AN ESSAY TOWARDS A GENERAL HISTORY OF Feudal Property IN GREAT BRITAIN, Under the following Heads,

I. History of the Introduction of the Feudal System into Great Britain.  
II. History of Tenures.  
III. History of the Alienation of Land Property.  
IV. History of Entails.  
V. History of the Laws of Succession or Descent.  
VI. History of the Forms of Conveyance.  
VII. History of Jurisdictions, and of the Forms of Procedure in Courts.  

By JOHN DALRYMPLE, Esq;

C'est un beau spectacle que celuy des Loix Feudales.  
Un chêne antique l'élève—
—Quantum vertice ad oras æthereas  
Tantum Radice ad Tartara tendit.  

MONTESEQUIEU.

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To

My Lord K A I M S.

My Lord,

I take the liberty of dedicating these papers to your lordship, as to the person, who not only led me into the general train of enquiry contained in them, but to whom any merit that may be found in the conduct of the particulars of that enquiry, justly belongs.

I know not whether I should have most shame, or most vanity from this confession; but I feel so much of the latter, that I am perfectly indifferent as to the other.

As the following thoughts were directed by your lordship, and were many of them revised by the greatest genius
DE DICATION.

... * President Moncey...

... genius * of our age, I have ventured to publish them to the world: I flatter myself they may prompt others, who have had advantages in any degree similar to those I have had, to trace the laws of their country with more success, than it has been in my power to do.

Many of your lordships papers as yet unpublished, though they were open to me, may give room for the publick to flatter itself, that whatever is deficient or erroneous in the following sheets, will be amply supplied by your lordship.

I have the honour to be, with very great respect and gratitude,

Your lordship's obliged,

And most obedient

Humble servant,

The Author.
P R E F A C E.

The following chapters contain an attempt, to trace from the earliest feudal times, the great out-lines of the laws which relate to land property, in England and in Scotland, so far as they are derived from a feudal origin.

The progress of these laws, however little attended to, is in both countries uniform and regular, advances by the same steps, goes in almost the same direction, and when the laws separate from each other, there is a degree of similarity even in the very separations.

The rights affecting land property, have chiefly distinguished the feudal from all other laws. Many of those rights distinguished in that manner, now prevail amongst us, and the remains of many more, may still be seen and felt.

Such a progress is the more to be attended to, because until the subjects of both countries have a knowledge of each others
others laws, there never will be a perfect union of the two kingdoms.

Will a subject of the one country lend money in the other, when he knows not by what process he is afterwards to recover it? Will he buy land in the other country, when he knows not what security he is to have in his purchase? An inhabitant of Northumberland makes no scruple to buy an estate in Middlesex or Kent, who yet will not buy the next field to him on the north of the Tweed, and people on this side of the border, make as little scruple to lend their money on estates, at the most northern extremities of Scotland, who yet will not trust a shilling, on a Northumberland security, at their door.

I am far from thinking our old laws in Scotland, should upon every occasion be overturned, to make way for an union with the laws of England. The following papers will show, that the former approach to the latter of their own accord, and that the legislature need only let them decay by degrees, instead of destroying them at once.

The
The following papers were, however, undertaken with another, and a more extensive design.

The spirit of laws first suggested in France, and the considerations upon forfeiture first suggested in England, that it was possible to unite philosophy and history with jurisprudence, and to write even upon a law subject like a scholar and a gentleman.

That discovery being made, it appeared, that a law, once so universal, and still so much revered, during the progress of which, men arrived from the most rude to the most polished state of society; a law which has been the cause of the greatest revolutions both civil and military; a law connected equally with the manners and with the governments of modern Europe; deserv'd an enquiry in the republick of letters, independant of the present and particular use of that enquiry, in any particular kingdom.
CHAPTER I.

History of the Introduction of the Feudal System into Great Britain.

It is now generally agreed upon, that the Feudal Laws derived their origin from the ancient Germans; under which denomination were comprehended all the northern nations on the continent, who, in vast bodies, quitted their native marshes and forrests, and overrunning the Roman empire, settled in it.

Yet in historical relations of these nations, while they were in their own country, we are not to expect relations of the Feudal Law; for during that period it existed not among them: A species rather than a peculiarity of manners and institutions, may however be observed while they were at home, which, added to a perfect peculiarity of situation when they settled in the conquered countries, was the cause of a system of laws and politicks, the most peculiar that ever appeared in the history of mankind; a system established by every one of those nations, however different in their dialects,
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dialects, separated by seas and mountains, unconnected by alliances, and often at enmity with each other.

The thought of distributing among a conquered people the lands they have conquered, and of annexing to the gift, a condition of military service, is in itself an exceeding simple one; accordingly we learn from history, it has been often reduced into practice, as among some of the Roman colonies on the confines of the Roman empire, among the Timarriots in the Turkish empire, and among other nations: But there were peculiarities attending the conquests of the German nations, which never did attend those of any other conquering people; and without a peculiarity of cause, there never will be a peculiarity of effect.

The Greek and Carthaginian colonies came from republicks; if they did not preserve a dependance on their native country, they at least preserved a great connection with it: They went out in small bodies, and as such they formed themselves into republicks. Equality among the citizens had been a rooted and political principle with them at home, it became now, from their
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their situation, still more the natural and consistent principle of their union.

The various conquests of Asia by Asiatics, have been made for one man, and not for a people, and therefore standing armies have always been kept up to secure them.

In the conquest of Asia by Alexander, neither he nor his army fought for habitations, but for dominion and glory: That dominion was preserved by armies and cities, he and his successors were honoured with the names of the cities, and together with the ancient revenues of the state, reserved to themselves the military and political administration: The armies found a refuge in the cities for themselves and their plunder, but the ancient inhabitants preserved their land property and their laws.

The Hebrews in Canaan followed different principles of conquest; they extirpated the ancient inhabitants, instead of associating with them.

The modern European colonies are kept in subjection, not only to their native country, but even sometimes to particular bodies of merchants in it. They are considered merely as instruments of commerce, and are
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therefore in general left to be regulated by the laws and police which chance to prevail in the different countries from which they are sent: Their principles of settlement are not determined by the natural circumstances of the settlement itself, but by the views with which they are settled.

The Romans, who extended their empire further than all other nations, preferred their conquests too by colonies; but as the members of them were for a long time taken from the dregs of the people, they went out without any extensive subordination; afterwards when the soldiers constituted the colonies, and paid military service in return for their lands, they had indeed a regular subordination; but then their connection with their native country was not broken, and besides they were in continual danger from incursions of the enemy: In these circumstances, it was not natural the possessions should be hereditary; for in the succession to a vacant possession, bravery, where bravery was so necessary, would be preferred to the relations of blood; nor would the preference be complained of by men having connections with another country, and still considering Rome as
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as the seat of their fortunes. Accordingly none of the lands given under the condition of military service, to the members of these colonies, went in descent; a few given by the emperor Severus excepted, and which rather were ordered to descend, than in reality ever descended to heirs.

In almost all those various transmigrations, it is observable, that the conquerors either conformed to the civil laws of the conquered people, if they left a people at all; reserving to themselves the political and military administration; or they retained their own laws among themselves, leaving to the conquered people the enjoyment of theirs. The reason was, a contrary regulation would have been either impossible for them to compass, or useless when compassed.

On the other hand, in every one of those various circumstances, the situation of the Germans was different: As there was no general system of government in their own country, they had been subjected in their various districts, to that chieftain, who could do them most good or most hurt: When they issued abroad then, they went rather as a band of independant clans, than of independant members, with a spirit of
Oligarchy, and not of equality.—Simple both in their manners and in their views, they could have no conception of a standing army, with the expense, and discipline, and resources necessary to support it: On the contrary, having quitted their own country in vast bodies from necessity, and being in quest merely of a habitation, they took up with the more simple thought, of spreading themselves all over the country, among the ancient inhabitants.—As the nations they conquered were more numerous, so were they likewise more polished, and expert in arts than themselves; therefore they durst not put such nations to the sword.—Unacquainted even with commerce itself, they were still more unacquainted with the refinement of being made the instruments of it to others.—As long as the most distant views to their native country remained, and as long as continual danger obliged them to be ready for continual defence, the possessions it is true, upon the death of tenants, could not regularly descend to their heirs, who perhaps were not able to defend them, but would be given to those in general, who appeared the most likely to be able to do so; yet when
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when in course of time that connection came entirely to cease, and this bravery was not so continually necessary, then the possessions we are speaking of, in contradiction to all others in the history of the world, which have any resemblance to feudal ones, became hereditary.—Being an army, these conquerors naturally fell into a subordination in their settlement: Valiant, their genius as well as situation led them to institutions, which made it an obligation upon almost the whole body, to be ready at a military call; and that settlement, subordination, and obligation to military service carried in themselves a system of laws, without the plan of a legislator, which, however the laws of the conquered people might for some time subsist, could not in the end but swallow up all the laws of all the countries where it came.

Naturally fond of the institutions of our ancestors, we are apt to make this system the result of the most consummate political prudence and refinement: But regular and extensive as the fabrick became, it was no more originally than the very natural consequence of very natural causes: In inventing other causes, we only deceive ourselves, by
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by carrying the refined ideas of our own age, into ages too simple to be capable of forming them.

It has been long disputed among Antiquarians, at what time the feudal system was first introduced into England. While some have been positive, it was established among the Saxons; others have been as positive, it was first introduced by the Norman conquest.

These opinions, by certain concessions, on both sides, may perhaps be reconciled.

The Saxons in their own country, had, like all the other German nations, their princes and chieftains; they had likewise their slaves, who served them not as domesticks, but as labourers of land, for which, when given to these slaves, they paid in return a certain quantity of cloaths, and corn, and cattle. When such a people settled in a foreign country, it is naturally to be expected, that certain portions of the land would be reserved for the prince, and the rest parcelled out among the chieftains; that in order to prevent disputes about limits, and to make the deed more formal, these last would have their lands pointed out to them by the prince, in presence of
of the other chieftains, and when writing came into use, pointed out to them by a charter; and that both the prince and chieftains again would settle upon their lands their followers of an inferior degree; and their slaves.

At the same time we are not to imagine that the whole land of the country was so distributed, or so holden. The Germans in none of their conquests assumed the property of the whole lands to themselves, the superfluity would have been burdensome; such of the ancient inhabitants then, as were allowed to live in the country, kept their lands on the ancient footing; such of the intruders too, as were not attached to any chieftain, taking possession of any vacant land that they found, enjoyed it on the same footing; both of them held their possessions at first without grant from the prince, and when writing came in, likewise without writing.

But then, as it was necessary to reduce to subjection, under government, in a political, those, who were not subjected in a feudal capacity, the king sent his own officers to judge, and to lead to war the possesors of these last lands, in the same manner as the chieft-
chieftains judged, and led to war the people dwelling upon the lands, which had been granted, in a feudal form, to them.

The distinction between lands held on the ancient, and those held on the new and feudal footing, is obvious, and marked with precision in the earlier French law. Lands of the former kind were called Alleux, the officer sent to command in them was called Count, those living under his jurisdiction, and pos sessing such lands, were called Libres, or in Latin Liberi, and often Milites, and were defined to be; † Superieure in feodalite, et ne sont sujets a faire, ou a payer aucuns droits seigneuriaux. Such lands were classed into counties, these again into vills, and these last into hundreds; over the vills Vicarii, and over the hundreds Centenarii were placed, the latter to act under the former, and both to act under the Count. Lands of the latter kind were called Feodaux, those holding them were called Leuds, i. e. Lords; the Leuds judged their own people, and led them to war; their lands were not contained in the divisions and subdivisions of the counties, nor were their people subject to the officers of them.——‡ Marcul-
allodial into a feudal estate.—At a much later period of the feudal system in Italy, the Allodia and Allodiarii make no inconsiderable figure in the books of the Fiefs; and in the earlier feudal history of all Europe, the distinction betwixt the Allodia and Beneficia, the lords and the counts, the free-men and vassals, is without difficulty to be seen.

When this distinction was so universal among other feudal nations, during the Saxon times, is it to be believed, that it did not subsist among the Saxons? It did subsist, and is to be found in the celebrated, though hitherto ill understood distinction, betwixt Thain Land or Boc Land, and Reve Land or Folk Land.

Land granted to the Thains or Lords was called Thain Land; Allodial Land, over which the king’s officer, called in the Saxon language, Reve, and afterwards sherriff, had jurisdiction, was called Reveland. Again, land of the one kind being held by a charter, was at other times called Bocland, that is, book land; land of the other kind being held without writing, and in the ancient manner, and mostly by the ancient inhabitants, was at other times called Folkland. In a mul-

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a multitude of the Saxon laws, these two species of lands are continually set in opposition to each other.

This produced the distinction between the proprietors of Bocland, called Thegen, that is, lords, with the Theoden, who were those under them; and the possessors of Folkland, called Coples, that is, counts or earls, with the ceorles, who were those under them.

A law of Æthelstan, in enumerating the orders of the state, says, *Et ibi erant quilibet, pro sua ratione, coplae et ceorle, Thegen et Theoden*; which first Lambard justly translates by the word * Comes*; and a law of king *† Ina*, so far back as the 688, makes mention of counts or earls, and of their counties.

The possessors of alodial lands are, in the language of those times, to be likewise understood, by the general word made use of in the French law, *Liberi*, set in opposition to the slaves, and to the tenants under the dominion of the Thains. As in the French law too, the *Liberi* were defined to be, *Celles qui ne reconnoissent superiere en Feodalite*, so in Dooms-day, the *Liberi* are expressed to be, those *qui ire poterant quo volebant*, men, in short, attached to no lord in a seig-
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a seignorial, but to the king alone in a political capacity; though from the same book it appears, that they often, for their greater security, put themselves under the protection of some lord.

The Folkland was divided and subdivided into Counties, Trythings, called since by corruption Rideings, and Hundreds, and over these divisions the king's officers, in the same manner as in the French law, were placed in their orders. Many Saxon laws describe these divisions, and the 35th law of Edward the confessor, near the end, enumerates the officers set over them to be, *Vice comites, et Aldermani, et Prepositi Hundredorum*, corresponding to the *Comites Vicarii* and *Centenarii* of the French, and set in opposition to the lords, who immediately follow them in the enactment of the law: *Barones vero qui suas consuetudines habent, et qui suam habent curiam, de suis hominibus videant, et sic de iis agant, et omnia rite faciant.*

As the judge of the Thain land was the Thain himself, so the judge ordinary of the *Reve* land or *Folkland* was the *Reve* or *L. Ead.-Shirrive*, and the court in which this last judged the freemen, separate from that court in which the Thaine judged his people,
ple, was sometimes called the Revemote * or Scyremote, and at other times by it is to be understood even the Folkmote.

As in France the form of converting allodial into feudal estates is to be traced, so in England great part of the book of Dooms-day is taken up with an account of the conversion of the former into the latter. From the same book it appears, that feudal often returned to be allodial estates, as for example, from the defeq of heirs, and returned to the subjection of the king; tho' he was sometimes cheated of the cenfus laid upon them: † Hae terra fuit tempore Edwardi Thain land, sed postea conversum est in Reve land, et idem dicunt legati regis quod ipsa terra et cenfus qui inde exit furtim aufertur regi, is a return often to be found in that book.

I am sensible, this account of the distinction betwixt Folkland and Bocland, is different from the various accounts given of it by modern historians, and lawyers, and antiquarians; but I appeal to the nature of the German conquests, to the analogy of law in neighbouring nations at the time, and to a general view of the surest guides in this question, the Saxon laws themselves.

Among the Saxons then, though a great part
part of the lands of England were held by a feudal tenure, yet many of them continued still to be alodial.

And even in those which were held by a feudal tenure, the feudal relations were far from running in that regular subordination, which, with after-ages, made the feudal connections and dependancies so compleat, in the establishment, and extension of the rights of the rear vassals.

Two things were great bars to the progress of the rear vassallage. In the first place, when the lands given immediately by the king, reverted to him, as they frequently did, either by the crime of the vassal, or from the limited destination of heirs; if the rear vassal had not fallen with the principal one, the king would then have lost the profits of the reversion. In the next place, the lords were too sensible of that independance, which arose to them, from the hereditary enjoyment of their estates, to bestow the same power of independancy on those below themselves. Both the king and the lords then found their advantage, in limiting the interests of the rear vassals.

Accordingly, it was late * in the French law, before the rear Fiefs were made de-
fercendable to heirs. In * Italy, at the time the books of the Fiefs were wrote, the crown vassals could give in fee; but then those to whom they gave, could not give again under themselves. Among the † Saxons, the kings did not grant the earldoms, &c. arising from territorial powers and emoluments in descent; the lordships were indeed granted to the lords and their heirs, at a more early period among this people, than in almost any other state in Europe; but then there is not the least reason to believe, that the grants under these lords were at all hereditary: for though we see by ‡ charters far down in the Saxon times, that some of the book lands were granted by the proprietors, to people under them, for many different services, in the form of a charter, and for one, two, or three lives; yet it is obvious that these grants were of the nature of Leases, not of Fiefs, and the possessors of them were tenants, not rear vassals.

Again, in the connections even between the king and his immediate vassals, or the lords, the tye was but slight among the Saxons. In the hereditary possession of the grant made secure to the crown-vassals; in the
the feudal form of the grant through a charter; in certain heriots and profits paid on change of heirs; and in the obligation to certain military duties; the out-lines of the feudal system may be seen: but that infinite variety of rights, arising from the closer union, betwixt the king and his vassals, and from the subordination of that union descending through the various ranks of the nation, was as yet not known.

Nor is this backward state of the feudal institutions among the Saxons to be wondered at: the feudal system was not established at once, in any one kingdom of Europe; the Saxons besides were a cruel and extirpating race; instead of settling themselves, and spreading peaceably among the Britains, those laws, which that settlement would have necessarily involved in it; they put many of them wantonly to the sword, and drove many more into France and Wales. Thus more land being vacant than the Saxons could possess, their chieftains would not for a grant of land, submit to the severe feudal regulations; add to this, that the princes who came over, being rather plunderers than princes, their attendants were, and continued to be, rather
associates of, than subjected to them; and from thence arose betwixt the princes and the chieftains, that degree of equality, which is so contrary to the Feudal System, and to the rights of the superior lord.

William the Conqueror came from a country where the greater power of the prince had sooner constituted the feudal services, and emoluments over the crown-vassals, and where a longer duration and smaller interruption of the feudal principles had given time and room for the rights of the rear-vassalage to ripen. He introduced many of the laws of his own country into his new dominions: By the number and variety of these laws, the infinite number of grants made by him and his followers, the language of the feudal books which he made to subplant that of the Saxons, and many new forms and terms in which it was made necessary to manage all disputes in law, at a time, when every judge was a Norman, and almost every dispute in some degree a feudal one; occasion has been given, for the opinion, that this prince was the first who brought the Primordia of the Fiefs into England.

Three general alterations were made by William, which, by their important effects, have
have dazzled Antiquarians, and led them into that opinion.

In the first place, he altered the nature of a good deal of the land in the kingdom, by abolishing the distinction betwixt allo-
dial and charter land. A great part of **Doomsday** is taken up with an account of the conversion of the one into the other; and most of those lands, as well as of all the other lands in the kingdom, he made to be held by military tenures or knight-
service. This he carried so far, as to sub-
ject the church-lands to the same service, and fixed the number of soldiers which every bishoprick and abbey should equip for the war.

Again, the distinction between alodial
and feudal land being destroyed, the great offices which were founded on that distinct-
tion, should have fallen too: But William
prevented this: From the greater progress
of the feudal system in his country, the earldoms were become hereditary, and were held of the sovereign by a feudal tenure: the counts again had spread the same system under themselves, and made the freemen hold of them by the same tenure. Now
William, in imitation of these great seigno-
ries
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ries of his own country, * attached large territories to the title of Earl, in England, and carrying the imitation of the same feignories still further, made the earldoms hereditary; by this alteration, those honours, which among the Saxons were only official, and during pleasure, became now seignoral and perpetual.

But the great alteration which happened in the time of William, or in that of one or two of his successors, was: That not only these great offices were made hereditary, but that the whole fiefs of the nation, as well those holding of the great officers, as those holding of the lords, became such; in short, the rights of the rear-vassals advanced to the same degree of firmness, with that of the more immediate vassals of the crown.

The greater progress of the feudal system had established these rights in Normandy, and they were by the conquerors transplanted into England: in consequence of this, all the effects which necessarily must follow a general extension of this kind, do immediately start up in this reign, or in a reign or two after. Thus the term † vavasour or rear-vassal we find immediately in the laws of the Norman princes.—Thus homage,
homage, if not introduced by William, had at least, all its ceremonies assigned it by him;* and which ceremonies became necessary to preserve the memory of the tenure, at a time, when not the heirs of a few great thanes holding of the king, as in the Saxon times, but the heirs of many thousand vassals holding both of the king and subjects, were claiming possession, and could no longer even by the last be refused it.—Thus the right of escheat to the lord was soon after established, over the rear-vassals, whose holdings were become by that time hereditary:—Thus the ward and marriage of the heir, of which, as Sir Henry Spellman † proves, there are no vestiges in the Saxon law, and to which indeed, the independancy of the Saxon thanes would never have submitted; we find, quickly taking place, among the Normans, taking place in favour both of the king as superior lord, and of the subject as superior lord; in favour of the king, who had power to enforce them, and in favour of the subject, who when he granted his land hereditarily under himself, had been accustomed in his own country to demand, and thought he had a right to demand, the same
incident, from his vassals, in return.—The ward of the heir, we find from Glandville, fully established, in the reign of Henry II. the marriage of the heir, which in its establishment could only come after the ward, is referred to, in the laws of Henry I. as a law subsisting in the time of William Rufus, the immediate successor to William the Conqueror; and this charter of Henry I. too, it is observable, ordains, that all subject superiors shall observe the same regulations with respect to their wards, which that prince there prescribes to himself, with respect to his own.

* Et præcipio ut Barones mei similiter se continant ergo filios et filias hominum suorum.

The question at what time the Feudal System was first introduced into Scotland, and by what steps it advanced, is much more difficult to be solved. The English have the laws of their Saxon kings, they have charters too as far back as the 694; but the Scotch have no system of their law before that of David I. who began his reign anno 1124; nor charters before the time of Malcolm III. who began his anno 1057.

In consequence of these defects, it is still a dif-
of Feudal System:

a dispute in Scotland, whether the feudal law was established there, as early as the reign of Malcolm II.

Perhaps by certain concessions, the differing opinions concerning the origin of the System, in this part of the island, may be likewise reconciled.

The Feudal System, we have seen, was not established at once in England, but by degrees; the same was its progress in every other country in Europe. Further, the principles of the fiefs were settled by a conquest in every country where they came, and in proportion as that conquest was perfect or imperfect, they acquired a firmer or less firm footing. Lastly, it is plain not only from facts handed down by historians *, but likewise from the famous account † of the laws of Malcolm, prefixed to the Regiam Majestatem, and the terms made use of in that account, that before his reign, some of the feudal characteristicsticks were known in Scotland.

It is probable then, that before the reign of that prince the Primordia of the fiefs were advanced in much the same degree in Scotland, as before the time of William the Conqueror they were advanced in England.
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They must have taken their rise from some conquest, made by nations of German origin, in the lower parts of Scotland; and from thence been extended to the more mountainous: for those nations, wherever they went, by their subordination of ranks in conquering, and their division of the conquest when made, laid continually a foundation for the feudal structure to rear itself upon.

It was Malcolm then who put the last hand to, and compleated the feudal structure: That politick prince brought the system to completion by art*; by the conversion of the allodial into feudal lands, expressed by Fordun†, and the laws of Malcolm,‡ as an alienation made by the king of all that land not yet disposed of, which, in right of the crown, was deemed to belong to the king; by the prudent distribution of those§, and of the real || crown-lands, among his nobles; by titles of honour attached to feudal grants; by making all donations of forfeitures in the feudal form; a custom which all his successors too followed; by the far greater privileges of the king’s vassal, than of the Al-\ldodarius, one of which was in most na-
tions of German origin, that a greater composition was exacted, and paid, for taking away the life of the former than of the latter; by that security of possession which the introduction of charters conferred, and which all were fond of acquiring: And lastly, by that influence, which the example of all neighbouring nations, could not but have upon his people.

The words of Fordun describing the state of the kingdom, prior to the time of Malcolm in Scotland, and the alterations made by that prince, contain the outlines of the state of the Feudal System among the Saxons, and of the alterations made upon it by William in England: † Antiquitus † Ford. vero consuerant reges, suis dare militibus, plus aut minus de terris suis, in Feodifirmam, alicujus provinciae portionem vel Thanagium. Nam eo tempore, totum pene regnum dividebatur in Thanagiis, de quibus, cuique dedit, pro ut placuit, vel singulis annis ad firmam, ut agricolis; vel ad decem annorum, seu viginti, seu vitae terminum, cum uno saltem, aut duobus hereditibus, ut liberis et generosis; quibusdam itaque, sed paucis, in perpetuum, ut militibus, Thanas, principibus. Malcolmum autem in donis ita largum fuisse, ut cum omnis
omnis totius regni, certas regiones et provincias, ritu priscorum, in propria possessione tenuerat; nihil inde possidendum sibi retinuit, præter montem Schonæ.

In return for these favours, and in consequence of the foundations which were laid by this prince, the ceremonies of homage were established, the incidents * of ward and marriage were conferred; and in situations of both nations ripe for the Feudal System, the natural course of things, and the prudence of the Scotch monarch, brought about in one part of the island, what the violence of the English monarch had before enforced in the other.
CHAPTER II.

History of Tenures.

SECTION I.

As the principles of the Feudal System were founded in conquest, as all its relations tended to preserve and defend that conquest; so at first almost all Fiefs were held by military service. In the Saxon times even the grants to religious houses were burdened with the charges of military expeditions, and the repairing bridges and castles.

This connection betwixt the nature of a fief and the military service, was understood to be so necessary, as to last even till the latest times in the law. * In England, before the twelfth of Charles II. if the king had granted lands without reserving any particular service or tenure, the law creating a tenure for him, would have made the grantee hold by knights-service; and in Scotland, before the 20th of George II. all lands were presumed to

*Wright's tenures, pag. 138 & Viner voce tenure (K.)
to be holden ward, that is, by knight-service, unless another holding was expressed.

In all the German settlements, after the division of the conquest, both the princes and the chieftains distributed their shares, partly among the bravest of their followers, who in return were to attend them in war; partly among such as inclined to be husbandmen, called in the complement of the Confessor's laws, Sokmen, from whom they received in return certain quantities of corn and cattle, and cloaths; and partly among their slaves, called in the same complement Villains, who laboured the ground for behalf of their masters.

The contempt which in those martial ages, was entertained for every man who was not a soldier, * brought the Sokmen very much upon the same footing with the Villains. A law of Edward the Confessor † puts an equal valuation on the life of a Sokman and of a Villain, Mandbote in Danelaga de Villanno et Sockmanno, 12 oras.

Hence, during a long time in the feudal settlement, the possessions of the husbandmen were rather leaves than feuds, and the possel-
possessors of them rather tennants than vassals. They were despised in the commonwealth; in every different nation they had a different name of baseness, as in France that of Roturiers, and in Britain that of Sokumen; they were subjected to the meanest services, and, as appears from the book of Doomsday, were inconsiderable in numbers; they bore no part in the councils of the nation; those who held of the king in capite, by knights service, being the only vassals who were originally admitted into these; even the price of their lives was estimated very low in the law; and at a period when the possessions of the military vassals were become hereditary, those of the husbandmen, as appears from all the Saxon charters*, to such people, were either during pleasure, or at most for life or lives.

But in process of time, these husbandmen having continued long in possession of the land, and during a more settled state of affairs, being grown into estimation in the commonwealth, began to claim, and with little opposition, an inheritance in the land: this claim made good caused Soccage to be considered as a regular tenure, and gave firmness to it as such.

As
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As the times too grew more peaceable, and the new conquerors were more safe in their conquests, superiors run very much into the practice of exchanging that military service, which was no longer of the same use as formerly, for the services of agriculture.

Further, the same peaceable manners, made the minds of men be shock'd with the bondage of their fellow-creatures; * Villains were infranchised, the flavius tenure of villenage, which had taken its name from the objects of it, was deemed to be too severe, and by degrees was converted into Soccage, a tenure better accommodated to the more civilized dispositions of mankind.

Thus the tenure by knights-service, and the tenure by villenage, the one finkling, and the other rising in dignity, falling both gradually into the ballance of Soccage tenure, this last extended itself daily in Great Britain over land-property.

The extension of Soccage, was a deviation from the original feudal relations; the alterations in the rents of Soccage were the effect of an equal deviation from feudal manners.

Lyt-
of Tenures.

Lyttleton observes,† that vassals by Soc- † Lytt. fect. 119.
cage, paid originally the actual service of the plow, in lieu of any other rent, and that from thence they got the name of Soccomen.

But afterwards, it appears, that they came to pay a certain rent in corn and cattle. According to Sir Henry Spellman*, the word Farm or Feorne, which we now use for rent, signified antiently corn and cattle; and Gervais † of Til- † Selden. bury relates, that he has himself, in the reign of Henry I. seen several of the king's vassals, driving their rent of corn and cattle to the king's court, but that the same prince going abroad, and having occasion for money, sent people through the kingdom to value the rents, and that in each earldom a vicarius was placed, to bring those rents converted into money, into the exchequer.

The alteration made by this prince, was made by a great many other superiors, who not residing on their estates, as superiors had done in the severe ages of the Feudal System, were glad to exchange the original duty of military service, for the service of agriculture; and that afterwards for the payment of corn and
and cattle, and that at last for the payment of a certain stated sum of money.*

Thus in the original feudal establishment, it appears, that almost the whole commonwealth would be divided into two classes of men; the soldiers and the husbandmen: The first of which, by their tenures, were bound to confront danger, and the other from intertine broils or foreign invasions, were continually exposed to it. The most martial nation however, must have some artificers attending them; but these, unable to brave the dangers to which the other two bodies of the nation were accustomed, and seeing no security for themselves in the country, either retired into the antient Roman towns, or built new towns for themselves.

At first despised among a nation of warriors, they were in the meanest condition: from a view of the situation of the towns of England in the book of Doomsday, it appears, that the inhabitants of them were anciently a mixture of people, either in the demesne of the king, and consequently tenants at will; or in the dominion of a variety of lords; or Liberi, who had found they could not live
live without putting themselves under the more immediate protection of the king, or of some lord; and that all of them were under the jurisdiction, either of the king in his burghmote, or of some lord in his court, and payed a census and taxes to the bailiffs, called Portreves, of the one or the other respectively. The famous charter of William I. to the city of London*, is no other than a mere instrument of protection; the mighty privilege he confers upon the citizens is, that they shall be law worthy, and that they shall be capable of inheritance.

Even in those times however, it appears, that both the princes and the lords were beginning to encourage these settlements. William the Conqueror † ordered many of them to be erected through the land; and the Saxon princes and lords had allowed the towns to form themselves into communities and gilds; had, under pretext of protecting them, walled them round, and garrisoned them with their own men; had bestowed small territories for support of the community; and in return had exacted small rents in provisions and horse-carriages.

D

In
In after times the benefit of these towns was still further observed; they were freed of their Portreves, and of foreign jurisdictions; their taxes and lands were feed out to them in feofarm; they were allowed to enjoy their own magistracies; enfranchisements were granted them; charters and privileges were conferred, and a new, feudal, free tenure was brought into the law, called tenure by Burgage; a tenure highly advantageous to those who erected it, as thereby they rendered the people who held by it dependants upon them, and the towns places of defence against their enemies.

The same security which bestowed firmness on the tenure of Soccage, and which the introduction of Burgage tended to bestow on the nation, produced likewise the tenure of mortification, or Frankall moigne; which last it was called, because the lands were held as a free alms in Libera Eleemosyna, on the account of religion *.

Originally, when lands were given to the church, they were burdened with military service; this service the bishop or abbot, in some ages by himself, and in others by a delegate, performed; but when the
the necessity for it became less, people in *Lyttlet.
giving lands to the church exacted no *Stair,
other return, than prayers and such reli-
cap. 2.
gious exercises *.
num. 39.

Thus the several orders that were of
value in the state, the soldiers, husband-
men, artizans, and clergy, became each
the object of a distinct tenure, and the
four simple forms of tenure, into which
all the rest may be resolved, came, by the
natural and gradual course of things, into
the law.

As these three last species of tenures
were extended by the more peaceable and
humane genius of the succeeding times, so
the same genius produced a great altera-
tion in military tenures, both in England
and in Scotland.

Originally the grants of lands were bur-
dened with indefinite military services; but
in the time of the Normans, these services
came to be distinguished one from another,
and according to those distinctions mili-
tary tenures got different names: Thus
some lands were granted on condition of
guarding a castle, and these were said to
be held by castle gard; others on that of
performing warlike offices about the king's

D 2  
per-
person, as to carry his banner in the day of battle, and these were said to be held by great serjeanty; others again were granted on condition of attending the king in person on foreign expeditions, and these were said * to be held by Escuage.

Of these last consisted the greatest part of the feudal property in the kingdom.

According to the books of the Fiefs †, all vassals were originally obliged to perform their services in person; afterwards, as the severity of the feudal law declined, and it became indifferent to superiors, whether the service was performed by the vassal or by another, the vassals by Escuage in England got into a way of not attending in person; instead of such attendance, they sent deputies in their places. To this practice long acquiesced in, a sanction was given, by a judgment, in the reign of Edward III. ‡. But still the sief, as appears from a case in that of Henry I. was forfeited, if the deputy was not sent §.

In further process of time, as superiors became still less exact, vassals became still more remiss; they did not even take the trouble of sending their deputies, but gave a compensation in money to the lord, according
of Tenures.

according to an assessment determined by parliament; and for this compensation he could only distain, but not subject his vassals to forfeiture.

At the same time, as superiors had still great power over their vassals, they exacted, and distained for exorbitant sums, under pretence of this compensation.

To elude these exactions, the vassals invented, what is called by Lyttleton the Es cuage-certain; by this they became bound in the charter, to pay a certain, stated sum of money, in lieu of attendance in person, or by deputy.

This produced the distinction betwixt Es cuage certain, and Es cuage uncertain; for where such provision was not made by the vassal, or where it was provided that the composition should be regulated by the assessment of parliament, the Es cuage was called uncertain.

In this last the superiors continued their exactions, nor when they laid on and levied them, did they give the vassals the antient alternative of paying in service, or in money, as they pleased: On the contrary, Henry II. upon occasions of war, used, without summons, or any other ceremony,
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* Madox

history of

excheq.

Pag. 435.

to affe$ a sum upon every knight's fee, for
the exigencies of the war *.

But what was laid on by this prince with
some moderation, seems to have been laid on
by succeeding princes without any; and
the example of the sovereign with regard
to his vassals, was followed by the lords
with regard to theirs.

These assessments raised so great cla-
mours in the whole nation, that they be-
came, in the reign of king John, one of
the chief sources of contention betwixt that
monarch and his subjects. These last pre-
vailed; John signed the Magna Charta;
one clause of it was, † *Nullum fentagium
ponatur in regno nostro, nisi per commune con-
cilium regni nostri*: And though this con-
cession concerned only the king, with re-
gard to his vassals, by Escuage uncertain,
yet it was equitably extended to all mesne
lords, and their vassals, by Escuage uncer-
tain; these being obliged to pay, and those
to accept, Escuage, at the rate affe$ed by
parliament.

