Greenberg’s Kant and the Fate of Aesthetics in Contemporary Art Theory

Why have aesthetic theories of art after modernism failed to compel widespread artworld assent? Why do Kantian approaches in particular seem so unpromising? In the first half of this paper I argue that the identification of medium-specificity with aesthetic value at the core of Clement Greenberg’s modernist aesthetic has overdetermined subsequent artworld conceptions of the aesthetic, both positive and negative, in ways that have stultified debate. I take Michael Fried and Rosalind Krauss as my examples here. In the second half I argue that Greenberg’s appeal to Immanuel Kant to underwrite modernist aesthetics is unwarranted. Despite this, Greenberg’s stress on Kant’s theory of taste at the expense of his theory of art continues to overshadow artworld receptions of Kant, both positive and negative. I take Thierry de Duve and Arthur C. Danto as my examples here. In conclusion, I indicate some resources in Kant’s theory of art, as opposed to his theory of taste, for retrieving aesthetics for contemporary debates about art.

I. GREENBERG’S MODERNIST AESTHETIC

In the predominantly anti-aesthetic climate of Anglophone art theory since the early 1980s, the discourse of aesthetics has been notable only for its absence—in contrast to postmodern art theory’s willingness to draw on a variety of other theoretical discourses of varying degrees of externality to art. For the most part, these discourses, particularly the technically more obscure ones—such as psychoanalytic theory and poststructuralism—have been excerpted from their own theoretical contexts and objects of enquiry, and applied readymade to works of art with scant acknowledgment of contentious issues within the fields borrowed from, or thematization of the potential pitfalls of such an undertaking. This fact, together with the marginalization of aesthetics that is its corollary, suggests that the majority of art theorists implicitly believe that the historical and conceptual limits of aesthetic
theory have been breached by the internal development of art after modernism. If so, they would share this view with many philosophers of art, if for somewhat different reasons. The questions this provokes are at least threefold. First, and most simply: Why do art theorists believe this? Second, are they right to believe it? And third, if the answer to the latter is no, as a consequence of the answer that emerges to the former—as I shall suggest—how are we to respond to this fact?

In answer to the first question I want to suggest something that I take to be noncontroversial, namely, that the widespread marginalization of aesthetics in postmodern art theory may be attributed largely to the success of Clement Greenberg, the art critic and theorist, in co-opting the discourse of aesthetics, particularly Kantian aesthetics, for modernist theory, thereby mediating the artworld’s understanding and subsequent rejection of both aesthetics in general, and Kant’s aesthetics in particular. Greenberg’s recourse to Kant was most pronounced in his later work, particularly from the late 1960s onward, as he struggled to buttress modernist aesthetics in the face of the increasing influence of Duchamp and the emergence of Pop, Minimalism, and Conceptual Art in quick succession. In taking issue with the rejection of taste as an adequate basis for the appreciation and understanding of art, which Greenberg believed underwrote these practices, the conception of aesthetics underpinning his own theorization of modernism became apparent.

[W]hen no aesthetic value judgment, no verdict of taste, is there, then art isn’t there either, then aesthetic experience of any kind isn’t there … it’s as simple as that. … I don’t mean that art shouldn’t ever be discussed in terms other than those of value or quality. … What I plead for is a more abiding awareness of the substance of art as value and nothing but value, amid all the excavating of it for meanings that have nothing to do with art as art. 1

For Greenberg, it was above all aesthetic judgment, by which he meant judgments of taste, and the distinctive kind of experience he associated with such judgments, that underwrote the value of art “as art.” Not surprisingly, in view of this identification of art with taste and aesthetic experience, Greenberg characterized modernism as a heightened tendency toward aesthetic value, and the foregrounding of such value, in art: “Modernism defines itself in the long run not as a ‘movement,’ much less a program, but rather as a kind of bias or tropism: towards aesthetic value, aesthetic value as such and as ultimate. The specificity of Modernism lies in its being so heightened a tropism in this regard.” 2 The conceptual cornerstone of modernism, as Greenberg theorized it, was “medium-specificity”: the self-reflexive investigation of the constraints of a specific medium through the ongoing practice of the discipline in question. In this spirit, Greenberg conceived modernist painting as an investigation into the essential nature of painting as an art that proceeded by testing its hitherto accepted “norms and conventions” as to their “indispensability” or otherwise, thereby gradually foregrounding what was “unique and irreducible” to its medium—in Greenberg’s account, notoriously, “flatness and the delimitation of flatness.” 3 Hence, when Greenberg identified modernism
with the pursuit of aesthetic value in art, he was thereby identifying medium-specificity with the
pursuit of such value, for the simple reason that cleaving to the specificity of their respective media is
what made the modernist arts modernist.

II. KRAUSS AND FRIED: TWO RESPONSES TO GREENBERG’S EQUATION OF MEDIUM SPECIFICITY
AND AESTHETIC QUALITY

The rhetorical force of this equation between aesthetic value and medium-specificity at the core of
Greenbergian theory can be gauged from the fact that the immediately succeeding generation of art
historians and theorists seemed to take it for granted that, while one might wish to defend or contest
modernism and aesthetics, one could only do so together. Hence, while one could be an anti-aesthetic
postmodernist or a modernist aesthete, the conceptual space appeared not to permit of being a
postmodern aesthete or an anti-aesthetic modernist. Consider the theoretical trajectories—and critical
fates—of Michael Fried (modernist aesthete) and Rosalind Krauss (anti-aesthetic postmodernist),
initially Greenberg’s two leading acolytes, in this light. While Fried’s criticism came to be regarded
as emblematic of everything that later generations of theorists found restrictive about modernism (the
stress on artistic autonomy, evaluative judgment, medium-specificity, and the like), Krauss’s star rose
in inverse proportion, and largely as a consequence of the extent to which she went on to take issue
with the fundamental commitments of Greenbergian modernism.

