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Boss Competence and Worker Well-being

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Abstract

Nearly all workers have a supervisor or 'boss'. Yet little is known about how bosses influence the quality of employees' lives. This study is a cautious attempt to provide new formal evidence. First, it is shown that a boss's technical competence is the single strongest predictor of a worker's job satisfaction. Second, it is demonstrated in longitudinal data -- after controlling for fixed effects -- that even if a worker stays in the same job and workplace a rise in the competence of a supervisor is associated with an improvement in the worker's well-being. Third, a variety of robustness checks, including tentative instrumental-variable results, are reported. These findings, which draw on US and British data, contribute to an emerging literature on the role of expert leaders in organizations. Finally, the paper discusses potential weaknesses of existing evidence and necessary future research.

Keywords: bosses, expert leaders, leadership, job satisfaction, happiness.

JEL codes: I31, J28, M54

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1. Introduction

Although bosses are ubiquitous in modern society, there has been almost no research by industrial relations researchers and labor economists into how bosses affect the happiness and well-being of the workers they oversee.¹ This paper cautiously offers new evidence. It suggests that the underlying *technical competence* of a boss may have major consequences for workers' job satisfaction. A range of correlational findings are presented. The paper draws upon crosssections and panels; it uses data on job satisfaction from the United States and Britain; it reports seven different forms of evidence. Although the paper's evidence is of a simple kind, and cannot have the persuasiveness of a perfect randomized controlled trial, we hope the later patterns and results might interest many different types of researcher. Job satisfaction is an indicator of worker well-being and is known to be a predictor of quit rates (recent work includes Clark 2001 and Levy-Garboua et al. 2007). Figure 1 gives an immediate non-technical flavor of the potential significance of supervisor competence. The paper's main findings, which appear to be the first of their kind, are reported in Tables 2 to 7, and in an Appendix.

This study is able to examine changes in supervisor 'within person and firm' (and thus relates to work on social capital in the workplace such as Helliwell and Huang 2010, the economics of hierarchies such as Garicano 2000, managerial attention such as Halac and Prat 2014, and on so-called expert leaders such as Goodall, Kahn and Oswald 2011). The paper also attempts to consider issues of causality. While it cannot resolve all the difficulties, the paper investigates a longitudinal sample of workplaces in which the identity of the employee remains the same and the only change is in the quality of the supervisor (and the paper also tentatively provides some instrumental-variable estimates). A significant role is found for variables that have been little-studied by labor researchers, such as:

• whether the supervisor worked his or her way up inside the company

¹ A search through the standard labor textbook Filer, Hamermesh and Rees (1996), for example, finds only one mention of the word 'boss' or 'supervisor' in its 600 pages; a text such as Ehrenberg and Smith (2012) has a larger number of mentions but does not provide an analytical model or discuss data. As another illustration, a search on the Web of Science shows that in the whole history of the <u>Journal of Labor Economics</u> there is only one article that mentions, in its Key Words or Abstract or Title, the word "supervisors" and one other article that mentions "bosses". The same is true of the <u>Journal of Human Resources</u>. The <u>Industrial & Labor Relations Review</u> has a number of articles, the closest in spirit perhaps being Heywood et al. (2002), but none looks at links with job satisfaction. In the <u>Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology</u>, the closest paper to ours appears to be Miles et al. (1996), but that paper does not make the same point as ours and is instead about supervisors' communication. There are large and important related literatures on procedural justice, by McFarlin and Sweeney (1992) and others, and on citizenship by authors such as Capelli and Rogovsky (1998), and on group-payment systems (by Freeman et al. 2008 and Green and Heywood 2010) but these also do not cover the issue tackled here.

- whether the supervisor could in an emergency do the employee's job
- *the supervisor's assessed level of competence.*

The first two of these are, in principle, indirect indicators of supervisor competence, but they also seem of independent interest as variables that are rarely examined by labor-market researchers.

This paper follows in the footsteps of Freeman (1978) and Lazear, Shaw and Stanton (2011). It links to a recent literature that -- though not directly on the influence of bosses upon well-being -- seeks to understand the influence of bosses upon productivity. Prominent among this recent literature are writings such as Branch, Hanushek and Rivkin (2013) and Lazear, Shaw and Stanton (2011) itself. The paper's results are also consistent with new evidence in Brown et al. (2014) on links between employee trust (in managers) and good workplace outcomes. More broadly, this study fits within a growing well-being research literature written by economists and psychologists (including Benjamin et al. 2012, Booth and van Ours 2008; Clark and Oswald 1996, Diener et al. 1999, Di Tella et al. 2001, Easterlin 2003, Frey and Stutzer 2002, Graham 2011, Hamermesh 2001, Layard 2006, Powdthavee 2010, and Senik 2004).

Although the happiness and job satisfaction of workers might be believed to matter strongly in itself, it is now thought that it also does so indirectly. There is growing evidence that 'happier' workers are more productive (in the work of Carol Graham, such as Graham et al. 2004; many papers by the late Alice Isen; and research by Bockerman and Ilmakunnas, 2012; Edmans 2012; De Neve and Oswald 2012, and Oswald, Proto and Sgroi 2015). The broader background is a more general research effort into the effects of leaders upon measures of organizational performance. One strand, to which this paper contributes, attempts to understand the role of so-called 'expert leaders' (Goodall 2009, 2011). Such research has largely been at a senior level: it has attempted to separate CEO effects from industry or firm effects in order to calculate the explanatory power of leaders and their characteristics (e.g. Thomas 1988; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Waldman & Yammarino 1999; Souder, Simsek & Johnson, 2012; Dezso & Ross, 2012; Bloom et al. 2005, Bockerman et al. 2012, Boxall & Macky 2014), but that has not tackled the exact issue considered in this paper, and on the influence of private equity (Agrawal & Tambe 2014).

Why would supervisors matter? There is no standard theory of how a supervisor² affects a workplace. Our approach has been influenced by the innovative work of Lazear et al. (2011), which discusses the potential training, advising, and motivating functions of bosses. That channel is logical and almost certainly captures some of the activities of real-world bosses and supervisors (Becker and Wrisberg 2008 and Goodall et al. 2011 contain some discussion of this for an elite sports setting). Nevertheless, our conception differs in one way. Bosses are, in principle, special workers because they are in charge. They make a range of organizational decisions. Therefore, it may be desirable not to view a boss as just another factor of production, or as altering only the quality of an employee's input through greater marginal product in the production function. Instead, it may be appropriate to view a boss as being able to shape the nature of the organization.

This paper is designed as an empirical rather than theoretical contribution. However, as one approach to possible thinking, we describe below a characterization of equilibria of different kinds of efficiency, and how supervisors might alter the outcome from one such equilibrium to another. We implicitly have in mind a wider set of supervisory functions than in Lazear et al (2011). One important conceptual challenge, on which our paper will be silent, is that real-world employees and supervisors are sorted into subtly different kinds of firms and specific job tasks; a weakness of our theoretical account will be that it ignores much of such heterogeneity.

Consider a world in which there are three kinds of agents to be understood – the worker, the supervisor, and the employer (ie. the firm or organization). Imagine that a worker and a supervisor can be thought of as combining in their efforts to produce some kind of output. For analytical simplicity, assume that the firm can be thought of as existing in the background rather than the foreground, but that this employing firm has, ultimately, to receive a share of whatever is produced jointly by the worker and the supervisor. The worker and the supervisor must then decide how to behave. Let the worker take some kind of action, denoted a. Let the supervisor's action be denoted s. These could be thought of as effort levels but can also be viewed much more broadly (s could be advice given to a worker by an experienced supervisor, for example). The variables a and s can easily be generalized to vectors of actions; but in the algebra below, for

 $^{^{2}}$ This might sound paradoxical, as supervisors are all around us, but historically the implicit presumption coming from labor economics has been that it is possible to treat supervisors (where it has done so explicitly at all) as just another kind of input in the F(...) function.

simplicity, they will not be. They will instead be viewed as single variables defined on the real line. Together, the two actions lead to output Q for the firm:

Q = q(a, s). Firm's output (1)

where both *a* and *s* contribute to output and have positive first-derivatives. Something has also to be assumed about incomes. Assume that the worker gets a share psi, ψ , of the output while the supervisor gets share sigma, σ . The remainder goes to the employer.

Assume the employee's utility function takes the general form

$$\mu = \mu(a, s, \psi Q) - c(a)$$
 Worker's utility (2)

where part of utility thus depends directly on the actions *a* and *s*, another part depends on the share of the output that accrues to the worker, and a final part depends on the cost of action *a*, which is assumed to be captured by a convex increasing function c(a). At this stage, no assumption needs to be made about the sign of the derivatives of the μ function in equation (2). For simplicity, the cost function is treated in the above formulation as separable, but that can straightforwardly be dropped. If desired, μ here might be thought of approximately as the 'overall job-satisfaction' of a worker. It is a measure of the total utility from the work environment.