The Escuage certain came to be deemed
altogether a Soccage tenure, and therefore
was only subject to the duties of it; but
the Escuage uncertain, on the contrary,
continued still subject to the incidents of ward and marriage. This last then came to be a strange mixture of military and socage holding; as it was subject to ward and marriage, it was of the former kind; as it paid money, instead of military service, it was of the nature of the latter.

In Scotland the severity of the military tenure came to be softened after a different manner.

As our only incursions were into England, they were easy; we had but little money, or occupation, and being weaker than the enemy, we were obliged to keep our discipline strict: Thus our vassals did not decline the military expedition; nor could they easily give a recompence in lieu of their attendance; nor in our dangerous situation, were such dispensations to be at all allowed.

For these reasons, the obligations to military service continued very long in the Scotch law*, even as long as we had wars with our neighbours in England.

But then, as the burthens of ward and marriage were not so intimately requisite in our military holdings, the profits arising from these incidents were estimated by a great
great many superiors and vassals among themselves, at a moderate rate: These vassals paid the estimation agreed upon, to be freed from the incident, and Taxt-ward was brought into our charters and law books.

Taxt-ward, like the Escuage uncertain of the English, was a strange mixture of military and Socage tenure; performing military service, it was of the nature of the one; paying a certain sum of money, it was of the nature of the other.

Thus while, in the military tenures of England, the military service was gone, and the wardship remained; in many of the military tenures of Scotland the wardship was gone, when yet the military service remained.

The same advancement of the interest of the vassal upon that of the superior, which in England created the distinction betwixt Escuage certain and uncertain, and in Scotland converted wardholdings into Taxt-ward, produced likewise a considerable alteration in many of the tenures by Socage.

Originally, when the king and lords granted their lands to be held in Socage,
or converted those before held by military into Soccage tenures, they received the full value for that grant or conversion.

But when the feudal manners began to give place to a certain degree of luxury, superiors who were in want of money to support it, were willing to give to their vassals, who had got money through it, lands, at very low rents, in consideration of large sums delivered at one payment.

These rents complained of as low in many statutes, became gradually lower, from the necessities of superiors: In proportion too as lands were improved, or by the sinking of interest rose in their values, these rents, when compared with the real rent, had the appearance of being still more low, than without those alterations they would have appeared to be.

The author of the old tenures reckons it Feefarm, when the third of the value of the rent is the sum paid.

However, the rent became afterwards still less, and in the end people got into the practice of laying aside a rent altogether, and took directly an ulterior duty, as a rose, a pair of spurs, &c. if demanded, which
which produced the holding called Blench, both in England and Scotland.

Most of the lands in Great Britain having been converted through time into this holding, the king lost his power over the crown-vassals, and the crown-vassals their power over the people.

S E C T. II.

AFTER the foregoing general view of the progress of the different species of tenures, it will be proper to observe the more immediate fruits and perquisites of them.

Antiently almost all lands were held by military tenures; in these the lord was in reality proprietor, and the tenant only usufructuary; and in return for this his interest, the tenant gave his personal service: but when he was no longer in a capacity of performing that service, it is not to be wondered at, that the lands should have returned to the lord, to be disposed of as he pleased; accordingly in the commencements of the Feudal System, the grants were good no longer, than for the life of the vassal.
of Tenures.

In consequence of the same principles, when afterwards the favour of the heir was a bar to this power of disposal, and grants were extended to a man and his heirs, it still remained congruous and just, that at least while those heirs from their minority were incapable of performing the service, the fief should return to the possession of the lord.

Perhaps too in those boisterous ages, it was a favour to the heir and to the fief, to put them under the protection of the lord, at a time when the heir was incapable to defend either.

Those considerations produced the right of ward in the military tenures both of England and Scotland; this right went so far, that in both nations, not only the military estate, but the person of the heir was in ward of the lord.

This last custom, strict as it was, prevailed even to the exclusion of the uncle or grand-father, almost invariably in Scotland, two hundred years ago, as may be seen from * the decisions at that period.

In such a situation it seemed but congruous and just too, according to the same principles, that the usufructuary or tenant should
History

should not bring into the joint possession of the sief, one who was perhaps an enemy to the lord, or of a family at enmity with him. Hence flowed the right of the lord to interest himself in the marriage of his vassal.

It is probable, that originally, in the very strict feudal times, the lord had the marriage of both the heir female, and the heir male, and that both forfeited, if they married without his consent.

But as there was an obvious distinction, in the importance to the superior, betwixt an heir female bringing a male foe into the possession of the sief, without the superior's consent; and an heir male bringing only a woman of a family at enmity with the superior into it; so there arose a difference between the penalties, upon the marriage of the one, and those upon the marriage of the other.

Thus with regard to the heir male, it appears in Scotland, by the *Quoniam Attachamenta*, and in England by the statute of †Merton, that if he refused to marry the woman whom his superior offered him, he was only obliged to pay the single value of his marriage; and if he married without his superior's consent, he only paid the double:
ble: whereas, on the contrary, with regard to the heir female, it is plain from Glanville and the *Regiam Majestatem*, that the ancient law remained; so that both *in* England and Scotland, one who gave his daughter in marriage, without consent of the lord, forfeited his heritage: nay, and a widow marrying *sine consensu warranti*, that *in* cap. 48. Glanville, lib. 7. is, without consent of her husband's heir, who was bound to warrant to her her dowry, and to whom her new husband owed fidelity, forfeited her dowry; *Tenetur damnum mulier cum essensu warranti sui nubere, aut dotem amittet.*

In the end however, heirs female came to be much in the same situation with the heirs male; their fiefs were not forfeited, and they paid the avails or values like the others.

Thus a statute in the reign of Edward II.† though it ordains, that the widow shall swear not to marry, without the consent of the king, yet does not make her dower to forfeit, if she marries without it ‡.

It is probable, that at a still earlier period in the two kingdoms, the distinction had worn out; for as power over their vassals came to be of less, and money to be of more
more consideration to superiors, they were well contented to exchange the right of disposfal, which they antiently had, with all the artifices they had used to support that right, for a sum of money in hand; and the vassals again, rather than marry women disagreeable to themselves, or run the hazard of the ancient law of forfeiture, were willing to give that sum. Bracton *, who wrote in the reign of Henry III. mentioning the penalties upon heirs, who had disregarded their superior's right of disposfal, uses the words, Sive sit masculus, sive femina, indiscriminately; and makes the penalties to consist, not in the forfeiture of either, but in the payment of the values equally by both.

This progress, though a certain one, has not always been attended to; for our judges in Scotland, influenced by the universal practice of this gift, as it then stood, did once so far forget the penal origin of the incident of marriage, that in a dispute between the donation of the earl of Argyle, and the laird of M‘Naughton, they, by their first decision, found †, a value due, even though the superior had given his

* Bract. lib. 2. c. 38. n. 1. comp. Saundf. prer. reg. cap. 4. fol. 21.

† Stair's decisions, Jan. 30. 1677.
explicit and ample consent to the marriage.

From the same principle from which, in the case of minors, the right of ward originally flowed, it followed in the case of majors, that the superior lord had a title to the possession, during the interval between the death of one vassal, and the entry of another.

Originally the property altogether returned to the superior lord, afterwards the heir was conceived to have a right to what his predecessor had had; but still, as the obligation upon the superior to receive the heir, was not conceived to be absolute, and even though it had, as it was not easy to force him to fulfil it; heirs were contented to make a present to the lord * for their entries.

Anciently, this present was said to be given in redemption of the fief, but in after times it was said to be given in renovation of it; the propriety of the terms is not attended to, but they contain a solid distinction: At first the effects of the old principle so far remained, that when the fief was renewed in the person of the heir, it was supposed to be in consequence of a
voluntary agreement betwixt the lord and him; but in after periods it was conceived to be in consequence of an absolute obligation upon the lord to renew.

From the return of the fief then upon the death of the vassal, into the possession of the lord, flowed the incident of Non-entry; a term not known in the law of England, tho' the incident itself was known: and from the right of the heir to repose the fief, upon giving a present to the lord, flowed that of Relief: and upon the same principles, if it was just, that the heir should give a present for the renovation of his grant, it was much more just, upon the alienation of the fief, whereby a stranger was brought into it, that the superior should receive likewise a relief or fine for alienation.

The law in the books of the fiefs * was extremely severe upon the non-entry of the heir: By that law †, if the heir did not enter within year and day, his fief was forfeited to his lord.

The laws of Great Britain were never so severe; for so far as we can trace them back, all that the superior could do, upon the death of a vassal, was, to take possession of
of the fief, till it was relieved by the proper heir.

Thus Glanville * treating of the death of a vassal, whose heir is of full age, says: Domini possint feudum suum cum herede in manus sius capere: And though he says, the heirs may retain the possession, yet that is only, Dum tamen parati sunt relevium et alia recta servitio inde facere: And thus by a statute of Robert III. † "it is leisum to the king, or inferior over lord, when the vassal deceases, to seize in his own hands, his lands, until it be made manifest by an inquisition or assise, quha is heir, and gif he be righteous, and of perfect age."

The law of Scotland remains the same to this day, with this only difference, that before the king or inferior lord can take possession of the land, they must procure a declarator of non-entry, or action of declaration, that the vassal lies out unentred; after which they draw the full rents of the lands.

The law of England took a different course; for as the power of the lords over their vassals, sooner decreased in that country, they lost the power of taking possession. E
When I speak of the lords, I mean strictly the lords superiors, and not the king superior; for with regard to this last, he from his prerogative retained his ancient privilege.

This distinction was brought about in the reign of Henry III. The words * of a statute in the reign of that prince are:

"Si heres aliquid tempore mortis antecessoris sui, plenae etatis fuerit, capitalis dominus eum non ejiciat, nec aliquid sibi capiat, vel amoveat; sed tamen inde simlicem feizinam habeat pro recognitione dominii sui, ut pro domino cognoscatur; et si capitalis dominus hujusmodi hominem extra feizinam malitiosè teneat, propter quod breve mortis antecessoris vel consanguinitatis, oporteat ipsum impetrare; tunc damna sua recuperet, sicut in affixa novae defeizinæ; de heredibus autem, qui de domino rege tenent in capite, sic observandum est, ut dominus rex primam inde habeat feizinam, sicut prius inde habere confuevit, nec heres nec aliquis alius, in hereditatem illam se intrudat, priusquam illam de manibus domini regis recipiat, prout hujusmodi hereditas, de manibus ipsius et antecessorum fuorum,
of Tenures.

"fuorum, recipi consueverit, temporibus "
elapsis."

An opposition, and an opposition wisely observed by lord Coke *, upon this statute, Coke
is put between the lord superior and the king superior, the new custom and the old
custom, the simple fabine or relief of the lord, and the real fabine or possession of the
king, the mere acknowledgment of the one, and the solid preservation of the ancient
right of the other.

From this time we read nothing of the possession of the lord: Braclton †, Fleta ‡ lib. 4.
and others, treat of the right of the lord to take a relief, called by the last of these
authors § Quasi prima faicina: But they say nothing of his right of possession, exclusive of the heir; whereas the statute || De prerogativa regis, ratifies, and Saundfort *, commenting upon that statute, explains and proves the right of the
sovereign.

In the origin of the feudal law in Eu-

rope, the gift which the vassal on his entry
gave to the superior †, consisted of amoury. Lib.

Therefore in the Saxon law ‡ the king
had his heriots, which were a quantity of
warlike accoutrements he had right to take

E 2 from
from the goods of the deceased vassal, and which accoutrements, in those days, were more in consideration than money.

But some reigns after the conquest, when money came to be more in request than armour, this heriot was changed * into relief, or the payment of a certain stated sum in money.

Heriots remaining still in some manors in England, and † heresilds having remained till very lately in some manors in Scotland, have made people consider them as fruits distinct from relief; but what the Saxon law of Canute calls heriots, the Norman law of Henry I. almost translated from it ‡, calls Relevations: the book of Doomsey § too calls the heriots in armour reliefs; Tainus pro relevamento, demittebat regi, omnia arma sua et equum, &c. And though upon the change of heriots into reliefs, some lords kept up in their manors, the custom of taking the best moveable besides; yet this custom was only particular to those manors, and the heriot was far from being a general fruit, distinct in its origin from relief.

Whether the exact quantity of this gift taken in money, was fixed by law, is not very
very material, seeing that the law, if there was any, was not observed; on the contrary, it was customary for the first violent princes of the Norman race, to demand such exorbitant redemptions, as through the inability of the heirs to pay them, brought the fiefs back into their own hands again.

This procedure by Henry I. who had a disputed succession to defend, and who was therefore more dependant upon his subjects, is complained of, and amended, with regard both to the king superior, and to subject superiors. The words of the charter of that prince are *: "Si quis ba-

ronum, comitum, sive aliorum, qui de me tenent, mortuus fuerit, heres suus non redimet terram suam, sicut faciebat tempore fratris mei; sed legitima, et cer-
ta relegatione, relevavit eum; similibet et homines baronum meorum, legitima et certa relegatione, relevabunt terras suas, de dominis suis."

But that advantage which the nobles had taken of the weak condition of this prince, they were obliged to depart from, in the powerful reign of Henry II. The law then was †, "De baroniiis vero nihil cer-
tum

E 3
Perhaps the nobles * more easily submitted to the uncertainty of relief, because some of them might hope, by opposition or favour, to get the king to remit the relief as to them. But as these views did not always succeed, they aimed at a more solid security, in the disturbed and impotent reigns of King John and Henry III. These princes opposed them long, but they opposed in vain: the nobles made good their pretensions, at the expense of their blood, and put the ascertained quantity of relief, in a proportion according to the ranks of the vassals, into the great charter of the nation †. 100 l. was made due by an earl, 100 merks by a baron, and 100 shillings by a knight.

The same progress, and for the same reasons, is to be observed in the law of Scotland; for though in the time of the Regiam Majestatem, the heirs of barons were ‡ in misericordia regis, yet in future reigns, as the vassals grew gradually less dependant upon the king, and the right of

* Kaines hist. notes, N° 15.
† Mæg. Chart. c. p. 2.
‡ Reg. Maj. lib. 2. cap. 71.
the heir grew stronger, reliefs in general came to be ascertained in their quantity, and the heir in Scotland was rendered equally independant with the heir in England.

Reliefs were originally peculiar to military tenures, but a right so beneficial to the superior could scarce fail of being quickly extended over Socage tenants, who originally were still more dependant than the military ones. It appears from *Bracton, and the † Regiam Majestatem, that at common law, an additional year's rent upon the succession of every new tenant in Socage, was understood to be due; but from the statute of wards ‡ of Edward I. which affirmed the common law in this respect, it appears, that superiors had chosen rather to keep the quantity of this relief undetermined, in order to have a larger field for extortion; this statute which seems made in favour of the vassal, after declaring, that a free Soccoman shall double his rent after the death of his ancestor, uses these words, which relate to the former abuse, And shall not be unmeasurably grieved. In Scotland again, we supplied the want of a statute preventing this grievance, by a precaution in

* Bract. lib. 2. feud. 85.
† Reg. Maji. lib. 2. cap. 71.
‡ An. 28. Ed. 1.
in the conveyance, and put almost constantly an obligation for doubling the rent, into the Soccage contract.

The year's rent extraordinary, in Soccage tenures *, paved the way for an alteration in the manner of ascertaining the quantity of relief due in military tenures; for when the sefes came to be dismembered, so that in the same order of men, some had very large, and others very small estates; the absurdity of making every man of the same order pay the same precise sum, and on the other hand, the difficulty of proportioning the quantity of the relief to the extent of the residue of the seif remaining undismembered, were equally great; and therefore, in imitation of the year's rent due in Soccage, a year's rent extraordinary was likewise made due in military seifs in Scotland constantly, and in England † often.

According to the strict feudal system, as will be more fully seen in the next chapter, the vassal originally could not alienate his seif, without the consent of his lord; to gain this consent, it was natural for him, or for the new vassal, to make a present to the lord; and on the custom of making a pre-
of Tenures.

present to get the lord's consent, was erected a right of exacting it, in after times, when his consent could not be refused: Hence the origin and the duration of the fine of a year's rent upon alienation.

In order to avoid this fine, the vassals got into a way of alienating, but so as to make the new vassals hold of them, and not of the superior; by which the superior lost many of the incidents and fruits of his superiority.

To correct this practice, the statute * Quia Emptores was passed both in England and * Scotland; by which vassals were allowed a full liberty of alienating, and the alienees were made to hold not of the vassal, but of the superior: by the last part of this statute, superiors recovered their incidents and fruits, which was full retribution to them for the liberty of alienation given to their vassals, in the former part of it; and therefore by these statutes it was intended, that the fines of alienation should cease.

But on the interpretation of the statute Quia Emptores in England, it had been found, that the immediate vassals of the crown in capite, were not comprehended under.
under the statute, and that they could not alienate without licence of the crown, and in consequence of this, the fines of alienation continued in the law over these particular vassals as long as the tenure by knights service subsisted. In Scotland again, the statute itself went into disuse, and in consequence of that, the fine of alienation returned into the law, over all vassals whatever.

The extreme dependance of the vassals upon their superiors at first, and the great cordiality betwixt both afterwards, produced another incident, to wit, that of aid.

Aids were at first benevolencies of the vassals, and were given during the great festivity, or the great necessity of the lord, upon three occasions, to wit, when his son was to be knighted, when his daughter was to be married, and when his person was to be ransomed.

But what flowed originally from regard, superiors soon changed into a matter of duty, and on a gratuity erected a right; they pretended to exact what they should only have received; and not contented with this, they extended the occasions of those aids,
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aids, and under colour of them, endeavoured to tax their vassals as they pleased.

The variations in the progress of aids; were much like those of reliefs, the occasions of them were limited or extended, and the quantum diminished or encreased, according to the characters of princes, the exigencies of the times, and the state of the vassals.

In the reigns of Henry II. and David I. the law was *: "Nihil certum statutum * Vid. "est, de hujusmodi auxiliis dandis vel exi-
"gendis;" and the only limitation upon this uncertainty, was, in the general words immediately after, "Ita tamen moderatæ, "secundum quantitatem feudorum suo-
"rum, et secundum facultates, ne nimis "gravari inde videantur, vel suum conte-
"nentum amittere."

But in the reigns of Edward I. and Edward III. in England, and of Robert I. in Scotland, the occasions of exacting aids, and the quantities of the aids were not only ascertained, but when ascertained, were observed.

Aids were originally peculiar to fiefs held by military tenures; but they had quickly been extended from military fiefs, into other species
Species of holdings; they were levied under the names of *Hidge, Carucage, &c. and too often at the arbitrary will of the king.

Taxes on lands were originally no part of the Gothick constitution; the king's court was supported by the rents of his demesne lands, and by the fruits and incidents of the feudal tenures, to which the other lands of the kingdom were subjected; and therefore it is not to be wondered at, that the subjects bore these approaches to a land-tax with impatience; to smooth over prejudices a little, the kings, at the very times they were levying these taxes with violence, pretended to receive them as voluntary contributions: a statute of Edward I. † proceeds on the king's narrative, "That forasmuch as divers people of our realm, are in fear, that the aids and talks which they have given to us, before time, towards our wars, and other business, of their own grant and good-will, howsoever they were made, may turn to a bondage to them and their heirs, because they might be at another time found in the rolls:" And there are a variety of old deeds ‡ in Scotland, in which the king is made to declare, that the tax which

† An. 25.
Ed. 1.
cap. 5.

‡ Anderson's appendix, No. 21.
of Tenures.

which he then levies by voluntary contribution, shall not be a precedent for the future.

Things could not stand long on this footing: on the one hand through the decline of the strict feudal system, the king’s feudal emoluments were become less, yet the exigencies of his government were not decreased; and therefore it was obvious, that a land-tax was needed: on the other hand it was equally dangerous to allow the king to lay it on, when, or to what extent he thought proper; and therefore in the reign of the same prince, who had first limited the occasions, and the quantities of aids in military tenures, it was settled *, that neither he, nor his successors, should lay on any new aid whatsoever, without consent of parliament.

It does not appear, that in Scotland, any restraint similar to this was laid upon the king by statute; nor indeed was it necessary: In Scotland the feudal system took a deep root, and remained long; that system was produced by, and produced again an oligarchy; in such a country it was needless to restrain the king by statutes, he was suf-
sufficiently restrained by his own impoten-
cy, and the power of his nobility.

The rise of the great families upon the power of the crown, stripped the king of the power of laying on a land-tax; but in the end, the rise of the commons upon both the great families and the king, stripped both of this power in England; and now in Britain the laying on taxes, not only on land, but on any other subject of property; from a consuetude much stronger than any statute; belongs not so properly to parliament, as to the house of commons alone. This power, thus taken from the king, and given to the subjects, was the foundation-stone of the English liberty, and now distinguishes the British constitution, from almost all the hereditary sovereignties in Europe.

Among many other effects, which the original situation of superior and vassal produced, and which remained in the law long after the principle itself was forgot, was the incident of escheat.

This incident branched itself into two heads; for, in the first place, if the vassal committed a delinquency, which made him unworthy of the feud, the feud escheated to
to the lord. In the next place, if the vassal died without leaving an heir to perform the service, the feud escheated to the lords.

Both incidents flowed from the principle, that there was no more than an usufruct, or pernancy of the profits in the vassal, which he being unworthy to enjoy, or having no heir capable to enjoy, reverted to the superior, and reunited itself to the property.

In the ancient laws not only of England and of Scotland, but of all feudal nations, the causes of making the fief to escheat, for offences against the honour or the interest of the lord, are without number.

In England, as the connection betwixt lord and tenant ceased sooner, so these penalties disappeared sooner than in Scotland. In the latter country, they may be traced through the reigns of most of the James's; and if we may credit the enumeration of Craig*, great numbers of them subsisted in his day.

In the end however, when land came to be a common subject of commerce, people who had paid value for it in money, refused to submit to such forfeitures, and scarce any
any injury done now by the vassal to the lord, will make the fief liable to escheat.

Yet still the escheat of lands for crimes against the publick, or against the lord through the publick, remained in both countries.

But on one crime, to wit, that of felony, this escheat had different effects in England and in Scotland.

In the first of these countries, felony was attended with corruption of blood; in the other it was not: the consequence was clear, that in the one country, the felon having no inheritable blood, his issue could not take upon his death; whereas, in the other country, the defect being only that of a tenant, as soon as the obstruction was taken away, that is, as soon as the felon died, a new tenant, that is, the heir started up.

This produced the distinction betwixt the * total escheat in England for felony, and the partial † life-rent escheat in Scotland for it.

The too great severity of this penalty among the English, obliged them, in many of their statutes against felony, to save against corruption of blood; in these the escheat
escheat became thereby the same with that for a civil debt in Scotland, and the offender forfeited for no more than his own life.

From want of attention to the total escheat for felony in the English law, perhaps our members of parliament for Scotland, have in statutes relating to Scotland, consented to the corruption of blood for certain crimes, when they meant only to subject them to the punishment of felony, known in the law of their own country.

In both the English and Scotch escheats it is remarkable, that the land escheated for a crime, went to the king for a year and day, before it fell to the lord.

This preference of the king deserves to be accounted for.

† As the land of the vassal originally belonged to the lord, when the vassal became unworthy to enjoy it, it reverted to the true proprietor; but the moveables of the vassal having been acquired by his own industry, were deemed to be his own; and for his debt contracted by his crime to the publick, forfeited to it. But it was necessary, that the publick magistrate, the king, should have some time to gather in these moveables, as well as the possession of the land,
land, in order to do so. The use which he made of this time and this possession, and which in those days he was conceived to have a right to make, was, to carry off every thing that could possibly be moved; and for the sake of encreasing the penalty, to destroy what he could not carry off. In consequence of these notions, it was his general practice, to fell the trees, pull down the houses, and as either the spirit of gain or of wantonness prompted, to waste the land. An institution of this kind could not last long; the lords had too much interest to prevent, and the king too little interest to support such national destruction; therefore the lord came into the practice of giving a whole year’s rent for the king’s right of waste, and got the lands safe and unwasted to himself.

In England this right of the king to the land for a year and day, and the subsequent escheat to the lord, was confined to real offences; for on outlawry in a civil action, there was no escheat * to the lord, and the king had only the pernancy of the profits of the lands, till the reversal of the outlawry, or the death of the person outlawed.

* Bacon voce Outlawry (D.).
But in Scotland we made a much wider stretch; upon the denunciation of a man for a civil debt, we used a fiction of law: On account of the debtor’s disobedience to the king’s writ, in not appearing to pay the debt, he was supposed to be a rebel, and as such his lands remained a year and day with the king, after which they fell under escheat to the lord. If within the year * the debtor had been released, or in the language of the law of Scotland, relaxed by the king, he was deemed to be again a true subject; for during the king’s year, the lord could not enter upon the land, and the debtor’s rebellion, which had been created by one supposition, was undone by another: but if he remained a year and day at the horn, that is, without appearing to pay the debt, the lord entered upon the land, and being once entered, his right could not, by the king, or the king’s pardon, be afterwards annulled.

The want of obedience to the laws, and of right police in the country, made the severity of this fiction of rebellion necessary, and the old law of escheat, with perhaps the hope of enticing the lords for the sake of their own interest, to punish those
those who disobeyed the law, occasioned the fruits of the fiction to be given to the lord, though invented for a civil debt in the reign of James VI. a period, when for rebellion to the king, one would have expected, that the law of forfeiture, rather than that of escheat, should have taken place.

From the principle of escheat likewise in a very early age, it followed, that on the treason of the vassal, his lands were escheated to his superior, to wit, the king; for during that period, the king was the only person who had real vassals; the possessors of lands under his vassals, not holding their lands in descent, were rather tenants at pleasure, or for lives, than vassals.

When afterwards the rear-vassalage came to be established, it may perhaps be found true, notwithstanding the authority of lord Coke * to the contrary, that on the treason of the rear-vassal, his land escheated to the lord, and that the law remained so, till it was altered by the famous statute of Edward III. † which made the lands holden of others to forfeit to the king upon treason.

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But whatever be in this conjecture, this is the single instance, in which, on account of the publick nature of the crime, and of its dreadful consequences, the law of escheat was made, at one period or other, to give place to the law of forfeiture; so that on treason the lands fall to the king, and not to the lord, to the publick magistrate, and not to the private superior.

Yet in many of the laws of forfeiture for treason, the original law of escheat may be traced; of which the following are examples.

Originally on a vassal's delinquency the lands returned into the superior's hands, in the same condition in which they had gone from him; in consequence of this, he was conceived to have a right to resume the lands, without being subject to the incumbrances charged upon them by the vassal: This notion prevailed so long in Scotland, that so late as the reign of James VI. the legislature were obliged to provide by statute * for the payment of the debt on which execution had passed by the donator of escheat, that is, by him to whom the crown gifted the profits of the escheat; and the treasury was afterwards obliged to add

\[ F3 \]
add further force to this provision, by taking security continually from donatars, for the payment of the debt: Now this principle of escheat transferred itself into the law of forfeiture, and it was doubted, whether the king was bound by the onerous deeds of the forfeited person.

In Scotland, so late as the year 1688, it is certain *, the forfeited estate was not subject to any deeds or debts of the traitor, which had not received confirmation of the king; and one of the articles of grievances, presented to king William, by the convention of estates, was, *The forfeiture to the prejudice of creditors*; nor were these things remedied till the year 1690, when by statute it was enacted †, *That all estates forfeited, should be subject to all real actions, and claims against the same*.

In England, even to this day, the old rule of escheat, that lands should revert free of burdens, so far prevails in forfeiture, that the lands revert to the king ‡, disburdened from the dower of the wife; and further, though the king upon forfeiture for civil debt satisfies the creditor, at whose suit the outlawry is prosecuted, yet, accord-
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according to lord Coke, he is said to do so de gratia, and not de jure.

The law of escheat is still further seen in the law of forfeiture, from this, that by the law of England, according to lord Coke *, if an estate devolved jure senquinis upon a traitor, it escheated to the lord, and did not become forfeited to the king; by the proper law of Scotland, in the same manner, it would have escheated to the king for defect of inheritable blood. I say, by the proper law of Scotland; for I speak not of the English law of treason, now extended to Scotland: I say, in the same manner; for though in England the lands fell to the lord, and in Scotland to the king, yet in both countries they fell by the same principle †: In England the lord was ultimus heres, in Scotland the king is ultimus heres, and therefore what the lord in one country took by escheat, on defect of inheritable blood, the king in the other country took by escheat, and not by forfeiture.

Perhaps too in this our day, or that of our fathers, we might trace the law of escheat in the statute of George I. known commonly by the name of the Clan Act, amidst
amidst all the political views with which it was made*. By that statute on the treason of the vassal in Scotland, the lands were on certain conditions relative to the superior, to escheat to him, and not to become forfeited to the king.

Again, with regard to the escheat arising from the defect of the existence of an heir, it is certain by the old law books, both of England and of Scotland †, that the lord, and not the king, succeeded as ultimus heres.

If we may believe Glanville ‡, the superior was not ultimus heres to a bastard, dying without issue, in England, in the time of Henry II. If we may believe Craig §, and Sir John Skeen ||, the king was in their time last heir to a bastard, in the same manner in Scotland. Perhaps those authors may not fully be trusted in their averments. Not Granville, because in the very next reign, the lord was ultimus heres to a bastard, as is obvious from the authority of Bracton * and others. Not Craig, because in another passage he directly contradicts himself; his words † in that other passage are: “Illud tamén interesse, quod baßtardo moriente fine liberis, five sit ec-
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"clefsalicus, five laicus, omnia ejus mo-
bilia fisco jure coronæ fiunt caduca, fi
testamentum non fecerit; nam baflar-
diæ inter regalia numerantur; at feuda
ad dominum suum de quo tenebantur
redeunt. Ratio est, quod ea domino-
rum ab initio voluntas fuiffè præsumitur,
"ut foli vaßalo providerunt et ejus filii le-
gitimis, qui si defecerint, ad dominum
"debeat feudum reverti." Not Skeen, be-
cause Sir James Balfour * not only gives * Balfour
his opinion to the contrary, but cites a
judgment to the contrary, which had been
given about that time, to wit, on the 12th
do December, 1542; and still more, be-
cause the preference of the king was con-
trary to the analogy of the feudal plan,
and of the feudal principles at the time.

At the same time, if the law stood as
these authors assert, the exception may be
accounted for †. Baflards seem in many † Dirf.
doubt. tit. baflards,
criminal i in the eye of law; they were not
allowed to make testaments, they could
not have an heir failing their issue; when
then the fucceffion fell, it seemed to fall as
if for a crime, and therefore the publick-
magi-
magistrate, rather than the private superior, seemed to have an interest in it.

But whatever be in this, it is certain, that after that distant period, the lord remained ultimus heres in England, as long as, the feudal subordination remaining, there could be room for the dispute betwixt him and the king; and in copy-holds he remains ultimus heres at this day.

In Scotland the lord remained likewise very long ultimus heres. In the record * of charters of the year 1506, there are on the 18th of February two very striking instances of this: the king in these as earl of Marr, and not as king, grants to Alexander Couts and his spouse, and to John Skeen and his spouse, certain lands, which he expresses had fallen by the right of ultimus heres to him as superior and earl of Marr, and not as king. Sir James Balfour†, who wrote before Craig, declares, the lord was ultimus heres, and the words of Craig ‡ are express: "Ad dominum ratione feudi " si nullus heres appareat, ex eorum nu- "mero, qui dispositione continentur, feu- "dum redit domino, etiamsi non sit ex- "prelium, ut in eo casu caderet."
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It appears in the reign of Charles II. though * it was fixed, that the king was * Dirleton ultimus heres to a bastard; yet it was a doubt in law, and among lawyers, whether the king or the lord was ultimus heres to other persons; for one of the doubts in the law of Scotland, stated † by Sir John Nisbet, is: "If a right be granted to a person, and the heirs of his body, without any further provision or mention of return, whether will the king have right as ultimus heres or the superior?"

In the succeeding reign it appears, from a circumstance in a judgment reported by lord Fountainhall ‡, that even superiors § Dec. 9. were taking gifts of the eschew of their own vassals from the crown, as last heir; for in that report one of the competitors is a superior, who has taken a gift of his vassals eschew upon the failure of heirs.

But lord Stair put totally an end to the doubt, who was ultimus heres in our law. He declared §§ Stair, lib. 3. tit. 3. No 47. that on the failure of heirs the king by his prerogative royal excluded all other superiors, who are presumed to retain no right nor expectation of succession, unless by express provision in the investiture the fee be provided to return.
"turn to the superior, in which case he is " proper heir of provision." And the reason he gives for it amounts to this, and is a wise one; that sefjs being now no longer gifts from the lord, but fold for their value in money, his ancient interest is lost. Ever since the time of that great author, the constant custom of issuing gifts from the exchequer, the acquiescence of superiors in not contesting those gifts, the opinions * of our lawyers, and the decisions of the judges, have run in the same channel, and have confirmed the right of the king, to the exclusion of that of the lord.

Nay, this law of escheat the judges have carried so far, in favour of the crown, that in the case of the estate of Masondieu, they lately found †, the king, as ultimus herei, could defeat a death-bed disposition; although the favour due to a testator, more especially to prevent his inheritance from being caduciar, be very great; and although the privilege of impugning a death-bed disposition, may appear to have been introduced only in behalf of the heir of blood, whose rights and expectations are disappointed; but not in behalf of the crown, which takes not as heir, but as pro-
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proprietor of *bona vacantia*, and the expectations of which, therefore, cannot be disappointed at all.

This transfer of the right of the lord, as *ultimus heres*, into the hands of the king, without statute, without even a single decision in point on the contest, is a very singular instance of the decay of the feudal law, how it melts away of its own accord, how the rights of superiors pass from them, as their interest waxes weaker in the fief, and how the minds of men yield without force, when the variation of circumstances leads them into yielding.

**S E C T. III.**

After tracing the progress of the present state of tenures, and of their original fruits, it may not be improper to take a general view of the fates of both.

The extent of enumeration in the different sections of this chapter, may appear tedious, but it is chiefly from this enumeration, that the basis of the feudal system, the connexion betwixt lord and vassal, can be
be known, and it was in the declension of this connection, that the ruin of the system itself was involved.

Tenures by *frankalmoine* preserving too little connection betwixt lord and vassal, at a time when a great deal was required, were very early restrained in both kingdoms, by the statutes * of Mortmain; after these the famous statute *Quia Emptores*, of Edward I. barred the subjects effectually from making grants in *frankalmoine* for the future, and the abolition of the Popish superstition, had the same effect in Scotland; for the lands held in *frankalmoine*, were at the reformation annexed to the crown, which disposed of them upon different tenures; and now the only remains of *frankalmoine* in Scotland, are the manses and glebes of ministers.

Military tenures preserving too much connection between lord and vassal, down to times when very little was required, shared the same fate at a later period.

Tenures by soccoage and burgage having in them a just moderation between these two extremes, have to this day a stable duration. In Scotland, they have the appearance
ance of separate tenures; and in England * Lyttlet. sect. 162.
are run into each other.

The perquisites of ward and marriage Ward marriage, being sufferable only in a very military age, were appropriated to military holdings, and were even in these softened with the temper of succeeding ages.