Krauss’s approach typically consists of a double movement. On the one hand, she sets out to
retrieve aspects of modern art, such as Dada and Surrealism, written out of modernist art history as
“bad” (that is, aesthetically meretricious) art by Greenberg. One can see the immense influence this
has had simply by looking at the amount of critical attention these movements have subsequently
received, particularly in American art history associated with the “October group” (those critics,
many former Krauss students, most closely associated with the project of the eponymous journal, of
which Krauss was a co-founder). On the other hand, she champions those more recent movements,
begging with minimalism and land art (or “sculpture in the expanded field”) that first transgressed
the strictures of modernist medium-specificity. Frequently, this double-barreled strategy is also
accompanied by an anti-modernist reading of canonical modernist works or artists—Jackson Pollock
being a prominent example. Not surprisingly, though, this approach tends to issue in term-by-term
negations of the privileged terms of Greenbergian theory. This procedure permeates Krauss’s The
Optical Unconscious, but it is raised to the status of a methodological principle in the exhibition
Informé that Krauss co-curated with Yves-Alain Bois at the Pompidou Centre in 1996. In the hefty
theoretical lexicon that serves as the show’s catalogue, Krauss and Bois oppose various operations
that reveal an impulse toward the “formless” in art to what they describe as being the “foundational
myths” of Greenbergian modernism. But doing so only serves to ensure that, rather than generating a
truly alternative paradigm to Greenbergian modernism (grounded in the writings of Georges Bataille)
as they intend, the agenda they map out remains trapped within the terms of Greenbergian theory. Indeed, the best such a strategy could hope to achieve is an inversion (or “abstract negation”) of the position on which it is conceptually dependent.

To take just one example: against what Krauss regards as Greenberg’s (and Fried’s) “transcendent” optical interpretation of Pollock, she counterposes her own “base” materialist reading, a reading that sets out to retrieve the “low” condition of Pollock’s paintings—what Krauss calls their bassesse. Krauss sees this embodied in the way the paintings’ material density indexically registers their horizontal mode of production, with its alleged associations of gravity, nature, even animality, and the unconscious. Krauss then counterposes these “low” characteristics of Pollock’s art to the act of critical sublimation she takes Greenberg’s focus on its vertical mode of reception to represent, given its correlation with the uprightness of the human posture, with its associations of humanity, consciousness, and—so the argument runs—culture in general. By refusing to take seriously the process of the works’ production, yet all the while foregrounding their optical effects for a perceiving subject (effects construed in terms of intricate and expansive visual fields), Krauss claims that Greenberg’s reading of Pollock strives to recuperate his paintings for precisely those categories of “good visual form,” and by extension consciousness itself, that his paintings actually work to explode.

My concern here is not with the intrinsic merits of Krauss’s revisionist interpretation of Pollock. That is, I am not concerned with whether the preferred term in each of her antitheses to Greenberg is more or less faithful to Pollock’s art. Rather, I am interested in the relation of Krauss’s reading to that against which it is pitched, and the limitations that accompany such a relation. That Krauss is forced to resort to such blatant inversions—the tactile for the optical, the material for the virtual, the horizontal for the vertical, production for reception, and so on—brilliant as her reading undoubtedly is, is because she, like many other anti-Greenbergian theorists in this regard, remains trapped within the terms of the very theory she means to oppose. Thus, rather than taking issue with the underlying philosophical foundations of Greenberg’s theory as she intends, Krauss has no alternative but to try to demonstrate the truth of its opposite—albeit an opposite framed within the terms of that theory itself, and thereby failing to escape it any meaningful sense (say, by shifting the framework of debate itself). As a result, far from exploding the “foundational myths” of modernist theory, as she supposes, Krauss and Bois’s procedure effectively reinstates their negative after-image.

Fried’s approach is Krauss’s antithesis. Because he initially held the line that medium-specificity is a necessary condition of aesthetic quality in art, Fried was obliged to reject art that flouted the constraints of the modernism as inimical to aesthetic value, leaving himself in an increasingly embattled position as a critic, given the development of art after the mid-1960s. This became apparent in his notorious critique of minimalism’s theatricality in “Art and Objecthood” (1967): “Theatre and theatricality are at war today, not simply with modernist painting (or modernist painting and sculpture) but with art as such—and to the extent that the different arts can be described as modernist, with modernist sensibility as such.” By “theatre” Fried means art that falls between artistic media,
and by “theatrical” he means in this context art that is structurally incomplete without the beholder whose attention (and interaction) it therefore actively solicits. Despite the very different meanings of these two terms, they have yet to be sufficiently disentangled by Fried or his critics. I have sought to clarify the relation between these terms elsewhere; I only want to note here that there is no necessary correlation between them. Whether a work is “theatrical,” in Fried’s sense, is orthogonal to whether it lies within or between established artistic media, and so counts as “theatre,” since a work may promote a theatrical relation to its viewers within a given artistic medium, or not do so between artistic media.11

