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Andreas Kokkinis




Assistant Professor


School of Law
University of Warwick
Tel: 02476573442

Research Interests

My research interests include corporate governance, corporate theory, and financial regulation. I am currently working on the corporate law framework for UK banks from a prudential regulatory perspective, on executive remuneration regulation in the banking sector and on alternative corporate forms such as the American 'benefit corporation'.


Andreas joined Warwick Law School in 2013. Before that he taught at UCL Laws, the University of Kent and the University of Buckingham. He holds a PhD from University College London (2014), an LLM from the London School of Economics (2009) and an LLB from the National University of Athens (2008). Andreas currently jointly convenes - and teaches on - the following modules: the Law of Business Organisations (UG, 30 CATS, optional 3rd/4th year module) and the International Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation Core Module (PG, 20 CATS, Term 1)


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Post Graduate Supervision

  • "Don't shoot the messenger" Whistleblowing in Corporate Britain: An assessment of the adequacy of the legal framework from a company and whistleblower perspective. Date of Completion:2021
  • Can institutional shareholder activism be an efficient mechanism of corporate governance? Date of Completion:2018

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    Corporate Law and Financial Instability

    This book explores the relationship between, on the one hand, the broader corporate law, corporate governance and securities law framework and, on the other, the prudential regulatory framework. Although the book’s main focus is on UK law, much of the policy argumentation is relevant globally and therefore appropriate international comparisons are drawn, and analysis of EU law and regulation is included. The book argues that the corporate law regime, which focuses on shareholder empowerment and profit maximisation, operates as an antithesis to prudential regulatory objectives thus undermining the safety and soundness of banks and other financial institutions by encouraging risky behaviour that may be in the best interests of their shareholders, but is clearly not in the public interest.