Thus † for two hundred years past, our judges in Scotland have given the ward of the minor’s person, not to the superior, but to his relations; and what the judgments of courts did in Scotland, the humanity of superiors did in England; statutes in both countries ‡ prohibited the lord to do waste, † An. 3. Ed. 1. cap. 21. and other statutes obliged him to give proper maintenance to the heir.

Thus again, with respect to the right of marriage, the statute § of Magna Charta § Mag. Chart. cap. 6. ordained, that the heir should be married without disparagement. A future statute of Henry III. || made the superior, in case of disparagement, lose the ward. A statute in the time of Edward I. repeats this penalty, and adds *, that if the superior keep the heir female unmarried for covetise of the land, she shall have an action for recovery of her land, without giving any thing for her wardship or her marriage. Temp-
peraments similar to those, were introduced into the law of Scotland, and extended in both countries. Our judges in Scotland, particularly, allowed the refusal of the marriage to be purgeable by an after consent; they modified the value of it according to circumstances; they excluded it altogether, where there was the least appearance of fraud; as for example, where the woman offered was already engaged, they took advantage of every flaw in the order of requisition, that is, the writ requiring to marry; and though it was agreeable to strict law, and to * one decision, where several heirs apparent of the same family, had died one after the other, before the age of marriage, that the value of the marriage of each should nevertheless be paid, yet lord Durie, who reports that decision, says, such a claim "was never by the court of feission sustained before." And lord Stair adds †, "That he hopes it will "never be sustained again." Nay, so far did the courts of law favour the vassal, that in a dispute whether the value of the marriage was to be computed at the marriageable age of fourteen, at which time the heir had been very poor, or at the time

* Durie's decisions. French against Cranston, July 11, 1622.

† Stair, lib. 2. tit. 4. No. 54.
time of his marriage, when by an estate fallen to him, he was become very rich, lord Stairs informs us, "That the lords Stair, "inclined much to ease the vassal, so far "as law would allow, and that several in- "terlocutors did pass supporting his plea." Agreeable to the same moderation in the judges, these two incidents of ward and marriage were, ever since the revolution, exacted with the utmost lenity, by the offi- ficers of the crown.

The severity of non-entry, made it last only a short time in England, in favour of the lord; and though that severity lasted longer, in favour of the king, over his vassals in capite, yet a statute * in the reign of Edward I. barred the king from taking possession till an office was found, that is, till he was authorized by the verdict of an inquest to do so. Many statutes † were afterwards made to the same purpose; they all limited the king, and they all favoured the vassal.

In Scotland, though the superior origi- nally could have entered directly upon the lands, in the same manner that the supe-rior in England could have done, yet the profits of non-entry our judges afterwards
Hampered with the necessity of a declarator, or action of declaration, that the lands were in non-entry, in the same manner that in England the king had been hampered with the necessity of an inquest made, and office found; nor even after declarator did the judges give any more, than the retoured or ancient duties to the superior, if the vassal had any tolerable excuse for standing out. Influenced by the ancient maxim, that relief was only due in military holdings, and by the uncertainty in which superiors had afterwards kept the quantity of relief in socage holdings, our judges in Scotland were so far from favouring the right of the lord, that they refused to double the rent, upon the entry of an heir in socage, unless there had been an express clause in the charter for doing it; and though upon the entry of a stranger upon the superior, they were obliged, by statutes, to make the composition, or fine for alienation, a year’s rent of the lands, at the improved value, yet on the entry of an heir they interpreted the profits to the lord to be according § to the retoured or ancient duty only; and not according to the improved rent of the lands: With these
temperaments, the rights of non-entry, relief, and composition, are subsisting in Scotland; but such of them as remained in England, were overwhelmed in the fall of the court of wards and liveries in that country.

The right of demanding aids of the vassal, though it remained in the highlands of Scotland, so late as the time * of Craig, yet wore away in that country by dilution, and in England was put an end to by the same statute which abolished knights service. The only remain of this right, is to be seen in the custom of parliament, to grant an aid for the dowry of the king's eldest daughter; for with respect to the land tax, it has long ago been transferred from a feudal perquisite, to be a national supply; and in this light is now to be looked upon rather as a political, than as a feudal part of the constitution.

The monstrous severity of the incident escheat, of escheat in Scotland for a civil debt, was abolished by the same statute, which took away ward-holdings; but the other effects of it on the delinquency of a vassal against the publick, are remaining, with a few variations equally in both countries; on default quency.
default of an heir again, the fruit of it * is fallen to the king in Scotland, and in England reverts to the donor, so far as by the utmost stretch of interpretation, he can be supposed to have an interest reserved in the land.

Such was the progress of tenures, and of their fruits, and such the fates of both; these tenures and fruits arose, most of them, at a time when the interest of the superior in the fief was extremely strong, and were therefore most of them in their origin extremely severe; but it was their uniform progress to vary with the uniformly varying situations of mankind, so that in the end, that military system which once was so universal and so severe, is now come to be limited in the nature of its tenures, and more so in the perquisites of them. The people by their customs, and by changing many of the military into civil feuds, effected the one; the judges by their interpretation, and bending that interpretation to the genius of the times, effected the other. The statute law came in aid to both. Many attempts had been made by parliament in England, in the reign of James I. to purchase from the king the abo-
abolition of wards and liveries. Cromwel * Scobil's
made them to cease during his administra-
tion, both in England and in Scotland; but
it was not till a period ripe for it in the
one country, and at an after period ripe
for it in the other, that whatever remained
in either country of military tenures, with
the various incidents, fruits, and depen-
dencies attending them, were laid for ever
to rest. This was done † in England dur-
ing the reign of Charles II. and ‡ in Scot-
land during that of George II. with this
memorable difference betwixt the two
æras, that the former prince asked and
got a considerable sum, to wit, the settle-
ment for perpetuity of one half of the ex-
cise upon the crown, to free the subject
from bondage; whereas the other monarch
made a present of all his rights of that
kind, to make his people happy.

G 3 C H A P.
History of the Alienation of Land-property.

In tracing the history of the alienation of land-property, it will be necessary to distinguish that voluntary alienation which takes place during the life of him who alienates, from the involuntary or legal alienation; and both of these again from that alienation, which, in consequence of the proprietor's will, is to take effect after his death.

S E C T. I.

This subject is curious and interesting; in order to trace the progress of it, the progress of society must be traced. The first state of society is that of hunters and fishers; among such a people the idea of property will be confined to a few, and but a very few moveables; and subjects which are immovable, will be esteemed to be common. In accounts given of many Ame-
American tribes we read, that one or two of the tribe will wander five or fix hundred miles from his usual place of abode, plucking the fruit, destroying the game, and catching the fish throughout the fields and rivers adjoining to all the tribes which he passes, without any idea of such a property in them, as makes him guilty of infringing the rights of others.

The next state of society begins, when the inconveniences and dangers of such a life, lead men to the discovery of pasturage. During this period, as soon as a flock have brouzed upon one spot of ground, their proprietors will remove them to another; and the place they have quitted will fall to the next who pleases to take possession of it: for this reason such shepherds will have no notion of property in immovable, nor of right of possession longer than the act of possession lasts. The words of Abraham to Lot are: "Is not the whole land before thee? Separate thyself, I pray thee, from me. If thou wilt take the left hand, then will I go to the right; or if thou depart to the right hand, then will I go to the left." And we are told that the reason of this separation, was, the quantity...
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of flocks, and herds, and tents, which each of them had, and which the land was unable to support; and therefore lord Stairs ingeniously observes, that the parts of the earth which the patriarchs enjoyed, are termed in the scripture, no more than the possessions.

A third state of society is produced, when men become so numerous, that the flesh and milk of their cattle is insufficient for their subsistence, and when their more extended intercourse with each other, has made them strike out new arts of life, and particularly the art of agriculture. This art leading men to bestow thought and labour upon land, increases their connection with a single portion of it; this connection long continued, produces an affection; and this affection long continued, together with the other, produces the notion of property.

But for some time after the notion of property in land was established, there appears to have been many restraints, either natural or civil, upon people's power of alienating it.

Thus the Romans, in the very earlier ages of the Roman law, could not alienate their heritage but in calatis comitiis, and with
with consent of the people; thus the *jus retræctus* of relations took place *among* *Ruth,* the *Jews,* among the *Greeks,* and till within *cap. 4,* *Jeremiah,* in these few years, in the udal rights of *cap. 38.* *Orkney* men; among all of whom the *Feudal System* was surely unknown.

When with these restraints, in this state of society, there chances to intervene the concurrence of feudal principles, the bar against the power of alienation becomes double.

Hence in the origine of all feudal nations, the *jus retræctus* † is given to relations, and the prohibitions to alienate, are without number: Penalties are even imposed: In some of the books of siefs, the right hand of him who wrote the deed of alienation, is ordered to be struck off.

This prohibition arises partly from the original principles of restraint, which were in favour of the heir, and partly from the feudal principles of restraint, which are in favour of the superior.

Instances of the effect of the last principle have been observed by every one; for every one sees the hardship it would have been upon a superior, to have allowed that land
land which he had given to one family, to

But instances of the effects of the first

principle have not been so readily attended
to. It will be proper then to point out

some of them.

In the old restraints upon alienation,

which we find in the laws of England and

Scotland, no distinction is made*, whether

the sief is held by a military, or a soc-
cage tenure; but the lord's interest in the

change of the vassal in the one sief is very

great, and in the other very small. It was

then the interest of the heir alone, equally

strong in both cases, which created an equal

prohibition in both.

Again, in † the same old laws the re-

straint upon alienation is almost absolute,

where the tenant is in by descent; but very

loose, when he is in by purchase. The heirs

of a person seem to have some right, in

what has descended to him from his fore-
fathers; whereas no one can pretend to

have a right in what a man has acquired

himself: It is the interest of the heir then,

which alone creates the difference betwixt

the one restraint and the other.

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But what puts it beyond dispute, that the interest of the heir, and not that of the lord, was sometimes considered in restraining the power of alienation, is, that even the consent of the lord to the alienation of what passed by succession, could not preclude the heir. *Alienatio feudi paterni non valet etiam domini voluntate, nisi agnatis consentientibus,* says the law of the books of the septs.—Lord Coke is therefore under a mistake, when he says †, that though a vassal at common law could not alienate a part of his fee to hold of his lord, yet he could alienate the whole of it. He founds his opinion on this, that in the latter case the fee was not dismembered, and the lord received the whole of his services; but the mistake arises from attending too much to the interest of the lord, and too little to that of the heir.—Is it possible the law could by implication allow a man in all events to alienate the whole of his fee, at the very time when it expresses the particular events in which he can alienate the whole, or can alienate only part? When a man is a purchaser, and has no children, he may alienate the whole; but when he is a purchaser, and has children,
dren, he may alienate only a part, say * the old law books of both kingdoms.

The first step of this alienation of land-property in Great Britain, was the power given to a man, of alienating what he had himself acquired. Over this, and for an obvious reason, he was conceived to have a more extensive right, than over what had been only transmitted to him from his ancestors.

This power is given by implication, in the books of the siefs, and in the Saxon law; but in express words in the laws of Henry I. § The words are: Acquisitiones suas det cui magis velit, si Boelan autem habeat quam ei parentes sui dederint, non mittat eam, extra cognitionem suam.

At the same time this licence must only be understood to have enabled a man to disappoint his other relations, cognationes suas, of the whole of his conquest; but not to disappoint his son of more than a part: for so it is limited in the reign of Henry II. || Si vero quæstum tantum habuerit, is qui partem terrae suæ donare volucrit, tunc quidem hoc ei licet, sed non totum quæstum, quia non poteat filium suum hæredem cxheredare. The
same was the rule in Scotland at * the same period. The alienation of conquest, or lands taken by purchase, paved the way for the alienation of what had come by descent.

At first, only a great part of this last was allowed to be alienated, and that not cui velit, as in purchases, but only on very reasonable motives. Thus the particular instances, as appears † from Glanville and the Regiam Majestatem, in which men were allowed to alienate their heritage, were, in gratitude to a vassal for services done to the lord in war, or to the siefe in peace. Secondly, in frank marriage with his own daughter, or the daughter of the feuditary, because this multiplied tenants to the lord. And lastly, in frank almoigne or free alms; the superstition of the times allowing this last for the good of the alienor's soul.

At the time that the law stood thus in military and socage tenures, the licence of alienation made a full and ample stretch among burgesses.

Thus the law laid down by Glanville and the Regiam Majestatem, permitted the alienation of no more than a part of a purchase, if there were children; but the laws
laws of the burghs in Scotland, on the contrary, gave a full power to the burgers to alienate the whole of his purchase without distinction, whether he had children or not; and to sell, with the observance of certain preferences, whatever had come to him by descent, if he was oppressed with poverty.

It is probable, though we cannot trace it, that the first free voluntary alienation of land in England, arose likewise among trading people; for in burghs the holding of it not being strict, it could not be of great importance by whom the services were done; add to this, that the extent of the notions of mankind concerning their powers over property, increases with society; and as people living in towns, from their greater numbers, and greater intercourse, are in a more extended state of society than people living in the country, it was natural that the power of alienating land should arise sooner among them, than among the others.

The free alienation of land being thus established in burgage tenures, and in other tenures the alienation of purchases in many cases, and that of inheritances in some cases,
cases, being allowed, alienation in these other tenures gradually gained ground; and when †Bracton wrote his book, seems †Bracton, to have been fully established. In socage tenure, the interest of the lord had never been great, and in all tenures the interest of the heir declined; so that in the end lands held by socage tenure, came to be freely alienated, both in England and Scotland; and as the strictness of the feudal system yielded to a more moderate temperament, the propensity to alienation, in the military holdings of both nations, grew so great, that in the reign of Henry III. it became requisite to restrain it by law.

This restraint was contained in † a † Mag. clause of the Magna Charta, and was afterwards, in the time † of William the Lion, transplanted into the statutes of Scotland. The words of it were, Nullus liber homo det, de cætero, amplius alicui, quam ut de residuo terræ possit sufficienter fieri domino feudi, servitium ei debitum. And this sufficiency which was ordered to be reserved, was by practice explained to be the one half of the feud.

One thing which very much facilitated the progress of alienation, was the practice of
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of subfeuing; for as in subfeus at first, the
original vassal remained still liable for the
services, and distresis might be taken for
them on the whole of the land, subinfeu-
dation in those days was scarce accounted
an alienation.

The licence of subfeuing the whole fief
is granted * in the books of the fiefs. Si-
militer nec vassallus feudum sine voluntate do-
mini alienabit, in feudum tamen recto dabit.
But that it should prevail in Great Britain,
beyond the bounds which the law precrib-
ed to the power of alienation in the time
of the Saxons, or even in that of Henry II.
and David I. is incredible; for the interest
of the heir would have been as effectually
hurt by subfeuing as by alienating: but
the interest of the heir, at those periods, in
Great Britain, as appears from Glanville,
and the Regiam Majestatem, was much
stronger than that of the heir in Italy,
at the period when the books of the fiefs
were composed.

The power of subfeuing, however, once
introduced, extended itself greatly in the
law of Great Britain; and though, in the
beginning, the original vassal was bound
to the services, and distresis might be made
for
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for them on the original land; yet in pro-
cess of time, the rear-vassals having posses-
sed their feuds long, and held them of an-
other, began to think they had a connection
only with that other, and none with the
original lord. This persuasion of the rear-
vassals gained ground, and thereby the su-
perior lord in the end came to be deprived
of his services and emoluments.

To remedy this, and to reconcile the jar-
ing interests of lords and vassals, while
these were eager after a power of aliena-
tion, and those complained that they were
stript of their ancient rights, the statute
Quia Emptores Terrarum was made in Eng-
land, in * the reign of Edward I. and
transplanted, or rather transcribed into the
statute-book of Scotland †, in that of Ro-
bert I.

In those statutes it is complained of,
that through the practice of subfeuing, the
over lords had been deprived of their es-
cheats, wards and marriages, and it is
enacted, in favour of vassals, that they may
alienate the whole, or part of their land,
as they please; and in favour of the lords,
that the lands so alienated should be held
of them, and not of the alienor.

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As the mischiefs complained of in the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum, were general, so the remedy was general too, and was meant to extend to all vassals indiscriminately, to those of the king equally with those of the lords. But some doubts having been raised * in England, whether the king’s vassals were within the words of the statute; the king took advantage of those doubts, and asserted his old claim of restraining his own vassals from alienating beyond a certain extent; for this purpose, in the statute † de Prerogativa Regis, of Edward II. the clause of Magna Charta, before recited, was revived against the king’s vassals in capite, and in imitation of this example, the statute of William the Lion was revived in Scotland ‡ by David II.

At the same time there was this great difference in the clause, as it had stood in those ancient, and as it was revived in these latter statutes; that by the former, no vassal whatever could alienate beyond a certain extent, whereas, in the revived English statute by express words, and in the revived Scots statute by interpretation, only the vassals by knights service and ward were restrained, which restraint in Scotland was guarded
guarded by the penalty of recognition, or the forfeiture to the lord upon alienation, beyond the extent allowed. The bent in favour of alienation was too strong, for the king to be able to restrain it in any other species of holding, and therefore the vassals by socage were allowed to alienate as they pleased.

As this claim of the king was the only exception to the statute *Quia Emptores*, as it was founded only on a doubt upon the statute, and was directly contrary to the prevailing bent of the people towards alienation, so the king was obliged, some reigns after, to give it up.

This was done by a statute *Edward III.* whereby the king’s vassals by knights *service*, were allowed to alienate as they pleased, on paying a composition in chancery.

These compositions were paid till the reign of *Charles II.* when tenures by knights service being abolished, they were abolished with them.

By the fall of these tenures, and of the fines which attended them, the voluntary alienation of land in England, so far as not restrained by private deeds, or particular
cular local customs, was brought to perfection.

In Scotland the consequences of the statute *Quia Emptores*, by no means kept the same course.

The necessary effect of the statute *Quia Emptores*, if it operated at all, was to make feudal land as much the subject of commerce, as if it had been alodial: Now in this view the Scotch had followed too close upon the English statute; for in a country where the rigour of the feudal law was somewhat abated, where, provided the lord had a vassal to do service, it was not of great importance to him who that vassal was; there it was right to allow an unlimited alienation: But in a country where the Feudal System still flourished, and where the lord had a very strong interest in the fief, to give the vassal an unlimited power of alienating, was bestowing upon him a power of giving away what did not belong to himself.

In consequence of those different circumstances, the statute *Quia Emptores* could not be put in execution in Scotland, as it was in England; on the contrary, superiors, according to their interest or caprice,
refused to receive those who pretended to enter in virtue of it. In soccage septs the vassals subfeued their lands, as formerly, to hold of themselves, and in military septs the penalties of recognition, or the forfeiture on the alienation of the half, founded on the statutes of William the Lion, and David II. kept their footing in the law; superiors inferred them from alienation, in spite of the new statute; they continued too to infer them from subinfeudation, as before the statute they had been continually attempting to do; and in the whole train of decisions since the court of seccion has been erected, the statute Quia Emptores has never once been set up to elude the recognition of a ward feud, alienated to hold not of the alienor, but of the over lord.

The statute Quia Emptores being thus disregarded, the law of Scotland wavered during a long interval; for when the bar to the alienation of lands held in ward was anew erected, the arts to make this bar of no effect were revived by the vassals.

One art particularly, which had some centuries before been invented in England, and which had been provided against * by * An. 52, Hen. 3, cap. 6.
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a statute of Henry III. was revived; va-

fals infeoffing their eldest sons, pretended

by so doing to elude the penalties of recog-

nition, and the judges supported this de-

vice in favour to the vassal.

Another art was that of the vassal’s grant-
ing infeoffments of annual rents, or rent
charges, out of their lands, by which, under
pretence of the granter’s remaining interest
in the estate, an attempt was made to elude
recognition; but the judges, in favour to the
lord, put a stop to this device, and held *,
that an infeoffment of annual rent above half
of the value of the land, inferred recognition.

To reconcile the jarring interests of
lords and their ward vassals, while those
disregarded as much as they pleased the
statute Quia Emptores, nor would admit
the alienees to hold of them, and yet in-
ferred recognition from subinfeudation;
and these, on the other hand, with the
genius of the times, were bent on alien-
ation, the laudable statutes of James †
II. and of James ‡ IV. were at last made,
encouraging and allowing all people to set
their ward lands in fee farm, or by soc-
cage tenure, holding of themselves, with-
out danger of recognition, provided the
lands were set at full value.

These
These acts were made from national considerations, and from national interests; but some reigns after they were obliged to give way to particular considerations and particular interests: they were in part repealed* in the reign of James VI. and in whole † in that of Charles I. at periods when the government of Scotland was a monarchy, controlled by nothing but a most grievous oligarchy, when the king and the nobles, who had their lands under ward, could not bear to see the subjection, under which they thereby held their country, broke through, by the independency of the socage tenure, into which their vassals were continually turning their lands. Therefore by statutes they forbade ward holdings to be turned into feu holdings; and still further to prevent the alienation of feu holdings, they often in the charters which they granted, added prohibitions on the vassals to alienate any part of the grant of their lands; and to these again they added clauses, subjecting the whole to forfeiture, in case the prohibition was infringed.

A greater independance of the people, and bent of that people in favour of alienation, joined to a greater moderation in the government, have concurred, in our day,
day, to destroy * this penalty of recogni-
tion, have removed these prohibitions, and
brought to perfection the voluntary alien-
ation of land-property in Scotland, so far
as it is not restrained by particular con-
veyances.

The only remaining difference betwixt
the laws of England and Scotland, in
point of the power of voluntary aliena-
tion, (for with regard to the forms of alie-
nating, there are still great differences) is,
that men can alienate in England upon
their death-beds, in Scotland they cannot.

Perhaps it is no refinement to say, that
this law of death-bed was in England, and
now is in Scotland, the last remain of the
ancient bar against alienation.

When the power of alienating had, by
gradual steps, extended itself in England,
yet still this law of death-bed kept its
ground long: It is probable the first de-
parture from it, was by the heirs consent-
ing to the deed of alienation; this proba-
bility is made strong from the authority of
Glanville †; Posset tamen hujusmodi donatio in
ultima voluntate, alicui facta, ita tener, si
cum consensu hereditis haeret, et ex consensu ha-
redis confirmatur; and stronger still by
the authority of ‡ Sir Henry Spellman,
‡ Lib. 7.
‡ Spellm.
remains.
the most accurate antiquary that we have, who avers the same thing.

The power of alienation on death-bed, thus introduced to be good with consent of the heir, came afterwards to be good without his consent; practice had brought about the one, and the same practice brought about the other: The statutes* of Henry VIII. allowing the disposal of immoveables by testament made at any time, _etiam in articulo mortis_, rendered unnecessary the former practice, and gave a sanction to the latter.

In Scotland attempts have been made† to † Falco-
support death-bed conveyances, by the con-
sent, and even by the oath of ratification of the heir; these, however, the judges have cut down; but they allow men on death-bed to provide their wives, and to sell, when oppressed by poverty, for payment of their debts; and it is the general opinion of our lawyers, that the first time the point comes to be tried, provisions granted on death-bed to younger children will be sustained; so that though the law of death-bed still lingers in Scotland, yet in a few ages it may probably be lost here, as it was lost formerly in England.

S E C T.
WITH regard to the involuntary, or legal alienation, which arises from attachment for debt, the progress of it, both natural and feudal, seems to be this.

The notion of borrowing under a promise of paying, is in general not very natural among a rude people; their conception of obligation is but weak in any case, and that of their obligation to fidelity still weaker. All uncivilized nations are observed to be cruel and treacherous; instead of a promise to repay then, or of a written document in evidence of that promise, the borrower gives a pledge, as a more solid security.

Thus the old word in the English and Scotch law books, Namium, which at present we translate by the word Distress, signified ancienly from the Saxon, Pignori Prechenio, the seizing or distraining of the pledge; and Wilkins *, in his glossary, commenting on this word, says, His primis temporibus vade et pignore caveri solebat; hære illi pejor bonum vacat; nos (qui ali-
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quam ejus rei tenemus umbram) radios et sal-
cvos plegios nominamus.

From * the Regiam Majestatem and Glan-
ville, it appears, that in consequence of vol-
untary prior agreements betwixt the par-
 ties, this pledge, upon failure of pay-
ment, either remained with the creditor, or on application to the judge, was sold by his order; and it is not improbable, that at that time, no moveables, unless so pledged, could be sold for debt; nor even when pledged could be sold, till after a competent time, and delay of payment; for so it is laid down in Glanville and the Regiam Majestatem: And a statute of Robert I. made at a time when even moveables not pledged could be sold for debt, declares, that even then they could not be sold for forty days after the attach-
ment. Before these days were elapsed, they were kept rather as a security for the debt, till the debtor still delaying to pay, they were employed to extinguish it.

The progress of the attachment of im-
moveables is the same. § In the law of the books of the fiefs they could not be at-
tached for debt; nor could they be attach-
ed by the Saxon law; nor for several reigns after
after that of William the Conqueror; nor in the time of Glanville: On the contrary *, the only writs of execution at common law in England, were the fieri facias on the goods and chattels, and the levari facias to levy the debt or damages on the lands and chattels; neither is there the least hint of such attachment in the Scotch Regiam Majestatem, or the Scotch Quoniam Attachiamenta: although in this last the method of attaching moveables for debt † is most exactly described, even the words of the brief, the duty of the sheriff, the proof of the debt, the sale, or if no body will buy, the appretiation; yet the attachment of immoveables is not mentioned at all.

Nor at these periods could the law well be otherwise: the limited notions of power over property, added to the interest of the lord against bringing in any vassal who was a stranger to him, were insuperable bars to any further attachment.

It is true, by the Regiam Majestatem, lib. 3. cap. 5. and Glanville, lib. 10. cap. 8. it appears, that land might be pledged for debt; and from the same passages, compared with cap. 3. of the first author, and cap.
cap. 6. of the other, it appears, that in consequence of bargains concerning such pledging of land, a practice had crept in, that the principal sum not being paid, the land either remained with the creditor, or on application to the judge, was sold by him. But some of those cases being in consequence of agreements, were branches rather of voluntary than involuntary alienation, and they belonged more to the rules of private transactions, than of publick law; and further, as no right of pledge was supported by the king’s courts without possession; Si non sequatur ipsius vadi traditio, curia domini regis hujusmodi privatas conventiones tueri non solet, nec warrantizare; * the possessor of the land * Glanv. lib. 10. cap. 8. Reg Maj. lib. 3. cap. 4. pledged, seemed to have acquired a connection with it, and power over it, which facilitated the notion of his retaining it, although the attachment of land by other creditors in general, who were not already in possession, was, it is certain, utterly unknown.

I say, by other creditors in general; for * Magn. Chart. though in the reign of Henry III. † Coke 2. inf. 19. we soon after find, that the king, and the property for the king’s debtor purging his debt voce exec-
debt to the king, could enter upon the land for their debt, and keep the land till the debt was paid, yet this was a preference special to the king; and as the surety had paid off the debt to the king, he seemed to come in his place, and to have a right to enjoy his privileges.

But as the involuntary alienation of land was first freely introduced among trading people in boroughs, so the voluntary alienation of it was first freely introduced among the same people in the same places.

Thus in Scotland, in the laws of the boroughs, which were composed in the reign of David I. * the method of attaching and selling land for debt, is compleatly laid down. By the laws of those people, every creditor might enter upon the lands of his debtor, and after certain delays sell them: The only restraint this attachment admitted, was a right of redemption given to the relations of the debtor †; a right derived from the most ancient law, and at that time not totally eradicated even in boroughs.

This attachment thus taking its rise in the laws of the boroughs, and among trading
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ing men, was afterwards extended to all the subjects indiscriminately; so that by a statute in the reign of * Alexander II. upon application of the creditor, it became the duty of the sheriff to advertise the debtor to sell his land in fifteen days, which if the debtor did not do, the sheriff was empowered to sell it himself. And that this statute was put in execution, appears from † the records of chancery, prior to the alteration of the law in the year 1469, to be afterwards mentioned.

In the same manner it was ‡, the statute \textit{de mercatoribus}, which in the 13th year of Edward I. produced the benefit of the statute merchant first into England. By that statute, which was transplanted afterwards likewise § into Scotland, the merchant creditor was allowed, upon failure of payment, to take possession of the whole of his debtor's land, till he was paid of his debt; in that land too he was infeoffed by the law; and upon the same plan of attachment with this statute merchant, the statute staple \| was two reigns after invented.

It is true, that the same year in which the statute merchant was introduced, execution upon judgments, and common recog-
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... cognizances *, by the writ of elegit, which was common to all the subjects, was likewise introduced. But the difference of execution given upon this writ, and that given upon the statute merchant, proves a very wide difference in the attachment allowed among merchants, and that allowed among the other subjects. The security by statute merchant, gave possession of the whole of the land to the creditor; but the writ of elegit gave him possession of no more than a half: Originally men could not alienate at all, afterwards they were allowed to alienate, but not beyond the half of the feud: now this principle, or rather rule, was strong at the time the writ of elegit was invented, and the statute Quia Emptores had not yet been introduced; therefore whatever stretches were found necessary from the circumstances of merchandise, yet with regard to the kingdom in general, only a small deviation was made from the common law, and the elegit was permitted to affect by the operation of law, no more than a man was supposed capable of alienating by his own deed.

As the feudal law relaxed of its severity, and the commerce of land grew more into use;
use, the attachment of land by statute merchant, and statute staple, was allowed to all the subjects in general. The statute merchant became first by practice, and afterwards by a statute of * Henry VIII. * An. 23. Hen. 8. cap. 6. one of the common assurances of the kingdom: And though the same statute of Henry VIII. confined the benefit of the statute staple within its ancient bounds, so as † to operate only for behoof of the merchants of the staple, and only for debts on the sale of merchandize brought to the staple; yet it framed a new sort of security, which all the subjects might use. This security is known by the name of a recognizance on 23 H. VIII. cap. 6. and in it the same process, execution, and advantage, in every respect, takes place, as in the statute staple.

But in later times, when land came to be absolutely in commerce, this attachment was thought insufficient; and therefore the act of the ‡ 13th of queen Elizabeth, and the subsequent acts concerning bankrupts, established a compleat attachment of such lands as belonged to the persons specified in those statutes: Instead of a half, those statutes laid the whole of the land

† Bacon, voce execution(B.)
land open to the creditor, and instead of a possession, which was all he had by the ele-git; or statute merchant, or statute staple, they gave him the means of procuring a sale of that whole for the payment of his debt.

On these statutes of bankrupts, it is well worthy notice, as confirming the principles already laid open, that although the statutes* of Elizabeth, and of † the first of James I. related only to people dealing in merchandise, yet they were extended afterwards, by degrees, to many other of the subjects. By the ‡ 21st of James I. they were extended to such as were scriveners by trade. By the § 5th of George II. they were extended to bankers, brokers and factors. By interpretation of the judges, they were extended further || to many different classes of tradesmen and mechanics; and though they do not hitherto relate to the rest of the subjects, yet future generations will see them extended to the whole. The compleat attachment of land now established among merchants, will, in the end, by a train of causes and effects, as absolute in the prophetical, as in the natural world,
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affect the property of all landed men whatever.

When a progress is uniform in its movements, and constant in its direction, there is no very great degree of arrogance in prophesyng where it will end.

In observing this progress of legal attachment in England and Scotland, it will readily occur, as a matter of surprize, that our ancestors, in the execution, by act of Alexander II. went before their neighbours in England, who from their situation should rather have gone before them.

The following history of the variation in our legal execution, consequent upon this act, will show the effects of this hasty step.

In England, those who entered by the elegit, statute merchant, &c. entered rather to the possession than to the property, being the original proprietor continued for ever to have a right of reversion: Further, the statute Quia Emptores soon after had effect in that kingdom, therefore the entry of the attacher was easy; in Scotland, on the contrary, by the statute of Alexander II. the attacher became absolute proprietor, and yet the law was
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so improvident, as to give no satisfaction to the lord for entering him: The statute of Quia Emptores was indeed afterwards made; but that went soon into disuse; and yet the lord remained still bound to receive the attacher without fee or reward: Sine obstaculo aut questione aliqui, says the law of Alexander.

Upon the refusal of the lords to enter those attachers, letters of four forms were directed against them, and * afterwards the form of a charge was invented; but then the lord, in right of his property in the ground, claimed a privilege to pay off the debtor, when he was attaching the land, and to take it to himself.

Though this claim was sustained, and even sustained in the statute itself, yet still the law produced great inconveniences to the creditor, to the debtor, to the lord.—To the creditor; for if no one bought the land which the sheriff set to sale, the creditor could not be paid.—To the debtor; for if he had not his money ready, and the land was attached for less than its value, the lord, by stepping in, and paying off the debt, might possess himself of the land, against both debtor and creditor.—

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To the lord; for if the land was attached for its value, or if he had not money ready to clear it off when attached below its value, he was forced to lose his old vassal, and get one, perhaps an enemy to him and his interest.

To these three evils, three remedies were applied, by the * act of 1469. In the first place, by that statute, if no purchaser appeared, a certain part of the lands was apprized, and at the apprized value given to the creditor: Next, a right of redemption was given to the debtor at any time within seven years: And lastly, the superior was not obliged to admit the buyer or creditor without a gift to himself of a whole year's rent of the lands; at the same time, his ancient right of pre-emption was secured to him; but subject still, by interpretation of the judges, within the seven years, to the redemption of the debtor.

These expedients indeed, cured some of the present evils; but still the origo mali remained: As we followed the English too closely, in attempting to allow the free voluntary alienation of land by the statute quia Emptores; so we made still a greater mistake in domestick policy, when we ran
before them, and allowed the free and unlimited attachment of land, even of land holding ward, for debt, at a time, when the strong notion of the ancient right to the land itself in the superior, gave to the superior a claim to interest himself in that attachment; when there was not such a degree of commerce in the country, as made so great a fluctuation necessary; and when the uncertainty, and imperfection, and weakness of the laws, joined to the dependance of the courts upon the great men, gave an opportunity to these last, of getting almost all the lands in the country into their possession, under the cover of the laws which gave attachment for debt.

