Telephone: +44 (0)24 765 28248
Email: K dot Pogorelskiy at warwick dot ac dot uk
Kirill received his Ph.D. in Social Science from the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) in June 2015.
His current work is at the intersection of economics and political science, with the general goal of developing a better understanding of group coordination under communication. He has also done research on voting power and tax progression.
- Political economy
- Game theory
- Mechanism design
- Ec228: Collective Decisions, Term 1
Select work in progress
Correlated Quantal Response Equilibrium, w/Thomas R. Palfrey
A Theory of Electoral Fraud and Voter Turnout, w/Kota Saito and Euncheol Shin
News Sharing and Voting on Social Networks: An Experimental Study, w/Matthew Shum, 2017. Last updated: 7/12/2017. [pdf], submitted
Skewness, Tax Progression, and Demand for Redistribution: Evidence from the UK, w/Stefan Traub, 2017. Last updated: 4/16/2017. [pdf]
Correlated Equilibria in Voter Turnout Games, 2014. Last updated: 3/22/2017. [pdf], Revision resubmitted, Games and Economic Behavior
Testing the Quantal Response Hypothesis, w/Emerson Melo and Matthew Shum, 2014. Last updated: 4/5/2017. [pdf], Revision requested, International Economic Review
Tax Progression in OECD Countries: an Integrative Analysis of Tax Schedules and Income Distributions, with Christian Seidl and Stefan Traub, Springer-Verlag: Heidelberg, 2013. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-28317-8. Available on Amazon.
Communication Among Voters Benefits the Majority Party, w/Thomas R. Palfrey. [pdf]. Forthcoming, Economic Journal
Actual voting power of the IMF members based on their political-economic integration, with Fuad Aleskerov and Valery Kalyagin, Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 2008, 48: 1554-1569
Refereed articles in Russian
Methods for measuring voting power: a survey, Control sciences, 2011, 5:2-13
Cost efficiency and shareholder voting power in Russian banking, with Fuad Aleskerov, Veronika Belousova, Irina Ivashkovskaya, Anastasia Stepanova, Upravlenie v kreditnoi organizatsii, 2010, 2(54): 49-64 and 3(55): 30-38
Voting power with preferences: an experimental investigation, with Fuad Aleskerov and Alexis Belianin, Psychology. The Journal of the Higher School of Economics, 2009, 6(2): 97-124
Power distribution analysis in the International Monetary Fund, with Fuad Aleskerov and Valery Kalyagin, Avtomatika i Telemekhanika, 2008, 11:140-148
Power and Preferences: an Experimental Approach, w/Fuad Aleskerov and Alexis Belianin, 2010.
Implications of the Quota & Voice Reform of the IMF: the Aspect of Power, 2010.
Distribution of Power within the IMF: When does Preference Mean Voice?, w/Fuad Aleskerov and Valery Kalyagin, 2010.