Finally, write the supervisor's utility function in a symmetric way. It is therefore $v = v(a, s, \sigma Q) - k(s)$ Supervisor's utility (3)

where in this case the function k(s) captures the supervisor's cost of action. For ease of notation, the form of equation (2) and (3) can be written in a more compressed way. Define identities

$$\mu(a, s, \psi Q) = u(a, s) \quad (4)$$

$$v(a, s, \sigma Q) = v(a, s).$$
(5)

Hence, from these, write the two parties' net utilities as:

Worker's utility =
$$u(a, s) - c(a)$$
 (6)

Supervisor's utility =
$$v(a, s) - k(s)$$
. (7)

This framework is a very simple one, but it is allows us to think of the different types of outcomes that might be expected to occur. Put more generally, simultaneous-move 'public goods' games with complementarities in the production function are known have multiple equilibria in a wide range of cases, and this kind of conceptual background therefore offers one

potential way of thinking about 'what supervisors do'. Both communication and co-ordination (changing the order of moves) are ways that supervisors might perhaps increase the chances that better equilibria are reached. For earlier discussions of such ideas, see the interesting work of Brandts and Cooper (2007) and Goerg et al. (2010). As Brandts and Cooper (2007) put it: "in the absence of managerial intervention, subjects invariably slip into coordination failure...we find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps."

Consider initially what might be called the *inexpert-supervisor* case: here there is a supervisor who is relatively inexperienced in the nature of the work and the type of workplace. He or she thus lacks deep knowledge about the worker and environment. Assume that the supervisor is able to observe the action of the worker, but beyond that understands little about the work-setting. In this case, because the supervisor is so inexpert, the two parties can be thought of as behaving in a non-cooperative rather than cooperative way. There is then potentially a Nash equilibrium where both the worker and the supervisor choose their actions (a, s) independently. This outcome is characterized by the usual first-order conditions

$$u_a - c'(a) = 0$$
 (8)

and

$$v_s - k'(s) = 0 \quad (9)$$

so the outcome, which can be thought of as the intersection of two reaction functions, is, for the standard reasons, either strictly or weakly sup-optimal for the worker-supervisor pair (intuitively, because each ignores the externalities imposed on the other party). Equations (8) and (9) define a self-reinforcing fixed point and thus one kind of equilibrium.

It might be thought that the supervisor in the above set-up is behaving foolishly. However, that reaction would not be an appropriate one. This kind of non-cooperative outcome is a feasible and rational one for a supervisor who has limited knowledge. It requires only that (i) the supervisor knows his or her own preferences, and (ii) the supervisor be able to see the action chosen by the employee, even if the supervisor has little understanding of why the worker is choosing that action or how the workplace could be organized better.

Some supervisors, however, may be different: call them *expert supervisors*. They are individuals who have a deep and expert knowledge of both the core business and the nature of the worker. In such a case, an 'expert supervisor' could, in principle, help guide the pair to a

jointly efficient outcome (for the pair, and, by implication, for the employing firm in the background). This is not a minor variant on the previous outcome. Instead, the outcome is not a Nash equilibrium, but rather the expert supervisor helps to produce a cooperative equilibrium. The worker and the supervisor choose actions (a, s) jointly to solve

Maximize u(a, s) - c(a, s) s.t. $v(a, s) - k \ge V$

where V is an arbitrarily fixed level of net utility for the supervisor. Thus this case is characterized by Pareto-efficiency and:

$$u_a - c'(a) - \lambda v_a = 0 \quad (10)$$

and

 $v_s - k'(s) - \lambda k_s = 0 \quad (11)$

where λ is the usual Lagrangean multiplier.

The defining aspect -- and perhaps ultimately a testable one -- here is that the 'expert supervisor' has to have an experienced understanding of the work setting and the character of the employees. The reason is simple. Such information is essential to achieve a cooperative equilibrium, whether by implicit negotiation or explicit negotiation. The expert supervisor leads the pair away from inefficient Nash equilibria. As can be seen, equations such as (10) and (11) satisfy the requirements for Pareto efficiency. The worker and the supervisor will thus typically have higher utilities in this case. 'Expert bosses' can offer workers the best outcomes. By contrast, to get to a Nash equilibrium in case 1, it is not necessary to know (almost) anything about the other side's preferences. An agent simply maximizes given what he or she sees the other side choose as the opposing side's action.

By such logic, workers can benefit from an expert supervisor, and not merely from any higher income level that such a supervisor might make possible. Supervisors' deep expertise may act to alter, and improve, the very nature of equilibrium outcomes. This paper does not attempt, and because of its type of data is unable, to test a narrow form of this framework, but this conception offers a potential way to think about the later empirical issues.

2. Cross-sectional data

The data used³ here are drawn from (i) a single cross-section from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth in year 1990, (ii) a cross-section from the Working in Britain Survey in year 2000, and (iii) then a set of panel data from the NLSY for a range of years between 1979 and 1988. These data sets are statistically representative of their chosen populations. Table 1 describes their key features; it reports means and standard deviations.

Elementary evidence consistent with the possible importance of supervisors is visible in the regression equations of Table 2. Here the dependent variable is a measure of the job satisfaction⁴ of approximately 6000 randomly sampled young US workers, where answers are on a 4-point scale and the wording is "Overall, how satisfied are you with your job? I like it very much,, I dislike it very much." [the foot of Table 2 gives full wordings]. For ease of reading, we report findings with a simple OLS estimator. However, the results are essentially unaffected by using instead an ordered estimator; those versions of the equations are available upon request. The mean of the dependent variable in Table 2 is approximately 3.2 on a 4-point scale. It has a standard deviation (driven by the across-person variation) of approximately 0.7.

We are interested in the consequences of highly competent, or 'expert', supervisors. There is no single or conventional way to define competence. Hence in this paper we examine a number of different measures.

In Table 2, a dummy variable for the supervisor having worked his or her way up the ranks is used, and another for the supervisor having started or owns the company. After adjusting for a conventional set of covariates, a dummy variable for these two together (a form of either-or dummy) enters, in column 1 of Table 2, with a positive coefficient of 0.047. This coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 95% level on a two-tailed test. It is substantial.

To get a sense for the estimated effect-size, some standard of comparison is required. A natural approach is to examine the coefficient on supervisor-competence variables against the coefficients on other variables in a regression equation.

 $^{^{3}}$ Most surveys do not report information about the role of supervisors, so we have to use selected years for which data are available.

⁴ Most of the results in the paper use job-satisfaction numbers as the worker well-being variable. But we have replicated the spirit of these results, and the key finding remains the same, with alternative measures (such as desire-to-quit information in the WIB dataset, and satisfaction with supervisor). Those equations are available on request.

Comparing, for example, to famously large coefficients in the job-satisfaction literature, the number 0.047 is close to being the same size as the coefficient on marriage, and approximately one third of the size of the extra satisfaction associated with working in the public sector. Other variables enter in ways familiar from the literature. For example, after controlling for income, those with higher levels of education are less satisfied with their jobs (one of the early demonstrations was in Clark and Oswald 1996), the level of earnings enters positively, and black workers suffer a negative coefficient. The second column of Table 2 explores the effects of dividing the supervisor dummy variable into its two constituent parts. Here the two coefficients (0.044 and 0.059 respectively) are close in size, although, as might be expected after the reduction in statistical power, the individual t-statistics become weaker at approximately 1.8 and 1.6.

Table 3 is in the same spirit but uses a British data set, the WIB 2000. This provides a randomly selected sample of approximately 1600 individuals. Here the wording used to construct the dependent variable is similar to before but workers now answer on a 7-point scale from "I am completely satisfied,....I am completely dissatisfied." The mean of the dependent variable in Table 3 is approximately 5.3, with a standard deviation of approximately 1.1.

In Table 3, workers are asked "Could your supervisor do your job if you were away?" and also "Does the supervisor know their own job well?" Both of these allow the construction of a banded dummy variable for competence. This is because they are coded on a 4-point scale from "Yes, very true" to "No, not true at all". In the first case, the mean of workers' answers is 2.5 and in the second case it is 3.2 (apparently a large number of workers do not believe the supervisor could fill in for the worker if the worker were away, whereas supervisors are given higher grades for the ability to do their supervisory role).

It might reasonably be argued that different interpretations are possible. Nevertheless, they seem independently interesting and apparently have not been studied before.