The following was one of these shameful devices: Originally it was the sheriff of the county, who, in consequence of application made by the debtor to the king, attached and apprised the land, in the same manner that the sheriff apprised by the eleget in England; but as the lands of a debtor lay under different jurisdictions, and the sheriff could attach only lands under his own jurisdiction, and as the trouble and expense of getting an apprising from every particular sheriff, was complained of,
it had crept into practice, on the establishment of the court of daily council, and of the court of session, (the judges of which courts came in the king's place, as the clerks to the signet were deemed the king's clerks) that the lords of these courts, instead of the order of the king, or the precept of the sheriff, granted letters, or a writ of apprising, under the signet, written by the clerks of it, directed not to a particular sheriff by name, but in general to sheriffs in that part, or pro hac vice, for whose names a blank was left in the letters. These letters being directed to messengers, the creditor who got them, generally filled up the blank for the names of the sheriffs, with the name of the messenger who was thus constituted sheriff in that part, or pro hac vice; and as such became the judge impowered to comprise the lands. Messengers in this manner being made judges in affairs of so much importance, those who were cunning in the law, did, in parts of the country where law could have force, and great men, who had always the counsel of such cunning men at command, did, in parts of the country where they themselves could give to the law force, make the following
use of it: They either lent small sums upon great estates, or bought up small debts upon them; they then applied to the king's court for letters of apprising, which were granted without examination, and the execution of them left to messengers, sheriffs pro hac vice. These messengers being named by the compriser, resolved in every thing to consult his interest; or tho' they had not been so resolved, yet residing at Edinburgh, and not being obliged by the letters to go to the lands, they could not know the value of them; or if they did, it was only by such a proof, as the compriser himself thought proper to bring. In consequence of these practices, large quantities of the debtor's land were given by the messengers to comprisers, for very small debts; nay, in the end they came to give without scruple the whole of his land for such debts: Nor had the debtor even the consolation to hope, that the rents of these lands would pay off the debt; for the creditor getting possession of the estate, and the circumstances thereof being by him kept secret, he became accountable for none of his intromissions: he kept his fund of payment in his own hands, and yet
yet he never was paid; for seven years he pretended it was a security, and after that the law made it to him a real property. From these legal catches flowed national misery; debtors grown desperate by such crying injustice, either opposed the law by force, or sold their right to some great man who could do so. The superior, if he was not tempted by the offer of a year's rent, (which however he generally was, and for that reason apprisings run on the fafter) to lose his old vassal, refused to enter the new one; the new one fell upon a contrivance to apply to the superior of that superior; and if he entered him, a quarrel ensued not only between debtor and creditor, but between mediate and immediate superior. These things filled the land, if not with civil, yet with household, wars, and made this people a scandal to all neighbouring nations.

As there is no record of apprisings, prior to the year 1636, it is impossible to prove this deduction from that record; but as it is agreed upon by our ancient lawyers, so there is sufficient evidence of it in the record of the king's charters. By these it appears, that originally * the sheriff com-
prised; that about thirty years after the statute of 1469, the letters * were directed to, and executed by messengers, who however for some time performed their duty, either upon the land, or at the head-burgh of the shire in which the lands lay, with the same exactness that the sheriffs had done. In the year 1528, the first † dispensation was given for holding the court of apprising at Edinburgh, instead of holding it where the lands lay; the reason given in the charter is, that the lands lay in different shires. Soon after this, many instances appear ‡, of dispensations granted even where the lands of the debtor lay in one shire. But still, notwithstanding these two last alterations, the apprisings were for some time led § by proof of the value, and with the same solemnities with which the apprising by the sheriffs had been led. From this period, till the year 1608, there appear: several || charters on apprisings, which had passed without specifying the value of the lands; but although in these it may be doubtful whether the debt did not exceed the value of the land, yet, after * that year, instances of general apprisings became numberless and uncontroverted, and
and lands are not only comprised without valuation, but the largest estates are comprised for the most insignificant sums. Such appears the progress of appraisings from our records, and the effects of that progress upon the manners of our people are but too well vouched in the histories of our families and of our manners.

The king, the people, the judges, saw those effects; they saw too the cause of them, and in their several capacities endeavoured to soften both. The judges*, as appears by the decisions of those days, in affairs of consequence, gave advocates to be assessorors to the messengers; they discharged courts of appraising to be kept anywhere, but in the county where the lands lay, unless for special causes shown to themselves. They prevented the legal from expiring, by taking advantage of every flaw in the comprising; as on the other hand, they discouraged all attempts to prove flaws in the orders of redemption; and the legislature, enacted by the act † of 1621, † Act. 6. that if the land comprised yielded more than the interest of the sum comprised for, the superplus should be imputed in payment of the principal sum.

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But still these corrections were not sufficient; for, under pretence of obeying this act, and of imputing the surplus of his annual rent, to the payment of his principal sum, the creditor still kept possession of the whole of the estate; after which, it was difficult to prove the intromissions upon him, and, at any rate, a proof of them could only be made good by an intricate and tedious lawsuit.

To remedy this, the act of 1661 was made, which enacted, that it should be in the power of the debtor; to offer security to the creditor, for his annual rent, instead of allowing him to possess any of the land; and that it should be referred to the lords of seisin, to determine, whether the creditor might safely accept the security offered, or should be allowed possession of the land to a certain extent; at the same time, that extent was limited, by the statute, to what produced exactly the annual rent of the principal sum. Further, by the same statute it was enacted, that the time of the legal, which was formerly seven years, should now be extended to ten; all of which regulations were in favour of the debtor. It is further to be observed, that
by interpretation of this statute, a charge to the superior became sufficient to establish the right of the creditor in the estate; whereby the creditor, not asking infeoffment, nor paying his entry during the legal, the discontent of the superior could not be dangerous to him, on the one hand, nor the eagerness of the superior to admit him, tempting to him, on the other.

By these last alterations, apprisings were changed from being the instruments of payment of debt, to be only a security for it. This the lords of session had been for some time aiming at, by doing every thing they could, to prevent the legals from expiring; the statute lengthened the time of expiry, and put it in the power of the debtor to remain in the possession of his land.

But this alteration in the nature of apprisings, made many discontented; for people had lent their money, in expectation of getting it back when they pleased, or at least of getting possession of land of equal value; whereas they might now be kept from both, by an offer of security for their interest, and that too, not for seven years, but for ten. The clamours raised on this ac-
account, made the introduction of adjudications, by the act of *1672, necessary, which being judicial sales, subject to redemption within five years, would, it was thought, please all parties, and solve all objections; And indeed, most of the inconveniencies of the former diligence, were prevented by this one. Anciently messengers had been judges in the attachment, now the lords of session were become such; formerly, though the act of 1661, restricted the creditor to an annual rent, agreeing to his principal sum, during the legal, yet on the expiry of that legal, by a saving clause in that statute, he might, if the debt was not paid, possess himself of the whole estate he had apprised; now only a proportional part of that estate was laid open to him at all: formerly there was room for lawsuits, in accounting for intromissions, now the creditor was made subject to no count and reckoning: formerly the legal being ten years, the land was not only not improved, but was totally neglected; because neither the debtor nor the creditor knew to whom it was to belong: but this uncertainty, by the present statute, was to remain no longer than for five years. At
the same time, as it would have been extremely hard, to have introduced all these things in favour of the debtor, unless some additional care had likewise been taken of the creditor; therefore, in consideration that this last was obliged to lie so long as five years out of his money, and to take land in place of it in the end, a portion of land equivalent to a fifth part of his sum, was given to him, to be kept with the rest, in case his money was not repaid within the five years. Further, in order to give him an absolute security in the land which he got, the debtor was ordained to compleat this judicial sale, by delivering to him the rights of the lands; and in case the debtor neglected or refused to do so, the creditor was allowed to apprise as formerly; in which event all the mischiefs of former apprisings were allowed to fall on the debtor disobeying the law.

These amendments and provisions were thought sufficient by the legislature, and lawyers of those days; but all that the wisdom and justice of parliaments can do, added to the foresight and precaution of lawyers, is often, only to apply remedies which future lawyers will break through, and
and which future parliaments must again remedy. Hard fate of law, in which, from a continual fluctuation of circumstances, the best laws are but remedies to bad ones; and all that posterity can hope for, is, to amend their forefathers defects, and in doing so, to leave defects for others to amend!

The original error of allowing the free attachment of land for debt, at a period when the genius and circumstances of the people were not ripe for it, was felt, when the law itself was forgot: for the genius of the people not complying with that free attachment, had brought in the right of redemption in favour of the debtor, and that right ran through all the future amendments of the law, to poison them, to flatter the debtor with false hopes of saving a ruined estate, and to make the creditor uncertain what was the nature of his own fortune. If the legislature in the 1672, at a period when the genius and circumstances of the people were ripe for an almost compleat attachment of land-property, had given a right to the creditor to fell the land, after a competent interval; or if it could not be sold, to take a portion to himself, the remedy would have been effec-
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effectual: but the effects of old laws are not soon to be rooted out, and the act of 1672 was tainted with these effects; consequently it's remedies were unavailing.

The error of this law lay here; that instead of it's being contrived, so as to make the creditor execute it, it was left to be executed by the debtor, and a penalty was inflicted upon him for non-compliance; but penalties against a wilful debtor, are at any rate vain, and in this special case the penalty was too weak: for to invite a man to consent to the sale of his estate, by taking from him a fifth part more than he owed, and by making him lose all hopes of recovery of it after five years, was surely no very great bribe; as on the other hand, to terrify a man who was already desperate, by allowing him to torment his creditor with law-suits, on account of intrusions, and to preserve his own right to the estate for ten years, was surely no very great penalty. Debtors saw, and felt the alternative, and acted accordingly: they almost universally neglected the act, they produced not the rights and evidents, they compleated not the sale; or if a very few did obey the law, they were only men, whose
whose estates were so overburdened, that there was no room for the fifth part more, which the statute had provided in favour of the creditor.

These mischievous effects were seen by the legislature, but their original cause was not seen; therefore they were remedied only by halves: They were so far remedied, that by the act * of the 1681, the right of redemption of the debtor was taken away, and any one real creditor could apply to the court of seision for a sale of the bankrupt estate: but they were so far not remedied, that within the legal it was still necessary to carry along the consent of the debtor; a consent, which was seldom got, and which, no legislature making allowances for human nature, ought in general to have expected.

† Act 20. Then came the act of † 1690, which empowered the court of seission, on the petition of any one real creditor, to sell the bankrupt estate; or on failure of a purchaser, to divide it amongst the creditors; both of which they were empowered to do, even within the legal, and though the debtor refused his consent.
Another * statute a few years after, along with the later † act of federunt, intended to make that statute effectual, gave, notwithstanding the abstraction of the rights of the lands, a total security to the purchaser: a security made such, by the interpretation of the judges, as perhaps, the rights and evidents themselves, if produced, could not have afforded. For on the 21st of June 1720, in the case Chalmers against Myretoun, the lords refused, after decree of sale, to hear a creditor plead, that the sale had been carried on for the debts of one who was only life-renter, and by collusion with the creditors, at a time when he, being an infant, was proprietor of the estate.

At the same time, it will be observed, that these two last statutes relate only to the attachment of bankrupt estates, and therefore, with regard to the attachment of other estates, the law still remains as imperfect as it did upon the statute of 1672.

Such is the progress of the law of English law and Scotland, on the attachment of land for the debt of the debtor himself. From that progress it will readily occur, that if there was so much difficulty in bringing
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ing in the attachment of the lands of the debtor himself, there must have been much more difficulty in bringing in the attachment of land in the person of the heir for the debt of his ancestor: The heir had not contracted the debt, therefore according to the law of nature he seemed free; the fief was bound for the services of the lord, therefore it appeared agreeable to the law of fiefs, that the heir should have the fief free of burdens, in order to enable him to do those services. And accordingly * it is certain, that at common law in Britain, the heir was not bound for the debts of his ancestor.

It has been seen, that the voluntary alienation of land, and the attachment of it in the debtor's hand for his own debt, took place, both of them, at first, among trading people: On the same plan of analogy, the attachment of land in the hands of the heir for the debt of his ancestor also took place first among the same people, and from them has been extended to the rest of the nation. By the statute merchant of † Edward the 1st, it was declared, that "If the debtor die, the merchant shall have possession of his lands, until he hath
levied his debt.” In Scotland the same thing is laid down in a statute of * Rob-
bert the 1st, relating to merchants; and more fully in the 94th law of the bo-
roughs.

The over-haste of the Scots nation, in going before the English, in the attach-
ment of land for the debt of a debtor, by the 24th act of Alexander the 2d; and for the debt of the ancestor, by the 94th law of the boroughs, at a time when the interests of the lord and vassal run too much into each other, to admit those attach-
ments, created very great embarrass-
ments in the law of Scotland, on an emer-
gency, which in this last deduction has not been mentioned. The emergency I mean, is, when a debtor died, whose heir would not make title to his estate; in that case, it was difficult to apprehend, how the creditor, consistently with the strict feudal notions, could reach the estate: It was not in the debtor, for he was dead; it was not in the heir, for he was not entered; it was not in the lord, for he had only the supe-
riority. This difficulty could not occur in the law of England, because, originally, if the heir possessed, his possession made him

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a title; and if the lord possessed, he was understood to possess for the heir; and afterwards * the statute of uses joining constantly the property to the right, made the estate as much the property of the heir, as if he had been entered with the superior; but in the law of Scotland it is certain, that for a long time, creditors could not reach an estate in this situation at all.

To remedy this, the act † of 1540 was passed, which made a charge by the creditor, to the heir, to enter, equivalent to an entry. After that, the estate was deemed to be in the heir, and was attached as so vested.

But to elude this, heirs gave into court formal renunciations of all connexion with the inheritance; after which, the estate could not be attached as belonging to the heir; neither could it be attached in the hands of the superior who had not contracted the debt, and to whom, by the renunciation of the heir, added to his own radical right, it simply returned, disburthened of debts to which himself had not consented.

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The injustice of this elusion was too crying, not to require a remedy; and therefore the judges of the court of secession interposed; and without statute, without even a feudal analogy to support them, introduced the adjudications on decreets cognitionis causa; that is to say, they allowed an adjudication against the hereditas jacens, as if it had still been the property of the dead person. Craig * says this expedient had been contrived only lately before his time. Erat sanè hæc adjudicationis formula, majoribus nostris incognita, et quodammodo necessitate, a recentioribus, introducita, ad eorum honorum dominium in creditorum transferendum, quæ alioqui, commodè, transferri non possunt, aut appretiari.

The introduction of the adjudication cognitionis causa, gave execution against the estate in which the ancestor had been vested; but then another difficulty occurred, with respect to the creditors of an heir apparent, who had during his life continued to possess the estate, but had made up no title to it: If the next heir passed him by, and served to another ancestor, the estate could not be attached, as the estate of the first heir, for he had never been vested in it;
it; neither could it be attached in the hands of the next heir, because the next heir did not represent him.

This gave great room for the frauds of heirs; the interposition of the legislature became necessary; and therefore, by the act of 1695, it was ordained, that if an apparent heir should possess for three years, the next heir passing him by, and connecting himself by service, or by adjudication on his own trust bond, to an ancestor vested in the estate, should be liable to the value of the estate, for the onerous deeds of the interjected heir whom he passed.

The interpretation of this statute produced a controversy in the law of Scotland, which, at the distance of half a century, is perhaps, yet undecided.

The words of the statute, it is observable, subject the second heir, only in the event of his passing by the first heir, and connecting himself by service, or trust adjudication, with an ancestor vested; now the second heir, to withdraw himself from the words of the statute, did not connect himself at all with an ancestor vested; but continued to possess the estate merely on his title of apparentcy. The question arose, was this heir
heir subject to the onerous deeds of the first, or interjected heir three years in possession?

On the one hand, it was pleaded for the heir, that the statute in question being corrective of the common law, admits only a strict interpretation, and ought not to be extended to cases beyond the letter of it. On the other hand, it was pleaded for the creditors, that when there is a defect in the common law with regard to the prevention of fraud, and a remedy is provided by a corrective statute, the statute ought to be extended to every fraud that falls within the purview and reason of it.

The judges, by two successive decisions, gave sanction to the former of these doctrines.

Particular remedies were however applied without doors; for, moved by the favour of the creditors claim, and by the fraud of heirs sheltering themselves under the defect of the law, the barons of exchequer, and likewise many subject superiors, made gifts of the incident of non-entry to the creditors, by which they could force the heir, either to enter, or to lose all benefit of not entering.

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The house of peers, on an appeal concerning * the estate of Kinminity, seemed willing to apply a more general remedy, by giving extent to the interpretation of the statute: in that case the first heir had possessed three years without making up title; the creditors had charged the next heir, who was a minor, to enter; and on that charge had adjudged the estate as his, upon the act of 1540; if the next heir had renounced, he would have avoided † the statute of 1540, which took no place if the heir renounced; and must have fallen under the doubt of the statute in question, by not making up a title at all; for which reason, he brought a reduction on the heads of minority and fesiation, of the execution which had been pursued against him; and pleaded, that his renunciation being admitted, the estate could not be touched, because he had connected himself with it, neither by service, nor trust adjudication. The lords of fesiation had found, that the estate could not be reached by the creditors; but the house of peers, in bar to the fraud of heirs, reversed the decree.
A few years after, in the case of the estate of Pronsy, the abstract question occurred again. An apparent heir, three years in possession, by marriage articles, gave a jointure to his wife, but made up no title to the estate; the next heir refused to make up title, and refused to pay the widow her jointure; and pleaded, by not passing by the first heir, that he fell not under the statute of 1695: The court of session adhered to the letter of the statute, and to the train of their decisions, and sustained his refusal; and perhaps, influenced by the uniform train of deciding the question in Scotland, and by the steadiness of the judges there, the house of lords gave their assent to the decree.

At the same time, whether in future times, a statute calculated to obviate frauds, will be allowed to give sanction to a very great fraud; and whether a second heir making up no title at all to the estate, will be allowed to be in a better condition, than a second heir making up titles fairly to it, may perhaps, with justice, be doubted.

Such is the progress of the involuntary alienation of land property, both in England
land and in Scotland. Upon a review of this deduction, it is no pleasing reflection, to observe, after the consummation of centuries, the law of England labour under this defect, that in common cases, the creditor gets a distant, and not immediate payment, the possession, but not the property of his debtor’s land; and the law of Scotland labour under this absurdity, that if a debtor having lands is in fact insolvent, his creditors get direct payment; but if he is able to pay, they do not. The first of these assertions seems strange of so commercial a nation as the English, and the other seems paradoxical in any nation; yet both are true: In England, if a man is not of a certain denomination to come under the statutes of trading bankrupts, his creditors only get, according to the nature of their debts, the benefit of the elegit, or of the statutes; that is, they get the possession, in some cases, of the half, and in other cases, of the whole of their debtor’s land; but in no case, the property of it. Again, in Scotland, if a debtor is in good circumstances, a creditor, by running an adjudication against his estate, gets not his money; he gets indeed land, but that
that land may be redeemed from him in a certain number of years; and thus he gets only a security for, or at most an indirect payment of, his debt; on the other hand, if the debtor is in fact insolvent, his lands are brought directly to a sale before the lords of seffion, and the creditor gets immediate payment.

The feudal law carries with it a system of private rights, which swallow up all others, wherever it comes; it involves too, in giving effect to those rights, a system of forms, which remain, even when the original rights are no more. Nor is this all, some of these former, by the force which both once gave to each other, remain, even when most of the latter have perished too; but the day will probably come, when all land becoming alodial; and the more compleat and easy attachment of it becoming necessary, the rule of the Roman emperor laid down in * L. 15. D. dere jufi- cata 2 & 3. Pandejects, and made when the feudal relations, and the bar to the alienation of land property consequent on them, were unknown, will be the law of the world. By that law it was ordered, that a portion of the moveables equivalent to the debt, should
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should first be sold; but if these did not suffice, that an equivalent portion of the land should be sold; and if no purchaser appeared, that the subject offered to sale, should become the property for ever of the creditor. Primo quidem, res mobiles animales pignori capi jubent, mox disfrahi; quarum prætium si suffecerit, bene est si non suffecerit, etiam soli pignora capi jubent, & disfrahi, quod si nulla moventia sint, a pignorisbus soli initium faciunt; si pignora quae capita sunt, emptorem non inventat, rescriptum est, ut addicantur ipsi, cui quis condemnatus est.

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FROM the foregoing deductions of the alienation of land property, by immediate deed of party, and by attachment of law, it is plain, that it would be very long before men could have a notion in the feudal law, or in any law, of the third branch of alienation; to wit, of that alienation which is to take effect, only after the death of the grantor.

When a man has bestowed much cost and labour upon a subject, he reckons it hard, that he should not have the complete
plete enjoyment of it, and consequently the voluntary alienation of it during his life; but his enjoyment ceasing after death, the liberty of alienating at a time when he can no longer enjoy, is, to a rude people, no very natural conception.

The introduction of money which buys all things, and in consequence of that, the favour due to creditors, who have lent their money to a possessor of land, brings in the necessity of legal alienation for the payment of what has been thus lent: But the same favour does not intervene, for an alienation by testament, which depends solely upon the will of a person who is now forgot, and against which, the favour, attending the heir of blood, is a bar.

Hence, in the progress of society, those first and second species of alienations very much precede this, of which we are now treating; and in many of the instances given in this chapter, men could alienate during their lives, who yet could not alienate to take effect after their deaths.

At first, this power of alienation is so little thought of, that men do not imagine they have a power of conveying even moveables, by testament.

Thus
Thus, before the time † of Solon, the Athenians could not make testaments: nor could the Romans † before the time of the twelve tables, and even then the use of testaments came not in, by the natural course of things, but was borrowed from the Greeks, and was the act of the legislature rather than of the people.Tacitus testifies to the same effect, of the limited idea of property among the Germans of his time. His words are, *Haeredes succrescere sui cuique liberi, & nullum testamentum; si liberi non sint, proximus gradus in possessione, fratres, patrui, avunculi.*

Afterwards, men got a notion of making testaments, but only of their moveables, and in some nations, of a part of these moveables only. Thus || in the *regiam majestatem*, testaments of moveables are permitted, but they are confined to one third of the moveables only, called the dead’s part. The same was the ancient law in England, as we learn from *Glanville and Bracton*; and notwithstanding that from the favour to power over property, this limitation wore out, in the other parts of that kingdom, yet till the statute of George † the first enabling men to devise in spite of all special
cial customs whatever, it remained the law in the province of York, and the city of London. In Scotland, at this day, where our notions of powers over property are not altogether so extensive, it remains still the law of the land.

The notion of a power over moveables even beyond the grave, once introduced, made way for a notion of the same power over immovable; yet still, in giving effect to this last power, people were obliged, at first, to use many arts, in order to smooth over the difficulty which the mind in a rude age had, to conceive, that a person's will can have any effect, when he himself is no more.

Thus in the * Roman law, before the * Heincc. time of the twelve tables, no man could transfer his inheritance, except in calatis commititis, with consent of the people, and by way of adoption; in which case the donee took, rather as legal, than as testamentary heir. In the same manner † from the Regiam Majestatem and Glanville, it appears, that our ancestors imagined, the ceremony of delivery to be absolutely necessary, to give effect to the deed of the testator; in which case, the donee did not so properly
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properly take after death by testament, for
the law says, *Deus et non homo facit bæredes*; as he took, by donation, during life. According to those authorities, if delivery had not followed, the heir might have disputed the gift; for without such delivery, says the law, *id intelligitur potius esse nuda promissio, quam aliqua vera promissio, aut donatio*:

This is the origin of our dispositions *inter vivos* in Scotland, to take effect, in point of form, *de presenti*; and even to this day, in England, no deed of feoffment is good against the heir at common law, if delivery hath not followed upon it.

But there is a long interval, in the progress of human society, between such alienation, *mortis causa*, as is made good by delivery during life, and that alienation, which is made good, by barely notifying a few words in a testament: The latter follows the former, at the distance of centuries. One thing which very much helps on the progress of this last, is the use of letters becoming common; for even supposing the idea of property were pretty much extended, before letters came into common use; yet still the mind would have difficulty to assent to this, that a man's will
will should have effect after he himself was no more; but the invention and common use of writing make all illusions, to smooth over this difficulty, unnecessary. When I see the will of a person lying on a table before me, he seems present with me, and commanding as if he was alive: This strikes the senses, and afflicts the imagination in transferring property to a living, from a dead person, by the will of the deceased. Thus it comes to be law, because it is every body’s interest it should be law, that a man may name his heir by testament as he pleases: nor is this all, for man being fond of power, and by letters expressing the exertion of that fondness, he names an heir to this heir. Thus substitutions came into law and fidei commissae, conditions, entails, with many other effects of pride, refinement, and an extended idea of property accompanying them.

To the first exertion of this power, the consent of the heir was taken, as appears from a multitude of old charters both in * England and Scotland, and afterwards, * Mad. form. Angl. when this consent was not asked, the heirs, as we learn from † Sir Henry Spellman, † Spellm. of ancient deed, were influenced to ratify the deeds, ob priete- tapem. 234.
History of

tatem. But as it depended upon these heirs, during the first period to consent, or during the last to confirm the donation; their doing either of these, was rather a matter of private choice, than of publick enforcement; and during neither of these periods can it be said, that the validity of testaments was established.

We have already seen, that the free voluntary immediate alienation, and the free involuntary alienation of land property, either for the debt of the vassal, or of the ancestor, arose originally in burrows; in the same manner, the same causes always producing the same effects, the first free alienation of land by testament, arose, in the decline of the feudal law, originally in burrows.

This we learn from Lyttleton, who lived in the reign of Edward the fourth: That most accurate of lawyers informs us, that the custom of devising land by testament, and without seisin, had first taken place in burrows.

This species of alienation, like the other two branches of alienation, was quickly transferred from burrows, to the rest of the country, partly by the interposition of courts, partly
partly by devices of lawyers, and in the end by publick law.

Partly by the interposition of courts: For though a deed of feoffment was not good at common law, without livery, yet validity was bestowed upon it by the courts of equity.—Partly by the devices of lawyers: For though the ancient rule, that a man could not alienate his lands by testament, stood in the law books, yet the invention of the distinction, between uses and lands, gave great room for a testator to dispose of the profits, though he could not dispose of the land itself. Lawyers found out too, that he might order, in his testament, his executors to alienate his lands for certain purposes. At first he was allowed to exercise such powers for the good of his soul; but by the preamble of statute 4th, ann. 21. Hen. VIII. it appears, that this pretence had been extended to paying his debts, satisfying his legacies, &c. Afterward, many people were not even at the pains to use these circuits, but devised directly by will: This appears from the preamble, and a particular clause* in a statute of the 27th of Henry VIII.—Partly by the aid of publick law: For in the end, the practice of devising...
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† An. 32. Hen. 8.
cap. 1.
au. 34.
Hen. 8.
cap. 5.

vising became, by † the statutes of the 32d and 34th of Henry VIII. no longer the de-
vice of lawyers, no longer an exception from the old law, weak as it was, but got
the sanction of the legislature. By these statutes, lands, with a certain exception in
favour of those lands which were held by knights service, were allowed to be devised
by will; and when knights service came to be abolished, these lands were allowed
to be devised too. Nay, so extensive is the
notion of mens powers over property in
England, that not only can a person devise
his immovable by will, in writing, but
he may devise his moveables, to the great-
est value, by bare word of mouth, if it be
sufficiently proved.

In Scotland again, we could not origi-
nally give away land to disappoint the heir,
unless by seisin during life; afterwards the
distinction between the life-right and the fee
was fallen upon, and the donor gave away
in his life-time, the latter, while he retained
to himself, with a power of revocation,
the former. In the further progress of
things, the invention of procuratories was
used; these answer to the English powers
of attorney, but they differ from them in
this,
Alienation.

this, that by a particular statute * in Scot-

land, they may be executed after the death of the donor; so that by the introduction of these, it became unnecessary to deliver feisin during the life of the donor. Now-
a-days, though we once went too equal with the English, in the voluntary aliena-
tion of land property, and most absurdly ran before them in the involuntary aliena-
tion of it; yet our customs are so far ac-
 commodated to the degree in which the feudal law is still amongst us, that we do not devise moveables by word of mouth beyond a trifling value; and in the aliena-
tion of land property to take effect after death, we use the ceremony of a disposition inter vivos, to be carried into effect by the execution of the procuratory. At the same time, we are approaching so fast to the practice of devising lands, that at present a bare disposition with a clause dispensing with non-delivery, found lying by a man at his death, though it had neither procuratory of resignation, nor precept of sasine, would bind his heir: It would indeed require the circuit of an adjudication in implement, to make it effectual, and by that means may be said to derive it's validity from
the act of the heir, or of the law; but whatever be in this, such a disposition would, in the end, be valid in law, and against the heir.

Upon a review of these three branches of alienation, it appears, that the laws of England and Scotland, originally the same, have, after departing long from each other, arrived by different courses, at being nearly the same again. The difference of circumstances obliged them to forswear each other, the similarity of circumstances is now bringing them together anew; and a few ages will probably make the re-union complete.

There is, however, some doubt, whether there be not one restraint in the law of Scotland common to all the three branches of alienation, which cannot now subsist in the law of England; the doubt is, whether a superior can be forced to receive a body politic? and the difficulty arises, from the hurt done to the superior, in being forced to receive a vassal, who never dies, and from whom therefore, when once entered, none of the emoluments of superiority can accrue. Craig * declares against receiving such body politic; lord Stairs does the same,
Alienation.

fame; and Spotiswood, in his * observations * on Sir George M'kenzie's institutions, says, that the barons of exchequer, after the union, refused to pass any signature of land held of the crown, in favour of societies, or corporations, or bodies politick.

This point received a decision in the † case of the university of Glasgow, not † Dia. many years ago, in favour of the body politick; but that decree was afterwards reversed in the house of peers.

The statute 20th of George II. in providing for the more easy and compleat transferring of land property, leaves this doubt as undetermined as before; that statute in ordering who shall be admitted, and how that admission shall be made good, uses the words, person who shall purchase or acquire lands in Scotland; leaving it thereby uncertain, whether these words be limited to natural persons, or can be extended to bodies politick. A few words in the statute would have ended the doubt; but what the explanation of the words, which are now in it, will be, must be left to future decisions of judges, or to future parliaments. It is probable, however, that the genius of the times, in favour of the com-
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compleat commerce of land property, will make a particular statute unnecessary, and that the judges, in spite of the above judgment of the peers, will take upon them, to give to bodies politick, the same privileges which natural persons have.
CHAP. IV.

History of Entails.

After the feudal law had, in the manner described in these papers, been for some time on the decline; it was again, notwithstanding the general bent of men against it, in some degree revived, by the bent of particular persons.

It was obvious to the ancient nobles, that the allowing land to come so much into commerce, tended to weaken them; by the prodigality of some, and the misfortunes of others of their own body, their lands, they saw, were continually shifting into the hands of people, who had formerly been little better than their slaves. In order to prevent such consequences then, the great nobles invented the artifice of entails, which took particular estates out of commerce, and with regard to those estates, revived the spirit of the feudal law.

Thus
Thus in England, in the time of Edward I. the feudal system had so far deviated from its original strictness, that proprietors in general were attaining the capacity of alienating their lands, of forfeiting, and of charging with rents: but the nobles, to stop the effect of this freedom of alienation, extorted from that prince the statute de donis conditionalibus. This statute gave a sanction by publick law to private men to entail their estates; and declared, that fines levied upon estates so entailed should be void. Most of the great families took advantage of the permission, and by doing so, prevented their posterity from alienating, from forfeiting, or from charging with rents.

There is no maxim in politicke more generally true, than that power follows property: In process of time, the property of these great families continually increasing, and never diminishing, their power grew to such a height, as enabled them totally to enslave the people, and sometimes to overshadow the crown.

These entails continued long in force, and the effects of them long in force too. But in the end, as the still progressive
crease of commerce gave a more general and universal bent for the alienation of land; and as that commerce established a luxury, which the great families, beyond others, rushed into; many of the nobles, to supply their prodigality, were willing to shake off the fetters of their entails; and the more so, as monied men were willing to give them any money for their land: entails then, came to decrease in their force, and in time their effects.

The great lords could not indeed be prevailed upon to make an alteration, in parliament, of the law of entails; but then, entails were suffered to be greatly discouraged in courts of justice.

For, on the one hand, the judges restrained all devices for new species of entails, and therefore, when in the reigns of *Richard II. and Henry IV. attempts were made to settle estates, with substitutes, under conditions, that if any of the substitutes or their issue should alienate, then their right in the estate should cease, and the estate forfeit to the next in order, the judges refused to give their sanction to settlements of that kind.

On
On the other hand, such devices as had been invented to elude the old entails, were sustained. * Bacon enumerates several that had been early introduced, and in the end, the device of a common recovery to bar an entail, was sustained by a solemn decision in the reign † of Edward IV. The form of a recovery is that of a collusive suit and judgment, and therefore under the very form of the law itself, the law was eluded.

But the politic prince Henry VII, who saw in all its lights, that superiority, which the preservation of land property in their families had given to the nobles; a superiority which had cost some of his predecessors their lives and their crowns, freed lawyers from the trouble of inventing future devices against entails: He got the famous statute passed ‡, in the fourth year of his reign, which made a fine, with proclamations, to conclude all persons, both strangers and privys. This was not so properly evading, as repealing the statute de donis; for as it was the purport of the statute de donis, that a fine should be ipso jure null, so it was the purport, on the contrary, of the statute of Henry VII. that a fine should be valid, to bar the persons therein

* Bacon voc. Fine and Recovery. P. 541.
† Sir Anthony Mildmay's café. Coke 6. rep. fol. 40. B.
therein intended to be barred. The form of a recovery had been that of a collusive suit and judgment; the form of a fine, was that of a collusive argument acknowledged on such terms, and with such circumstances, as were sufficient to defeat the entail.

By this statute the right and interest of all persons were saved, which accrued after ingrossing of the fine, they pursuuing their right within a certain time after it accrued: On this clause, a doubt occurred, whether the issue of tenant in tail could be barred by the statute, notwithstanding that by the general tenor of it, privys were barred. The judges * embraced the occasion, * Bacon, voc. Fine and Recovery. (E) which the ambiguity gave them, of defeating entaills, and bound the issue by the fine. A statute of † the succeeding prince † An. 32. approved their construction, gave a retrospection to that construction, and prevented the ambiguity for the future.

Nor were these statutes agreeable to these princes only; the genius of the times too, was bent against the feudal system, and every thing which tended to revive the effects of it. A commercial disposition had brought in the necessity of allowing an unbounded commerce of land; the landed men,
men, the monied men, found their views equally hurt by entails: The lawyers in their writings had been long inveighing against them, and the judges, by their judgments, had long been discouraging them.

Perhaps those various ranks of men did not foresee, in all their consequences, those important effects which quickly followed from the dissolution of entails, and the transition of property flowing from that dissolution. Perhaps too, it would be urgeing too far in favour of a system, to say, that the dissolution of entails, was the sole cause of the great alterations, which afterward happened in the constitution of England; yet so far, it is obvious and certain, that this dissolution added greatly to the transition of property from the lords to the commons, which so soon after made the commons possessed of almost all the land property of the kingdom; too powerful for both the nobility and the king; so insolent, as by a vote to declare the nobles no necessary part of the constitution, and by a publick trial and publick execution, to put their sovereign to death.
The same desire of reviving the spirit of the feudal law, at a time when that spirit was decaying, which had introduced the statute de donis into England, introduced likewise the artifice of entails into Scotland. But as the general bent of the nation against the strictness of the feudal system came much later into Scotland, than into England; the attempts of particular persons to revive the effects of that system, were necessarily more late too, in the one nation than in the other.

As long as a great part of the lands in the country were unalienable beyond a half; as long as there was not a sufficient commerce, to cause a considerable fluctuation of land property; and even when land came more into commerce; as long as the great families were powerful enough to defy the law, and laugh at execution by appraising used against their estates, there was no need of entails. In the highlands of Scotland, at this day, entails are far less frequent than in the low-countries.

But when arts and commerce introduced luxury, when the alienation of land property became more frequent, and when the voice of the laws was heard through the
land, then people, to secure their families, introduced entails.

The first instance, so far as I have heard, that occurs in our records, of a prohibitory clause *de non alienando*, ingrossed in the infeoffment, is, * in the year 1489; and even that instance is singular: In the revocation of tailzies by our kings in parliament, nothing more is meant by a tailzie, than a conveyance, altering the course of succession from heirs general to heirs male.