In Fried’s early criticism, however, “theatre” is taken to follow from “theatricality.” Fried describes minimalism as “theatrical” in virtue of its relation to the space in which it is set, a self-consciously theatrical mis-en-scène projected toward the beholder required for its completion. Fried claims that minimalists such as Carl Andre and Robert Morris effectively incorporate the viewer into the work, as an anticipated component of its structure, by installing it in such a way as to draw attention to the time it takes the viewer to navigate the physical space of its installation. This whole situation—consisting of the work, its placement within a given architectural container, and the viewer—is responsible for the presence of such works, a presence that is “theatrical” because it engenders an experience that is staged, and persists in time, rather than gathering itself into the punctual plenitude characteristic of the best modernist works according to Fried.

In effect, minimalism expands the traditional notion of a “work” from a discrete, internally complex entity on the wall or floor, to that of a simple object plus its spectator plus the spatio-temporal location in which it is installed, hence from a one-term to a three-term relation, or from a complex object to a complex installation. This expansion serves to blur the boundaries between media—hence the argument from theatricality to theatre. The result, for Fried, is an art that collapses back into objecthood, and hence is not properly to be thought of as art at all. Far from offering the satisfactions proper to art, such works confront their viewers with obdurate and unresponsive objects from which all internal richness has been drained. From this Fried concludes that the concepts of value and quality only apply to works not so expanded: “The concepts of quality and value—and to the extent that these are central to art, the concept of art itself—are meaningful, or wholly meaningful, only within the individual arts. What lies between the arts is theatre” (where theatre has already been glossed as the “degeneration” of art).12

But this conclusion is too strong; what Fried’s argument shows, assuming one shares his judgment of minimalism, is that the concepts of quality and value cannot gain a purchase on these works, insofar as they conflate art with objecthood. It does not, and indeed cannot, show that blurring the boundaries between artistic media need result in art that collapses back into brute facticity. Given the openness of art to transformation over time, and the resultant obligation to judge each work on its merits, one cannot infer from the fact, if it is a fact, that these works fail as art, that no work that
transgresses the boundaries between artistic media could succeed as art. Such an inference cannot be justified—irrespective of whether Fried is right in his estimation of minimalism.

In sum, both Fried and Krauss remain within the horizons of modernist theory to the extent that neither breaches its conceptual cornerstone—Greenberg’s equation of medium-specificity and aesthetic value. On the contrary, the work of both is (or at least was) overdetermined by that equation in the texts discussed here. Of course, unlike Fried, Krauss seeks to demonstrate the truth of its opposite, but because she fails to take issue with the conception of aesthetic value underlying that equation, she is obliged to defer, if only implicitly, to Greenberg’s understanding of the aesthetic. As a result, her critique of the privileged terms of modernist theory is framed within the terms of the very theory she means to oppose. To the extent that Krauss opposes aesthetic ideals in the name of anti-, non-, or post- medium-specific art, and Fried opposes post-, anti-, or non- medium-specific art in the name of high aesthetic standards, both appear committed to the view that art after modernism has breached the internal conceptual or historical limits of aesthetic theory. But this only follows, or so I want to suggest, on the basis of the modernist conception of aesthetics Greenberg bequeathed to subsequent art history and theory.

Given this, I now want to examine Greenberg’s understanding of aesthetics more closely, particularly his claim to a Kantian provenance for his aesthetic theory. If this claim turns out to be unwarranted, the artworld will be shown to have rejected (Kantian) aesthetics on the basis of a misperception.

III. GREENBERG’S APPEAL TO KANT

Greenberg appealed to Kant on several fronts, the most famous being his invocation of Kant as the “first real modernist” in “Modernist Painting” (1960), because he used reason to immanently criticize reason, and thereby entrench it more firmly, if more narrowly, in its “area of competence.” But Greenberg’s appeals to Kant are more fundamental than this well-known remark suggests; I shall argue that mis-readings of Kant underwrite both Greenberg’s modernism, his account of the history of the best modern art as a reduction to the essence of each art, and his formalism, the understanding of aesthetic theory that underpinned his activity as a critic.13

Greenberg’s formalism, his theoretical self-understanding of his activity as a critic in a Kantian mold, is beset by several difficulties. At the most general level, it suffers from his failure to distinguish between “free” and “dependent” beauty in the third Critique. Greenberg attempts to apply Kant’s account of pure aesthetic judgment, a judgment about the aesthetic feeling aroused by “free” (or conceptually unconstrained) beauty, to works of art—thereby ignoring, in a way that has since become the norm, Kant’s more apposite remarks on fine art, genius, and aesthetic ideas in favor of an account that takes natural beauty and decorative motifs (“designs à la grecque, the foliage on borders or on wallpaper”) as its paradigm.14 It is above all Greenberg’s recourse to Kant’s formalist account
of the pure judgments of taste to underwrite a theory of _artistic_ value, as if Kant himself had had nothing to say about fine art, that is responsible for the general rejection of Kantian aesthetics in subsequent art theory. As a result, Greenberg misses two distinct kinds of conceptual complexity that attach to works of art, even for Kant, and that ought to present difficulties for the widespread rejection of Kant as an arch-formalist in art theory. That is, the constraint that the _concept_ a work of art is meant to fulfill imposes on artistic beauty, and the complexity that conceiving works of art as expressions of aesthetic _ideas_, and hence as having a distinctive cognitive function, adds to Kant’s conception of fine art.