The coefficient in Table 3 on the variable denoted 'supervisor could do the worker's job' is positive, large, and statistically well-determined. It is estimated at approximately 0.13 with a t-statistic in excess of 5. Employees enjoy their jobs far more where the supervisor is assessed as technically competent. To get a sense of the size of the coefficient, it is necessary to note that the variable here runs from a value of 1 to a value of 4. Hence a movement from Not True at All (that the supervisor could do the person's job) to Very True would be associated with a

quadrupling of the level of job satisfaction from this source. The first column of Table 3 therefore points to a striking pattern in the data. Here the existence of a highly competent supervisor would imply 0.4 extra points (on a seven-point scale) on the worker's job satisfaction. This is almost double the combined coefficients of marriage and working-in-the-public-sector. We return later to what might account for this strength.

Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 report coefficients on a variable that codes answers to the question "How true is it that your supervisor or manager knows their own job well?" As a referee has pointed out, because of its directness this question might be thought to have special appeal. In column 2, the coefficient on this variable is 0.305 with a t-statistic greater than 8. The values of the variable run from 1 to 4. Thus a statistically representative worker whose supervisor knows his or her own job very well is markedly more contented than other workers. The difference in job satisfaction is approximately 1 full point on a seven point scale. Column 3 of Table 3 shows that both of these independent variables, for 'supervisor could do my job' and 'supervisor knows own job well', are significant when entered together in the specification. As would be expected, the individual coefficients in column 3 are slightly lower, at 0.055 and 0.279 respectively, than in the previous two columns.

3. Pooled equations and longitudinal evidence

Table 4 contains evidence on a larger data set. It gives pooled cross-sectional estimates from the NLSY for the years 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1988. Here we have used all of the years in which a particular supervisor question was included in the survey, namely, "Is your supervisor competent in doing the job?" where people may answer on a 4-point scale "Not true at all, …, Very true". The sample size in these regression equations is approximately 27,000 employees.

The coefficients on the supervisor variable are now very substantial. In the first column of the job satisfaction equations of Table 4, for example, the estimated coefficient is 0.303 with a t-statistic of approximately 35. This implies that a movement from having the least-competent category of supervisor to the most-competent category of supervisor would be associated with a difference in job satisfaction of nearly 1 full point on a 4-point scale.

In column 1 of Table 4, we exclude a large number of the potentially relevant influences on the job satisfaction of the workers who are being supervised. Later columns gradually introduce more and more of those. Only minor changes are observed in the estimated coefficient on the supervisor-competence variable. By the fourth column of Table 4, the coefficient is still approximately 0.3.

A coherent objection to Table's 4 estimates is that they are biased because of the fact that the personality of the worker is here an omitted variable. Hence it might be that inherently 'cheerful' people tend both to report high levels of job satisfaction and to give favorable assessments of their supervisor (they simply have a sunny outlook about everything). In that case, the association between the worker's well-being and the assessment of the supervisor might be spurious. One way to probe this possibility is to include another variable for the inherent cheerfulness of the employee, and to see whether that largely eliminates the significance of the supervisor variable. The final column of Table 4 does so. It includes a variable for whether the individual reports that his or her co-workers are friendly. The friendliness variable is positive in column 5 of Table 4. Once this inclusion is done, the coefficient on the supervisor-competence variable is barely affected. It falls by only approximately 0.05 points to 0.238. This result is consistent with the existence of a genuine role for supervisor competence.

Table 5 reports another form of evidence. In these fixed-effects regression equations, we are able to confirm that the positive correlation between job satisfaction and a supervisor-competence variable is not spuriously due merely to factors such as omitted personality factors. Table 5 continues to give similar results to those earlier tables, which establishes that such an interpretation cannot explain the patterns in the data.

Once again, consecutive columns of Table 5 build up to fuller specifications. The supervisor coefficient remains highly stable, at approximately 0.23, across the first four columns of the table. That is not far from the estimate size from cross-sectional estimates. This fact itself suggests there is comparatively little bias from omitted person fixed effects in cross-sectional equations. Once again, the addition of the 'co-workers are friendly' variable has only a minor effect on the supervisor coefficient, and itself is positive and well-determined (which is arguably suggestive, because this is in a fixed-effects equation, of the idea that the friendliness of co-workers genuinely matters). In column 5 of Table 5, the variable for supervisor competence remains at approximately 0.2 with a t-statistic of approximately 23.

The other variables in these fixed-effects specifications of Table 5 are of interest. Even in the fullest specification, there is evidence that job satisfaction depends upon education, whether the person works in the public sector, weekly earnings, and tenure. These variables' coefficients are necessarily estimated from the 'switchers' in the data set.

An illustration of effect-sizes is provided in the histogram of Figure 1. Here it is necessary to standardize the data in some way, so that the quantitative role of different explanatory variables can be compared appropriately. We do so here by using 90th percentile – 10^{th} percentile movements in the main independent variables (except, necessarily, in the case of the zero-one public-sector dummy variable). The size of the estimated supervisor effect, in the first column of Figure 1, is strikingly large. It dominates any of the more conventional influences upon people's job satisfaction, including the role of worker remuneration⁵. Here the 10^{th} percentile for the supervision variable is the second-lowest rating of supervisor competence; the 90th percentile is the highest of the four possible ratings; thus this change corresponds to a 2-point movement in the independent variable that measures supervisor competence.

Table 6 reveals that the paper's principal finding is robust to an important form of correction. A potential objection to the previous table, Table 5, is that in the whole sample used there, the switchers might be moving disproportionately to different workplaces with (unobservably) better characteristics, and that this, it might be argued, could lead to an upward bias on the coefficient on the supervisor-competence variable. We show that this is not what is driving the paper's key finding. Columns 1 to 3 of Table 6 reveal that even in the final column, where we study only those who remain in the same job and same workplace, we again find an influential role for the supervision variable. As would be expected, the coefficient is slightly lower, at 0.121. It remains well-determined, with a t-statistic of approximately 5.

Are some kinds of employees more sensitive to bosses' actions? What of certain kinds of workplaces? Further robustness checks are reported in Table 7. Column 1 tests for an interaction between the age of the worker and a variable for supervisor competence. The level of supervisor competence continues to be highly significant. An interaction term, however, enters with a coefficient of 0.004 and a t-statistic of approximately 2.3. This implies that the marginal effect of supervisor competence on the job satisfaction of the worker is considerably larger for older employees. One possible interpretation of this is that young workers are highly mobile and

 $^{^{5}}$ A referee has asked us for a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the required monetary 'compensating variation' for having a much poorer supervisor. That number is large. Although we would wish to view this kind of calculation as illustrative rather than as causal, the arithmetical answer, taking Table 5's estimates, is that around the mean of earnings a one standard-deviation worsening of supervisor competence (admittedly a substantial worsening) would have to be offset by approximately a 150% change in the worker's pay. This conclusion, and the largeness of the estimate, is consistent with the spirit of the ideas of Brandts and Cooper (2007).

thus less susceptible to good or bad supervisors; another is that the old hold more senior positions in the job hierarchy and that their bosses are therefore fewer and individually more influential. It is then shown, in columns 2 to 3 of Table 7, that in a fixed-effects job satisfaction equation a supervisor-competence variable works powerfully both for the large establishments and the small establishments (where the cut-off chosen for the definition of smallness is having fewer than 50 employees). Its coefficient is slightly greater in column 2 for the group of small establishments. In each of the two columns its t-statistic exceeds 5. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 7 alter the dependent variable. They use not a job satisfaction variable but instead a variable for how the worker answers: "You are given the chance to do the things you do best? Not true at all,....Very true". The aim is to probe whether supervisors might have effects through such a channel. The coefficients on the supervisor competence variable are then, respectively, 0.207 and 0.183. Hence these findings are consistent with such a view. Competent supervisors may assign their workers particularly effectively. Further issues related to the gender of bosses are taken up in Artz and Taengnoi (2014); we do not pursue those here.

4. Further issues

There remain a number of issues and concerns; given length constraints, we briefly review them below.

Issue 1: Although it is true that the results cannot be explained by omitted fixed-effects, they could, in principle, be the spurious result of exogenous mood swings. Consider a worker who becomes 'happier' for some external reason. Then he or she might see the world as a rosier place, and thus both report higher levels of job satisfaction and also view the supervisor more favorably.

However, such a criticism, while a cogent one, cannot account for all of the paper's findings. It is unable to explain, for example, why the "supervisor worked his way up through the company" variable enters statistically significantly in Table 2. It would be difficult to argue that it could explain the statistical significance of the "the supervisor could do my job if I were away" variable in Table 3. It also cannot say why, in a table such as Table 4, the addition of a variable for perceived co-worker friendliness (which should absorb most of a temporary mood-swing effect) leaves the coefficient on the supervisor-competence variable largely unchanged.