† President Balfour, in his Body of Law, accurate and complete, seems to have had no other idea of them: Skeen in his treatise *de verborum significatione*, in which he gives an account of all the objects of law, that were of consequence in his time, makes no mention of cailais. Craig indeed has a chapter upon the subject of entails; but the superficial way in which he treats it, shows plainly, that the age in which he wrote, which was about the year 1600, had not the knowledge of entails, in the same degree which we now have.

By that author's account of them, they seem to have been no more than simple destinations, cutting the ordinary course of succession, defeasible by every possessor, attachable
tachable by creditors, and the heirs of which were rather heirs of provision than of tailzie. In this light Craig says partly, *hi autem ex taliae bæredes alio etiam no-
mine bæredes provisionales dicuntur*: and afterward, *itaque provisio nihil aliud est, in ef-
fectu, quam tallia*: and in another paragraph, *rumpitur autem, sive dissolvitur tallia, ex mutuo consensu domini superioris et vassalli, codem quo constitucbatur modo; cum nihil sit tam naturale, quam unumquodque, eodem modo dissolvi, quo colligatum est, sive constitutum fuit.*

After this period it appears, from the decisions of the court of session, and from the records, that people came into the use of inserting prohibitory clauses in their settlements. By these the heir was prohibited to alienate, or to create charges on the estate. But as there was no necessity for the registration of these prohibitions, and without registration creditors could have no knowledge of the limited nature of the settlement; the judges, in order to pay as much regard to the will of the entailer as they could, consistently with the safety of others, resolved, to consider such estate, as absolute with regard to creditors, but as
limited with regard to the proprietor: With this view they allowed the former to attach it for debt, but they did not allow the latter to convey it gratuitously.

To get free of this distinction, and to fetter their estates equally in both cases; people fell next upon the contrivance of serving inhibition upon these prohibitory clauses. Inhibitions were obliged to be recorded, and therefore the contrivance seemed favourable; yet even the force due to settlements in that form, was called in question * by lawyers adhering to the maxim, that though an inhibition may give force to an old security, it cannot create a new one.

The invention of those, who wished to preserve their familys by entailts, and of those who were employed to execute what the others wished, fell therefore upon further expedients; and at length, clauses irritant and clauses resolutive were invented, which inforced the settlement, by subjecting to penalties, those who were concerned in infringing it. By the one clause, all the new charges upon the estate were made void, and the creditors were disappointed; by the other, the right of the contravening member of entail was made void, and
and the next heir was called to the succession.

Those clauses, in the time of Lord Stairs, that is to say, about the middle of the last century, became very frequent in entail.

His lordship, whenever he speaks of them, seems, and indeed all the lawyers of his time seem to have been greatly at a loss, to determine what force was due to them; for on the one hand, there stood the will of the entailer, a will contrary to no law; and on the other hand, there stood the danger of entrapping the rest of the subjects, through the want of a register for entail.

At last a prohibition to contract debt, with an irritancy of the contraveeners right in an entail, both of them indeed contained in the original seisin, and repeated in the subsequent ones, received, anno 1662, a solemn decision, after a pleading appointed in presence of the whole judges, in the case of the viscount of Stormonth against the creditors of the earl of Annandale*. By that decision not only the right of the earl of Annandale, who had contraveened, but that of all his creditors, who had apprised, was made void.
This decision was justifiable, on the repetition of the prohibitory and resolutive clauses in the infeoffment; but as it was not certain, that the same decision might not follow, though the same repetition was not observed, it became high time for the legislature to interpose, and to give precision to a form of conveyance, that was now becoming so extremely important in its consequences.

For this reason the statute of 1685 was made: That statute though it gave licence to entails by publick law, yet on the other hand took care, that third parties should be acquainted with the existence of the entail; for at the same time that it prevented entailed estates from being alienated, or charged, or carried off by creditors, it likewise ordained, that the entail should be produced before the lords of seisin, to be approved by them; that it should be recorded in a particular register, and that all the provisions and irritancies should be inserted in the original, and every subsequent seisin. With regard to this last requisite of entails, it was further ordained, that though the non-repetition of these provisions and irritancies should infer a dissolution of the right.
right of the present proprietor, yet it should not prejudice the creditors. These last had contracted *bona fide*, they had not seen the provisions and irritancies in the register, and therefore it was thought right they should be obliged to attend to nothing but what they saw in it.

Thus entails were made as effectual by statute among us, as they had been made by the statute *de donis* among the English.

As the same cause which introduced entails in England, introduced them in Scotland; so the same cause which brought about the discouragement of them in England, brought about likewise the discouragement of them in Scotland: In all ages and all countries, the same causes must have the same effects.

At one period, it had become the aim of the lawyers and judges of the one country, when entails grew troublesome, to elude that species of settlement. At another period, it became the aim of the lawyers and judges of the other country, if not to elude altogether, yet very much to limit their entails.

Thus,
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Thus, in the case of the viscount of Stor-month, though there was no clause irritating the right of the creditor, yet the lords had disappointed the creditors; but now, on the contrary, they found, in the case of Baily against Carmichael of Mauldly, anno 1732, that if there was not a clause irritating the right of the creditor, the charging the estate, though it would irritate the right of the heir, yet would not irritate that of the creditors. Thus, in the case of the estate of Carlewry, where there was a prohibition, to alter the succession or contract debts, or do any deed whatsoever whereby the lands might be evicted, or the succession prejudged: And in another case, where there was a prohibition to alter, innovate, or infringe the aforesaid tailzie, or the order of succession therein appointed, or the nature or quality thereof, any manner of way, they found, that the heir of entail was not barred from selling. These two decisions were given on the apparent medium, that in those clauses there was no express words prohibiting to sell; but on the real medium of aversion to, and contempt for entails. Thus again, it is now held to be law, that if the maker of an entail makes the heir the
the first institute, and not substitute to himself, that first heir may disregard the entail. And thus, though by the statute of 1685, on a contravention, the right of the contraveener, is declared to be ipso jure void; yet the judges have held it to be only voidable upon declarator; and even upon that declarator, they have held the irritancy to be purgeable at the bar.

Yea so far did the judges go in disappointing entailis, that when some of their judgments went up to the house of peers, that assembly, in a country still more an enemy to entailis than our own, judged however more by the letter of the law-books, than by the genius of the times, and refused their function to the judgments.

Thus, in the dispute not many years ago, between the heir of tailzie and the creditors of Sir Robert Denham, the court of session had found a tailzie continuing in the form of a personal deed, but not recorded, to be ineffectual against creditors. The house of peers, on the contrary, although it is law, that a deed of tailzie not recorded, if compleated by infeoffment, is not good against creditors; yet were of opinion, that a tailzie, as long as it remained a personal deed,
deed, and not compleated by infeoffment although not recorded, was good against them.

Hitherto entailts have been considered, as disabling the heir to alienate, or the creditor to attach; it still remains to take notice how far they were subject to forfeiture.

On this head a remarkable difference occurs between the laws of England and of Scotland. In the first of these countries, till a very late period, entailts were never subject to forfeiture; in the other, till a very late period, they always were.

To find out the reason of this, we must look very far back into the laws of both kingdoms.

Before the statute de donis, lands in England were divided into fee simple, and what Lyttleton calls fee simple conditional: One possessed in fee simple, who held an estate of inheritance descendible to his heirs; one possessed a fee simple conditional, to whom an estate had been given, descendible to the heirs of his body. In the first case, the possessor had an absolute property in him, and could alienate, charge with rents, and forfeit: In the other case he had in him only
only an estate conditional, the donor still retained an interest in the estate, and failing the condition, that is, failing issue of the donee, had a right of reversion in it. In consequence of this, unless the donee had issue, he was restrained from doing any thing to the prejudice of the donor; and as he was not capable of alienation, so as little was he thought to be capable of forfeiture, seeing this last, would have created as much prejudice to the donor as the other.

Thus, it came to be a maxim in the English law, that who cannot alienate, cannot forfeit; a maxim unknown in the older English law, and unknown in the feudal law, in both of which, though a man could not alienate above one half of his military fief, yet for his treason he forfeited the whole.

When the statute *de donis* was made, this maxim which had been first introduced, and justly, in favour of the donor, was extended, and erroneously, in favour of the heir. It had been just that who could not alienate, could not forfeit to the prejudice of that person from whom the gift came, and only conditionally came; but it was absurd
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absurd to say, that who cannot alienate, cannot forfeit to the prejudice of an heir, from whom nothing came. The application of this rule however, was made to preserve estates tail, upon the statute de donis, free from forfeiture for some centuries.

It is extremely entertaining to a philosophical mind, to observe the different fates of laws, and maxims of law, not only from general causes common to mankind, or common to that part of them governed by one system; but to observe their different fates, from particular exigencies and situations. By a mistaken interpretation, the English extended the rule, that who cannot alienate cannot forfeit, from fees simple conditional, to fees tail upon the statute de donis; and yet, when by the devices of lawyers in the reign of Edward IV. and the function of parliament in that of Henry VII. estates tail became by consent alienable, they refused to extend the same interpretation to the forfeiture of such estates. They had refused to subject estates tail to forfeiture, and on this medium, that who cannot alienate cannot forfeit, and yet, when that medium was taken away,
away, they refused to find, that who can alienate can forfeit.

The first interpretation had been applied in the days of ignorance, and when the conceptions of men were not very accurate with regard to law matters: the other interpretation was refused in the days indeed of knowledge, and when mens notions were on such subjects more accurate; but in the days too of civil discord, when the disputes between the houses of York and Lancaster, made the judges fearful, even upon the most obvious interpretation, of opening any more doors to forfeiture, at a time when, as lord Coke expresses it, the pains of treason were so diverse, that there was no man did know how to behave himself, to do, speak, or say, for doubt of such pains.

When those disputes, and these dangers were over, estates tail were put upon the same footing with other estates. And, by a * statute in the reign of Henry VIII. * An. 26; were subjected to the same penalties of forfeiture with them.

At the same time, as this last statute had a clause, saving all rights, titles, or interests of third parties, the rights of remainder
remainder men or substitutes were saved by
it; for these remainder men were con-
dered to have in them a conditional estate,
to take place upon the failure of the te-
nant in tail and his heirs, and separate from
their estate.

In another statute 5 of Henry VIII. the
saving clause is more particularly expressed;
and those are saved from forfeiture, under
the express name of remainder men, who,
in the former statute, had been by impli-
cation saved from it under that of third
parties.

With regard to Scotland again, that
there once was a period in the law of that
country, when one possessor of a fee simple
conditional, could not do any thing to pre-
judice the donor, may be very true; and
if entail had been introduced during that
period, it is very probable the privileges of
donors would have been extended to heirs
of entail.

But entail were introduced at a differ-
ent period in Scotland; at a period when
the donor himself had lost his privilege;
for when donors, to preserve still more
firmly their interest in the gift, had invent-
ed clauses of return, and thrown them in-
to their grants, yet lord Stairs, in many passages of his book, and other lawyers of his time, represent it to be law, that such limited estate could be apprised by creditors, notwithstanding such clause of return.

Now, as every such estate could be alienated, unless limited by the nature of the holding, the maxim who cannot alienate cannot forfeit, could not be thought of.

When the modern entails then came in, this maxim which was before unknown in the law of Scotland, could not be applied; and if in point of forfeiture, so little attention had been paid to the interest of the donor, from whom the estate came, it is not to be expected, that any more attention in point of forfeiture, should have been paid to the interest of the heir, from whom nothing came: and therefore, entailed estates were subjected to forfeiture in prejudice of the heirs; in the same manner that estates with clauses of return had been forfeitable to the prejudice of the donor.

We read nothing of the maxim, who cannot alienate cannot forfeit, in the old books of the laws of Scotland, nor in the statute
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Statute of 1685; which last, on the contrary, makes a particular proviso, that the entails confirmed by it, shall not disappoint the king of his forfeiture; nor in the writings of any of our lawyers, till the year 1690, in an act of king William. At that period, we borrowed from England and brought into the statute book of the one kingdom, a maxim, which had been invented four hundred years before, in the other. In that statute, men, as the appendix to Considerations upon forfeiture expresses it, *not looking forward with enlarged views to future contingent dangers from the abdicated family, but attentive only to that dark scene, which had been just closed with such wonderful circumstances of felicity to both kingdoms*, ordained, that entailed estates should be safe against forfeitures, except for the life of the forfeiting person. The maxim who cannot alienate cannot forfeit, was the pretence; but the fame remembrance of the bad use made of forfeitures, which in England, till the reign of Henry VIII. saved entails from forfeiture, even when they could be alienated, was the real cause of this saving in Scotland. Nay, so great was the remembrance of the miseries brought
brought on the country by forfeitures, during the two reigns immediately preceding the revolution, that people were not contented with the security conferred by this statute; and therefore that the estate might be secured, not only after the death, but even during the life of the forfeiting person, they frequently added clauses, irritating the possessor's right in case he should become rebel, and ordaining the estate to devolve, *ipsō jure*, on the next heir.

What effect such clauses would have had, or whether they would have enabled the next heir, during the life of the traitor, to have run off with the estate from the crown, was never determined by regular decisions on the point, in the law of Scotland; nor could that effect well be determined, as the whole system of our law of forfeiture was soon afterwards overturned.

By an act of the 7th of Queen Anne, entitled, *Act for improving the Union*, the Scots law of forfeiture was made to give place to that of the English.

This act was made, as appears by the preamble of it, with a general view, to make the laws of the two parts of the island with regard to forfeiture, the same.
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But whatever were the particular objects, which the parliament of Great Britain had at that time in their view, it is certain, a great doubt was on that statute created in law, whether it was the meaning of the legislature, thereby, to subject the entails of Scotland to a total forfeiture. On the one hand it was maintained, that the English having no conveyance of estates like the conveyance in question, it could not be the intention of the English law, though extended to Scotland, to forfeit, without express words, an estate not known in that law: On the other hand, first, from the comprehensive words of the English statutes of treason, referred to in the act of Queen Anne; and next from the necessity there was, considering the dissimilarity of conveyances in the two nations, to compare the conveyance which subsists in the one country, to that which comes nearest to it in the other, in order to be able to apply the law; it was maintained, that tailzied estates in Scotland fell to be subject to forfeiture, as estates tail in England were.

After the rebellion in 1715, the court of session, the commissioners of forfeitures, and the court of delegates seemed all greatly
ly perplexed, what determination to give upon these entails. The judgments of the two last courts particularly, often went cross to each other, but in general, the judgments run † in favour of entails.

The house of peers was under the same difficulties at the same period, in the cases brought before them by appeal, and laid hold of specialities, in order to avoid determining the general point. Thus, in the case of Cassie of Kirkhouse, and Sir Robert Grierson of Lag, they reversed the decrees of the court of feudalion, which had been given in favour of the heirs of entail; but they reversed them upon this medium, that the court of feudalion wanted jurisdiction. And in the case of afflent claiming the estate of Seaforth, though the judgment of the court of feudalion in favour of the substitute in the entail was reversed; yet the reversal, as there were specialities in the case, was far from fixing the general question in the law of Scotland.

But after the rebellion of 1745, the house of peers, upon the solemn opinion of all the judges in England, made use of an expedient, which on the one hand, is a sufficient penalty to deter men from trea-

† Cases of Coul of Blumby, of Kirkhouse, of Lag, of Crombie and of Seaforth.
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son; and on the other hand, does not forfeit entails altogether; and both of which ends were attained, in consistency with law, and the exactest analogy of law. In the case of captain Gordon claiming his brother Sir William's estate, the peers found that Sir William forfeited for himself, and such issue of his body, as would have been inheritable to his estate, if he had not been attainted; but they found, that he did not forfeit for his brother, who in virtue of the substitution to him, in the original entail, was accounted the same with a remainder man in England.

By this judgment that solecism in politics is taken away from the law of Scotland, that a man should have it in his power, by his mere will, to prevent his posterity from being punished for their crimes; and that inequality between the laws of England and Scotland was abrogated, so inconsistent with the otherwise equal rights of the two nations; that an Englishman possessor of any estate but one for life, should forfeit for his treason, but a Scotchman, not only if possessor of an estate for life, but possessor of an entailed estate, should not.

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Entails.

The only dissimilarity in respect of capacity of forfeiture, that remains now in the two species of entails, is to the disadvantage of the Scotch entails; for whereas possessors of entailed estates in England, meditating treason, may by fine and recovery prejudice the king; in Scotland, on the contrary, a possessor of an entailed estate, must in his treason see the certain and uneludable forfeiture of himself and his issue.

As the laws of the two countries are otherwise come now to be the same, with regard to the forfeiture of entailed estates; so in the most other respects, there is by no means that excessive superiority in strictness of the Scotch over the English entails, which is often superficially imagined.

In Scotland, if the tenant in possession has been called as heir whatsoever, the entail breaks of itself; or where he has not been called in that last place, the prophecy of * lord Stairs has come to pass, that when * S:airs, entails became frequent, the heirs of such of them as were cumbrousome, would apply to parliament for redrefs: upon such special application, redrefs upon equitable considerations is constantly granted. Again, if the heir of entail be the first insti-

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...stitute, he may repudiate the entail entirely; or if he be not the first institute, he may by neglecting to repeat the resolutive and irritant clauses in his infeoffment, charge the estate with debts to its value, or even sell the estate. In either of these two events, the charger or the seller would indeed subject himself to an action at the instance of the next heir; but the creditor or the purchaser would be safe. Nor have entailists in Scotland the same fair interpretation, that entails in England have; on the contrary, the judges by confining their interpretation, when that interpretation would make for entails, and extending it, when it will make against them, impose additional clogs, upon that species of settlement.

By these inlets and discouragements, and various others, it happens, that there are more entailed estates in Scotland, gradually turning into fees simple, than there are fees simple turning into entails, while on the law as remaining, many of the old families are still enabled to preserve themselves in their estates, and while they share the wealth, the liberty, and safety of the English, retain their antient lustre the same; instead of
of seeing (as a lord in the Scotch parliament, in the debate on the union, pretended to foretell) an excise-man more honoured and revered than an antient noble of the land.

Men who were to consider the measure of a total dissolution of entails in Scotland, as it regarded their country, might perhaps foresee, with pain in such a step, so great a tide of land property in the market, as from the cheapness occasioned by that tide, would call the money out of trade to the purchase of land; as would render our landed men discontented and bankrupt, and our traders, what they are too apt when they have got a little money, to hasten to be, little lairds, poor, proud and idle: instead of wishing that more land-property, were brought into market, he would perhaps wish that we had as little as the Dutch, or that the price of what we had was kept high; the former to hem our native country-men into manufacturers and merchants, and the latter to put it out of their thoughts when they were become such, to convert their circulating cash into a dead stock of land. And in general, he would in part foresee, and in part dread many
many consequences, which attend the innovation of every system, if not at the exact period of society ripe for that innovation.

But whatever regard might be due to those who reasoned thus, upon the constitution of their country, and the state of families, or on the favour of trade, and against the risk of hurting it; thus, surely one who was a lawyer, and who was inquisitive in tracing laws, their regular progress and declension, would reason first; he would look back, and unmoved by all that clamour, which past lawyers foreseeing rather what might happen, than what has happened, have raised against entail: he would reflect, that though their prophecies were founded on reason, yet from many circumstances, they have come to nothing. Next, he would look forward, and conclude, that if ever the mischiefs, which in reason seem to attend upon entails, should in fact happen; should the number of entailed estates, instead of decreasing, increase; and should there be any considerable failure in the commerce of land upon that account, or should there be so extended a trade, as to make even an inconsiderable
considerable failure in that commerce a detriment; should there be so much money to keep up the price of lands, and so much industry to stock trade sufficiently, as that any attempt to preclude men from the most unbounded commerce of land, would be no advantage to a nation, and only a cruelty to private men; then our entails will share the fate of almost all the other remains of the feudal law. They will either be abolished altogether, or they will be exchanged for those of the English; and as in the act of the 7th of queen Anne, which subjected entailed estates to forfeiture, there was an exception made, in tenderness to the wife who had contracted with a man so seemingly secure against forfeiture, and in tenderness to her children; so when our entails came to be abolished, or exchanged for those of the English; the same tenderness to the wife who contracted with a man so seemingly secure against alienation, and the same tenderness to her children, will produce the same exception, in favour of the children of those, who being possessed of entailed estates, or those who being immediate heirs of such estates, are married at the time of passing the act.

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This exception will preserve a few of our entails only one generation longer, and no more, and perhaps, in future generations, as in the case of many other branches of the feudal system, it will be remembered no where but in books of antiquities, that such a species of conveyance ever existed.

Till this period arrives, our conveyancers will be inventing new clauses to guard entails; our lawyers will be inventing new devices to elude these clauses; our judges will for sometime fluctuate between the two, and our parliaments will be passing laws to enlarge the power of those who are too much limited by particular prohibitions in their respective entails.

Since this treatise was wrote, an application is preparing to parliament, for allowing tenants in tail, in Scotland, to provide wives and children with moderation; to exchange lands, to charge with debt in proportion to the improvement of the rent made by the proprietor, to grant long leases, and to feu in perpetuity to certain extents.

Wife governments find it safer to conduct than to thwart, to point out to men their
their good, than to drive them to it; to enable them to relieve themselves if they please, than to force relief upon them against their wills; and to soften by degrees, instead of overturning at once those general customs of a country, which once had the authority and encouragement of law.
C H A P. V.

History of the Rules of Descent or Succession.

IT has been a great loss both to history and to law, that they have too little contributed their mutual aids to each other: lawyers themselves seldom give deductions of laws, and historians seldom meddle with laws at all, even with those which give occasion for the constitution of a state, and on which, more than on battles and negotiations, the fate of it doth often turn.

For this reason, it is difficult to trace the several revolutions of the feudal laws of descent in any one state in Europe; nor could such revolutions be often traced at all, were it not for the lights which the histories of publick successions afford.

The feudal system, in its regulations, was orderly and universal. Those rules which it applied to fiefs, it extended likewise over kingdoms: and therefore, as in general the same persons who were heirs to
to the king, were heirs to the lords, so, on the other hand, for the most part, the same rules which regulated private, were likewise the measures of publick succession.

Before Edward I. proceeded to hear the claims of Bruce and Baliol for the crown of Scotland, he put the following question to the parliaments of both kingdoms assembled together: By what law of succession is the right of succession to the kingdom to be determined? The answer made unanimously by the parliaments of both kingdoms, was, That the right of succession to the kingdom is to be judged by the rules observed in the cases of counties, baronies, and other unpartible tenures.

**S E C T. I.**

When the nations of Germany first took possession of the Roman provinces*, the grants of the conquered lands were made to last no longer than during the pleasure of the grantors. It was natural it should be so in a subordinate body, and where every member of that body was sure of a subsistence on the lands of some chieftain or other, as long as he
he had a sword and a shield: at that time these grants were properly called Munera.

Soon afterwards they were granted for life, and they were then called Beneficia, as we now a-days term the possessions for life of clergyman Benefices.

But when the connection of future generations with their native country was entirely broken, and their attachment to that in which they lived was grown strong, it was accounted hard, after the father's death, that the sons should not have the possession of what they had formerly had a share in the enjoyment of; it readily occurred too to superiors, that a man would venture himself less in battle, when the loss of his life was to be attended with the ruin of his family: from these considerations the grants were extended to the vassal and his sons, and they were then, and not till then, properly styled Feuda.

Yet still, during this last period, the right of succession was so limited, that after the death of the vassal and his sons, the fief reverted to the lord.

But the former continually and gradually gaining upon the latter, and becoming less dependant upon him; and on the other hand,
hand, the lord standing more and more in need of them, to support a constitution, which, in any but unsettled times, was an extreme unnatural one, the succession was first extended * to grandsons by law, and afterwards to descendants in infinitum, by practice; for those vassals who had been in possession of lands for three generations, and had built upon, and improved them, grew accustomed to look upon them as their own; superiors too, by length of time, and alterations in the lands, at a period when lands were of very little value, and when the improvements upon them were rather the principale than the accessorium, forgot they had ever been theirs.

The distinction between dominium directum, and dominium utile, came then to be invented, in order to reconcile the difficulty which the mind had, to conceive a perpetual property belonging to one person, when yet the perpetual enjoyment of it was, and by the concession of all, in another.

This deduction, gradual and uniform as it is, may be followed step by step in the laws and histories of foreign sefts, but is not so easily traced in Great Britain; for though
though it be known that the dukedoms and earldoms were in the Saxon times during pleasure, or a very few of them during life, yet it is certain the book-land went in general to the heirs of the immediate crown-vassals; but at what time it began to do so, or by what steps it was granted to more and more heirs, is impossible to say. The English antiquities are involved in mist, and the Scotch in the most profound darkness, during the period in which such alterations might be expected to be found.

It is to be observed, that during the whole of the foregoing period of feudal succession, the inheritance, without fixing upon the eldest son, or indeed on any son at all, was equally divided among all the sons*. *Si quis igitur decesserit, filiis et filiabus superstitibus, succedunt tantum filii equaliter, fays the law of the books of the fiefs.

But the incompatibility of performing that service by many, which, as the feudal services were of various kinds, could perhaps be performed only by one, being observed, the law of nature, and which, till then, had been in private successions the law of the world, gave place totally to a
law which was peculiar to feudal principles, and the succession, not only of the daughters who had long before been *ex- cluded, but that of all the sons in general, gave way to the succession of one son, and one only.

At the same time, as the feudal nations were very long in continual dangers, both from foreign invasions, and from intestine commotions, it was plainly incongruous, that the chance of being the first born should give the possession to a person perhaps unfit to defend it; therefore the granter reserved to himself a power of choosing the particular son whom he pleased to give the sief to: *Sic progressum est ut ad filios deveniret, in quem dominus vellet hoc beneficium confirmare*, says the law of the books of the siefs †.

A beautiful instance of the remains of this ancient practice, is still to be seen in the law of England, at this day, upon the devolution of a peerage to heirs female ‡. † Bacon

Upon that emergency, it is the king's privilege, to confer the peerage, upon any of (C.) the daughters he pleases.

Some ages after, when security in their settlement, made this chance direction of O
less dangerous consequence, the natural principle of giving the sief, since only one could regularly have it, to that son who first presented himself in the train of ideas, took place; and the right of primogeniture came to be fully established.

The progress of the minds of men in Great Britain, through this last progress of succession, to the establishment of primogeniture, is very easily traced.

By a law of Edward the Confessor, and many other Saxon laws, it is obvious, the feudal principle was so weak, and that of the ancient law so strong, that all the children succeeded equally; Si quis intestatus obierit, liberi ejus succedunt in capita, says the † law of that prince.

Further down in the Saxon times, it appears by many charters, that though the rule of succession, ab intestato, was in capita, yet people were come into the use of ab\-tracting themselves from that rule, by taking the destination in their charters to one son only; the principle of primogeniture, however, was at that time so weak, that the nomination of the son, in whose favour the destination should operate, was left to the grantee. Thus though ‡ in these char-

* Lex. Canut. 65.
† Leg. Ed. Conf. 167.
‡ Speir. of feudal.
ters the grant generally runs post mortem hæredi uni, yet it runs too, hæredi uni cui-cunque voluerit: That is to say, though the grant was limited to one son, it was open to that son of many sons, whom the gran-tec should be pleased to nominate.

Again, the people of Kent, at an after period, having been left, through the favour of the conqueror, in the enjoyment of their ancient laws, the succession in capita of the sons, called by the Saxon name Gavelkend, was long the universal law of that country, and does, in great part of it, remain even unto this day. The Welch not being subjected to the power, were still less subjected to the laws of the Normans; and therefore among them that equality of succession which had prevailed before fiefs were introduced, remained as far down as the reign of Edward I.

The feudal system having been completed by William the Conqueror, there is no doubt the right of primogeniture was established by that prince; and yet in the reign of Henry I. the traces of the ancient law were far from being lost. By one of his laws it is ordained, not indeed that one fief should be split, but that if there were...
were more than one, the succession should be split, and the eldest son have only primum fratris feudum.

In the time of Henry II. however, these exceptions disappeared in the English law, and the eldest son became the heir, ab intestato; nor was this all, the principle of primogeniture about that time grew so strong, that though, from the darkness of our antiquities, we cannot trace the foregoing progress in Scotland, yet, according to the earliest law authorities in this country, as well as according to the same authorities in England *, a man could not only disappoint the right of primogeniture altogether, but he could scarce even alienate a part of his estate to the diminution of that right.

Hitherto, in the progress of the right of primogeniture, we have been speaking of the succession to a military, but not of the succession, to a socage fief.

In those military fiefs, the necessity of having one certain vassal to perform that service which perhaps could be performed only by one, had introduced the right of primogeniture; but the same necessity not intervening in these (as I may call them) civil fiefs, the preference of primogeniture did
did not appear so obviously advantageous, in them; and therefore, both in England, during the reign of Henry II. and in Scotland, during that of David I. in soccage fiefs, all the sons succeeded in capite.

But in the after law both of England and of Scotland, this rule of succession appears to have gone into disuse; and both military and soccage fiefs came to the same footing.

The example of by far the greatest number of fiefs; the distinction of a soldier and sooman wearing away, together with the rigour of the feudal law; the conversion of most of the military into civil fiefs; and the imagination of superiors, that the rent would be easier levied, and better paid, when the fief was in the hands of one, than when dissipated among many; the unwillingness of the soccage vassals to have their succession split, or their families brought into greater decline, than those of the military vassals, who were neighbours to them; these imperceptible causes in the circumstances of mankind, more powerful than any publick law; and no publick law itself, brought about this alteration.

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The alteration was made, and the distinction lost, between the succession to a military, and the succession to a socage fief, before the time * of Fleta in England, and some hundred years before that of † Skene, Balfour, and Craig, in Scotland.

The progress of the right of primogeniture in publick, corresponds to the same progress of it in private successions.

Thus in the two first races of the French monarchs, the succession to the kingdom was divided among all the sons; and in the earlier periods of the Saxon history, the same division of the kingdom is observed to take frequently place.

Nay, even in much later times, when the rule of primogeniture had taken place in private successions, yet the ancient notions of the rules of succession, added to the power of those who could claim the benefit of them, were so far an obstruction to the principle of primogeniture in kingdoms, that to make up for any weaknes in that principle, kings were in use, not only to declare their eldest sons for their successors, but to have the ceremony of coronation performed, and the oath of fidelity taken to them by the vassals. This prac-
practice was observed without a single exception, from Hugh Capet, the first king of the third race of France, down to Lewis VIII. by William the Conqueror, to his son Robert, in his French dominions, and by a number of foreign princes, down to the 13th century.

After the right of primogeniture was established, it was very long, however, before the right of representation, or the preference of the remoter heir, representing his ancestor, to the exclusion of a nearer, was added to it, either in Great Britain, or in foreign countries.

Many things were obstacles to the progress of the law of representation: The simple notions of a gross people, who were apt to take up with the principle of nearness of blood, instead of looking forward to a more enlarged justice; the barbarity of the times, in which the rights of infants were little attended to, while the uncle had age and power with which to back his pretensions; the necessity there was, that the vassal in the fief should always be ready for service; and which service, an infant was incapable of; the extreme hardship upon the uncle, when primogeniture came to be
be established, that his nephew, perhaps an infant, should run off with the whole of the fief; whereas, in the Roman law, the nephew would have only carried off that equal share which his father should have had.

Accordingly, there is scarce an instance in Europe, till the 13th century, in publick successions, in which, upon the death of a grandfather, leaving a son of age, and a grandson under age, by an elder son deceased, the son did not take to the exclusion of the infant: for though in Scotland *, Kenneth III. briguèd a contrary law from his barons, yet that law was not observed.

Nay, the exclusion of minors was so strong, that upon the death of the brother, who being major, had taken the crown, to the prejudice of his brother's infant children, it sometimes returned to those children, if they were then majors, to the prejudice of his own, being then minors. Thus in England, upon the death of Edmund I. in the year 949, his brother Edrid inherited the crown, to the exclusion of Edwy and Edgar, then minors, who were his brother's sons; but at his death these princes being majors, the eldest of them, Edwy, suc-
succeeded to the crown, in preference to the sons being then minors of Edrid. And examples to the same purpose, are to be met with in the ancient history of Scotland.

Again, although the preference of the son had been introduced, in a competition between him and the infant grandson, yet it extended itself to the prejudice of the grandson of perfect age.

Thus Lewis succeeded his father Charles, to the exclusion of Bernard, his de-ceased eldest brother’s son, though that son was sixteen years of age at the time; neither is this mentioned as any thing extraordinary, by the historians of the age. And in like manner, in the reign of Philip the Fair, Maud succeeded in the county of Artois, to her brother Robert II. to the exclusion of Robert III. grandson, by his eldest son deceased, to Robert II. although Robert III. was of perfect age, and asserting his right: This last succession took place upon a solemn trial and judgment of all the peers of France.

There was one thing particularly which made both these exclusions last longer, and consequently the right of representation advance more slowly: A notion in those times
times prevailed, perhaps borrowed from the Romans, in whose dominions the feudal nations settled, or at any rate, by no means incongruous to the situation and turn of thinking of such nations themselves; that when a son was provided for, or as it is termed, both in the feudal and civil law books, forisfamiliated, he had scarce any right to expect any thing further from his father, and consequently the grand-son could expect still less from his grandfather.

Hence, in the publick successions of England, on the death of William the Conqueror, William Rufus succeeded to the crown of England, in exclusion of his elder brother, already provided in the duchy of Normandy: On the death of Henry I. Stephen took the same crown, in preference to his elder brother Theobald, already earl of Blois: On the death of Richard I. John succeeded, to the exclusion of Arthur, his elder brother's son. With regard to this last exclusion, it may indeed be observed, that the right of representation being at that time more advanced towards its establishment in France than in England, almost the whole French lords took side with Arthur, and though the title of John was but
but little questioned in the first of these kingdoms, yet in France he was universally looked upon as an usurper.

The rules of publick, were the measures of private succeffions; and therefore, in private succeffions, it is laid down in * Glanville, and the Regiam Majestatem lib. 7. cap. 3. upon the same plan, that when a son died, Reg. Maj. lib. 2. cap. 33. who was already provided, his son should succeed to that provision, in preference of his uncles, and to no more.

By degrees, however, this right of representation in the descending line, came on and took place, equally, and at equal times, both in private and in publick succeffions.

Thus in the time of † Glanville, and † Glanv. David I. the grandson, whose father had not been provided by his father, had the benefit of the duel, against the claim of his uncle, instead of being excluded altogether; but in the time of ‡ Fleta, who wrote in ‡ Flet. England, in the reign of Edward I. the right of representation, in this competition, was the law of the land. It is probable, that about the same time, it became in Scotland, the law of the land too; for after the Regiam Majestatem, we § hear no more of this § Balf. in. doubt in our law books, and at a still ear- lier
lier period, it had become the law of most other foreign nations.

Upon the same plan, again, in more publick successions, the judgment already mentioned, in the succession to the county of Artois, was the last of consequence, that was determined on the old principle of nearness of blood; for about fifty years after, Joana, grand daughter to Arthur II. duke of Bretagne, by a deceasest son, succeeded in the dutchy of Bretagne, to the prejudice of John, second son to duke Arthur. In the same way, Richard II. son to the black prince, succeeded without dispute, to his grandfather Edward III. to the exclusion of his uncles, who were men of great abilities, and of power; and in Spain, a century before, Sancho I. taking the crown on the death of his father, and thereby excluding the sons of his deceasest elder brother, was excommunicated by the pope, involved in civil wars, and all his life looked upon as an usurper.