Moreover, Greenberg tends to empiricize and psychologize Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment. Greenberg’s belief that he could demonstrate the “objectivity” of taste by appealing to the record of past taste—when induction could not provide the necessity he required to support his argument—is evidence of his empiricization of Kant, in this case, the judgment of taste’s _claim_ to validity over all judging subjects. The fact, if it is a fact, that judgments about artistic merit have tended to converge over time provides no guarantee that they will continue to do so in the future. Should they not, the conceptual fallacy involved in appealing to the arguable fact that they have done so to date would be apparent. Relatedly, Greenberg’s psychologization of Kant is evidenced by his tendency to conflate the Kantian criterion of “disinterest” as a necessary condition on aesthetic judgment with his own, psychologistic, conception of “aesthetic distance.” As a result, Greenberg runs together a transcendental theory of the epistemic conditions of aesthetic judgment with a psychological description of a particular empirical state of mind. Ironically, this robs his own theory of what is perhaps most persuasive about it, its attention to the material specificity of its artistic object. If aesthetic experience were really as voluntaristic as this implies, a matter of merely _adopting_ a distancing frame of mind toward an object, the nature of that object itself would fall away as a significant determinant on aesthetic judgment. At the very least, its role in determining such judgment would be significantly underplayed; for one can adopt such an attitude toward anything, at least in principle.

Greenberg’s modernism is similarly compromised, in this case by dogmatic epistemological and ontological assumptions about the individual senses and their relation to individual arts. As early as “Towards a Newer Laocoon” (1940), Greenberg sought to align specific arts, under the influence of music, with specific senses in a way that underwrites his theorization of modernism throughout his career. But in order to do so, he is forced to conceive the intuition of works of art in terms of discrete sensory inputs. Like his psychologizing of Kant, this is essentially a product of Greenberg’s deep-seated empiricism as a critic. As a result, he conflates judgments of taste, properly so-called, with what Kant would have concurred were aesthetic judgments, albeit of _sense_ rather than _reflection_. That is, judgments grounded, like judgments of taste, in feeling, albeit unlike judgments of taste, in feeling occasioned by objects impacting causally on the sense organs, hence in what one might call “sensation,” rather than in reflection on what Kant would call an object or perceptual
configuration’s “subjective purposiveness” or “finality” for cognition in general. That is, its suitability for engaging our cognitive faculties in an (optimally) enlivening way. As such, Greenberg’s conception of medium-specificity turns out to be based on an attempt to align an essentially empiricist notion of cognitively uninflected sensation, which owes more to Hume than to Kant, with specific artistic mediums, as if the sensory impression made by a work of art were a correlate of the intrinsic material properties of its medium, from which it could therefore be read off.

If Greenberg’s desire to align specific arts with specific senses explains why he sought to differentiate the arts in terms of media, the question it provokes is analogous to that provoked by his view of the senses. Namely: Can the arts be so easily parsed in this manner? The fact that they could, as it happens, be separated at the height of Greenberg’s authority as a critic, clearly does not make this a necessary feature of art’s—or even good art’s—identity. Had Greenberg’s supposed Kantianism stretched as far as the “Transcendental Aesthetic” of the first Critique, he would not have sought to parse the arts in terms of either medium or sense and could have avoided this impasse. For on Kant’s account of space and time as a priori forms of intuition, our perception of works of art, like our perception in general, must be grounded in the originary unity of sensibility underpinning it. Thus, while it may make sense to talk about the contribution made by an individual sense to our intuition of works of art in the anomalous event that that sense is defective, it is both alien to Kant’s epistemology, and phenomenologically unpersuasive, to construe normal instances of intuition as mere aggregates of the senses—the more so when it comes to such culturally and historically freighted entities as works of art.

IV. DE DUVE AND DANTO: TWO RESPONSES TO GREENBERG’S APPEAL TO KANT TO UNDERWRITE MODERNIST AESTHETICS

The point of these criticisms is to show that rejecting Kant’s aesthetic theory on the basis of Greenberg’s appeal to it is an ill-founded rejection. Herein lies the irony of artworld hostility to Greenberg since the 1960s: for despite that antipathy, the majority of artists and art theorists continue to operate with a broadly Greenbergian conception of aesthetics. What Greenberg valued is, of course, now roundly devalued, but what has not changed is the understanding of aesthetic theory underpinning his opponents’ anti-aestheticism. In effect, art theorists have tended to defer (if only implicitly) to Greenberg’s presentation of aesthetics, notably his invocation of Kant to underwrite modernist aesthetics, and taken this as a basis for rejecting both aesthetics in general and Kant’s aesthetics in particular. I suggest in what follows that this is even true of so astute a philosopher of art as Arthur Danto, at least when it comes to Kant. But if Greenberg’s claims on a Kantian provenance for modernist theory are unwarranted, it will follow that art theory has rejected Kant’s aesthetics as a viable discourse about art after modernism on the basis of a distortion. So far this account has much in common with de Duve’s. But I would maintain that not only has the artworld inherited a distorted
picture of Kant’s aesthetics from Greenberg, it has also inherited an extremely partial one. Thus, despite the fact that Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment is routinely dismissed for its formalism in art theory, one seldom finds reference to what Kant himself had to say about how his own account applies to works of art. This is true, surprisingly, not only of critics of Kant’s formalist legacy to modernist aesthetics, such as Danto, but also of sympathetic theorists, such as de Duve himself.

