in the canes” to hide. When tered and attempted to flee northeast, away from in the Lowcountry and toward land still occupied made it, but of the ten maroons listed in the newsPaper nearly all were women, who may not have been ab least one had a child with her. The only man re but he was traveling south toward “his Master’s M blend back into the slave population as an ordinarHe was “taken by two negroes belonging to Mr Bi and the fact that he was captured by two slaves is t had its limits. Even if the two slaves had been symp the maroons were forced to abandon their island re finished. It is also possible that the increased vigil the maroons might inspire greater resistance mment among those remaining on plantations. When supplies, and recruits, those most likely to suffer w suspected them of colluding with the rebels, or be on the plantation.
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The two women who testified against Lewis, Julieta and Peggy, had run away from their plantations together with their husbands within the last year. Phillis, on the other hand, "a stout, strong made wench, . . . about 28 years of age," had fled from James Gunn's Cashall-Hall plantation in 1783, taking her one-year-old son with her. When Captain Dasper captured her in 1787, she still had the boy with her, now named "Sharper," suggesting that his father might have been the maroon leader. Labor among the maroons was clearly gendered: "all the women Stayed in Camp" and planted rice, while the men conducted raids on nearby plantations and organized the defense of the settlement. None of the women had guns, and when the militia attacked, one of Sharper's first orders was to send "all the women in the canes" to hide. When the battle was lost, the maroons scattered and attempted to flee northeast, away from the concentration of white settlement in the Lowcountry and toward land still occupied by the Creeks and Cherokees. Not all made it, but of the ten maroons listed in the newspapers as being captured by the militia, nearly all were women, who may not have been able to travel as quickly as the men, and at least one had a child with her. The only man recorded as being captured was Lewis, but he was traveling south toward "his Master's Mills on Ogeechee," perhaps hoping to blend back into the slave population as an ordinary runaway and not a maroon leader. He was "taken by two negroes belonging to Mr Bird" before he reached his destination, and the fact that he was captured by two slaves is further evidence that racial solidarity had its limits. Even if the two slaves had been sympathetic to those resisting slavery, once the maroons were forced to abandon their island refuge, it was clear that their cause was finished. It is also possible that the increased vigilance of whites, as a result of their fear that the maroons might inspire greater resistance among the enslaved, caused resentment among those remaining on plantations. When maroons raided plantations for food, supplies, and recruits, those most likely to suffer were the slaves, either because masters suspected them of colluding with the rebels, or because there was now simply less food on the plantation.
Lewis's trial for the murder of John Casper Hirschmann and three counts of robbery took place before four justices of the Chatham County Inferior Court. A jury of seven was selected to hear the case, and the trial record indicates that only three people testified: Lewis himself, Peggy, and Juliet, there being no bar in the slave code to black people testifying against other blacks. It did not take the jury long to convict Lewis of all charges, though it seems likely that he did not commit the murder. Even if he had been acquitted of the murder, the outcome would have been same: the robbery charges also merited a death sentence. The justices ordered that “the Negro Lewis . . . be hanged on the South Common by the Neck until he shall be Dead on the Ninth day of June next at ten o’clock in the Morning; After Which his head to be Cut off and Stuck upon a pole to be set up on the Island of Marsh opposite the Glebe land in Savannah River.” By ordering the mutilation of Lewis’s corpse, the justices were following the act of 1770 “for the better governing of Negroes,” which ordered that the “manner of death” in capital cases involving slaves should be the one judged “most effectual to deter others from offending in like manner.”

The same act stated that all capital sentences had to be approved by the governor, and therefore all relevant documents relating to the trial were sent to Augusta. The state’s executive council “approved the sentence” and issued a warrant for the execution of Lewis on the day appointed. A terse report in the local newspaper the following week stated: “Last Saturday Lewis, one of the head-men of the camp of runaway negroes lately broke up, was executed pursuant to his sentence.” Two years later Lewis’s owner, Oliver Bowen, was awarded £40 compensation by the state for his executed slave. Requests from other slaveholders for compensation for slaves “killed among the Runaway Negroes” were rejected, since the state paid only for slaves executed after a trial, not for those killed by the militia while “in arms against this state.” Those unable to produce a trial transcript received no compensation.

The destruction of the maroon camp in the Savannah River in May 1787, and the dispersal of the maroons themselves, seemed to mark an end to the use of those islands as refuges for large numbers of slaves. No doubt individuals, and perhaps small groups, fled into the swamps for as long as slavery persisted in the South. As late as 1823, newspapers reported: “A correspondent in Puryburg informs us, that a number of armed negroes were encamped in that neighborhood, and that several gentlemen had gone in pursuit of them.” This was an isolated report, however, and there are no records to suggest that the militia or the state governments had to mount large-scale expeditions against armed slaves on the Savannah River as in 1787. If the man reports suggested, the militia killed very few of their Carolina government, equating to six deaths, and in the press as being captured. Those who were since masters were expected to claim those adverti forward, the slave would be sold by the state. But i maroons succeeded in escaping northward and avo

After the chaos of the Revolutionary War, the rem River marked the completion of a process of rest country that had been in progress since 1782. The roons to prospective runaway slaves was a challenge try planters were well aware of the situation in Jam.; groups had “fixed and fortified the recesses . . . and and they oby.” They did not believe that the “runaway negroes (maroons) were yet comparable to Jamaican maroons the Savannah River maroons might have led to inc coming so strong that even “the best stationary regi effort put into the destruction of the maroons—two: more than a hundred troops and recruited a party paid or rewarded as well as supplied with food and Carolina government alone paid out £241 for suppl that.” Such sums are evidence of how seriously the ti societies where the entire economy was constructed the maroon threat, white authorities reasserted their ensured that whatever future resistance they encour varied and widespread, would ultimately be insuff slavery until the Civil War.
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slaves on the Savannah River as in 1787. If the maroons numbered "upwards of 100," as
reports suggested, the militia killed very few of them. Just £60 was paid out by the South
Carolina government, equating to six deaths, and only a small number were reported
in the press as being captured. Those who were captured could expect reenslavement,
since masters were expected to claim those advertised in the press. If no claimant came
forward, the slave would be sold by the state. 36 But it seems likely that the majority of the
maroons succeeded in escaping northward and avoided a return to slavery.

After the chaos of the Revolutionary War, the removal of the maroons in the Savannah
River marked the completion of a process of reestablishing racial slavery in the Low-
country that had been in progress since 1782. The "general asylum" offered by the mar-
oons to prospective runaway slaves was a challenge that could not be ignored. Lowcoun-
try planters were well aware of the situation in Jamaica and in Suriname, where maroon
groups had "fixed and fortified the recesses . . . and opposed and harrassed their masters
until they were obliged to treat with them; and they are now an actual independent col-
ony." They did not believe that the "runaway negroes" (contemporaries never called them
maroons) were yet comparable to Jamaican maroons, but "to have despised or neglected"
the Savannah River maroons might have led to independent maroon communities be-
coming so strong that even "the best stationary regiments could not subdue them." 47 The
effort put into the destruction of the maroons—two state governments together provided
more than a hundred troops and recruited a party of Catawba, all of whom had to be
paid or rewarded as well as supplied with food and drink—was considerable. The South
Carolina government alone paid out £241 for supplies, with soldiers' pay in addition to
that. 48 Such sums are evidence of how seriously the threat posed by maroons was taken in
societies where the entire economy was constructed around racial slavery. By eliminating
the maroon threat, white authorities reasserted their control over African Americans and
ensured that whatever future resistance they encountered from the enslaved, although
varied and widespread, would ultimately be insufficient to challenge the institution of
slavery until the Civil War.