It is no objection to tracing such rules of succession, that in the earlier ages of Europe, the crowns were generally given by election; for if the rules of that election were established, and generally followed, they
they were properly rules of succession. The dispute is merely about words; the only difference between these words, is, that in the last case, the rule of law points out the succession in a law book; whereas, in the other case, the rule of law, in an assembly of the law-makers, did the same.

S E C T. II.

Such being the progress of succession and representation in the descending line, a still further progress, and from the same causes, may be seen, extending itself in the other lines of succession.

Originally, none could succeed in the seif, except those who were specified in the original grant; now, as anciently, the interest of the lord in the seif, was greater than that of the vassal; and as it was a favour to this last, to give him a seif, for which he paid only, what in a military age was no great trouble to him, to wit, his personal service; he was well contented to get it to himself and his posterity; but thought not of asking the succession to his collaterals.

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Nor is it any objection to this doctrine, that collaterals are observed, in the earliest fiefs, to have sometimes succeeded; for this their succession was not in a sief acquired by the vassal himself, but only in feudo paterno; and in a sief of this last kind, the successor took as descendant to the original vassal, and thereby nominée in the original grant, but not at all as collateral to the last vassal. Accordingly *, in a law in the books of the fiefs, the distinction between the succession to the one of these fiefs, and that to the other, is laid down: Frater fratri sine legitimo hærede defuncto, in beneficio, quod eorum patris, fuit succedat. Sin autem unus ex fratribus a domino feudum acceperit, co defuncto, sine legitimo hærede, frater ejus in feudum non succedit. And by the promulgation of that law, it appears, that even in feudis paternis, the real quality of descendant to the original vassal, had been so far forgot, in the seeming quality of collateral to the last one, that a publick law was necessary to overcome the difficulty which was made of receiving such real descendant.

By degrees, however, the collateral succession gained ground. It first took place in
in brothers only, afterwards it was extended to the father's brother, and in process of time, to the collateral line, even to the seventh degree. Craig * relates, that whether this succession was extended beyond that degree, was so much a doubt, as to be the subject of two contests before courts, in his time. But in the end, when wars came to be waged in Europe by standing armies, and not by vassals; when trade, manufactures, and money, introduced luxury; when by that luxury the great lords were impoverished, and that money in the hands of those who had been formerly their slaves, it then became of little consequence to the lord, who was the vassal in the fief; and therefore he gave it to him who was willing to advance most money for the grant; the vassal, on his part again, as he gave value for that grant, was not contented with a right of succession to his descending, but insisted it should go likewise to his collateral, line.

Thus by practice, without a publick law, it crept into the law of Great Britain, as well as unto that of other European nations; that not only in feudis paternis, but even in fiefs which a man had purchased him-
himself, his collaterals in infinitum, as well as his descendants in infinitum, should succeed.

When collateral succession came to take place, it will readily occur, that difficulties could not but speedily arise in law, concerning the succession of a middle brother dying without children, and leaving an elder and younger brother alive.

When that happened, the law took the following course, and for the following reasons:

If the fief had come by descent, it went to the younger brother; if it was a purchase, it went to the elder.

A fief of the nature of the first kind could be in a middle brother only, in consequence of a grant from his ancestor, or in consequence of a grant from his elder brother, which last was in construction of law deemed to be a feudum paternum: in either of these cases, the elder brother behoved to be either superior, or heir in the superiority, and the middle brother behooved to be vassal; but the feudal law had a peculiar aversion at joining again the property and superiority in one person, when they had been once disjoined. The whole
whole system was built on the distinct rights of superior and vassal, and the blending these two characters in one person, appeared to be the blending of contrary qualities together.

As conquest, on the contrary, had come to the middle brother from a stranger, when the law allowed the succession of such a seigneur to go to the elder brother, there was no danger of the junction of the property and superiority in one person; the stranger remained superior, whoever was the heir.

So stood the law, and such was the distinction, in the time * of the Regiam Majestatem, and in the time of Glanvill.

In England, the relations of superior and vassal having been long ago lost, the danger of uniting these two characters in one person no longer subsists; and therefore the exclusion of the elder brother in feudo paterno, has for many ages been forgot, perhaps ever since the end of the † Hale's reign † of Edward I.

In Scotland, on the contrary, where the distinction between superior and vassal is still formally kept up, and where many maxims, however unnecessary in reality,
yet founded upon the form of that distinction, are still kept up, the law handed down through the * writings of our lawyers, remains the same. The distinction between the heir of line, and the heir of conquest, is as perfect at this day in Scotland, as it was five hundred years ago. And therefore at present, if a middle brother should die, possessed of an estate which had come to him by descent, and should have a son who made afterward a purchase, upon the death of this son without issue or brothers, the succession would split; his younger uncle would take what had come by descent; or as it is called in Scotland, the heritage; and his elder uncle would take what had come by purchase; or as it is called in Scotland, the conquest.

The right of representation, was † longer in being introduced in the collateral, than in the descending line, and consequently took longer time to be firmly established in that line than in the other.

In the original law of nature, representation must be unknown; those who are nearest in blood to a man, will be conceived to be nearest connected with him afterwards. It is observed to be a hardship,
Succession.

ship, that children bred up in a rank suitable to that of their father, and with a prospect of succeeding to his rights, should be cut off at once from that rank, and that prospect; it comes to be observed as a further hardship, that a woman who has married one seemingly a match for her, should by his untimely death, lose not only her husband, but see her children reduced to beggary.

These considerations bring in the right of representation in the descending, but the same considerations do not occur in the collateral line. The children of a brother or cousin, have not the prospect of succeeding to their uncle’s or cousin’s estates, because it is always to be supposed, every man is to have children of his own; it is no hardship upon them then, to be removed by another uncle, or another cousin, from a succession to which they could have no views.

Thus representation must be late of coming unto the collateral line, and when it comes in, it does so rather by analogy of the other, than by principles of its own.

The steps by which, in private successions, it came into the collateral line in Great
Great Britain, or even in any other country in Europe, are extremely difficult to be traced, and perhaps are not very certain when they are traced; therefore we must supply them by the progress of the fame representation in publick successions.

In these last successions, it is plain, that representation was originally unknown: In the histories of modern Europe, for a long tract of time, wherever a succession opens to collaterals, the nearest of blood takes to the exclusion of representation.

In the time of Edward I. when representation in the descending line was tolerably established throughout Europe, the point was so doubtful in the collateral line, that upon the death of Margaret of Norway, and the dispute for her succession, between her cousins Bruce and Baliol, not only the eighty Scotch commissioners, named by the candidates, and the twenty four English, named by king Edward, were long doubtful, but all Europe was doubtful, which side should prevail. The precise question, in the end put by the king to the commissioners, and there was none other insifted upon in the dispute, was: Whether the more remote by one degree in succession,
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cession, coming from the eldest sister, ought to exclude the nearer by a degree, coming from the second sister? And on the answer, importing, that representation should take place, judgment was given for Baliol.

The Scotch writers of those days are positive this judgment was wrong; the English writers of those days are as positive that it was right: These different sentiments are reconcilable: In England, at that time, representation in collateral succession was beginning to take place, and this their advance the English made: the measure of their opinion: The Scotch, on the other hand, at the same period had not arrived the same length; this species of representation was unknown to them; and therefore they disapproved of the judgment.

Solemn as this decision was, yet even in England, a century afterward, the right of representation in this line was so far from being compleat, that it was the same doubt, which in the disputes between the houses of York and Lancaster, laid that kingdom for ages in blood. On the abdication of Richard II. the two persons standing in the right of the crown, were his two cousins, the duke of Lancaster,
History of

grandson of John of Gaunt, who was fourth son to Edward III. and the earl of March, great grandson to Lionel, duke of Clarence, who was third son to the same prince. It was in the right of these persons, and therefore, in consequence of the doubt, whether representation in collateral succession should take place, that all the miseries attending that competition, ensued.

Yea, even in much later times, and when the growth of law was much firmer, it was on the same ground, that upon the death of Henry III. of France, the league set up the cardinal of Bourbon as heir to the crown, in opposition to his nephew the king of Navarre. This last prince was son of the elder branch to the cardinal, but the cardinal being one step nearer to the common stock, it was asserted, that nearness of blood, and not representation, took place in collateral succession.

For many ages, it has now been fixed in private successions, that representation in the collateral line shall take place; and although of late in Europe, there has been little dispute in publick successions, to give room for either principle to prevail, yet the
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the example of those private sucessions, and the now rivited notions of mankind, in favour of representation, will probably prevent it from being ever made again the subject of a dispute.

These notions in favour of representation, both in the descending and collateral lines, are now so strong, that we are apt to term rebels and usurpers, those who ever contested them. History and law will convince us of our error; these will exhibit to us many thousands of our ancestors dying in the field, in a prison, or on a scaffold, for rights which once were, though we measuring every thing by our present notions, superficially imagine they could never exist.

SECTION III.

If in the origin of fiefs there was any difficulty in admitting collateral relations to succession, it will readily occur, that the ascending line must have had still greater difficulty to be admitted. A man who was sufficiently obliged by getting a fief to himself, would little think of asking it for his ascendants; these ascendants too,
it was unnatural to suppose, would survive him; and above all, it could not fail to occur, that a grandfather, or great grandfather, would have been but very useless vassals, to make offer of to a superior.

Thus it came to be a rule in fiefs, that they always descend, but never ascend; a rule laid down in the books of the fiefs, and in the feudal law of all Europe, for a very long time observed.

In England the exclusion of the direct ascending line went so far, that the succession passing by the father, went to his brother the uncle; after which, if that brother entered, and died without children, it might indeed return to the father; but then it returned to him, as brother to the uncle, and not as father to the son. This regulation, by an unaccountable tenaciousness of that nation to single points of doctrine in their law, when their genius and circumstances have made them overturn the whole doctrines themselves, subsists to this day.

In Scotland*, Craig, who wrote about the 1600, relates, that in the case of the earl of Angus, which was decided a little before his time, the ascending succession had

* Craig, lib. 2, dieg. 13, N° 47.
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had been debarred. From him too it may be gathered, that the decisions were taking a contrary turn, at the time when he wrote, although he always favouring the old law, disapproves of them. Skene asserts like-wise, that a father * cannot be heir to his son: And Balfour †, treating of all the lines of succession in use when he wrote, takes no notice of this one.

Soon after the age of these authors, however, the succession of ascendants in their order, was as universally received into the Scotch law, as that of either of the other two lines in their order. In short, the succession of heirs whatsoever, if not excluded, continually took place. And thus sefts, which originally were a right of possession of the land only as long as the lord pleased, and which afterwards were a right of usufruct during the vassal’s life; are now, in point of succession, a right of property, to him and to all his heirs.

In both the collateral and ascending lines, so far as the ascending line can take place in England, there is a remarkable difference between the laws of England and of Scotland; to wit, that in the first country half blood is excluded altogether from
History of succession; whereas, in the other it is only excluded by the whole blood.

On this head, anciently in England, the following distinction was made:

A fief was either a late purchase, or had descended from an ancestor: if it was a late purchase, the half blood was totally excluded: if it had descended, and the vassal was entered in it, it is probable, that originally the half blood was admitted; because that which was only half blood to him, was whole blood to the ancestor from whom the estate came: but whatever way the law stood originally, it appears, that in the time of Bracton and Britton, it was made a dispute, whether in this last case the half blood could take the succession.

But that dispute came to an end; the principle on which the claimant by half blood had founded his claim, was, that he could deduce his pedigree through ancestors, from the first acquirer; but in a long course of ages, it became impossible, or difficult for him, to prove such connection; and therefore the law established a rule, that the last actual seisin should make the person last seised the root of descent,
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scnt, equally to many intents, as if he had been the purchaser. From this rule it followed, that in the question in hand, the half blood could * no longer pretend to be admitted.

In Scotland we have followed a middle course, between admitting or excluding the half blood entirely; in competition with the whole blood, in the same degree, we exclude it; in competition with the whole blood, in a remoter degree, we admit it.

'From the train of these papers, it will Women. be easily imagined, that women at first would not be admitted to the succession of a fief.

In all barbarous ages, where courage and strength of body are more necessary than the virtues of the mind, the rights of women must be but little regarded.

In the more ancient period of the Athenian and Spartan states, women were excluded, as long as there was a male of the same degree existing.

In Rome, before the time of the twelve tables, women were likewise excluded; nor is it even certain, that they were admitted by these tables; on the contrary, it is probable they were first admitted by the equi-
ty of the prætor, correcting the harshness of the ancient law, and by his edict unde cognati.

In the ancient feudal ages, to the bar-
barity of the times there was added, the nature of the services to be performed by the vassal, and which women, from their weakness, were uncapable of performing.

Hence, in the Salick law, they were ex-
cluded altogether: hence the books * of
the sefts exclude them and their posterity,
if not expressly mentioned in the original
grant: hence † all feudal writers agree in
the maxim natura ab omni feudo faeminas se-
cludere videtur: Hence, in publick succes-
sions, except in Spain, where, by reason of
the inundations from Africa, the system
introduced by the German nations, had
not the same vigour that it had in neigh-
brouring countries, they were in the earlier
ages, throughout all Europe, overlooked.

In these last, to wit, the publick succes-
sions, the neglecting women went so far,
that among the Goths, even the infant
grandson was preferred to his mother; for
on the death of Theodorie, his infant
grandson Athalarie succeeded, to the ex-
clusion of his mother Amalugonta.

But
Succeshion.

But when the original barbarity of the feudal nations, yielded in the natural course of things, to a greater softening of manners; and when many of the military, came to be converted into socage, or burgage fiefs, the rights of women came to be attended to, and regarded.

It is probable they were first admitted into socage, or even into burgage fiefs; for in these the offer of performing the duties by another, would have been no injury to the lord; and from thence, it is likely, their right of succession was extended into military fiefs.

In England, unless excluded by the patent*, they were admitted to a peerage; in Scotland, unless admitted by the patent†; they were excluded from it. The quicker progress of society in the one nation than in the other, accounts for the difference.

With respect to other inheritances, admitted to all others as they are; yet the remains of their former exclusion are in the very midst of their admission to be seen.

Thus in the descending and collateral lines, though they are admitted, yet the order in which they are received, is still removed as far as possible; they are not at-
attended to, till the whole male order, in the same degree, has failed: And indeed, in these lines, our ancestors have considered, the admission of them at all, as so subversive of all feudal notions, that in forming the rules of succession in their favour, they have not even applied the common feudal principles, but instead of establishing among them the right of primogeniture, have let the succession to the sief go equally, by the ancient law of nature among them all.

In the ascending line again, although in England the rule *materna maternis* takes place, yet in a descent to a son from the father, the mother shall never succeed; and even to a purchase by a son, the mother shall not succeed, as long as there is one relation left on the side of the father. In Scotland we do not even admit succession upwards on the side of the mother at all; so rigid is the law in this respect, that the king shall take as *ultimus hæres*, to the exclusion of a person's nearest relations by his mother.

When the feudal branches are lopped off, or even when the trunk is cut down, it still takes a very long time, before the roots from whence they sprung, can decay. 

C H A P.
CHAP. VI.

HISTORY of the

FORMS OF CONVEYANCE.

The forms in which property is transferred, must vary with the nature of the right enjoyed by the person from whom the transfer proceeds: it will therefore equally excite our curiosity, both as philosophers and lawyers, to trace the congruity between the feudal forms and the feudal rights, through the three great channels of conveyance, the deed of the party to take effect either immediately, or to take effect after his death, attachment by force of law, and making title by descent.

SECT. I.

The history both natural and feudal of the first form of conveying property, seems to go in the following gradual and regular progress.

The
The notion of property was originally created by the long connection of a person with the thing which he occupied, and the affection which from that connection he had conceived for it.

It was these which at first gave to the person who had long lived upon one spot of ground, the property of it: It was these, which for so many centuries in Europe, gradually strengthened the rights of vassals in their lands against their superiors: It was these, which converted the rights of copy-holders in England, and of rentellers in Scotland, both originally no more than rights of possession, to be at this day both of them rights of property.

Property being founded originally upon such principles, it is not easily conceived among a rude people, how it can be transferred to another so as to be vested in him, until there is evidence that the connection as well as the affection of the former proprietor is ceased. Hence the rule * Nudo sensu dominia rerum non transferuntur, must in such a state of society take place; the emi verborum in the act of consent, affords indeed presumptive evidence that the conveyer's affection in the property is ceased; but as that
that emissio is a found and no other thing, it is not a proper medium to dissolve the corporeal connection between the proprietor and the subject, and much less to create a corporeal connection between that subject and another person; a different medium in conveying is therefore requisite, to wit, that of delivery; delivery gives further evidence, likewise that the affection of the conveyer is ceased, for as it breaks his corporeal connection with the subject, so it also carries the mind to connect it with another, and justifys that other in conceiving an affection for it.

The first subject of property is moveables, and these from the facility of moving them were transferred de manu in manum: again, when men came to transfer the next subject of property, to wit immovable, these were transferred by putting the intended new proprietor into possession, by placing him in, or upon the subject itself. In the antient burrow laws of Scotland it is said, if any one fell his house, the seller shall stand within the house and come out of it, and the buyer shall stand without it and enter. The same was the regular method of conveying a house likewise, anciently in England.
In the transfer of both moveables and immovable, at first, in order to fix the remembrance of what had been done, many witnesses were called, many ceremonies used, and magistrates resorted to: Abraham in the patriarchal ages, bought the field of Macpelah before the whole people: in the very old Roman law, not only the ceremonies in conveying immovable were very numerous, but even such moveables as were rei mancipes, that is moveables of value, were transferred before a magistrate; and among the Lombards, Saxons, and Normans, most deeds in law and even sales of moveables were made good before a magistrate.

Afterwards, the trouble in some cases, and the impossibility in others, of delivering actual possession, made the introduction of symbolical possession necessary.

Thus, the land of Elemelech many ages after the patriarchal one, was conveyed to Boaz by the delivery of a shoe, and calling the elders with the people to witness. And land in England is now transferred by delivery of the lung or bow, and in Scotland, by that of earth and stone.

When in the further progress of Society writing comes much into fashion, many of the
the set forms of ceremonies give way to the set forms of writing in conveyances. Hence, in a more refined state of the Jewish nation, Jeremiah buys the field of Hamamiel, by writing, sealing, and witnesses; and hence conveyances in writing come to all polished nations whatever.

These set forms, whether of ceremonies, or of writing, must prevail more in the feudal, than in any other law; because in the conveyances under other laws, all connection between the grantor and grantee, unless what arises from particular covenants and qualifications, are at an end on compleating the grant; whereas a feudal grant is subject not only to the like covenants and qualifications, but to a great many more, from the relations between superior and vassal.

As the most ancient grants in Great Britain as well as in other countries, were gratuitous on the part of the superior, who, retaining in himself the dominium directum, gave only the dominium utile to the vassal; so they were given with much state on

his side, and received with much humility on that of the vassal: at the same time, to make both impressions stronger, as well as to keep alive the remembrance of the grant, possession was delivered by the superior himself, which was called investitura propria, in presence of the pares curiae, and on the land itself, though without writing, as writing was at that time but very little known.

Conveyances made good by livcry, and without writing, took so firm a root, that the frequent use of them remained in England till they were abolished by a statute in the reign of Charles II. which ordained, that parole conveyances should extend no further than to an estate at will, or a lease for three years. And in Scotland, so late as the time of Craig, that author informs us, that in his day, in the mountainous parts of the country, the superiors themselves delivered possession of the lands to the vassals without writing, and before the pares curiae.

However, in most lands, as soon as the fiefs ceasing to be personal came to descend to the heirs of the vassal, there could not but often occur upon the death of a vassal,
a defect of proof as to the origin and conditions of the grant. Vassals to remedy this, applied to superiors, and prevailed upon them to give in writing, what in the books of fiefs is called || a breve testatum, || Lib. 
declaring the tenour of the investiture: To this testification there was no date, nor did the witnesses sign it, and as the interests of mankind were at that time extremely simple in themselves, there were no involved qualifications annexed to it.

Rude and unformal as these writings were, they are the origin of the charters which are used at this day: and Craig * Craig, informs us, that even in the low countries of Scotland, fifty years before his time, there were vassals, who instead of the present formalities of conveyance, were contented with the breve testatum from their lord.

This gradation from the most ancient form to the use of the breve testatum, and the variation in the points of that gradation, according to the ancient division of Scotland in the progress of society, into the low-lands on the one part, and into the high-lands and border lands on the other, is most curious, as marked by Craig:
"Hujus nostræ observationis exempla ad huc habemus apud nos (neque enim omnia antiquitatis vestigia adhuc exoleverint) nam in limitaneis regni partibus et inter montanos, nostro ævo propriam investituram retinebant, cum dominus in loco feudi constitutus possessionem tradebat fine scripto; in locis mediterraneis, his quingentis annis elapsis, breve testatum, quod nos chartam dicimus, soliti sunt vassalli a dominis accipere, quo se inveniisse vassallum domini significabant; quæ merito brevia testata dici poterant: nam si quis monumenta antiquarum famili- arum excusserit, brevissimas chartas habendas pro tanto non sursum, sed brevem esse sufficiendum, ut totum solum necessitatis, dum inter se domini, liberae se jussisse, etiam etiam esse testatum, tunc chartam a vassali, in ea quemcumque esse posset, præsertim in hac communium usu, esse poterat.

When writing came more fully into use, these declarations came to be so much extended, as to contain more clauses than they had originally contained words; for as the power over property from the progress of society grew more extended, and as the interests of mankind from the same progress grew more involved; these conveyances were clogged with qualifications, conditions, and covenants, extensive as the powers,
Conveyances.

powers, and various as the interests of mankind.

This extent of society made men less fond of that feudal pageantry which had arisen only from a more narrow state of society. In consequence of this, superiors, instead of delivering possession themselves, gave orders † to their bailiffs or attorneys to do it; and any witnesses signing, though not pares curiae, were sufficient. And thus the ‡ improper investiture was established.

In England these investitures when reduced into writing, were executed by feoffment and livery, and in Scotland, by charter and seisin.

As long as the possession was given before the pares curiae, there was a necessity for the livery of each particular manor, because those who were pares curiae to the investiture of one manor, were not pares curiae to that of another.

But the introduction of symbolical delivery, and the dispensing with the pares curiae as witnesses, made people more remiss in requiring livery of each particular parcel of land. Hence, in England, at present, if a man seised of many vills in one county, makes a feoffment of the whole, Q 4 and
and gives feisin in one vill in name of the whole, all the lands of the feoffor lying in that county shall pass: Hence, in Scotland, in an erection of several parcels of lands with a clause for their union, feisin of one parcel shall be feisin of the whole barony.

Such were the forms of original grants; in derivative grants the forms of necessity admitted some variations.

In an original grant, nothing but a charter by the giver and delivery to the receiver was needed: but in a derivative grant, as anciently the vassal of himself could not alienate, there was besides the vassal's grant, further need either of a confirmation by the superior, or of a surrender into his hand, if the fief was to remain with him, or of a surrender to, and new grant from the superior, if it was intended to be transferred to another. And accordingly, in the *formulare anglicanum*, there are a multitude of examples, of such confirmations and surrenders in the ancient law of England.
But afterwards, the statute *Quia emportors* in England, took away the distinction between an original and a derivative grant, for as it allowed a free alienation, and made the donee hold not of the donor, but directly of the chief lord, it removed the necessity * of confirmation by the chief lord, or of surrender to him. In Scotland, on the contrary, as that statute did not take effect, superiors claimed a title to bar alienation; their consent then came to be sought, and needed; and in consequence of this, the forms of original and derivative grants remained in the law; so that now in these last, where the grant is in favour of a third person, the gift, and the possession, the charter and the feisin, appear in point of form, to proceed from the superior, in the same manner, as if the grant had been from him, gratuitous and original.

Not only so, but a proprietor of an estate, unless a power of altering be reserved to him by a former conveyance, cannot complete the smallest alteration in the settlement of his estate, without application to the superior, or laying a foundation for it.
To this ancient strictness our judges adhered so rigorously, that in a late case, in which, upon the death of an ancestor the heir not entered, had procured from the superior, a charter de novo, altering the former course of succession; they found the alteration not effectual; and were of opinion, that the superior, being by the original grant divested of his property, could make no new grant till he was re-invested in it: for which reason it was held, that the heir ought first to have got himself invested on the ancient investitures, then resigned in the hands of the superior, and after that taken the new limitations as he pleased.

The power of alienating to take effect only after the death of the grantor was so much supported, and needed so much to be supported by the forms which ushered it in, without its being almost perceived, that the same chapter of this work which marks the progress of that species of alienation, must mark likewise the progress of the forms in which it was made good.
SECT. II.

The involuntary transfer of land property by force of law, happens two ways; either by forfeiture, or by attachment for debt.

As only the king and the lord were interested in the transfer by forfeiture, so anciently, in the law of England, and possibly in that of Scotland, the transfer was made good by the immediate seizure of the subject forfeited.

This was agreeable to the genius of the feudal system; for that system went on the general plan, that wherever there was a deficiency of a vassal, the seif should revert to the lord; which rule had originally taken place in escheats, when the property and superiority were reunited; and took likewise place, even when the deficiency was only a temporary one, as during the interval between the death of one tenant, and the entry of another.

It was on these last contingencies, that the rule had much more frequent opportunities
nities of exerting itself, than on the contingencies of forfeiture; and therefore it was first in non-entry and escheat, that the severity of the regulation was checked; for in England, the lord, as has been seen, lost the power of taking possession at all upon the death of a vassal: and either upon the death or escheat of a vassal, the king, by a statute in the reign of Edward I. was restrained from taking possession till an office was found. This restraint paved the way for restraining the king's power of seizure on forfeiture; it readily occurred, that if the king's power of seizing upon the death of a vassal or the failure of an heir was dangerous, his power of seizing upon forfeiture, was still more dangerous, and as he was restrained in the two first cases by the necessity of having an office found, it appeared that he ought equally to be restrained in the latter.

Between these suggestions in favour of the necessity of an office on the one hand, and the king's ancient right against it on the other, it appears, that the law of England † was unfixed for some time; but at length, the following distinction was made: If the person attainted of treason died, his lands
lands were vested in the king without any office, because by the attainder, there was no heir to claim, and therefore no injustice could be done to any one; but on the contrary, when the alleged offender was alive, who might have injustice done him by the seizure, it was agreed that his lands were not vested in the king till an office was found.

A statute of * Henry VIII. however, put * An. 33. an end to this distinction in attainders of treason, and declared, that the lands of persons so attainted, should be vested in the king without any office; at the same time, as this statute relates only to attainders of treason, so the common law † in other cases † Staundf. prerog. cap. 18. is left on its ancient footing.

In Scotland, the law took a different course, when the forfeiture was in parliament, the estate was indeed directly vested in the king, but in other forfeitures, the king could not seize till he had brought a declarator or action of declaration of the forfeiture. As there was once a time in the law of Scotland, when no declarator was needed, in non-entry or escheat, it is likely that the introduction of it on these con-
contingencies, paved the way to the introduction of it into forfeiture.

Another difference occurred between the customs of England and Scotland; in the first of these countries, whatever was forfeited or escheated, was levied by the king’s officers, and accounted for to him. In Scotland, on the contrary, the king almost constantly made gifts both of the forfeiture and of the escheats. In England, the subordination of superior and vassal having soon ceased to be strict, there seemed no incongruity in the king’s holding an estate by forfeiture, which the forfeiting person had even held of another, but in Scotland, that subordination remaining entire, it was deemed an inconsistency in the king to hold an estate which was in vassalage to another superior: and the custom of making gifts of such estates, probably led the way to making gifts of almost all other estates that fell to the crown by forfeiture or escheat; and perhaps the greater necessity of the nobility in Scotland, than in England, along with the subjection in which the king was kept to his nobles, extended and established the practice.
This difference in the customs of the two nations, insignificant as it may appear, led to consequences that were terrible in Scotland. As the great families who remained were to enjoy the spoils of those who were forfeited, they were very ready to thunder out their dooms against each other; and on the other hand, as a pardon after the gift did not restore the estate, all access to mercy was shut up. In consequence of which, for ages, this land was torn in pieces by a nobility on the one hand greedy, and on the other hand driven to despair; and a race of princes, many of whom, in order to protect themselves, played the mutual furies of both against each other.

The late British statutes are bringing the laws of Scotland and England nearer together, both on the contingencies of forfeiture and escheat. By the vesting acts of 1715 and 1745, the forfeited estates are vested without any office of inquisition, and without declarator. The clan act made the superiority to be vested in the loyal vassal, without declarator of forfeiture, and the property to be vested in the loyal superior without declarator of escheat; and by the
the late vesting act, the estate of the forfeiting vassal was understood to be vested directly in the crown, though holding of a subject superior.

The manner of making the transfer good upon attachment for debt, was originally the same both in England and Scotland. The attachment was made good by a petition to the king or the king's judges, who upon that issued an order to the sheriff to deliver possession.

But in the form of delivering this possession, a difference arose between the English and the Scotch law: in England the sheriff delivered constantly the seisin, whether the land was held of the king or of the lord: as the lord's connection with his vassal came early in England to be but slight, he interested himself but little in the attachment; and the statute *Quia emptores* too, taking effect there almost as soon as the attachment of land, it appeared no hardship upon the lord, to have that tenant put in by the sheriff, who could have been forced upon him by the voluntary conveyance of the debtor; but in Scotland, where the connection between lord and tenant remained strict, the lord thought he had
had a right to interest himself in the attachment; and as the statute Quia emptores went into disuse, the lord often refused to accept for tenant as attacher, him, whom he could have refused as voluntary dispence. In consequence of this, the infeoffment of the sheriff, except in lands holden of the king, would have been to no purpose; seeing the debtor would still have continued immediate tenant, and he and those in his right remained subject to the incidents due to the lord. In order to avoid those incidents then, it became necessary in Scotland for the attacher to receive feisin from the lord, if the land was held of him; and accordingly in the law * of Alexander, though it is the sheriff who sells, and in the statute of † 1469, though it is the sheriff who comprises, yet it is the lord, when the lands are held of him, who infeoffs. In the last of these statutes, a privilege granted to the debtor is clogged with this burden: "he payand the expences made on the over-lord, for charter, feisin, "and infeoffment."

From that day to this, in Scotland, the form in which the law transfers land from the debtor to the creditor, remains the same,
for though a variety of means have been used to force the lord to infeoff, or in some cases to render his infeoffment unnecessary; and though since the late statute of the 20th of the present king, he can refuse no person attacher who is within the meaning of the statute, yet even independent in fact as the creditor is of the lord, he must still in point of form apply to him, and from him seek possession. The grant is made by the lord, the seisin is delivered by him, and his power alone, not the operation of law appears in the form of the transference.

Again, with respect to the attachment of land for the debt of the ancestor, the novelty of the attempt to reach land for such debt, could not fail to be attended with embarrassments, and variations in the form of doing it. It has been seen, that this attachment first took place among trading people, by the statute merchant in England, of Edward I. which declared, “that if the debtor died, the merchant should have possession of the lands,” and by a similar statute along with the laws of the burrows in Scotland. Now it is probable, that at first, upon the strict words of the statute of Edward I. the land was directly
directly attached without taking any notice at all of the heir, although the method came afterwards to be changed, and the heir was sued for the assets descended to him. It is certain in Scotland, that at first, the creditor attached the lands of the deceased debtor directly, without any previous constitution of the debt against the heir, or any charge to enter heir. This appears from some ancient deeds, in which the bailiff either gave to the creditor in a burrow, the brief of distress, directly against the inheritance of the debtor, or only called the heir upon his jus retractor, to assert his preference and to redeem the lands if he pleased. But this method came afterwards to be changed, as it had been changed in England, and a decree of constitution was previously used against the heir.

The singular effect of the heir's renunciation in Scotland, was remedied, as has been seen by the introduction of the adjudication cognitionis causa. The singularity of the remedy was attended, as all novelties must be, with variations in the form of making it good. According to Sir Thomas Hope, the superior was originally nally minor practicks.
nally made the defender in this adjudication, the heir being called only for his interest, and decreet was given against the superior solely. * This was natural at a time, when the lord’s interest was extremely strong in the fief; but at present the process is directed against the heir alone, without even calling the superior; and by the decree the land is adjudged from the heir directly to belong to the creditor. This is equally natural, at a time when the interest of the vassal in the fief is become stronger than that of the lord. Again, originally, the decree against the superior was only personal, ordering him to infeoff the creditor in the land for payment of his debt, but gave no real lien directly on the land: and perhaps the judges at first thought, they had made stretch enough, in giving this personal decree; but now, from the ripening of the diligence, and the favour of creditors, direct access is given to the land, and a real lien created on it by the adjudication.
THE forms of taking an estate by succession, proceeded originally upon the same plan of connection between superior and vassal, on which the other forms of conveyances proceeded.

In the ancient constitution of a feudal grant, the lord gave the fief to the vassal, under the express condition, that certain services should be performed or duties paid to himself; and under an implied condition, that when the vassal failed in his part of the obligation, the fief should return to the lord. In consequence of this, when the grantee died, the property of the land returned to the lord. Afterwards, when the rights of the vassals gained so much upon those of the lords, that fiefs descended universally to heirs; yet still the old form founded on the old right, so far remained, that on the death of a vassal his fief returned into the hands of the lord; but then the lord on his part, was understood to be
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S E C T. III.

The forms of taking an estate by succession, proceeded originally up-on the same plan of connection between superior and vassal, on which the other forms of conveyances proceeded.

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subject to an obligation which he could not defeat, of renewing the grant, in the person of the vassal's heir.

In the old laws therefore both of England and Scotland, the vassal, in order to make title to the fief of his ancestor, was obliged to apply to the lord, and to get a renewal of the investiture from him: and indeed this notion of a right of reversion in the superior, went at one period so far in both kingdoms, that the heir not being supposed to take through the ancestor, but directly from the superior, was not subjected to the debts of his ancestor; and in Scotland, at a much later period *, the renunciation of the apparent heir would have sent back the property of the fief to the superior, and disappointed the creditors altogether.

In England, by the time † of Henry II. the rigorous dependance of the vassal, upon the lord had so far ceased, that the vassal, provided he payed the simplex fasina, or relief, could take up the fief without applying to the lord.

But even then, the king continued in possession of his old right; upon the death of the vassal he took possession of the land,
and the heir could not enter into possession, till he sued out a livery, by means of a service upon the briefe or writ *diem clausit extremum*; the right of the king in the statute *de prerogativa regis* is described, post mortem, &c. capiendo omnes exitus, earundem terrarum et tenementorum, donec facta fuerit inquisitio; sic moris est, et ceperit homagium hæredis. And the writ of *diem clausit extremum*, whereby this writ was put in execution, run thus, *cape in manum nostram, omnes terras et tenementa*, &c. donec aliud inde præceperimus, et per sacramentum proborum hominum diligenter inquiras, &c.