Hence, despite transcending the alternative of an anti-aesthetic postmodernism or modernist aestheticicism offered by Krauss and Fried, by seeking to do justice to both Greenberg and Duchamp—which, as anyone familiar with how such debates typically break down will be aware, is a highly original undertaking—and his desire to make Kant’s aesthetics productive for a contemporary art audience, de Duve shows his deeper debt to Greenberg by predicating his own position on a reformulation of Kant’s account of pure aesthetic judgment. This is all the more surprising in view of his critique of Greenberg’s reading of Kant. For de Duve, bringing Kant up to date involves substituting the judgment “this is art” for the judgment “this is beautiful,” thereby capturing the transformation in the nature of art embodied in, if not brought about by, Duchamp’s readymades. On the face of it this might look like a category mistake, the judgment “this is art” being a determinative judgment that subsumes a particular under a concept (namely, the concept art) and hence neither a reflective nor an aesthetic judgment for Kant. Nonetheless, de Duve maintains that the judgment “this is art” is aesthetic—if only liminally—by virtue of being singular and based on feeling alone. Preserving the basic Kantian commitment that aesthetic judgment is noncognitive because it refers an intuition to the feeling it occasions in the subject, rather than predicates a concept of an object, de Duve maintains that the judgment “this is art” does not subsume an object under a concept, namely, the concept “art,” but, rather, confers the name ‘art’ on any object judged accordingly. On de Duve’s account, the judgment “this is art” is akin to that original baptism through which a person acquires a proper name. Just as the class of persons called Tom need have no properties in common in virtue of which they are so-called—that is, Tom is not a concept under which persons are subsumed in virtue of possessing the relevant traits—so works of art need have no properties in common in virtue of which they are called art. On the contrary, what they need is to sustain comparison with exemplary works of past art.

But de Duve’s account of how this baptism takes place vitiates his argument—both that art is a proper name, and that the judgment “this is art” remains aesthetic in Kant’s sense. De Duve argues that the judgment “this is art” is aesthetic because in making it, one holds a candidate work up to previous recipients of that status in one’s personal canon to judge whether it is worthy of inclusion by consulting one’s faculty of feeling, in this case the feelings past works have occasioned. Like reflective judgment in Kant, this is based on an act of comparison, though unlike the aesthetic form of such judgment in Kant, what is compared here is either the works themselves or the feelings they have occasioned. But once the judgment itself becomes a comparison between examples, rather than between a given intuition and the “free play” of the faculties, sensed in feeling, to which it gives rise,
it can be neither noncognitive nor aesthetic after all—at least not in Kant’s sense. Even taken on its own terms, it is hard to see by what criteria past feelings, as noncognitive and private, could be reliably reidentified over time for the purpose of such comparison. Moreover, given that what distinguishes proper names from concepts is that they are conferred without regard to other bearers of the name, it is hard to see how art can be a proper name when the judgement that confers it is essentially comparative.

In direct contrast to de Duve’s intention to breathe contemporary life into Kant’s aesthetic, Danto has, until recently, entirely rejected Kant’s aesthetic as an adequate basis for the theory of art, largely on the basis of Greenberg’s appeals to Kant. Danto locates what he calls two “Kantian tenets” propping up Greenberg’s practice as a critic. The first tenet is that, just as genius must be unconstrained by rules if it is to produce something original, so, too, must critical judgement operate without rules if it is to be adequate to the resultant object. The second is that the critic’s “practiced eye” can tell the good from the bad everywhere, irrespective of whether it is informed by knowledge of the tradition to which a given work belongs; in effect, that all art is of a piece as regards its quality.

This is somewhat uncharitable to Greenberg, who was, not surprisingly, much better informed about the constraints on the creation of art within a given tradition than Kant. But Danto is right to call the first a Kantian tenet, albeit an inverted one, since for Kant the entailment runs in the opposite direction, from an analysis of aesthetic judgment to the nature of works of art as possible objects of such judgment. Nonetheless, what Danto neglects in this account of Greenberg’s supposed debt to Kant is the additional constraint Kant imposes on artistic beauty: namely, that in addition to being beautiful, the beauty of art must be appropriate to the concept governing its production as a work. In Kant’s example, a beautiful church must not only be beautiful, its beauty must be fitting to its purpose as a house of worship, and much that might otherwise please freely in aesthetic judgment would fall foul of this constraint. Thus, the idea of dependent beauty, beauty that is dependent on (or “adherent to”) a concept of what the work is meant to be, places a restriction on the scope of free beauty, rather than negating it altogether. Indeed, were this not so, judgments of dependent beauty would fail to conform to the basic requirements of Kant’s own account of aesthetic judgment in the “Analytic.” If works of art fulfilled the concept guiding their production at the expense of being freely beautiful, judgments of dependent beauty would reduce to judgments of perfection, despite Kant explicitly distinguishing between the two in the “Analytic.” Indeed, were Danto to give Kant’s account of dependent beauty its due, it would be hard to distinguish it (at least in broad terms) from his own view that works of art—as “embodied meanings”—should be judged for the appropriateness or “fit” of their form of presentation to the content thereby presented. Danto’s recent concession, in The Abuse of Beauty, that beauty may be a necessary feature of works of art after all—at least in so far as it is conceptually entailed by, and hence “internal” to, a given work’s meaning—only confirms this.