It would be reasonable to argue that we cannot be certain what a variable for "worked his way up.." literally means. As a referee has pointed out, it might even act as a proxy for social friendships between worker and supervisor. However, we hope the results are interesting enough to stand as they are.

Issue 2: Supervisors in these data sets are not randomly assigned, so causality is moot.

This is an important point and there is no perfect reply to it. Relatively little is known in this research area. The econometric work points to an interesting and persistent type of correlation, so these early patterns seem intriguing. A number of steps have been taken here to explore endogeneity. Perhaps most interestingly, Table 6 reveals that even when the worker stays put, so that the nature of the supervisor is the only thing that alters, the paper's key result continues to hold in longitudinal data. This finding is not plausibly viewed as unexplained reverse-causality.

Issue 3: The dependent variables in the empirical work use subjective data, so they are not reliable.

If readers reach this point in the paper, they have perhaps accepted the principle that subjective data can be of value. Nevertheless, as explained earlier, there is evidence that subjective scores are correlated with, and predictive of, objective and observable phenomena. Examples include Oswald and Wu (2010), which also reviews the literature. It might also be pointed out that corporations around the world make use of subjective satisfaction data, in market research and their human resources divisions, so such data might be said to have passed a key Chicago-esque 'market' test.

Issue 4: It is not easy to assess whether the data support the conceptual framework sketched earlier in the paper.

Such a view is fair, but the conceptual section, which is not necessary, offers one way to think that is different from treating supervisors mechanically as another input in a standard concave production function. Once explicit functional forms are assumed, it may generate testable predictions for future research.

Issue 5: In principle, a valid instrument is needed for supervisor competence.

We are extremely sympathetic to, and cognizant of, such arguments; given the data available to us it is not possible to answer this concern in a truly persuasive way. However, although we would not wish to emphasize them, we have, in the spirit of inquiry, done some instrumentalvariable (IV) estimation. It is intrinsically difficult to obtain an instrument that satisfies the exclusion restriction. Nevertheless, our attempted IV results are reported in Table A1 in an Appendix. For this, a variable is needed that influences the competence of the supervisor and satisfies the necessary exclusion restriction in the second-stage equation. We exploit two possibilities. The first is whether the supervisor has a college degree; we view this as a likely shifter in the competence equation and as a priori excludable from a worker satisfaction equation that includes industry and occupation dummies. The second is a simple instrument. It is the earlier variable on whether the supervisor worked his or her way up in the organization (or owns or started the company), which could be viewed as a proxy for individual knowledge of, and detailed experience within, the company. We might view this not as a direct variable -- as earlier -- but instead as a candidate for inclusion in a competence equation, and one that is excludable from the satisfaction equation as long as industry dummies are included. It is possible to estimate such a model on the 1988 data. Columns 1 and 4 of Table A1, which are for different sub-samples, report OLS estimates as a baseline. Column 2 is the first-stage equation, namely, the equation for whether the supervisor is assessed as competent. The variable for the instrument (coded 0, 1, or 2) works positively with a coefficient of 0.171 and a t-statistic of approximately 8. In column 3 of Table A1, the instrumented job-satisfaction equation has a well-determined coefficient of 0.381 on the variable for supervisor competence. The same pattern is found in columns 5 and 6. We would argue that these IV estimates should be treated cautiously.

Issue 6: A central role in the analysis is played by subjective assessments of the level of supervisor competence, and these are used to define the key independent variable, so the evidence depends on the validity of such data.

Employees seem to be in a good position to answer truthfully and fairly objectively to, for example, an inherently factual question of the kind: "Did your supervisor work his or her way up in this company/start the company?" To answer this in the positive does not require the worker to like, or admire the behavior of, the supervisor. Such factual questions are routine in social-science surveys and are widely used in almost all econometric research. In so far as people's answers contain measurement error (perhaps because they are new to the office or factory and are thus not certain about the job history of their supervisor), then regression coefficients will be biased downwards, and that will typically make it harder, not easier, to find statistically significant results in the earlier equations.

5. Conclusion

Bosses are found everywhere in working life, but their activities have provoked relatively little empirical interest among labor-market researchers. This paper offers evidence consistent with the belief that the qualities of supervisors -- particularly their technical competence -- may have significant and currently under-appreciated consequences for workers' well-being. To the best of our knowledge, these results are the first of their kind.

Seven forms of empirical support have been documented. Some are particularly simple. These seven have different (perhaps complementary) strengths and weaknesses, but each is consistent with the broad idea that the quality of workers' lives is higher if the supervisor is highly competent, in a technical sense, at his or her job⁶. The size of the estimates varies from fairly substantial to strikingly large. In some equations, such as those in Table 5, the assessed competence of the boss is the strongest predictor of employee well-being⁷. One weakness of our analysis should be noted; it would be desirable to have information on an even wider range of supervisors' characteristics (see Artz 2013, for example, on supervisor age), and that must largely await future data sets.

Boss competence is, admittedly, a subtle concept. There is no conventional method for assessing it. For this reason, the paper has explored a variety of empirical proxies for technical competence and expertise. ⁸ First, in a cross-section of 6000 young U.S. workers, the job satisfaction of employees is positively correlated with whether the supervisor worked his or her way up within the company (or literally started the company). Second, in a cross-section of 1600 British workers, satisfaction levels are higher among individuals whose supervisor could if necessary step in competently to do that job, and where the supervisor knows his or her own job extremely well. Third, in pooled cross-sections totaling 27,000 workers, a variable for assessed supervisor-competence enters with a large positive coefficient in a job satisfaction equation. Fourth, the key conclusion continues to hold -- with an only marginally reduced coefficient -- in fixed-effects estimation. Fifth, it is also unaffected, in fixed-effects equations, by the inclusion of an extra control variable that is a proxy for fluctuations in the underlying cheerfulness of individuals. Sixth, it is robust, with an only fractionally reduced effect-size, in estimates that

⁶ As mentioned above, we have obtained the same kinds of results with other measures.

⁷ Figure 1 is one non-technical way to convey this.

⁸ Although, for simplicity, we have in some cases used a cardinalized measure of competence, Table A2 shows that the findings are the same when the equations are re-estimated with a set of competence dummies. In further tests: (i) Table A3 reveals that -- as a check against attrition bias -- the supervisor effect is equally strong in a sample of workers who have recently left the employer; and (ii) there is some sign of asymmetry in the supervisor effect, in the sense that the absolute value of the coefficient is larger when acquiring a bad supervisor rather than a good one.

restrict the sample solely to workers who remain in the same job in the same workplace, who are thus the employees who experience only a change in the quality of their supervisor. Seventh, tentative instrumental-variable estimates are reported in the Appendix.

Lazear et al. (2011) argue, in an appealing way, that bosses act to raise workers' productivity. We agree with this. The paper has attempted, however, to consider a wider remit for bosses. They are trainers and advisors; nevertheless, they also make organizational decisions about how workplaces actually run. It is likely that future research will have to examine explicit models of supervisory behavior. It will also be important to construct quasi-experimental inquiries into the effects that stem from poor, mediocre, and talented bosses. Most especially, true randomized trials -- where different kinds of team leaders are allocated to work teams in some form of otherwise standardized productivity setting -- would teach us much about the size of leaders' effects. In the world of practice, moreover, it may be that our results could one day be helpful to CEOs and human resources managers when making promotion decisions. Such issues merit future attention.