In Scotland, as the dependance of the vassals on the lords remained strong; not only the king, but the lords retained their ancient right. As soon as a vassal died, his lands became open to the superior, or as the law terms it, fell in non-entry; to him the heir of the vassal was obliged to come, and from him sought entry: If he was a subject superior, as every such superior is supposed to know all his vassals, he generally granted a writing, called from the narrative of it, a precept of *clare constat*. This writing declared it was known to him, that the claimant was next heir to the vassal.
fal last deceased, &c. and therefore ordered the bailiff to deliver him possession of his predecessor's land: but if the king was superior, as from the multiplicity of his vassals and the cares of Government, it was impossible he could be acquainted with all his vassals, he referred the question of the right of the claimant, to the cognizance of an inquest, by a brief or writ out of the chancery, which is the king's great charter room, and antiently was ambulatory with him. Upon the report of this inquest in favour of the claimant, returned into chancery, a precept was issued from it by the king's officers, who did now, by their office, what the king more antiently did in his own person: this precept ordered feisin to be given to the claimant, was directed to the sheriff, who is the king's bailiff, and was by him executed.

The same ceremonies in the transmission of common estates, and similar ceremonies in the transmission of burgage estates, remain in Scotland, in favour both of the king and of the lord, to this day. And founded on these ceremonies, which suppose a right of property in the superior, but subject to an obligation of renewal in the
the person of the heir, which cannot be defeated; it is still the law of Scotland, that the renunciation of an heir before he is entered, though a renunciation is not a proper mean of conveyance, yet is sufficient, where the interest of creditors does not oppose it, to vest the property of the estate compleatly in the superior, or rather to disburden that estate, which was before deemed to be in him, of the incumbrance which affected it in favour of the heir.

In England, the same form of an heir's taking a military, or socage estate, in capite, rather from the superior, than through his ancestor, remained, with only such differences, as the different offices and officers of the two kingdoms created, as long as the court of wards and liveries remained; for the king *, as has been seen, took possession upon an office found, and the heir was obliged to sue out a livery, before he could recover it.

Such is the progress of the feudal forms of conveyance by deed of party, to take effect now, or to take effect after death, by attachment of law, and by making title in descent. In all of them, the connection between the feudal rights and the feudal forms,
forms, and a regard to the interest of the superior, even when the fief is continuing to pass from him, may be traced.

In the end, however, when a very extensive degree of commerce, causes a continual fluctuation of land-property; and that fluctuation arises much more from onerous, than gratuitous causes; the connection between the grantor and grantee, and between this latter and the granter's superior, comes to be but slight: the dispatch of business at the same time so necessary in extensive dealings, cannot admit the slow forms of a grant from one person, and of an after application to another. These feudal forms therefore give way to other forms, more accommodated to the natural state of mankind.

Property comes then to be transferred, when by deed of party, in no other ceremony of words, than is sufficient to show the intention of the granter, generally indeed for the sake of evidence expressed in writing, attended with possession, and sometimes even without it.

Thus in England, although originally conveyances by deed of party were executed by acts of feoffment; which, as will
appear from a comparison of * Madox and * Mad.
form. an-
craig, answer in their nature and progress glec. diff.
to our charter and seisin; or by fines, p. 11. &
which were originally an acknowledgement alibi.
craig. lib. 2.
disc. 2.
of such feoffment in a court of record;
yet earlier than the time of Lyttleton, it
had come into fashion, to transmit land by
attornment, if there was a tenant, and by
lease and release, if there was none; in the
first of which cases, the form of getting the
consent of the tenant of the ground to the
transfer, supplied the place of that livery,
which could not be given; and in the
other case, the grantor gave to the grantee,
an imaginary lease, in order to put him
into possession, and the next minute re-
leased; or in the language of the law of
Scotland, renounced all right or interest he
had in the land.

In attornment something was done to
supply the want of livery, and in lease and
release the entry gave livery; but a statute
of † Henry VIII. by making provisions † An. 27.
H. 8.
cap. 16.
concerning a form of conveyance, which
before had been in use, enabled people to
dispense with these two shadows of a form,
and with the circuit of a feoffment alto-
gether. The form of conveyance by bar-
gain
gain and sale, made secure by writing and enrolment, by virtue of this statute, corresponds to our disposition, without infeoffment in Scotland: This last with us does not transfer; it is only a step to the transfer; but in England, on a bargain and sale, all notion of a superior or delivery is lost, the moment the deed is inrolled, the estate, to almost all effects whatever, is vested *ab initio*; nor can there be any dispute between competitor purchasers, except what arises from the dates of their respective inrolments. And so much did the English in this form of conveyance dispense with the strictness of forms, that till the statute directing the inrolment, lands might have been conveyed by even a parole bargain and sale; and even after this statute, as the easiest forms of conveyance take place always in boroughs before other places, it still remained allowable, till a statute † of Charles II. by bargain and sale, to convey lands, by word of mouth, in cities and boroughs.

In Scotland we are so far approaching to a moderation in the rigour of our forms of conveyance, that though originally no one could grant to another what was granted

† An. 29
C. 2.
cap. 3.
Bacen
voce Bargain & Sale (C.)
Nv 1. & lote.
to himself, till he was seised in it, yet at present a man can assign over, his author's personal obligation to dispone in the disposition, before he is himself infeoffed; and for a long time, a personal disposition without infeoffment, was preferable to a posterior disposition, though attended with it.

Upon the same plan of facility of conveyance, instead of the circuit of a disposition de praesenti, and feisin upon it, a man may at present, in England, devise a land estate by a mere testament, with the same ease, with which he may devise the most inconsiderable sum.

In the same manner, in the attachment by law at present in England, the judgment of law only appears. The feudal forms, except in the transmission by escheat, are not even to be traced in it. The land charges its master with as few ceremonies, as land originally allodial could have done. On forfeiture it is vested as often in the publick as in the king, and on attachment for debt, the creditor is obliged to apply to none but the judge.

The transmission of succession ab intestato, has had the same fate; the heir, instead of application to the superior, rather continues
nues that right which his predecessor had, than acquires a renewal of his predecessor's right, and now takes the estate in the same way, that in the Roman law a Roman would have done: That is, he takes it by any ouvert act, showing his intention to do so.

The form of taking an ancestor's estate through the superior, was the last feudal form of conveyance, that was kept up with ancient exactness, in the law of England; but the same statute, which by abolishing the tenures by knight's service, abolished so great a number of the private rights of the feudal system, put an end to the almost only remaining feudal form of conveyance in it. And thus those rights, and those forms, which arising from the peculiar circumstances of a rude people, absorbed in themselves all other rights, and all other forms; which for so many centuries in Europe, were a continual bond of union, and yet a continual source of wars; which by one general tenor, subjected to the same rules, princes and subjects, kingdoms and private estates; that system, which by the simplicity and orderliness of its principles, so long flourished, and is yet
yet so much revered; fell not at once, but by slow degrees: Every age impaired some part of the fabrick, till in the end, unnatural, though well compacted and dependant as it was, it gave up most of its particular rights to the natural equality and police of society, and submitted its peculiar forms to the dispatch and ease required in the extended, varying, and intricate dealings of mankind. At what period we shall arrive at the same state in Scotland, is uncertain; but it is certain we have been for some time fast approaching to it; and as almost every nation in Europe, has run, or is running the same course, it is not probable that we shall be the only exception to that chain of causes and effects which is always the same.

One difference, a considerable and a curious one, may be observed in the different channels, which the declension of the feudal law has taken in England and in Scotland. In the first of these countries, the transmission of land-property through the feudal forms, had gone into disuse, when yet many of the most rigorous feudal rights remained in the dependency of tenures by knight's service: In Scotland, on the
the contrary, the dependency of this last tenure has been abolished, though yet the old forms of transmission universally remain over the country.

In England, the great commerce, and frequent fluctuation of land-property arising from it, made the embarrassment of the feudal forms of transmission too inconvenient to be born with; while, on the other hand, the power of the king, and of the great families, supported the military tenures, with the solid interests to themselves arising from them. In Scotland again, as the power of the nobility is visibly decayed, they have not been able to support the dependency of a holding, which has been esteemed so detrimental to the rest of their fellow-subjects; while, on the other hand, we have not yet arrived at so extended a commerce, and consequently, frequent fluctuation of land-property, as to make the embarrassment of the feudal forms of transmission, be very sensibly felt.

When from a greater extent of commerce, these embarrassments come to be more sensible, we shall probably come to sell lands by bargain and sale, or for form's sake, by something like lease and release. We
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We shall devise lands by testament, not by a disposition de praefenti. Our adjudications will be compleated without acknowledgment of the superior. The heir will take his ancestor's estate by entry, not by service and charter. And as there is already an union of kingdoms and of interests, there will probably be in these respects, in future generations, an union of forms and of laws.

SECT. IV.

FORMS of conveyances are only to Records, be regarded, in proportion as they give security to purchasers and creditors: Hitherto they have been traced, as recurring to, or deviating from feudal principles; but in this section it is to be enquired, how far the forms of conveyances in Great Britain, have a more intrinsic and and independent value, as conferring security upon purchasers or creditors. Perhaps the digression will be pardoned, in consideration of its importance.

It is not a little to be wondered at, that a nation so wise and provident as the English, should at all times have been so deficient
cient in the use of registers, by which alone purchasers or creditors can know with certainty, the estate of the person from whom they buy, or to whom they lend.

In the ancient voluntary conveyances by feoffment and livery, and the after one by lease and release, and the still more modern one by bargain and sale, there was no necessity to record the transmission: Nay, so carelessly were the ancestors of the English, that these conveyances would have been good, though not reduced into writing, and only executed by parole.

This negligence was bad enough, in all these modes of transmission; but in that of bargain and sale, by which the estate was vested without livery of the land, it was intolerable: and therefore, by a * statute in the reign of Henry VIII. all bargains and sales were ordered to be inrolled, within six months from their date; and by a future † statute, all conveyances of land for more than three years, were ordered to be executed in writing.

In the securities for debt, the law of that country seems to have been more provident; for on a recognizance or statute being entered into by a debtor, the security was
was inrolled; and upon execution by ele-
git, the ‡ sheriff was obliged to return his ‡ Bacon,
writ of elegit into the court from which it vol. 2.
pag. 349.
proceeded.

Notwithstanding these precautions, pur-
chasers and creditors remained however up-
on an extreme uncertain footing; for still many kinds of voluntary conveyances were not under a necessity of being recorded; and therefore, through these a man might convey over the same estate to several different people: or, as there was no re-
cord of wills, he might grant security on that estate from which he had been disin-
herited.

To remedy these things, a practice which had been originally instituted for other purposes, was turned into an instru-
ment of conveyance §. Fines were origi-
nally no more than a friendly composition and determination of real differences rec-
corded in the superior’s court, and they were the more easily admitted, because the pares of the court, who were the judges of it, were through them, the sooner dismissed from their attendance on the court, and the superior received a fine upon the com-
position made. But as fines were very

S 2 much
much favoured in the law, people took advantage of them, and by feigned acknowledgements of a feoffment, recorded originally in the lord's court, and afterwards removed into, and limited to the king's court, turned these fines into a very secure form of conveyance; for the effect of them was to conclude not only the right of those who were parties to them and their heirs, but to conclude also all others, as the statute of fines of the 18th of Edward I. declares, if they make not their claim within a year and day.

Although these fines standing thus at common law, or at common law explained and ascertained by statute, were a remedy to much of the uncertainty to which purchasers were formerly exposed; yet another statute, authorizing estates tail, having declared, that any fine levied of them, should be null and void; no fine could extinguish the rights of heirs of entail: and their settlements in tail being private, and not recorded, the purchaser or creditor was still insecure as against them.

To remedy this †, a statute of Henry VII. and another of ‡ Henry VIII. explain-
plaining it, enacted, that fines for the future, should bar the issue of tenant in tail. At the same time, as it would have been very partial to have introduced all these things in favour of purchasers, unless some additional care had likewise been taken of those who had rights in such estates, the necessity of proclamations, was therefore by these last statutes established, and the right of claim, in those having interest in the estate, was extended from one year to five.

The statutes of Henry VII. and Henry VIII. remedied by such means, part of the insecurity of purchasers; but they did not remedy it entirely; for though those statutes barred the issue of tenant in tail, they barred not those who had the remainder or reversion in fee.

These last then were still to be barred by a common recovery, a form of conveyance, which had formerly been sometimes used to defeat entails, but which after the time of Henry VIII. was used continually, whenever it was necessary to extinguish these remainders and reversions in fee, and by that means became, like a fine, one of the common assurances of the kingdom.
This recovery was made good by a feigned suit and judgment recorded, in which the estate was ejected from the tenant in tail, and relief given to him upon the lands of an imaginary warrantee who was worth nothing. As the relief was supposed when got, to go in the same course of descent in which the lands recovered would have gone, this was deemed a recompence both to those in remainder and reversion, and imaginary as it was, they were not permitted to impeach it.

Extended in their effects, as those fines and recoveries are become, though they confer additional security upon purchasers, yet they confer none upon creditors; and even to purchasers there still remain two dangers, which no foresight can be secure against: for as there is no register either for rents or mortgages, the purchaser cannot be certain of the rents to which the land is subjected, and still less of the mortgages affecting it, of which the mortgagee may not even be in possession.

In Scotland it was a considerable time before the alienations of land-property were frequent, and at the time they became so, we had before our eyes all the mis-
Thus by an act of * James VI. extended by two of † Charles II. seifs upon voluntary conveyances were ordained to be registred in certain registers. In involun-
tary conveyances again, the privy council ‡ ordered all comprisings to be registred; a short record on the allowance of compris-
ings, came by practice in the place of that registration; and this practice, was by a statute § of Charles II. approved of. In transmisions from the dead to the living, by the constitution of the chancery, the retour or verdict of the jury on the service was obliged to be recorded; or though there had been no such necessity, the neces-
sity of registiring, the seifin would have been sufficient. The same statutes which ordered the registraction of seifsins, made more effectual, than it had been, the registraction of reversions. Real burdens being made good in the feudal form, fell under.

S 4 the
the necessity of the same registration of seizins. By an act in the reign of || James VII. not only the irritant and resolutive clauses of entails, were ordered to be repeated in the instriments of seizin, but a particular record was directed for that species of settlement. Statutes were made in the reign of * James VI. to establishe, and to perfect the registration of inhibitions, and interdictions, against those who were prohibited to convey by the law. Many acts of securant, and other statutes, proceeded upon the same plan with those already mentioned. And to crown all, by a process of reduction, and improbation, and certification following upon it, which cuts off every thing, even rents and mortgages, purchasers are more effectually cleared of incumbrances in Scotland, than by a fine and recovery, they are cleared of them in England.

In short, by the number and regularity of our registers, not only purchasers of, but creditors upon land estates, if they are tolerably inquisitive, are as secure of the condition of their subject, in the law of Scotland, as they are in the law of any nation upon earth.

Of
Conveyances.

Of late years it appears, that the English are becoming sensible of their deficiency in the want of registers, and are attempting to remedy it.

Thus by an act of † queen Ann, a register is ordained to be kept, of all deeds and conveyances executed, which affect lands in the west riding of York-shire. Another statute of the same † queen, established a similar register in the east riding of York-shire. A third § does the same in the county of Middlesex. And a statute of the present king extends it to the north riding of York-shire.

In most of the regulations affecting land-property, the law of Scotland is approaching to the law of England. But in the establishment and completion of registers, it is probable, the law of England will rather approach to, and imitate that of Scotland.

C H A P.
CHAP. VII.

History of Jurisdictions, and of the Forms of Procedure in Courts.

I am far from attempting in this chapter, to give a compleat history of the courts, and far less of the procedure in the courts of Great Britain. I pretend to trace those courts, and that procedure, so far only, as they are connected with the progress, and declension of the feudal system of our land-property.

SECT. I.

The natural progress of jurisdiction seems to be this:

In the rudiments of society, people unite more from the accident of living in the same family, than from any notion of advantage or order: they are all children, or wives, or servants of one head; the former were under his subjection from their age, the others from their condition, and that power which in his youth he was able to hold
hold through force, he retains in the decline of his life, from authority.

The first tribunals, in the order of things, then, were the domestick.

When many such families are residing together, it cannot be long, till one head of a family, from his superior wisdom or force, becomes master of the rest; but his superiority must be supported by the same activity which gained it; and therefore, in this transition from domestick to political government, the chieftain himself, will be not only be general in war, but judge in peace.

It seems an invariable law in the political world, that society shall not remain long in the same state. The small principality we are speaking of, if the society subsists for any time, either extends itself by conquest, or is changed into a republick; one of which cases must happen, whenever the inhabitants encrease greatly in numbers: in either case, these numbers of inhabitants make it impossible for the supreme magistrate to take cognizance of every cause; and the complexity of their actions producing an equal complexity in the regulations of their actions, puts it out of his power
power to take cognizance of almost any. The chief magistrate must be too much employed in military, and political, to have either time, or knowledge, for jurif-
prudential functions. Jurisdiction is therefore intrusted to subordinate magistrates, who may make jurisdiction more immedi-
ately their concern.

At the same time, law is not yet, during this period, become so extensive an art, as to give entire occupation to those subordinate magistrates, and therefore, for a long time, they perform the functions of priests, of soldiers, or of senators, together with those of judges. Who the particular persons shall be, who are intrusted with these magistracies, varies with the imaginations and circumstances of different nations. By the Jews, among whom the subordination of internal policy was profound, jurisdiction was given to age. By the Romans, haughty and vain, to splendor of race. The ancient Germans, fierce and free, scorning human, would yield to none but the divine authority; and, as Tacitus re-
lates, made the ministers of God, the avengers of injustice.
But when the state of society comes nearer its perfection, the greater numbers of men, and their still greater numbers of rights, the folly of some, the injustice of others, and the continual intercourse of all, make the science and art of law so extensive, that it can allow no conjunct occupation to those who are intrusted with the care of it; lawyers then are formed into bodies by themselves, and from these bodies the judges are taken.

This progress is confirmed by the histories of all nations, particularly by that of our ancestors. Tacitus relates, that among the ancient Germans, men had power of life and death in their own families. — The princes who gave a beginning to the feudal system in Great Britain, were at once generals and judges. — When the conquests were settled, their officers shared with them in a regular jurisdiction. — And in the end the power of judging taken from those who formerly enjoyed it, is at present intrusted entirely to judges.

The gradation from the third to the last step of this progress, constitutes the history of feudal jurisdictions in Great Britain, and must therefore be traced by itself.
It is observable, of all the conquests made by all the feudal nations, that to the possession of lands there was always attached a power of judging the people who lived on them. Many particular reasons contributed to this, but a general one is obvious. Those old nations had not arrived at that regularity of police, which makes the arm of the governor, and the voice of the law attended to, through the furthest bounds of the state: fierce as well as independent, they would submit to that authority alone, which could immediately observe, seize, and punish, and that jurisdiction, which in the hands of kings or of judges would have been vain, was therefore given to the proprietors of lands over their own territories.

Upon this system, the lords of charter land, whether ecclesiastical or civil, among the Saxons, were invested with a power of judging their own people in their own courts, which from the great hall of the manor in which they were held, were called Halmotes.

In the same manner, the people on the king's land were subject to the king's judge; and the alodial people, or the Liberi, being
being attached to no lord, in a seignioral capacity, were subject likewise to the king's judge. The name of this judge, in each county, was the Reve or Sheriff, who had several judges under him, according to the several divisions of the county; and the name of his court was the Revemote, when he sat as judge of the county, and the † Burghmote, when he sat as judge of a borough.

These courts of the king, and of the lords, had their separate limits; nor could the former ‡ interfere in the first instance, with the causes, or the people belonging to the latter.

The only exceptions to this independence of the lords, were the following: When the lord refused justice altogether, or when he was so poor as not to have a court of his own, recourse was had to the king's court; although in this last case, says the § law, Salvo postea jure baronum il·brum. Again, when one lord pretended to give judgment in the case of a person subject to another lord, in order to prevent the jurisdictions from clashing, they were both obliged to remove to the Revemote, which being the king's court, was deemed to
to be superior in dignity to both; and for the same reason, when a dispute arose between two thanes, they were obliged, as appears from a * Norman law, reciting a law of Edward the Confessor, to apply to the king's great council, in which he sat himself in person.

It is no objection to this separation of jurisdictions, that the bishop, who, as a lord of charter land, had a court of his own, is yet described in many of the Saxon laws, as sitting together with the sheriff in the king's court. For he sat not there in his own right of jurisdiction, but as called to be an assistant and adviser to the sheriff, who in those times could not be so learned in matters of judgment as the other. What proves this beyond contradiction, is, that the bishop had no † share in the fines of the court; and the right to the fines of the court, was at that time, in all nations of feudal origin ‡, the sure test, of having, or not having a proper jurisdiction.

From the court either of the lord, or of the sheriff, among the Saxons, there lay an appeal to the king, who sat in his great council, and took cognizance of it. But the
these * appeals were rare, in singular cases; * L. Eadg.
and discountenanced.
N° 2.

Upon the Norman conquest, all the † al-
loodial were converted into feudal lands, by
which means the earls acquired the same
power over the freemen become now their
vassals, as had formerly belonged to the
king; or rather retaining their former
titles, they became in reality lords, and as
such, had jurisdiction in their own lands.
The necessary consequence of the interpo-
sition of the earls between the king and the
freemen, was, to throw the power of the
king over these last, one step further back.
But to prevent the king’s power from be-
ing by this means entirely excluded the
provinces, the sheriff court was still retain-
ed, and not only upheld in its ancient
powers, but new powers were added to it.
It was made ‡ co-ordinate with the lords
Bract.
courts in most cases: it was made superior
cap. 7.
to them, in many cases enumerated by
Glany.
§ Glanville, and received appeals from
lib. 12.
them: and as the || Norman princes obli-
cap. 9.
ged the bishops, the late earls, and the old
|| L. Hen. 1.
lords, all to attendance in it, it received
N° 7.
additional splendor.
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To give more state to his own jurisdiction, and to keep the provincial jurisdictions in awe, William the Conqueror established a constant court in the hall of his own palace, called Aula Regis, for all matters of right, of crimes, and of finances. This single court executed that business, which is at present divided among the four courts of chancery, king's bench, common pleas, and exchequer. It consisted of the chief officers of the king's palace. The justiciarius capitalis, instead of the king, presided in it; and appeals from both the lords courts, and the kings courts, and complaints against all inferior judges, were greedily received, and encouraged in it.

Yet during the reigns of the first princes of the Norman race, almost all suits, even those of the highest consequence, as appears from the famous decision against the bishop of Bayeux, brother to the Conqueror, were determined in those inferior courts, with a power of appeal to the king's justiciarius capitalis, in aula regis.

It will be easily imagined, that the king could not be very fond of these territorial jurisdictions of the lords, or even of the sheriff courts, which were sometimes under the
the influence of the lords. And therefore Henry II. divided the kingdom into six circuits, and sent judges itinerant through the land.

The ignorance of the judges in inferior courts, the variety of customs introduced by so many independent courts, and the management of business by parties and factions in them, were the pretences for this alteration; but the real cause was, the view of humbling the power of the great men in their counties.

Henry was not contented with this; he divided part of the business of the aula regis, or of the court of the justiciarius capitalis, among two new courts, called the king's bench, and the common pleas; the one for criminal, the other for civil matters: and these drew to them, not only by appeal, but in the first instance, many suits which had been anciently decided in the counties: and Edward I. who completed this division, in order to give more state to these courts, sat sometimes himself in the court of king's bench.

The same prince, Edward I. * ascertained the boundaries of another supreme court, which had been raised out of the
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aula regis, the court of exchequer. He took opportunities to abridge the powers of the lords in their own courts. He invented a new jurisdiction, to wit, that of the justices of peace; which being a wheel within a wheel, tended greatly to distract the power of the lords upon their estates. And his successor took the nomination of all the sheriffs into his own hands, some of whom his predecessors had been so wary as to make sheriffs in fee, and of others they had allowed the election to remain in the free-holders, if they inclined to elect.

Edward III. is said to have extended the jurisdiction of the court of chancery; a supreme court, which had likewise its foundation in the aula regis; but which afterwards, by applying the remedies of equity to strict law, and by granting injunctions, came to curb the jurisdiction of the other courts, and to swallow up the greatest part of the business of the common law.

Upon the dissolution of the aula regis, and the formation of the four great courts out of its ruins, the house of peers came to be the supreme court of appeal. The king's
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king's great council, among the Saxons, had consisted chiefly of the great thanes of the kingdom: the aula regis, among the Normans, being made up of the officers of the palace, had likewise consisted chiefly of the great lords of the kingdom: and when the first of these courts of dernier resort was sunk, and the other divided into other courts, the great lords of the realm being assembled by themselves, and though a part of the parliament, yet retaining their ancient distinction, fell naturally, according to the analogy of ancient practice, to be considered as the great court of appeal to the nation.

By these means the business of the inferior courts gradually decayed: the king, and the king's courts, by statutes and devices, drew that business to themselves: the feudal jurisdiction sunk: the official jurisdictions rose: and at present a landlord cannot hold plea of debt, or trespass, when the debt or damage amounts to forty shillings; and a sheriff is more properly an officer than a judge, and in his county court cannot determine in a debt amounting to forty shillings, unless in consequence of a commission, and by a writ of justicex.

T 3

Yet
Yet even when the feudal jurisdictions were in general put an end to in England, the remains of them appeared, and with vigour too, in the courts Palatine. The Palatines had anciently their own courts, into which the king's writs could not go, and they had a power of pardoning all murders, treasons, &c. with many other royal powers, and many royal appearances, in which these powers were made good. But as it had been the bent of the king, and of his judges; to crush in general the courts of the lords, so it continued to be the continual aim of both, till they succeeded, to subject these last particular exceptions, as much as possible, to the general law of the land.

The county Palatine of Pembroke falling into the king's hands*, was taken away by statute. Although Hexam † had by one parliament been acknowledged to be a franchise where the king's writ went not, and by another had been named a county Palatine; yet in the reign of queen Elizabeth its authority was sifted, and its privileges were taken away by parliament. And ‡ in the reign of Charles I. a jurisdiction in the dutchy of Lancaster, similar

* Coke, 4. Inst. p. 221.
† Coke, ibid. 222.
‡ An. 16. Char. 1. cap. 10.
to that of the Star chamber, was abolished by statute.—In respect to the counties palatine that were allowed to remain, contrivances * were fallen upon, in some cases, * Coke, 4. Infl. 215, 218. 2. Infl. 219, 220. † An. 34. Hen. 8. cap. 14. to extend the force of the common law thither.—By a statute of Henry VIII. † the county palatine of Chester, which before was not even linked to the political body, was ordered to send representatives to parliament; and this statute proceeds on a complaint of the inhabitants of the county, that several incroachments had been made, upon "the ancient jurisdiction, liberties, and privileges of the ancient county palatine." Under pretence that justice was not exactly administered in the county palatine of Chester, power was given to the lord chancellor, by a statute of † Henry VIII. to appoint justices of the peace, and of gaol delivery, within the county of Chester. And an after statute of the 27th § of the same prince, gave a general and important blow to all those private jurisdictions. This statute recites, "That where divers of the most ancient prerogatives, and authorities of justice, appertaining to the imperial crown of this realm, had been severed from the T 4 "fame,
fame, by sundry gifts of the king’s pro-
genitors, to the great diminution and
detriment of the royal estate of the fame,
and to the hinderance and great delay
of justice:” Therefore, it takes from
the proprietors of the counties palatine,
the power of pardon, it takes from them
the power of naming justices of eyre, of
assize, of peace, and of gaol delivery;
whatever powers it takes from the proprie-
tors, it gives to the king: and in order to
abolish even the form of the ancient autho-
rity, when the reality was gone, it ordains,
that all writs and process within the coun-
ties palatine, shall run in the name of the
king.

Such is the progress from territorial to
feudal jurisdictions in England. A pro-
gress similar in general, though differing
in particulars, may be traced in Scotland.
The law of the one country is often no
more, than a reflection, with some varia-
tions, of that of the other.

As we have not the knowledge of our
antiquities so far back as the English have,
it is impossible in our law, to trace the dif-
tinction between the vassals and the free-
men, the lords presiding over the one, and
the king's officers over the other. But after that distinction was abolished, the same courts appear equally in the antiquities of both countries.

The kings in Scotland had very early given away all the crown lands; this made them dependent upon their nobles. The want of property too in feudal times, could not fail to be attended with the want of jurisdiction. And for a very long time, they do not seem to have been so provident, even to control the territorial jurisdictions, as the princes in England were.

Hence they granted considerable civil jurisdiction to boroughs and baronies; they granted likewise the power of punishing with death, to such of the former as they erected into sheriffdoms, and to such of the latter as they indented cum fossa et furca. They made many of the sheriffs chamberlains, constables, and other officers of the law hereditary. The king's sheriff lost by dilution, the right which he anciently had, of being present when the lords held their courts, ad videndum, curia recta tractatur. Hereditary regalities both ecclesiastical and civil, were erected, with power to judge even in the four pleas of
of the crown, and with many other powers almost equal to those of the courts palatine in England: and although upon the reformation the ecclesiastical regalities might have fallen, the jurisdictions of the church were preserved * in the hands of private noblemen, when her temporalities were seized. Even private hereditary justiciaries were erected in favour of private persons over their estates: and at last by one grant, the king in a manner surrendered the sword of justice out of his hands, by making the office of the justiciarius of Scotland, an office of inheritance in the family of Argyle.

As these feudal courts, in their constitution, were independant of the king, so in their procedure they were still less dependant-upon him, and in a good measure independant of each other. The right of repledging was a right which a judge had of † reclaiming from another court any person who was subject to his own. Now one baron ‡ could repledge from another. In certain cases a baron could repledge § from the sheriff. The borough could repledge not only from || the sheriff, but

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from the justice eyre. And the proprietors of regalities could repledge from all courts whatever. And not only could the people under these territorial judges be repledged, but when they submitted to other jurisdictions, they were subject to punishment.

Our kings seem at last to have been sensible of those weaknesses in their government; they became rapacious in the forfeitures, their revocations of the gifts of the crown were frequent, and their attempts to perpetual annexations as frequent.

During this period, the attempts of the princes to raise their own courts above the feudal courts, and the endeavours of the feudal judges, to keep the determination of law matters in the ancient provincial courts, are very observable.

The thing was so far favoured by the subordination of the feudal system, that there lay an appeal from the baron §, to the sheriff or his deputies, and from them || to the jurisdiction or his deputies, and from

the borough * to the chamberlain: a complaint lay † against the judge of the regality to the justiciary; and an appeal from both the justiciary and the chamberlain, to the king and his council. The parliament originally consisted chiefly of the great lords ecclesiastical and civil. By the king’s council therefore was meant ‡, the parliament when it was fitting, or such of the members as were attending the king, when it was not fitting.

From the same feudal subordination, as the king sat in judgment himself, which he continued sometimes to do, so late as the reign § of James VI. so he had at all times, upon a complaint, a power || of bringing directly the feudal judges, as well as their partys, before himself and his council, or even before himself, at his pleasure, as a * statute expresses it.

But when many of the jurisdictions were become hereditary in families, those appeals to the king’s courts were of little use to him; appeals to a parliament independant of him were of still less. And com-

plaints directly to himself, were rare from the dread of the territorial jurisdictions, and from the consequences of a defeat. For which reasons, when a regality fell into the king's hands, he came into the practice of subjecting * the people in it to * An. 1449. cap. 26. his ordinary judges, and of annexing the regality itself to the royalty; and in a † An. 1455. particular case he stretched the execution of the sheriff into the bounds of the regality. In one reign he sent a new set of judges, called lords of session ‡, to hold † An. courts where he pleased, three times in the 1425. year, and forty days at a time. These judges were chosen by the king as he pleased, from among the estates of parliament. All the powers of jurisdiction which had formerly belonged to the king's great council, were given to them. Although an appeal § from the inferior jurisdictions to the parliament, was allowed, yet, as the lords of session gave more attention to private business than a parliament could do, people chose rather to apply to them than to appeal to it; and as they were a committee of parliament, no appeal lay from them || to the parliament. In another reign, under pre- 1457. cap. 62. tence of the short sessions of these lords, the
the king put another set of judges in their place, called the lords of daily council. These were a fixed court, sitting continually, as business occurred, at Edinburgh, or where the king resided: they were chosen by him: there was no necessity for his choosing them from among the estates of parliament: they got all the late powers of the lords of session, and which the great council more anciently had. As no appeal had been allowed from the lords of session to the parliament, so it was understood, that no appeal lay from the lords of council to it: and still further, to give less importance even to appeals from the justiciary to parliament, the king, upon a petition to him for an appeal, or, as it is called, a falling of doom, instead of remitting the affair to parliament, remitted it to thirty or forty persons named by himself, who, according to the words of the statute †, "had power, as it were, in an parliament, to decide, and discuss the "said doom."

The possessors of feudal jurisdictions on the other hand, procured at one time, a law ‡, repeated often § afterwards, that all suits should pass at first through their ordi-
ordinary courts. At another time, that the lords of session should not judge in questions of heritage, and that in other questions, parties might apply to them or the judges ordinary as they pleased. And afterwards, that appeals from the sheriff should be discussed in the county, by a justice eyre, consisting of the freeholders of the county.

In this struggle betwixt the king and the lords in support of their respective jurisdictions, one law both readily concurred in, though from far different views. By two statutes in 1455, it was enacted, that no regalities should afterwards be granted without deliverance of parliament; and that no office should be granted for the future in inheritance at all. This law was favourable for the crown, as it tended to secure it against the future alienation of its jurisdictions. On the other hand, those already possessed of regalities and heretable offices, saw the greater splendor arising to their families, from the singularity of a privilege, which all others were precluded from procuring. But the views of both were disappointed by the necessities of future princes, and the ambition of future great families;
families; things took their natural course in spite of the political prohibition, and regalities and other heritable offices continued to be granted as formerly. The king and the parliament on the succession of every prince repeated the force of revoking them; but every thing added to the number of the grants, and every member of those parliaments who could get such grants, took them.

But when the feudal system abated in the closeness of its relations, when the dignity of the crown rose, and when the rising of the people diminished in some degree, the power of those who had most interest in upholding that system, then the feudal jurisdictions yielded to those of the sovereign.

In all degradations of the feudal system, the burrows, from their tendency to a more general system, were always the first to give way: they first then lost the power of repledging by difuse, and by * statute: the barons followed and lost by difuse the same power. In the time of † Balfour this power in the barons had almost entirely disappeared, and the weakness of the ecclesiastical regalities upon the reformation, made their right
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right of repleading dwindle away into a right of sitting in judgment with the juf-
ticiary, when he had used a prior seizure or citation.

What the feudal courts lost, the king's courts acquired. The supreme court of
council and feilion † was erected by James † 1537. V. and indued with all the powers, which
the lords of feilion or the lords of daily council formerly had, and with many more.
Under the titles of extraordinary lords, se-
veral peers of the realm took their seats in
it; privileges were bestowed on its mem-
bers, its forms were prescribed, its feillions
fixed, and regularity, power, and splendor
conferred upon it. The importance of the
constitution, was attended with equal im-
portance in the effects of it; for in process
of time, this court put an end to appeals || Skene.
through inferior courts, and by suspension
tiff. Bank.
vol. 2.
P. 551.

or advocation brought causes from the
lowest directly to itself: it made regali-
ties subordinate to it in civil matters:

it withdrew § the whole civil business from § Bank.

the justiciary: it reduced infeoffments
vol. 2.
P. 523.

though confirmed * in parliament. It even An.
assumed a legislative power under pretence of passing acts of seaderunt, for the further-
U

ing
ing of justice before itself; and it became a great doubt among lawyers and politicians, whether its judgments were reviewable in parliament.