As regards Greenberg’s supposed second “Kantian” tenet, Greenberg’s conception of the “practiced eye,” like Danto’s account of it, owes more to Hume’s description of good judges than to
Kant, Kant never having addressed himself in detail, unlike Hume, to the kind of empirical disputes that may arise from trying to make fine-grained discriminations in taste. Nor would many of the disputes that Hume recounts, such as that occasioned by a leather-thonged key sunk in a barrel of wine, qualify as differences of taste or instances of *reflective* aesthetic judgement in Kant’s sense. Like Greenberg’s account, with which it has much in common, these would be aesthetic judgments of *sense* rather than reflection in Kant’s terms. Hence Danto’s claim that this is a Kantian tenet is tendentious.

But what Danto’s criticisms of Kant and Greenberg finally come down to is the claim that Greenberg inherits a “weak distinction” between artistic and natural beauty from Kant that vitiates the aesthetics of both so far as the theory of art is concerned. I have already argued that Greenberg fails to recognize the complexity that Kant’s distinction between free and dependent beauty adds to his account of artistic value; but Danto maintains that Kant himself conflates natural and artistic beauty. In support of this claim, Danto cites Kant’s remark that “[n]ature is beautiful [*schön*] if it also looks like art; and art can be called fine [*schön*] art only if we are conscious that it is art while yet it looks to us like nature.” For Danto this demonstrates the inadequacy of Kant’s aesthetics as a basis for the theory of art. But when Kant claims that fine art must “look like” nature, he does not mean what Danto evidently takes him to mean, namely, that fine art must resemble nature; he means that it must appear as *unwilled* as nature. Despite being aware that we are judging art rather than nature, Kant holds that “the purposiveness in its form must seem as free from all constraint of chosen rules *as if* it were a product of mere nature.” In other words, Kant is not arguing that works of art must be indistinguishable from nature, but rather that they must appear equally free of any trace of laboriousness that might impede their free appreciation. As Kant puts it: “the academic form must not show; there must be no hint that the rule was hovering before the artist’s eyes and putting fetters on his mental powers.” This lays down no substantive prescriptions on how works of art must look as a matter of fact, and certainly does not require that the beauty of art must resemble that of nature. *Pace* Danto, art need not look anything like beautiful nature in order to be aesthetically pleasing as art, even for Kant.

V. RETRIEVING KANT’S AESTHETICS FOR THE THEORY OF ART TODAY

So far the results of this paper have been largely negative. If the argument is sound, it shows only that art theorists have gone astray to the extent that they take notions like aesthetic value at Greenberg’s word, regardless of whether they understand the relation between aesthetics and the theory of art positively (like Fried) or negatively (like Krauss) as a result. I have also tried to show that art theory goes astray to the extent that it views Kant’s aesthetics through the distorting optic of Greenberg’s recourse to it, where this leads to a marginalisation of Kant’s theory of art, in favor of an exclusive focus on his theory of aesthetic judgment, whether this is taken as essentially isomorphic with art (as
with de Duve) or essentially distinct (as with Danto). Of course, even if one grants both that Greenberg mediates the discourse of aesthetics for art theory and that his appeal to Kant is responsible for a selective reading of Kantian aesthetics in particular—and this would be granting a lot—this would still only show that Kant’s aesthetics has been marginalized on the basis of various infelicities. It would not show that the artworld may not have been right to reject Kant’s aesthetics all along, albeit for the wrong reasons. That is, it would not show that Kant’s aesthetics can be applied to art after modernism. To show that there is no prima facie reason to suppose that it cannot, I want to conclude by pointing up some resources in Kant’s theory of art for retrieving aesthetics for contemporary artworld debates that I believe are underplayed in art theory to this day.\textsuperscript{36}

For Kant, works of art are expressions of “aesthetic ideas.” To put this in the most straightforward terms possible, an aesthetic idea is Kant’s account of what is distinctive about both the content of works of art and the way they present that content. What is distinctive about the content of works of art is either that they present concepts that may be encountered in experience, but with a completeness that experience never affords, or that they communicate ideas that cannot—in principle—be exhibited in experience.\textsuperscript{37} What is distinctive about the way works of art present such content is that they imaginatively “expand” the ideas presented in virtue of the indirect means through which they are obliged to embody them in sensible form. For rather than seeking to present the idea itself, which would be impossible—ideas being by definition what cannot be exhibited in experience for Kant—an aesthetic idea presents the “aesthetic attributes” of its object, thereby expressing an idea’s “implications” and “kinship with other concepts.”\textsuperscript{38} In effect, aesthetic ideas indirectly present what cannot be presented directly (the idea of freedom, as opposed to the concept of a chair, for example). To take Kant’s own example: “Jupiter’s eagle with the lightning in its claws” expands the idea of God’s majesty by presenting it aesthetically. What Kant calls the “logical” attributes of an object, in this case God, would be those in virtue of which it fulfils a concept, in this case majesty. Jupiter’s eagle with the lightning in its claws, by contrast, is a metaphorical expression of those same attributes, through which we are encouraged to envisage God’s majesty in the light of the thoughts provoked by Jupiter’s eagle, thereby opening up a rich seam of further associations. In this way, works of art present ideas that would otherwise remain unavailable to intuition in sensible form by using their “aesthetic” attributes in ways that provoke “more thought” than a direct conceptual elaboration of the idea itself could facilitate, thereby “expanding” the idea in the process.