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Figure 1. An Illustration of the Major Role of Supervisor Competence (with standardized effect-sizes, using the fixed-effects estimates of Table 5)




Table 1. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Definition	Mean (Standard De	viation)
variable		(1)	(2)	(3)
Job satisfaction	Global job satisfaction: = 1 if "dislike very	3.181	3.295	
(NLSY data)	much" to 4 if "like very much".	(0.749)	(0.728)	
Job satisfaction	Global job satisfaction: = 1 if "completely			5.305
(WIB data)	dissatisfied" to 7 if "completely satisfied".			(1.101)
Supervisor	Supervisor is competent in doing the job: $= 1$ if	3.489		
competence	"not true at all" to 4 if "very true".	(0.748)		
Supervisor	= 1 if supervisor "worked way up through ranks"		0.683	
expertise	or "started or owns company" or 0 otherwise.		(0.465)	
Supervisor	Supervisor "knows their own job well": = 1 if			3.236
knowledge	"not at all true" to 4 if "very true".			(0.904)
a .	Supervisor "could do [worker's] job if [worker]			0.500
Supervisor	was away": =1 "not true at all" to 4 if "very			2.523
replacement	true".			(1.216)
T 1 1	Your co-workers are friendly: = 1 if "not true at	3.630		
Friendly	all" to 4 if "very true".	(0.588)		
_	You are given a chance to do the things you do	3.085		
Best	best: = 1 if "not true at all" to 4 if "very true".	(0.887)		
		0.466	0.444	0.529
Female	= 1 if worker is female and 0 if male.	(0.499)	(0.497)	(0.499)
	= 1 if worker is Hispanic and 0 otherwise.	0.161	0.156	(0.177)
Hispanic		(0.368)	(0.363)	
		0.217	0.245	
Black	= 1 if worker is Black and 0 otherwise.	(0.413)	(0.431)	
	= 1 if worker has only a high school degree and 0	0.445	0.429	
High school	otherwise.	(0.497)	(0.495)	
	= 1 if worker has more than a high school degree	0.196	0.223	
Some college	but not a 4-year degree and 0 otherwise.	(0.397)	(0.416)	
	= 1 if worker has at least a 4-year degree and 0	0.090	0.208	
College	otherwise.			
		(0.286)	(0.406)	0.302
Degree or higher	= 1 if worker has a degree, equivalent or higher			
	and 0 otherwise.			(0.459)
A / AS level	= 1 if worker has A-level or AS-level education			0.112
	and 0 otherwise.			(0.316)
O level	= 1 if worker has O-level education and 0			0.252
	otherwise.			(0.435)
CSE	= 1 if worker has CSE education and 0			0.111
	otherwise.	0.000	0.500	(0.314)
Married	= 1 if worker is married and 0 otherwise.	0.283	0.523	0.653
		(0.451)	(0.500)	(0.476)
Union	= 1 if worker is a member of a labor union and 0	0.174	0.138	0.327
-	otherwise.	(0.379)	(0.345)	(0.469)
Public	= 1 if worker's employer is a government	0.111	0.131	0.300
	institution and 0 otherwise.	(0.315)	(0.338)	(0.458)
Age	Age in years	22.160	29.038	38.501
		(3.842)	(2.254)	(10.584)
Age squared	Age in years x age in years	505.81	848.31	1594.29

		(178.14)	(131.60)	(840.39)				
Tenure	Tenure at employer in weeks	78.21	177.15	386.71				
Tenure	Tenure at employer in weeks	(96.31)	(172.64)	(389.09)				
Tenure squared	Tenure at employer x tenure at employer	15391	61182	300842				
Tenure squared	Tenure at employer x tenure at employer	(41683)	(101907)	(567750)				
Log hours	Natural log of weekly hours worked	3.555	3.731	3.454				
Log nours	Natural log of weekly hours worked	(0.400)	(0.150)	(0.427)				
Log earnings	Natural log of weekly earnings at job	5.141	5.918	5.553				
Log earnings	Natural log of weekly earlings at job	(0.763)	(0.622)	(0.775)				
Column (1): Obse	ervations = 27,537 across five NLSY waves (1979, 1	980, 1981, 1	982, 1988).	10				
occupation catego	ries and 13 industry categories are included.							
Column (2): Obse	ervations = 6,298 in NLSY 1990 wave. 10 occupation	on categories	s, 13 industry	/				
categories, and 4 f	categories, and 4 firm size categories are included.							
Column (3): Observations = 1,604 in Working in Britain 2000. 9 occupation categories, 9 industry								
categories and 3 fi	rm size categories are included.							

Table 2. Regression Equations for Job Satisfaction in the United States: OLS Cross-Section Estimates (NLSY 1990 data)

	Job satis	sfaction ^a
	(1)	(2)
Supervisor "worked way up in the ranks" or	0.047**	
"started or owns company" ^b	(2.009)	
Supervisor "worked way up in the ranks"		0.044*
		(1.782)
Supervisor "started or owns company"		0.059
		(1.612)
Female	0.031	0.030
	(1.143)	(1.120)
Hispanic	0.075***	0.075***
-	(2.663)	(2.668)
Black	-0.062**	-0.062**
	(-2.413)	(-2.382)
Age	0.064	0.064
	(0.479)	(0.478)
Age squared	-0.001	-0.001
	(-0.473)	(-0.473)
High school degree	-0.031	-0.031
	(-0.836)	(-0.837)
Some college education	-0.046	-0.046
	(-1.105)	(-1.099)
Four-year college degree	-0.084*	-0.083*
	(-1.789)	(-1.780)
Married	0.062***	0.062***
	(2.761)	(2.778)
Union	-0.049	-0.048
	(-1.498)	(-1.453)
Public sector	0.136***	0.137***
	(3.279)	(3.300)
Log weekly earnings	0.115***	0.115***
	(4.568)	(4.550)
Log weekly hours worked	0.230***	0.230***
	(2.893)	(2.892)
Tenure	-4.9x10 ⁻⁴ **	-4.9x10 ⁻⁴ **
	(-2.417)	(-2.412)
Tenure squared	2.80x10 ⁻⁷	2.79×10^{-7}
	(0.846)	(0.844)
Firm sizes (4)	Yes	Yes
Industries (13)	Yes	Yes
Occupations (10)	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.973	0.972
	(0.498)	(0.497)
Observations	6298	6298

^a "How do/did you feel about the job you have now / your most recent job?" 1 = "dislike very much", 2 = "dislike somewhat", 3 = "like fairly well", 4 = "like very much".
^b "To the best of your knowledge, what reason on this card best explains how he/she came to

occupy his/her position?" 1 = "worked way up through ranks" or "started or owns company" and 0 = otherwise.

Table 3. Regression Equations for Job Satisfaction in Great Britain: OLS Cross-Section Estimates (WIB 2000 data)

		Job satisfaction	a
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Supervisor "could do [worker's] job" ^b	0.132***		0.055**
	(5.321)		(2.086)
Supervisor "knows own job" ^c		0.305***	0.279***
		(8.633)	(7.371)
Female	0.227***	0.212***	0.213***
	(3.193)	(3.065)	(3.074)
Age	-0.033	-0.047**	-0.044**
	(-1.526)	(-2.237)	(-2.125)
Age squared	$4.47 \mathrm{x} 10^{-4} \mathrm{*}$	0.001**	0.001**
	(1.657)	(2.382)	(2.284)
Degree or higher	-0.142	-0.182*	-0.178*
	(-1.349)	(-1.762)	(-1.727)
A-level or AS-level	-0.175	-0.210*	-0.206*
	(-1.506)	(-1.836)	(-1.802)
O-level	-0.212**	-0.222**	-0.223**
	(-2.243)	(-2.368)	(-2.385)
CSE	-0.052	-0.058	-0.065
	(-0.489)	(-0.552)	(-0.622)
Married	0.106	0.123*	0.118*
	(1.621)	(1.943)	(1.847)
Union	-0.183**	-0.146**	-0.147**
	(-2.484)	(-2.040)	(-2.058)
Public sector	0.117	0.149*	0.146*
	(1.413)	(1.842)	(1.815)
Log weekly hours worked	-0.237***	-0.207**	-0.204**
	(-2.693)	(-2.414)	(-2.383)
Log annual salary	0.211***	0.192***	0.201***
	(3.456)	(3.124)	(3.304)
Tenure	1.84×10^{-4}	1.92×10^{-4}	2.30×10^{-4}
	(0.816)	(0.834)	(1.003)
Tenure squared	-1.41x10 ⁻⁷	-1.38x10 ⁻⁷	-1.59x10 ⁻⁷
	(-0.863)	(-0.796)	(-0.924)
Firm sizes (3)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industries (9)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupations (9)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	5.239***	4.814***	4.634***

	(9.746)	(9.197)	(8.867)		
Observations	1604	1604	1604		
Cost values10041004t-statistics are in parentheses: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%,5% and 10% levels, respectively. Survey weights are used throughout.a "All in all, how satisfied would you say you are with your job?" Range from 1 ="completely dissatisfied" to 7 = "completely satisfied".b "How true is it that your supervisor could do your job if you were away?" 1 = "not atall true", 2 = "somewhat true", 3 = "true", 4 = "very true".c "How true is it that your supervisor or manager knows their own job well?" 1 = "notat all true", 2 = "somewhat true", 3 = "true", 4 = "very true".					