To balance the feudal jurisdictions even in the smallest matters, the same art which had been used in England for the same purpose, was used in Scotland. The institution of justices of peace was introduced by James VI. and their powers were daily extended.

Upon the same general plan, the office of justiciary of Scotland was purchased back by Charles I. from its proprietor. The court belonging to that office was new modelled by Charles II. and though confined to criminal matters, the justiciary received new splendor in the model. As in those reigns of which we have been speaking, it still maintained its right of judging in the ecclesiastical regalities together with the baillie, if he neglected first to cite or to seize; so in the reign of king William, it endeavoured to assert the same right of judging in laic regalities, together with the lord who had neglected to cite or to

† Sir G. McKenzie obs. on act 1457. cap. 62. † An. 1669. cap. 7. || April, 1628. § An. 1672. cap. 16.
feize the criminal within fifteen days of his committing the fact. The acts of 1693, 1695, and 1702, stretch the power of the justiciary into whatever regalities were in the highlands without ceremony; and the method of extending the same into the private justiciary which the family of Argyle had reserved to itself, when it parted with the office of justiciary general of Scotland, is most curious: The act of *1693* An. empowers the king to appoint for two years, commissioners of justiciary for the highlands, and though these are not allowed to extend their jurisdiction into the bounds of the private justiciary, yet the earl of Argyle is obliged to grant a commission to the king's commissioners, who under pretence of the earl's commission, are to stretch their authority into his bounds. The act † of 1695 renews the commission † An. for three years; and still the earl of Argyle is obliged to concur in it. In this form the commission continued to be renewed, till the year 1702 ‡, when a statute varies ‡ An. the expression somewhat, only recommends it to the duke of Argyle to give his commission to the king's commissioners, orders the court to be fenced in the duke's name
name as well as the king's, and allows the
duke to sit as president in the court. With
the antient proprietor of the feudal jurisdic-
tion, the shew and the form of autho-

rity remained, but the reality and substan-

t was with the king. And not contented

with all this, the court of justiciary in lat-
ter times, took upon it ||, to review, as a
superior court, the sentences of all the dif-

erent regalities.

Yet even when the king's courts were
gaining those various superiorities over the
feudal courts, these last were far from be-
ing sunk altogether. Many baronies had
still a power of punishing with death;
many sheriffdoms and regalities were he-

reditary, with considerable jurisdictions;
and the attempts to extend the court of
justiciary into the bounds of the laic re-
galities, ended in a few local temporary
experiments, and no more.

James VI. formed a plan of putting an
cend to the heretable jurisdictions of his
kingdom: with vivacity enough to form a
project, but with little prudence to con-
duct, and with still less constancy to per-
svere in it, he got an act of parliament
past, extolling the wisdom of his design,

ordaining
ordaining that reparation should be made to the private proprietors, and naming commissioners, the highest persons of the kingdom, to transact with them. All this great apparatus ended in nothing; a few sheriffships were brought in, and some other project equally vaunted and equally unsuccessful came in the place of this.

Charles I. under pretence of the general revocations in the beginning of every reign, made an attack upon all those regalities and heretable offices, which had been granted posterior to the acts of 1455, prohibiting such grants for the future. He wrote a letter to the lords of session, declaring that he meant not to be precluded by the prescription of the statute 1617, from attacking these grants: but being afterwards advised of the impropriety of cutting down so many grants which had been made and acquiesced in, by so many of his ancestors, which those who got them, thought they were secure in taking, and which had past from hand to hand by sales and execution, he desisted from his measure. Like many other incidents in this unfortunate prince's reign, the unpopularity of the at-
tempt remained with the king, the popularity of dropping it with his ministers.

Cromwell had enough of the monarch to see how inconsistent these private jurisdictions were, either with the interest of the supreme power, or the safety of the people, but he had too much of the tyrant, to think of making any reparation to the private proprietors, from whom he took their jurisdictions, but to whom he gave nothing in return.

In this progress of the gaining of the kings upon the feudal courts, I hardly take into my view, the act of 1681; an act forming propositions concerning the most antient feudal rights, yet founded on abstract, not on feudal principles; an act unhinging the rights of the orders of the state, granting no equivalent for those rights, yet asserting there is nothing taken from their proprietors; an act, in fine, composed in the days of slavery, and repealed in the days of liberty.

The statute of the present king came last, which abolished some, and limited others, of such of the territorial jurisdictions, as were found dangerous to the community; gave their proprietors a just equi-
equivalent, bestowed additional elevation upon the judges of the supreme courts, who best could know the laws of their country, and had the most interest to support them; made the power of judging in general official, and brought the courts in Scotland nearly on the same footing with the courts in England.

S E C T. II.

All barbarous nations are observed to have a great deal of superstition, one benefit arising from which, is, that they have above other nations a regard for the sanction of an oath: legislators observe this, and endeavour through religion, to subject to the rules of justice, that people, whom justice by herself could not bind.

Our Saxon ancestors particularly, took advantage of this circumstance, and drew the first determination of the law suits from the sacred regard paid to an oath. As far back as the reign of *Hlothar and Eadric, when a complaint was preferred against a party, he defended himself by his own oath, and the oaths of a certain number of com-

U 4 purgators,
purgators, swearing to their belief of his credibility.

This form of procedure might be tolerable in civil cases, but in criminal cases the temptation to perjury was higher; therefore in these, the ordeal was afterwards introduced; and exorcism, and § many other awful ceremonies used in it, the more effectually to discover the truth.

Absurd as these methods of carrying on law suits may appear, they were neither of them destitute of foundation. As the Saxons were very regular and minute in the divisions of their people, as every family had an eye on the neighbouring families in its proper division, and as the compurgators could be taken only from that division, it is more than probable, that their oaths to the credibility of a party, gave a tolerable certainty that he was worthy of credit; and in the ordeal again, as the defender was allowed * to compound with the accuser, the ordeal was only an expedient to force him to give satisfaction to the person he had injured.

During the whole Saxon period then, these were the only forms in which controversies in law were decided. But
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But when the Normans came over and settled in England; the mixture of foreigners and natives, the mutual hatred they bore to each other, the extensions of a new system, the convulsions in the old one, and the daily increase of numbers and of intercourse, made people distrust, and justly, the oaths both of parties and compurgators.

It was very natural for a soldier, when he saw another going to carry off his property by a false oath, to challenge him to fight; the superstition of the times too, made people readily imagine, that heaven would interpose for the side that had right; and the frequent injustice arising from the perjury of parties, stood in need of a check. These things had introduced the decision of law suits by combat into Normandy, and it was by the Normans Transplanted into England: probably too, it was the example of the same Normans which made it find its way into Scotland, as the Saxon conquest or the Saxon example had formerly introduced the oath and ordeal into it.

However absurd this form of maintaining actions may appear, it was not altogether destitute of reason. At a time when the
the passions of men were furious, and the voice of the laws weak, it was right to prevent general quarrels by particular combats, and to subject to rules in a court, that sword, which might have raged abroad without any.

During the reigns of the Norman princes, there appears to have been a struggle betwixt the clergy on the one hand, in support of the oath and ordeal, and the laity on the other, in support of the form of the combat; for though the oath and the ordeal remained in the publick ordinances, and though some bishops took a right in their charters of using the ordeal, yet it appears, from almost every page of Doomsday, that the claimants were continually offering battle in support of their rights.

But when more regular governments came to be settled, the uncertainty arising from such rules of judgment, was easily remarked.—The trial by oath went into disuse.—Henry III. in England, by a special precept to his itinerant judges, prohibited the trial by ordeal; William the Lyon in Scotland, restrained the abuse of it, by discharging it in the courts of the lords,
lords, unless in presence of his own judges; and Alexander II. † prohibited it altogether.—Henry II. in England ‡, and David I. in Scotland ||, although they were not allowed to abolish the duel altogether, yet granted to the defendant the privilege either to fight, or to throw himself upon an assize of twelve men. And even in this alternative, the duel was limited almost as soon as the alternative was introduced. In the course of these papers it has often been seen, that all declensions in the feudal manners took place first in the burrows, and therefore many of King John’s § charters to burrows contain this clause, *nullus corum faciat duellum.* David I. * exempted burgesses in almost every case, from the necessity of fighting. The same exemption was afterwards extended by degrees to other people; and David II. † granted to gentlemen the privilege of fighting by a champion.

Laws, especially laws so much connected with the manners of a people as these were, are a long time before they are entirely


rooted
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rooted out; and therefore, notwithstanding these various discouragements, it continued still possible, to trace these forms of procedure in the law. As some ‡ bishops in England had taken the right of ordeal in their charters, that right could not be taken from them but by publick law. The combat ‖ lasted in England, with the alternative of an affize, for several reigns: One of the sons of Edward III. § wrote a treatise on the form and the rules of the duel; and in one particular case it was used as late as the reign * of queen Elizabeth, and in Scotland it was used without any alternative, in capital crimes, where there was a deficiency of other proof. In the time † of Robert III, and even later, as appears from the authority ‡ of Skene, the trial by oath continued in Scotland; In the reign of David II. ‖ when either no proof was offered against the defendant, or § the proof was difficult to be brought: and in England it remains at this day in the wager at law. By wager at law, the defendant, where apparent proof is not brought

by the plaintiff, is allowed to clear himself by his own oath, and the oaths of as many credible persons, averring they believe he swears true, as the court shall appoint.

With these exceptions, however, the form of procedure by assize gained continually ground, till it came to be firmly established both in England and in Scotland.

But a remarkable difference arising from the different constitutions of the superior courts in England and Scotland, soon appeared in the two countries.

The court of session by James I. and II. the court of daily counsel by James IV. and the court of council and session by James V. were all made to consist of such a number of judges as were sufficient for an assize, and were therefore supposed to supply the place of one.

In the sheriff courts and in the justiciary courts, the trial by juries it is likely, remained as late as the reign * of James IV. * An. 1503, but when the justiciary was supplanted in his civil jurisdiction, by a more numerous set of judges. The practice of those judges, to judge without a jury, set an example to the inferior courts, and in these courts, the
the trial by jury in civil cases fell into disuse too.

But the remains of the antient form of trial by jury in civil cases are still to be seen, in the procedure upon the three retournable and the three unretournable briefes.

From the same principle that the court of session is a jury, it is, that in one particular case, it is necessitated to take the whole proof in presence of the whole judges; and that all proofs issuing from the court, ought regularly, and are generally reported to the whole judges.

The example of the civil courts led many of the inferior ones, to judge in smaller crimes without the assistance of a jury; but the court of justiciary being supreme, takes examples from its ancient customs alone, and according to these continues still to judge by an advise.

The same extent and refinement of society, which removed men from particular to general courts, and which made forms of trial depending upon chance, yield to the certain and uniform decisions of law, produced another alteration in the form of procedure at law.
Jurisdictions.

In all simple nations it is observable, that as there are a great many ceremonies used in constituting an obligation, or making good a transfer, so there are certain strict and fixed forms used in all proceedings at law. Among such a people, the transactions of mankind are not very intricate or numerous; all the claims arising from these transactions are easily reducible into strict forms; they are accordingly reduced into them, and judgment is given in the precise terms of these forms.

Thus in the Roman law, originally, all actions were prisci juris, the Patricians invented the legis actiones, they reduced every claim that could be preferred into a certain brief, or what is in that law called a formula, and upon that formula, judgment prisci juris was given.

The same cause produced the same effect, both in England and in Scotland. Originally, in both countries, every right had its particular brief †, issuing from the chancery assigned to it, in which it was to be made good; and at that time no judgments could be given except they applied precisely to the terms of the brief. This in England went so far, that before the
the reign of Edward I. whenever there was a new case, that seemed to require a remedy, the chancery referred the plaintiff to petition the next parliament; but because this multiplied petitions to parliament, a statute was past, authorizing the clerks of chancery to invent a new writ if the case was similar to any case falling under a former writ, or if the clerks could not agree, ordering the case to be hung up till in the next parliament a writ should be contrived for it. The statute is in these words: *Et quotiescumque de cætero evenerit, in chancellar, quod in uno casu repetitur breve, et in consimili casu cadente sub codem jure, et simili indigente remedio, non repetitur; concordant clerici de cancellaria, in brevi faciendo, vel atterminent querentes in proximum parliamentum, et scriptoribus casus in quibus concordare non possint, et referant eos ad proximum parliamentum, et de consensu jurisperitorum fiat breve, ne contingat de cætero, quod curia domini regis deficiat conquerentibus, in justicia perquirenda.* And in Scotland, by an act of § James the IV. it was ordained, "That na briefes, nor uthers letters, be given to na partie, but after the forme of the briefes of the chancelarie used in all times of before."
And by another * of James VI. it was ordained, "That nae writer to the signet cap. 13. should take upon hand, to wryte, or put in forme, any maner of signature or letter to be past his majesty's hand, that conteins noveltie contrair the ac- customary stile and forme."

But when men become more numerous, their intercourse is greater, their actions are more complex, and consequently their claims are less simple; for rights supported on new modifications of the actions of mankind, cannot be subjected to briefs invented at a time when these modifications were unknown; and as there is a greater latitude in the form of the claim, so there is a greater latitude in the views of the court.

Hence in the Roman law, the distinction betwixt actions fisci juris and bona fidei; the directions of the prætor in these last to determine, uti inter bonos et æquos agier oportet; the office of the prætor himself ad corrigendum et temperandum juris rigorem, and the invention of actions præ- scriptis verbis; hence in England, the permission given to the chancery of forming new writs; the invention of actions on the case;
case; and the jurisdiction of the chancery itself considered as a court of equity. Hence, in Scotland, the gradual extension + within these two hundred years, in the natures of summons, and the powers of the clerks to the signet; the acts before granted by all courts; the general interlocutors informing only in general the pains of law, passed on the relevancy of criminal libels; and the junction of a court of equity and of strict law, in the constitution of the college of justice.

It is thus that laws gradually alter and gradually refine. Men complain of the multiplication of laws, of forms, and of courts; they do not see, (to use the words of an author || who saw through the whole spirit of law) that the trouble, expense, delays, and even dangers of judiciary proceedings, are the price which every subject pays for his liberty.
CHAP. VIII.


FEW subjects of enquiry have more engaged the writings and the passions of men in Great Britain, than that regarding the constitution of parliament. But while some have directed their enquiries only to exalt the power of the crown, and others only to exalt that of the commons, few have tried the justness of their notions, by the only object which could throw light upon the question, or bestow assurance on their conclusions. The object I mean is that feudal system, which varying in its state, and extensive in all its operations, made the constitution of parliament follow its gradual changes, in the same manner that it caused the nature of tenures, the power of alienation, the force of entails; the rules of succession, the forms of conveyances, and the property of jurisdiction, to vary with all its variations.
From the obligation of the king's vassals to be suitors in his court is generally derived the origin of parliaments: the conclusion seems too hasty: did it follow from the vassal's being the object of jurisdiction himself in the king's court, or even from his attending there as a peer to his brother vassals in a judicative capacity, that therefore he was intitled to become a law-maker himself, to advise and reprove that lord paramount, to whose court only as an object, or an instrument of justice, he owed attendance, or to controul his sovereign in the administration of his government; parliaments then must have some further foundation.

The supreme government in all uncivilized nations is exceeding lax. If the chief ruler is general in war and judge in peace, he is general only from the dread of the enemy, and because in the time of war, it becomes the interest of all to submit to one. He is judge only from the dread, that without a common arbitrator, the country would become, even in time of peace, a scene of blood. But when things concerning the society in general come to be consulted or determined, the power of consult-
ing and of determining is conceived to lie in the society itself, or in the heads of the tribes of it. As one of the society the chief ruler has a right to be present at the deliberation, and as the chief person of the society he ascerts and is allowed the right of presiding in it; but his power is merely that of presiding, attended with the influence which perhaps, his presiding may give him, and nothing more. If even as general in war his soldiers are disobedient to him; if even as judge in peace he is not able to restrain his people from outrages; it can hardly be thought, that he should have a power of regulating the publick concerns of the society without the publick consent of it.

A general assembly of a nation, or of the heads of its tribes, arises, therefore, from the natural course of things; and the powers of such an assembly, must in the same natural course be very extensive. Perhaps, with regard to uncivilized nations, all reasonings and conclusions from political views are fallacious, because uncivilized nations are generally incapable of forming such views; yet, if these were attended to among the feudal nations at all, it could not

X 3 but
but occur, that possessed as the king was of the military service of his vassals, of the power of judging them in his own courts, and of applying most of the profits of those courts to his own use; if he had likewise had the exclusive political part of the government in his hands, the military, judicative, fiscal, and political powers, would all have centered in his person; a junction which could not fail to be productive of despotism: but the feudal manners and spirit tended to an oligarchy. It was not likely that chieftains, who in the countries from which they originally came, were so little inferior to the prince, as to be called his Comites, that is, his companions; and who in the conquered countries were affenting the same military, judicative, and fiscal powers upon their own estates; would give up the sole political administration to a person, the value of whose life was estimated by the law like any other persons, and whose murder was forgiven on the payment of a few † thousand drachms by his murderer. Even in an age dark in political views, it required no great reach of thought in the chieftains to foresee the danger to themselves, of joining so many
powers in the prince. Their former equality gave them a right to be of his counsels. The rule of the fiefs, that the vassal should give intelligence and advice to his lord against his enemies, made this right a duty, and perhaps the frequent occasions of attending in a judicative capacity, gave them the better opportunity of ascertaining that right, under pretence of performing the duties of vassals and of judges.

In the feudal settlements the persons attending the king’s great councils, called since parliaments, were the _proceres regni_, those who had originally been his companions, and were now his immediate vassals, whether civil or ecclesiastical, and the more considerable officers of his court and crown. I speak at present not of Britain, but of Normandy, of all France, of the Low-Countries, of Germany, of Italy, and of the whole feudal world. In the antiquities of none of those countries, are the commons or the burgesses to be heard of as members of the great councils, the immediate vassals ecclesiastical and civil of the sovereign, and the officers either civil or military of the sovereign, are the only persons appearing in them.

X 4      They
They who think that during the reigns of the Saxon kings, and of the first princes of the Norman race, there were no Parliaments in England, attend little to the state of the feudal system at the time; but they who think that the commons fact during those reigns in parliament attend still less to it. In the Saxon times the nation was composed of the lords of charterland both civil and ecclesiastical and the people under them, of the counts or earls, and the alodial people under them; the people under the lords were either tenants at will, or for a few lives, slaves in a manner to their masters, they could not pretend to become rulers over their countrymen: Those again, who were under the counts, or the alodial people, were not even tied to the community by the feudal bond, and therefore could have no suffrage in the feudal councils; so that * the lords ecclesiastical and civil, as holding of the crown, and the great officers in virtue of their offices, as well as in virtue of their being generally vassals to the crown †, together with the fages of the law, either the king’s judges or the king’s council, called Sapientes, were the only constituent members of the Saxon parlia-
Constitution of Parliament.

Parliaments. This will appear obvious to anyone, who takes a view of the preambles to the laws of most of the Saxon kings. We have no records of the laws of Scotland in those distant ages; but from the authorities of our historians, the proceres regni, and the sapientes or the sages of the law, were the first constituent members of our parliaments.

During the reigns of the first Norman princes, the commons were continued in the same subjection; the alodial people were indeed brought into the feudal system, but then from the book of doomsday, it appears, that the whole lands of the country were either the demesne of the king and worked by his slaves, or tenants at will; or were held by the great barons, or the counts, or the church; and that in like manner the burrows were either demesne of the king; or were held by the barons, or the counts, or the church. From the same book it appears, that in the time of the conqueror, the whole lands of England, exclusive of those of the church, were possessed by 700 immediate vassals of the crown, an infinite number of men under them of a slavish condition, called servi,
History of the

servi, villani, bordarii, and a very few soc-
cage tenants of poor and trifling posses-
os. As all who held of the king in capite
fat in parliament, the nation was at
that time represented by a body as nume-
rous as at present, and by the proprietors
of almost the whole land of the kingdom,
if one can apply the word representation
to men who sat in parliament, not as re-
presenting others, an idea at that time un-
known, but in their own right, not to
protect the people from slavery, but to
preserve themselves against tyranny.

Calculated as the feudal system was, to
bar the alienation of land property, it
could not however withstand the natural
necessities and desires of mankind; it was
impossible in the nature of things these
700 original vassals would keep their fees
for ever dismembered, creditors were cla-
morous, younger children were to be pro-
vided for, and therefore, in spite of all the
restraints of the feudal law, partitions of
estates were made, either voluntarily by
their proprietors, or by force of law.

This increased the number of the king's
vassals in the counties.

Again,
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Again, although in the Saxon times the inhabitants of the towns or the burgwaren were in the lowest condition, yet for the benefit of trade they had formed themselves into communities and gilds; though in a manner the property of others, and subject to the officers and magistrates of those in whose dominion they were; yet with respect to each other in matters of trade, they were allowed to have their own laws and police. As the Normans had the arts of life among them more than the Saxons had had, the inhabitants of the towns grew into some estimation soon after the conquest: the Norman kings and lords bestowed upon those communities and gilds which they found erected for the benefit of their members only as traders, the privileges of men and of freemen: they enfranchised the inhabitants; to the communities, by way of appanage, they gave territories in property; they farmed to them their own census and taxes; they withdrew the officers, who in right of the king or the lords, had governed the town, or collected its taxes, and allowed the inhabitants courts, and officers, and magistrates of their own. The charter of enfranchise-
History of the
franchisement of great Yarmouth by king
John, points out most of these alterations;
it relates *, Quod progenitores domini regis
tenuerint, prædictum burgum, in manibus
suis propriis, percipiendo omnia proficua inde
excuntia, de portu, usque ad tempus Ioannis
regis qui concessit villam, burgensibus villa,
ad feodi firmam. The gift of the territory
in perpetuity, and the feofirm of the cen-
sus and taxes in perpetuity, constituted a
fief not in the members of the community,
but in the community itself. This fief
was said to hold by a tenure, from the
subject of it called burgage; the commu-
nity represented by the governing part of
the burrow was the vassal in it; and when,
either by the original right of the king,
or by a right derived to him from the
lords, the king was superior in this fief,
that governing part was the immediate
vassal of the crown, and if the members
of it observed the feudal principles and
orders, they owed attendance in parliament,
not as barons, but as vassals to the crown,
and if not in person, from the inconveni-
ency of their too numerous appearance,
yet by representatives elected by them-
selves.

Lord
Constitution of Parliament.

Lord Coke says †, the king shall not † Coke have "primer seisin of lands holden in Lytton sect. 103. " burgage, as some have said; for that is " no tenure in capite." Madox ‡, in his ‡ Mad. Firma Burgi, brings a number of autho- form. burg. cap. 1. rities to show, that burgage was accounted sect. 8. a tenure in capite. It may be true with lord Coke, that it was not a tenure in capite, to the effect to carry primer seisin, but surely it can bear no doubt, that it was a tenure in capite, to the effect of obliging to attendance in parliament.—

In the time of the conqueror, none but vaissals by military tenures were intitled to fit in parliament, because at that time all the vaissals in capite who had their lands in descent, held by military tenures; but when many of these tenures were changed into tenure by soccage, the persons possessed of them still sat in parliament, because, on the one hand, they were not *vilani*, and on the other hand, they were the king's immediate vassals. In the same manner, when some time after the conquest, the tenure of burrows was changed, or rather was created, and their communities were made to hold freely of the crown, instead of being in demesne, can it be doubted, that
that their members, or the representatives of their members, likewise sat in parliament? they were not *vilani* more than the soccage tenants, and they held immediately, that is in capite, of the king equally with them. The preamble to the statutes of Robert III. says, "summonitis, more solito, bur-
" gensibus, qui de domino rege tenent in 
" capite."

The alteration made in the condition of these inhabitants, then, tended to increase the number of the king's vassals in burrows.

Add to this partition of the original fiefs, and to this erection of the burgage fiefs, that the crown came further into the custom, of granting its demesne lands, both in the counties, and in the burrows, in fief.

This was a third source of increase to the number of the king's vassals.

These changes produced a great alteration in the appearance of the orders of the state; for as the ancient summons to parliament ordered all thosc to come *, qui de 
nobis tenent in capite, the vassals who had a right to come thither, once few and power-

* Mag. chart. Joan. & preamb. to itat. of Rob. 3.
ful, were now become numerous beyond measure, and many of them poor.

This attendance at a time when the same advantage did not accrue from it as at present, and parliaments were held much oftener than they are now, was by these last, complained of as a burden. There are instances in the history of England, of barons denying their tenures to avoid the attendance, of burrows denying their title, of sheriffs returning, that in whole counties they could not get a burgess to send up; and lord Coke's declaration*, that char-
ters granted of exemption from parliament, are against law, shows that such charters were asked, and were given. In order to relieve those then, who were unable to bear the burden of attendance, it was ordained, that the great barons should attend in person, but the small barons and the burgesses only by their representatives; and it is likely that a representation from the burgesses, as early as the burgesses came into parliament, had paved the way for a representation from the small barons. At the same time a distinction was made in the form of summoning the greater and the smaller vassals: the former were sum-

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* Coke 4 Inst. 49.
moned each *figillative per literas regis*, the latter only in general *per vicecomites*.

This alteration in the persons summoned, and the manner of summoning to parliament, must probably have happened by statute in the reign of King John. The record of the statute is lost, together with the other statutes of his reign; but the form of the distinction in the summons is preserved, in the *Magna charta* of that prince. And in the writs of his son Henry III. the sheriffs are directed to return the knights of the shire, and the burgesses.

The like alteration happened in Scotland, though at somewhat a later period, as the declension of the strict feudal system came always later in this country than in England. The record of the statute is preserved in the year 1427*. By that statute it was declared, that the small barons and free tenants needed not come to parliament, provided they sent commissioners from the shires, but that the king should summon the great barons, and church-men, by his special precept.

These laws bringing the representatives of the shires and of the burrows into parliament,
The great number of members in the English parliament made it difficult, in all the perambulations of parliaments, to find one room capable of holding the whole members; and therefore they came to be divided into two houses. The members of the Scotch parliament on the contrary, being less numerous, the same difficulty of finding a room large enough did not occur; and therefore, even after the introduction of the commons, the whole members sat in one house, and made but one assembly.

It has been said, that the privilege of sitting in parliament was given to commissioners of shires, in England, by Simon de Montfort, to secure him in his power. It has been said, that the same privilege was given to the commissioners for burrows, by Edward I. in order to procure from them supplies, when he was in war with France, and foresaw it from Scotland. The mistake arises from attending too much to political, and too little to natural and to feudal views. The feudal system, though and regular in its movements, was not to

be
be whirled about, in subserviency to ministers, or even to exigencies. The ranks of the state intitled to government, were fixed in the original constitution; gradual alterations in the constitution might produce gradual alterations in the ranks of the state, and accordingly, the gradual infranchisement of the burrows, and the gradual dismembering of the great baronies, brought the burgesses and the freeholders into parliament: but that new ranks should be made, by a political nod, to start up at once, in order to deprive those of government, who had possessed it for centuries, is not to be credited, in that system, which of all others, was the most exact, in ascertaining the orders of men. If the commons were brought into parliament, to serve a political purpose, in England, what was the political purpose, and where was the Montfort, or the Edward, who brought them into parliament in Scotland?

The same dissipation of land property, which brought the commons into parliament, produced a great alteration in the nature of the nobility, intitled to sit there.

Originally, dukes, earls, and barons were no other than officers appointed over certain
certain districts, the possession of which gave them a title to certain emoluments and privileges, and subjected them to certain duties. One of these privileges, and likewise duties, was attendance in parliament. It has been shown, that originally feudal grants were not even hereditary: as soon then, as a duke, earl, or baron was stripped by the prince, of power over his district, he ceased to be an officer; he owed no longer attendance in parliament, and the person who was put in his place in the province, took his place in the great council: afterwards, these offices came to be hereditary, and none could be stripped of them, except for their crimes; but still, if a person stripped himself of his office, by giving away, or selling his fief, it is obvious, by a continuation of the same principles, that he ceased to be a feudal officer, he could not enjoy the privileges attached to a subject which he had given away, nor render duties in return for that fief which another enjoyed. Hence it appears, that the feudal peerage was originally territorial, not attached to the person, but to the possession of the feudal estate. The castle of Arundel conferring an earldom
on the proprietor of it, is said to be a remain of the old law, in this respect, in England: and * the late essays on British antiquities give us an instance, in Scotland, of an † earldom sold for money, by which sale, all the honours attending it, were transferred to the purchaser.

This constitution might last as long as there were few sales of shiefs, and as long as only powerful families or persons were the purchasers: but when in the progress of luxury, alienations became frequent, and through the same progress mean people were enabled to become purchasers; it was impossible, that either the pride of the nobility, or the splendor of the kingdom, could suffer so unnatural a mixture. The peerage then ceased to pass with the shief: the king, in order to prevent the body from expiring, created peers himself; these fat with those who were ancient peers by prescription; and the dignity of peerage from being feudal, territorial, and official, became alodial, personal, and honorary.

The author of the late Essays on British Antiquities, has traced the progress of this alteration with wonderful accuracy. From
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his enquiries it appears, that "the first form of the creation of an earl, was that of a grant of an office over a county.—When by the multiplication of earls, the earldoms were become more numerous than the counties, the form was to erect a particular estate into an earldom, or county; which was all that was necessary, to bestow upon the proprietor, the territorial dignity.—Afterwards, when the notion of personal honour crept in; certain solemnities were used at the creation of a peer, such as girding him with a sword, covering his head with a cap of honour and circle of gold, all of them marks of personal respect.—And now, both in England and Scotland, the notion of territorial dignity being quite worn out, an earl's patent is so framed, as to import a mere personal dignity, without relation either to office, or to land."

The erection of the house of commons in England, whose interests being to support the people, were opposite to those of the lords; and the introduction of the new nobility, who owing their rise to the crown, were devoted to it; tended much to weak-
en the power of the ancient barons. At an era when the commons had risen upon the barons, and yet had not quite sunk them, so that both balanced and weakened each other, Henry VIII. was the most absolute monarch that ever sat on the English throne. At an era when the commons had risen upon both the king and the peerage, Charles I. was in a state, the weakest that a king of England had ever been reduced to.

The similar constitutions of parliament in England and Scotland, by the introduction of the commons, and of the new nobility, ought to have had, it would be thought, similar effects in both countries; yet they had not. In England, the commons rose immediately to vast power: in Scotland they never attained any power in the legislature, and it is only since the revolution, they attained even common freedom.

Many things contributed to this difference.

The most general and important cause was the different circumstances of the two nations themselves: England was a trading country, and though originally the land
land property was ingrossed by the great nobles, yet in the progress of trade, the commons bought from those nobles' great part of their lands: but power follows property: the same cause then, which made the nobility powerful originally, made the commons powerful afterwards. In Scotland, on the other hand, we had little or no commerce; the land property was ingrossed by the nobility; and it continued to remain so, as long as we had parliaments: the same cause then, which raised the commons in the one country, depressed them in the other.

Again, the commons in England forming an assembly separate from that of the peers, became a body more distinguished by themselves: they reared up rights and privileges peculiar to their assembly: once made a distinct order in the constitution of government, they struggled to ballance the peers, and having ballanced them, they struggled next to overcome them: being taken from the commons, they were favoured by them, and favoured the commons in return. The knights of shires, and the burgesses in Scotland, on the contrary, continued all along to fit in the same
fame house with the peers: the nation carried away with the splendor of these last, lost sight of their own representatives; and the representatives themselves imposed upon by the same splendor, lost the idea of their own importance. There could be no balance where there was no distinction of assemblies: the commons could set up no distinct rights and privileges in a single body, of which they only made a part: and not favoured by the people, they would not favour the people in return.

Again, by the statute Quia Emptores in England, upon the dismembering of a fief, the new purchasers were made to hold not of the alienor, but of the chief lord; and therefore when the king’s vassals were allowed to alienate, all the purchasers from them were made to hold directly of the crown: whereas, in Scotland, as the statute Quia Emptores did not take effect, many of the purchasers held of the lords from whom they purchased, so that the crown vassals were not multiplied by the addition of all the new purchasers.—Further, in England, by an act of * Henry VI. every free-holder possessed of land of forty shillings of present rent, was intituled to
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to vote at elections, which law stands to this day: whereas, in Scotland, by an act of James † VI. none were intitled to vote† An. 1587. cap. 114. in the counties, who had not a forty shilling land, not of present rent, but of old extent, holding of the king. By an act of † Charles II. those voting on church lands † An. 1661. cap. 35. were obliged to have 1000 l. Scots of present rent. By another act in that § reign, § An. 1681. cap. 21. voters were obliged to have either a 40 shilling land of old extent, or 400 l. Scots of valued rent. And by later statutes still greater attention is obliged to be shown, to the purity of rolls, so circumscribed in their nature, and where intrusion and abuse would be so provoking.—Lastly, by repeated resolutions of the house of commons in England, it has been determined, where prescription has not fixed the manner of electing in particular boroughs, that the election of members for boroughs, shall be, not in the common council, but in the whole body of the burgesses; whereas, in Scotland, the election for a borough lies in the common council, and not in the whole body of burgesses.

By this variety of differences, it has happened, that while there are above 30,000 voters
voters in some particular counties in England, there are not in Scotland, above 3000 voters, free-holders and common council men included.

The constitution of Scotland, till incorporated with that of England, was in fact a mixture of monarchy and oligarchy: the nation consisted of a commonalty without the privilege of chusing their own representatives; of a gentry intitled indeed to represent by election, but unable to serve the nation; and of a nobility, who oppressed the one, and despised both.

In this situation, the representatives of the commons discouraged with their own insignificancy, either did not attend the parliament, or surrendered their privileges when in it. It appears by the acts of 1457, and 1503, that though the act of 1427 had given the free-holders a power of sending representatives to parliament, yet none, or few, were sent: and in fact, for forty years before the act of 1587*, it is certain, that not a single baron by tenure attended the parliament. The erection of the lords of articles, a court committee, which under pretence of preparing business for the parliament, admitted, and
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excluded what they pleased, annihilated almost the constitution of that body. Is it then to be wondered at, that while the English parliament, in the reign of Charles II. were arraigning the conduct of that king and his ministers, the Scotch parliament were pouring forth, to a prince not beloved by their nation, addresses, filled with adulations†, to a minister who was hated by themselves.

The revolution first brought other maxims into our government, and the union gave other rights to our part of the legislature; so that now, our lords and commons being incorporated with those of the English, the constitution of Scotland is settled upon that just poise, betwixt monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, which has made the constitution of England the wonder of mankind.

Whether the limited number of the Scotch electors, or the extended number of the English, is the most advantageous, is doubtful. For if the former is more easily managed by a minister, the latter is more easily driven into fury by a faction. And though it is true, that what concerns all, should be judged of by all, yet it is equally just,
just, that those who have the largest share of the property, should likewise have the largest share of that legislature, which is to dispose of it.

In the declensions of almost every part of the feudal system, the English have gone before us: at the distance sometimes of one, and sometimes of many centuries, we follow. However distant, at present, the prospect may appear, there is no impossibility, in a future age, that that limitation of electors, which subsists at present, from the lingering of the feudal system amongst us, may give way, to the more extended, and alodial right of election, which takes place among the English.

FINIS.