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[A]esthetic attributes … prompt the imagination to spread over a multitude of kindred presentations that arouse more thought than can be expressed in a concept determined by words. These aesthetic attributes yield an aesthetic idea … its proper function is to quicken the mind by opening up for it a view into an immense realm of kindred presentations.\textsuperscript{39}
In doing so, aesthetic ideas might be said to achieve the impossible: they allow works of art to present rational ideas in determinate sensuous form. Consider Delacroix’s *Liberty Leading the People to Victory* as an example of the sensuous embodiment of the idea of freedom. The aesthetic attributes through which freedom is personified in the guise of “Liberty,” and shown leading her people to victory (fearlessness, spontaneity, resoluteness, leadership, all attributes of an active self-determining will) while holding a flag, symbol of freedom from oppression, aloft in one hand and clutching a musket in the other serve to “aesthetically expand” the idea of freedom itself. By presenting freedom in the guise of *Liberty* in this way, freedom is depicted concretely as something worth fighting for—indeed, as something requiring courage and fortitude to attain. This is what Kant means when he claims that works of art “quicken the mind” by freeing imagination from the mechanical task of schematizing concepts of the understanding. No longer constrained to present concepts of the understanding in sensible form, as it is in determinate judgment, aesthetic ideas free the imagination to spread over an array of related thoughts. By doing so, aesthetic ideas stimulate the mind, albeit in a less structured way than determinate cognition, enabling us to think through the ideas presented in a new light. As this way of putting it implies, this has more than a little in common with the theory of art Danto has been refining from *Transfiguration of the Commonplace* to *The Abuse of Beauty*—his previous antipathy for Kant’s aesthetics notwithstanding.

On Kant’s account, the expression of such ideas in art gives rise to a feeling of mental vitality—what he calls a “feeling of life”—in the work’s recipient, a feeling of the enhancement, or furtherance, of the subject’s cognitive powers. Works of art do this, not by giving rise to determinate thought, but by arousing a feeling of mental vitality that mirrors the cognitive state to which Kant attributes the production of aesthetic ideas. Hence the common claim that Kant’s theory of art is a form of expressionism. Accordingly, “genius” (the productive faculty responsible for fine art) is defined as the ability to “discover [aesthetic] ideas for a given concept” and “hit upon a way of expressing these ideas that enables us to communicate to others … the mental attunement … those ideas produce.” Genius, in other words, is the ability to “communicate” the free play of the faculties (the cognitive state responsible for the production of aesthetic ideas) and thereby occasion a similarly enlivening cognitive play in the work’s recipient.

The little Kant concretely says about in what this play of imagination and understanding occasioned by aesthetic ideas consists suggests a kind of free-wheeling, associative play in which the imagination moves freely and swiftly from one partial presentation of a concept to another. Hence the claim that aesthetic ideas encourage the imagination to “spread over an immense realm of kindred presentations that arouse more thought than can be expressed in a concept.” Indeed, it is this stress on the imaginative engagement with ideas that works of art induce in the spectator, far removed from the astringent formalism typically attributed to the third *Critique* in art theory, that I want to draw attention to in Kant’s theory of art. For Kant it is above all the way in which artworks indirectly embody ideas in sensuous form, by bringing their “aesthetic attributes” together in a unified form that
is the focus of judgments of artistic beauty. Moreover, although Kant, for historical reasons, no doubt thought of visual art in representational terms, there is nothing in his account of aesthetic ideas that requires art to be representational, in a narrow sense, my recourse to Delacroix notwithstanding. All Kant’s account requires is that works of art expand ideas in imaginatively complex ways, and there does not seem to be anything wrong with that thought in the light of more recent art that could not have been envisaged by Kant.

Indeed, I want to argue—and have argued elsewhere—for the much stronger claim that many, if not most, works of art typically viewed as anti-aesthetic on the formalist conception of aesthetics that the artworld inherits from Greenberg nonetheless engage the mind in ways that may be called aesthetic in Kant’s sense. This includes much conceptual art, despite the fact that conceptual art is routinely held up as a paradigm of the shortcomings of aesthetic theory when confronted by recent art. To my mind, all this actually shows is the limitations of most artworld conceptions of aesthetic value. That conceptual art is so widely assumed to be anti-aesthetic only shows how swiftly the aesthetic dimension of art is equated with an affective response to its visual properties in isolation from the ideas such properties are used to convey. What most art thought to be hostile to aesthetic analysis shows—against this assumption—is not the limit of aesthetic theory per se, nor the limit of Kant’s aesthetics in particular, but the limit of formalist aesthetics, as mediated by Greenberg, in coming to terms with the cognitive dimension of art.