Table 4. Regression Equations for Job Satisfaction in the United States: Pooled Cross-Section Estimates (NLSY 1979-1982, 1988)

	Job satisfaction ^a					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
Supervisor competence ^b	0.303***	0.303***	0.301***	0.293***	0.238***	
	(35.187)	(35.155)	(34.890)	(34.057)	(26.616)	
Co-workers are friendly ^c					0.225***	
					(20.243)	
Female	0.039***	0.037***	0.065***	0.057***	0.062***	
	(3.026)	(2.814)	(4.896)	(3.837)	(4.274)	
Hispanic	0.004	0.003	-0.004	0.002	0.010	
	(0.277)	(0.200)	(-0.243)	(0.129)	(0.710)	
Black	-0.110***	-0.102***	-0.097***	-0.081***	-0.054***	
	(-7.600)	(-6.993)	(-6.551)	(-5.472)	(-3.704)	
Age	0.033**	0.034**	-0.031*	-0.024	-0.023	
	(2.274)	(2.121)	(-1.739)	(-1.360)	(-1.330)	
Age squared	-3.83x10 ⁻⁴	-4.59x10 ⁻⁴	0.001*	0.001	4.89x10 ⁻⁴	
	(-1.232)	(-1.353)	(1.885)	(1.378)	(1.334)	
High school degree		-0.017	-0.039**	-0.060***	-0.055***	
		(-1.074)	(-2.384)	(-3.641)	(-3.456)	
Some college education		-0.014	-0.026	-0.084***	-0.081***	
-		(-0.690)	(-1.265)	(-3.894)	(-3.861)	
Four - year degree		0.009	-0.057**	-0.196***	-0.201***	
		(0.361)	(-2.214)	(-7.017)	(-7.332)	
Married		0.049***	0.042***	0.043***	0.044***	
		(3.488)	(2.993)	(3.094)	(3.170)	
Union			-0.066***	-0.039**	-0.031**	
			(-4.001)	(-2.370)	(-1.964)	
Public sector			0.137***	0.051**	0.052**	
			(6.877)	(2.024)	(2.116)	
Log weekly earnings			0.110***	0.093***	0.092***	
			(8.065)	(6.719)	(6.834)	
Log weekly hours worked			0.038*	0.052**	0.051**	
			(1.862)	(2.502)	(2.472)	
Tenure			-9.10x10 ⁻⁵	-1.76x10 ⁻⁴	-1.74×10^{-4}	
			(-0.655)	(-1.265)	(-1.269)	
Tenure squared			4.19x10 ⁻⁹	1.41x10 ⁻⁷	1.52x10 ⁻⁷	
			(0.015)	(0.501)	(0.547)	
Industries (13)	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	
Occupations (10)	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	
Year dummies	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	

Constant	1.592***	1.598***	1.771***	2.086***	1.441***
	(9.385)	(8.528)	(9.295)	(10.415)	(7.214)
Observations	27537	27537	27537	27537	27537

t-statistics are in parentheses: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Survey weights are used throughout. Standard errors are clustered by individual respondent.

^a "How do/did you feel about the job you have now / your most recent job?" 1 = "dislike very much", 2 = "dislike somewhat", 3 = "like fairly well", 4 = "like very much".

^b "Your supervisor is competent in doing the job." 1 = "not true at all", 2 = "not too true", 3 = "somewhat true", 4 = "very true".

^c "Your co-workers are friendly." 1 = "not true at all", 2 = "not too true", 3 = "somewhat true", 4 = "very true".

			Job satisfaction	a	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Supervisor competence ^b	0.243***	0.243***	0.239***	0.233***	0.198***
	(28.790)	(28.767)	(28.183)	(27.647)	(22.951)
Co-workers are friendly ^c					0.165***
					(14.993)
Age	0.039***	0.040**	-0.001	-0.028	-0.025
	(2.789)	(2.374)	(-0.064)	(-1.192)	(-1.078)
Age squared	-4.75x10 ⁻⁴ *	-0.001	2.55x10 ⁻⁴	4.37x10 ⁻⁴	3.74x10 ⁻⁴
	(-1.618)	(-1.530)	(0.696)	(1.169)	(1.007)
High school degree		-0.017	-0.065***	-0.074***	-0.066***
		(-0.745)	(-2.800)	(-3.235)	(-2.911)
Some college education		-0.011	-0.079**	-0.114***	-0.105***
		(-0.339)	(-2.473)	(-3.594)	(-3.342)
Four - year degree		0.035	-0.142***	-0.242***	-0.239***
		(0.892)	(-3.398)	(-5.699)	(-5.688)
Married		0.014	0.018	0.015	0.016
		(0.883)	(1.147)	(0.975)	(1.059)
Union			-0.004	0.007	0.011
			(-0.264)	(0.459)	(0.742)
Public sector			0.149***	0.059**	0.061**
			(7.115)	(2.367)	(2.471)
Log weekly earnings			0.123***	0.118***	0.117***
			(7.709)	(7.325)	(7.366)
Log weekly hours worked			-0.004	-0.003	-0.004
			(-0.194)	(-0.148)	(-0.190)
Tenure			-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
			(-4.879)	(-5.439)	(-5.243)
Tenure squared			4.60x10 ⁻⁷ *	6.13x10 ⁻⁷ **	5.93x10 ⁻⁷ **
			(1.715)	(2.276)	(2.212)
Industries (13)	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Occupations (10)	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.718***	1.710***	1.708***	2.361***	1.853***
	(10.514)	(8.772)	(8.600)	(6.684)	(5.261)
Observations	27537	27537	27537	27537	27537

Table 5. Regression Equations for Job Satisfaction in the United States: Fixed-Effects Estimates (NLSY 1979-1982, 1988)

t-statistics are in parentheses: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by individual respondent.

^a "How do/did you feel about the job you have now / your most recent job?" 1 = "dislike very much", 2 = "dislike somewhat", 3 = "like fairly well", 4 = "like very much". ^b "Your supervisor is competent in doing the job." 1 = "not true at all", 2 = "not too true", 3 = "somewhat

true", 4 = "very true".

^c "Your co-workers are friendly." 1 = "not true at all", 2 = "not too true", 3 = "somewhat true", 4 = "very true".

Table 6. Regression Equations for Job Satisfaction in the United States: Alternative Groupings Fixed-Effects Estimates (NLSY 1979-1982)

(This table gradually restricts the sample to show, in the final column, that the FE results hold even when *the sample is only those workers who remain within the same job and workplace, namely, when only supervision alters.*)

		Job satisfaction ^a	
	Narrow sample 1	Narrower sample 2	Narrowest sample 3
Supervisor competence ^b	0.179***	0.149***	0.121***
	(16.420)	(10.375)	(4.926)
Co-workers are friendly ^c	0.160***	0.100***	0.064**
	(11.800)	(5.965)	(2.485)
Age	-0.138**	-0.129	-0.046
	(-1.979)	(-1.294)	(-0.223)
Age squared	0.004**	0.004*	0.001
	(2.534)	(1.653)	(0.185)
High school degree	-0.084***	-0.057	-0.051
	(-2.890)	(-1.364)	(-0.749)
Some college education	-0.162***	-0.118*	-0.102
	(-3.618)	(-1.755)	(-0.939)
Four - year degree	-0.446***	-0.432***	-0.839***
	(-6.040)	(-3.396)	(-4.288)
Married	0.002	-0.037	0.022
	(0.102)	(-1.185)	(0.382)
Union	-0.003	0.019	0.004
	(-0.144)	(0.722)	(0.095)
Public sector	0.093***	0.158***	0.171*
	(2.712)	(2.754)	(1.930)
Log weekly earnings	0.126***	0.042	0.048
	(5.564)	(1.490)	(1.011)
Log weekly hours worked	0.006	0.029	0.000
	(0.191)	(0.586)	(0.005)
Tenure	-0.002***	-0.004***	-0.006***
	(-5.062)	(-8.198)	(-4.238)
Tenure squared	7.11x10 ⁻⁷	6.47x10 ⁻⁶ ***	9.65x10 ⁻⁶ ***
	(0.502)	(4.085)	(3.359)
Industries (13)	Yes	Yes	No
Occupations (10)	Yes	Yes	No
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	2.828***	3.484***	3.180
	(3.499)	(3.104)	(1.437)
Observations	19587	9361	3275

t-statistics are in parentheses: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by each cluster type in the corresponding columns.

^a "How do/did you feel about the job you have now / your most recent job?" 1 = "dislike very much", 2 = "dislike somewhat", 3 = "like fairly well", 4 = "like very much".

^b "Your supervisor is competent in doing the job." 1 = "not true at all", 2 = "not too true", 3 = "somewhat true", 4 = "very true".

^c "Your co-workers are friendly." 1 = "not true at all", 2 = "not too true", 3 = "somewhat true", 4 = "very true".

Sample 1: all observations from 1979 – 1982 are included.

Sample 2: only observations of workers in the same employer are included.

Sample 3: only observations of workers in same employer, occupation and industry are included.

Note

The number of third-column observations is reduced (i.e. groupings large) because we use 3-digit occupations and industries to generate the sample/groupings. This corresponds to very close job-matches across the waves.

Table 7. Regression Equations for Job Satisfaction and Am-Given-Chance-To-Do-My-Best in the United States: Robustness Checks

	Job sati	sfaction ^a – Fixe	d effects	Can do what	at does best ^d
	Whole	NLSY 1979	, 1980, 1988	Pooled	Fixed
	sample	Small firm ^e	Big firm ^e	cross-sect.	effects
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Supervisor competence ^b	0.110**	0.194***	0.125***	0.207***	0.183***
	(2.299)	(7.784)	(4.557)	(20.818)	(19.291)
Co-workers are friendly ^c	0.165***	0.150***	0.162***	0.160***	0.135***
	(15.011)	(4.868)	(4.830)	(13.315)	(11.215)
Female				0.123	
				(-7.030)	
Hispanic				0.043	
				(-2.347)	
Black				-0.006	
				(-0.352)	
Age x supervisor comp.	0.004*				
	(1.846)				
Age	-0.040	-0.007	0.042	0.076***	0.015
	(-1.604)	(-0.131)	(0.555)	(3.702)	(0.554)
Age squared	3.91x10 ⁻⁴	0.001	-0.001	-0.001***	-0.001
	(1.055)	(0.606)	(-0.446)	(-3.185)	(-1.258)
High school degree	-0.067***	0.019	-0.181**	-0.081***	-0.051*
	(-2.941)	(0.317)	(-2.478)	(-4.019)	(-1.868)
Some college education	-0.106***	0.045	-0.190*	-0.179***	-0.073*
	(-3.372)	(0.521)	(-1.878)	(-6.890)	(-1.934)
Four - year degree	-0.242***	-0.065	-0.345**	-0.224***	0.032
	(-5.742)	(-0.594)	(-2.478)	(-7.077)	(0.637)
Married	0.016	-0.011	-0.018	0.021	0.019
	(1.053)	(-0.270)	(-0.369)	(1.365)	(1.097)
Union	0.012	0.035	-0.077	-0.096***	-0.027
	(0.796)	(0.713)	(-1.577)	(-4.943)	(-1.474)
Public sector	0.062**	0.207**	0.354***	-0.016	-0.036
	(2.508)	(2.152)	(2.634)	(-0.535)	(-1.181)
Log weekly earnings	0.117***	0.042	0.061	0.105***	0.116***
	(7.346)	(0.979)	(1.370)	(7.087)	(6.661)
Log weekly hours worked	-0.004	0.113**	0.073	0.160***	0.071***
	(-0.162)	(2.093)	(0.978)	(6.557)	(2.756)
Tenure	-0.001***	-0.001	-0.001	0.001***	0.001***
	(-5.192)	(-1.397)	(-1.505)	(6.912)	(3.209)

Tenure squared	5.92x10 ⁻⁷ **	4.50x10 ⁻⁷	8.09x10 ⁻⁷	-1.76x10 ⁻⁶ ***	-1.21x10 ⁻⁶ ***
	(2.205)	(0.698)	(0.968)	(-5.364)	(-3.925)
Industries (13)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupations (10)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	2.163***	1.431*	1.504	-0.072	1.177***
	(5.520)	(1.740)	(1.286)	(-0.301)	(2.943)
Observations	27537	8009	6339	27537	27537

t-statistics are in parentheses: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Survey weights are used throughout. Standard errors are clustered by individual respondent.

^a "How do/did you feel about the job you have now / your most recent job?" 1 = "dislike very much", 2 = "dislike somewhat", 3 = "like fairly well", 4 = "like very much".

^b "Your supervisor is competent in doing the job." 1 = "not true at all", 2 = "not too true", 3 = "somewhat true", 4 = "very true".

^c "Your co-workers are friendly." 1 = "not true at all", 2 = "not too true", 3 = "somewhat true", 4 = "very true".

^d "You are given the chance to do the things you do best." 1 = "not at all true", 2 = "not too true", 3 = "somewhat true", 4 = "very true".

^e Big firms have more than 49 employees and small firms have less than 50 employees.

Appendix

Table A1. Regression Equations for Job Satisfaction in the United States: Instrumental Variable Estimates (NLSY 1988)

	In	clusive Samp	ole	Ех	clusive Sam	ole
	OLS	IV (OLS	OLS	IV (OLS
	Job sat. ^a	First-stage equation	Second- stage equation	Job sat. ^a	First-stage equation	Second- stage equation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Supervisor competence ^b	0.286***		0.381***	0.336***		0.493**
	(16.053)		(3.009)	(13.048)		(2.235)
Instrument ^c	0.016	0.171***		0.022	0.142***	
	(0.742)	(6.922)		(0.709)	(3.966)	
Female	0.014	-0.005	0.014	0.022	0.031	0.018
	(0.451)	(-0.152)	(0.468)	(0.503)	(0.605)	(0.388)
Hispanic	0.075**	-0.053	0.080**	0.086*	0.026	0.082
	(2.017)	(-1.250)	(2.124)	(1.650)	(0.428)	(1.572)
Black	-0.054*	-0.049	-0.049	-0.172***	0.004	-0.172***
	(-1.660)	(-1.322)	(-1.483)	(-3.808)	(0.071)	(-3.825)
Age	0.154	-0.154	0.169	0.235	0.107	0.218
	(1.092)	(-0.959)	(1.189)	(1.196)	(0.477)	(1.102)
Age squared	-0.003	0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.002	-0.004
	(-1.135)	(0.931)	(-1.230)	(-1.221)	(-0.493)	(-1.122)
High school degree	-0.010	-0.077	-0.003	0.030	-0.033	0.035
	(-0.232)	(-1.501)	(-0.069)	(0.467)	(-0.452)	(0.546)
Some college education	-0.079	-0.035	-0.075	-0.042	0.011	-0.044
	(-1.561)	(-0.615)	(-1.500)	(-0.573)	(0.136)	(-0.596)
Four - year degree	-0.053	-0.062	-0.048	-0.007	-0.042	-0.001
	(-0.943)	(-0.955)	(-0.852)	(-0.089)	(-0.450)	(-0.008)
Married	0.057**	0.010	0.056**	0.062*	0.038	0.056
	(2.198)	(0.327)	(2.167)	(1.679)	(0.895)	(1.484)
Union	-0.016	-0.164***	-1.4×10^{-4}	-0.053	-0.133**	-0.032
	(-0.467)	(-4.292)	(-0.004)	(-1.131)	(-2.486)	(-0.574)
Public sector	0.066	-0.087	0.075	0.161**	-0.073	0.172**
	(1.346)	(-1.561)	(1.493)	(2.418)	(-0.959)	(2.529)
Log weekly earnings	0.020	-0.035	0.023	0.027	0.015	0.024
	(0.694)	(-1.062)	(0.804)	(0.634)	(0.321)	(0.572)
Log weekly hours worked	0.101	-0.092	0.109	0.054	-0.027	0.059
	(1.289)	(-1.042)	(1.387)	(0.507)	(-0.219)	(0.546)

Tenure	-0.001**	-0.001***	-0.001*	-0.001	-0.001***	-3.2x10 ⁻⁴
	(-2.471)	(-3.783)	(-1.813)	(-1.336)	(-3.123)	(-0.604)
Tenure squared	8.35x10 ⁻⁷	1.6x10 ⁻⁶ ***	6.8x10 ⁻⁷	2.8x10 ⁻⁷	2.0x10 ⁻⁶ **	-3.8x10 ⁻⁸
	(1.621)	(2.796)	(1.223)	(0.381)	(2.404)	(-0.043)
Industries (13)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occupations (10)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.023	6.190***	-0.566	-1.109	2.093	-1.439
	(0.012)	(2.814)	(-0.272)	(-0.412)	(0.681)	(-0.528)
Observations	2469	2469	2469	1197	1197	1197

t-statistics are in parentheses: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

^a "How do/did you feel about the job you have now / your most recent job?" 1 = "dislike very much", 2 = "dislike somewhat", 3 = "like fairly well", 4 = "like very much".

^b "Your supervisor is competent in doing the job." 1 = "not true at all", 2 = "not too true", 3 = "somewhat true", 4 = "very true".

^c Count variable = 0 if worker's supervisor does not have at least a college degree and did not work his/her way up through the ranks or owns / started the company; = 1 if one of these is true; = 2 if both of these are true.

Note: On a Hausman test, the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of the instrument is not close to rejection (the test statistic has a p value of approximately 0.5 in each of the instrumented columns of Table A1). The count variable enters significantly in the first-stage equations. Further test statistics are available on request.

Table A2. Regression Equations for Job Satisfaction in the United States with Banded Supervisor Dummies: Pooled Cross-Section (NLSY 1979 – 1982, 1988) and Fixed-Effects Estimates (NLSY 1979-1982)

	Job satisfaction ^a				
	Pooled Cross- Fixed Effects Estimates				
	section	Narrow	Narrower	Narrowest	
	Estimates	sample 1	sample 2	sample 3	
Supervisor not too competent ^b	0.130***	0.167***	0.162**	-0.004	
	(2.898)	(3.020)	(2.342)	(-0.032)	
Supervisor somewhat competent ^c	0.368***	0.328***	0.255***	0.063	
	(9.064)	(6.581)	(3.987)	(0.578)	
Supervisor very competent ^d	0.633***	0.520***	0.433***	0.245**	
	(15.614)	(10.374)	(6.685)	(2.203)	
Co-workers are friendly ^e	0.223***	0.159***	0.099***	0.061**	
	(20.003)	(11.736)	(5.873)	(2.408)	
Female	0.061***				
	(4.208)				
Hispanic	0.011				
	(0.749)				
Black	-0.052***				
	(-3.596)				
Age	-0.024	-0.137**	-0.126	-0.024	
	(-1.360)	(-1.971)	(-1.264)	(-0.120)	
Age squared	0.001	0.004**	0.004	4.335x10 ⁻⁴	
	(1.370)	(2.532)	(1.635)	(0.094)	
High school degree	-0.055***	-0.085***	-0.056	-0.051	
	(-3.422)	(-2.900)	(-1.353)	(-0.759)	
Some college education	-0.081***	-0.163***	-0.119*	-0.106	
	(-3.835)	(-3.635)	(-1.764)	(-0.970)	
Four - year degree	-0.200***	-0.445***	-0.431***	-0.828***	
	(-7.293)	(-6.031)	(-3.378)	(-4.307)	
Married	0.043***	0.002	-0.037	0.022	
	(3.146)	(0.094)	(-1.201)	(0.382)	
Union	-0.031*	-0.002	0.020	0.005	
	(-1.947)	(-0.128)	(0.742)	(0.099)	
Public sector	0.052**	0.093***	0.158***	0.178**	
	(2.085)	(2.710)	(2.753)	(1.979)	
Log weekly earnings	0.093***	0.126***	0.042	0.051	
	(6.889)	(5.576)	(1.498)	(1.095)	
Log weekly hours worked	0.050**	0.006	0.028	-0.002	
~ ·	(2.447)	(0.187)	(0.559)	(-0.022)	

Tenure	-1.60x10 ⁻⁴	-0.002***	-0.004***	-0.006***
	(-1.167)	(-5.051)	(-8.239)	(-4.263)
Tenure squared	$1.34 \text{x} 10^{-7}$	7.29x10 ⁻⁷	6.55x10 ⁻⁶ ***	9.84x10 ⁻⁶ ***
	(0.484)	(0.514)	(4.150)	(3.450)
Industries (13)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Occupations (10)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.775***	3.019***	3.619***	3.183
	(8.795)	(3.735)	(3.229)	(1.438)
Observations	27537	19587	9361	3275

t-statistics are in parentheses: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by each cluster type in the corresponding columns. ^a "How do/did you feel about the job you have now / your most recent job?" 1 = "dislike very much", 2 = "dislike somewhat", 3 = "like fairly well", 4 = "like very much".

^b "Your supervisor is [not too] competent in doing the job." Base category is "not competent at all".

^c "Your supervisor is [somewhat] competent in doing the job". Base category is "not competent at all".

^d "Your supervisor is [very] competent in doing the job". Base category is "not competent at all".

^e "Your co-workers are friendly." 1 = "not true at all", 2 = "not too true", 3 = "somewhat true", 4 = "very true".

Sample 1: all observations from 1979 – 1982 are included.

Sample 2: only observations of workers in the same employer are included.

Sample 3: only observations of workers in same employer, occupation and industry are included.

Note

The number of fourth-column observations is reduced (i.e. groupings large) because we use 3-digit occupations and industries to generate the sample/groupings. This corresponds to very close job-matches across the waves.

Table A3. Regression Equations for Job Satisfaction in the United States: Robustness Checks in Pooled Cross-Section (NLSY 1979 – 1982, 1988) and Fixed-Effects Estimates (NLSY 1979-1982)

	Job satisfaction ^a					
	Pooled Cro Estin		Fixed Effects Estimates			
	Job is current	Recently left job	Narrow sample 1	Narrower sample 2	Narrowest sample 3	
Supervisor competence ^b	0.229***	0.248***				
	(24.147)	(10.749)				
Positive change in sup. comp. ^d			0.118***	0.081***	0.079*	
			(5.878)	(3.312)	(1.794)	
Negative change in sup. comp. ^e			-0.176***	-0.149***	-0.164***	
			(-9.330)	(-6.700)	(-4.577)	
Co-workers are friendly ^c	0.225***	0.192***	0.194***	0.124***	0.075***	
	(19.155)	(5.944)	(14.428)	(7.461)	(2.989)	
Female	0.063***	0.100**				
	(4.137)	(2.458)				
Hispanic	0.013	0.024				
	(0.807)	(0.551)				
Black	-0.063***	0.027				
	(-4.084)	(0.716)				
Age	-0.034*	0.028	-0.127*	-0.140	-0.001	
	(-1.846)	(0.478)	(-1.821)	(-1.412)	(-0.002)	
Age squared	0.001*	-3.5x10 ⁻⁴	0.004**	0.004*	-1.1x10 ⁻⁴	
	(1.723)	(-0.280)	(2.399)	(1.772)	(-0.023)	
High school degree	-0.049***	-0.118***	-0.088***	-0.049	-0.054	
	(-2.930)	(-2.697)	(-3.017)	(-1.190)	(-0.812)	
Some college education	-0.066***	-0.178***	-0.167***	-0.109	-0.114	
~	(-2.942)	(-3.229)	(-3.715)	(-1.615)	(-1.050)	
Four - year degree	-0.187***	-0.362***	-0.454***	-0.428***	-0.810***	
	(-6.495)	(-4.323)	(-6.006)	(-3.308)	(-4.245)	
Married	0.049***	-0.003	-9.4x10 ⁻⁵	-0.038	0.017	
	(3.423)	(-0.065)	(-0.004)	(-1.194)	(0.297)	
Union	-0.024	-0.116**	-0.004	0.021	0.007	
	(-1.437)	(-2.165)	(-0.202)	(0.780)	(0.148)	
Public sector	0.050*	0.089	0.095***	0.161***	0.202**	
	(1.939)	(1.289)	(2.750)	(2.793)	(2.214)	
Log weekly earnings	0.081***	0.096**	0.125***	0.039	0.042	
	(5.621)	(2.575)	(5.400)	(1.371)	(0.891)	
Log weekly hours worked	0.059***	0.041	0.008	0.032	0.003	
- •	(2.677)	(0.750)	(0.240)	(0.627)	(0.034)	
Tenure	-5.0x10 ⁻⁴ ***	0.001**	-0.002***	-0.005***	-0.006***	
	(-3.480)	(2.393)	(-5.398)	(-8.331)	(-4.567)	

Tenure squared	6.6x10 ⁻⁷ **	-2.5x10 ⁻⁶ *	1.2×10^{-6}	6.8x10 ⁻⁶ ***	1.0x10 ⁻⁵ ***
	(2.323)	(-1.677)	(0.773)	(4.207)	(3.464)
Industries (13)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Occupations (10)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.640***	0.652	3.221***	4.056***	3.085
	(7.864)	(1.001)	(3.981)	(3.631)	(1.403)
Observations	24196	3341	19587	9361	3275

t-statistics are in parentheses: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by each cluster type in the corresponding columns.

^a "How do/did you feel about the job you have now / your most recent job?" 1 = "dislike very much", 2 = "dislike somewhat", 3 = "like fairly well", 4 = "like very much".

^b "Your supervisor is competent in doing the job." 1 = "not true at all", 2 = "not too true", 3 = "somewhat true", 4 = "very true".

^c "Your co-workers are friendly." 1 = "not true at all", 2 = "not too true", 3 = "somewhat true", 4 = "very true".

^d Worker experienced a change in supervisor competence from the lowest 3 competence categories to the highest competence category.

^e Worker experienced a change in supervisor competence from the highest competence category to the lower 3 competence categories.

Narrow sample 1: all observations from 1979 – 1982 are included.

Narrower sample 2: only observations of workers in the same employer are included.

Narrowest sample 3: only observations of workers in same employer, occupation and industry are included.

Note

The number of fifth-column observations is reduced (i.e. groupings large) because we use 3-digit occupations and industries to generate the sample/groupings. This corresponds to very close job-matches across the waves.