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<NOTES>


4. In this influential essay, Krauss sought to show how medium terms, such as “sculpture,”
depend structurally not on some inner positivity (or set of necessary and sufficient condition for any
candidate object to count as sculpture) but on a network of relations and differences to cognate terms.
Krauss argues that sculpture is located at the intersection of “not-landscape” and “not-architecture”
(thereby bringing it into relation to an “expanded field” of other forms related to landscape and
architecture). See Rosalind Krauss, “Sculpture in the Expanded Field,” in The Originality of the
Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths (MIT Press, 1986). For an illuminating discussion of
Krauss’s account, including the infinite regress onto which it seems to open, see Stephen Melville
“What Was Postminimalism?” in Art and Thought, ed. Dana Arnold and Margaret Iversen (Oxford:

5. See Rosalind Krauss, “Six,” in The Optical Unconscious (MIT Press, 1994); Rosalind Krauss

6. See Yves-Alain Bois, “The Use-Value of ‘Formless,’” the introduction to Krauss and Bois,

7. Whether Krauss and Bois’s recourse to Bataille is faithful to his own motivations is also
contentious. For an argument to the contrary, see Michael Richardson, “Bataille,” in Art: Key

8. This is because, like other early advocates of anti-aesthetic postmodernism, Rosalind Krauss
understands aesthetics through the optic of the very theory she means to contest. Hence, in The
Optical Unconscious, a text aimed squarely at the aesthetics of Greenberg and Fried, Krauss has to
contest opticality, medium-specificity, and aesthetic autonomy precisely because these were valorized
as criteria of artistic merit in modernist theory. For a similar conclusion, see Stephen Bann,


10. See Michael Fried, “Art and Objecthood” (1967), in Art and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews

11. See my “On the Very Idea of a ‘Specific’ Medium: Michael Fried and Stanley Cavell on
more nuanced account of Fried’s relation to Greenberg, focusing on his response to Greenberg’s
essentialism about artistic media. See also “After Medium-Specificity chez Fried: Jeff Wall as a
Painter, Gerhard Richter as a Photographer,” in Photography Theory, ed. James Elkins (London:
Routledge, 2007), where I consider the implications of the resulting account for more recent art,
taking Fried’s recent work on photography as my starting point.


13. I owe this way of parsing Greenbergian theory, and several of the criticisms that follow, to de
Duve’s exemplary work on Greenberg, even if I take issue with his solution to the problems he finds


15. This identification of judgments of artistic value with pure aesthetic judgment pervades Greenberg’s work throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, from “Complaints of an Art Critic” (1967) onward. It is most evident in the essays and seminars collected in *Homemade Esthetics*.

16. Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, § 16 and § 49, respectively.

17. “The solution to the question of the objectivity of taste stares you in the face, it’s there in the record … In effect the objectivity of taste is probatively demonstrated in and through the presence of consensus over time. That consensus makes itself evident in judgments of aesthetic value that stand up under the ever-renewed test of experience.” See “Can Taste be Objective?” (the original publication of “Seminar III”) in *Art News* 72 (1973): 23. Both versions are collected in *Homemade Esthetics*. For a critique, see de Duve “Wavering Reflections,” pp. 107–110.

18. This conflation of “disinterestedness,” for Kant a necessary condition for any judgment to count as aesthetic, with aesthetic distance, a mental act or state of mind, is often explicit: “Kant pointed … to aesthetic distance when he said that the ‘judgment of taste … is indifferent as regards the being of an object’; also when he said ‘Taste is the faculty of judging of an object, or a method of representing it, by an entirely disinterested satisfaction or dissatisfaction’.” See “Observations on Esthetic Distance,” in *Homemade Esthetics*, p. 74 (emphasis added). Greenberg attributes his own psychologistic conception of aesthetic distance to Edward Bullough’s account in “Psychical Distance” (1912), reprinted in *The Philosophy of Art: Readings Ancient and Modern*, ed. Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley (New York: McGraw Hill, 1995), pp. 297–311.

19. To his credit, Greenberg was the first to acknowledge this: “the notion of art, put to the test of experience, proves to depend in the showdown … on an act of distancing. Art, coinciding with aesthetic experience in general, means simply a twist of attitude towards your own awareness and its object.” See Greenberg “Seminar One,” *Arts Magazine* 42 (1973): 44, reprinted in *Homemade Esthetics*.

20. “The advantage of music lay chiefly in the fact that it was an ‘abstract’ art, an art of ‘pure’ form. It was such because it was incapable, objectively, of communicating anything else than a sensation, and because this sensation could not be conceived in any other terms than those of the sense through which it entered consciousness. … Only by accepting the example of music and defining each of the other arts solely in terms of the sense or faculty which perceived its effect … would the non-musical arts attain the ‘purity’ and self-sufficiency which they desire.” Clement

21. “Agreeable is what the senses like in sensation”; “A liking for the beautiful must depend on the reflection, regarding an object … This dependence on reflection also distinguishes the liking for the beautiful from [that for] the agreeable, which rests entirely on sensation”; “Insofar as we present an object as agreeable, we present it solely in relation to sense.” Kant, Critique of Judgement, § 3, Ak. 206, p. 47; § 4, Ak. 207, p. 49; § 4, Ak. 208, p. 49, respectively.

22. “[P]leasure in aesthetic judgement … is merely contemplative … The very consciousness of a merely formal purposiveness in the play of the subject’s cognitive powers, accompanying a presentation … is that pleasure.” Kant, Critique of Judgement, § 12, Ak. 222, p. 68.

23. For Kant, space is the form of all outer sensibility, hence a condition of perceiving anything at all in the external world, while time, as the form of inner sensibility, is a condition of perceiving anything whatsoever. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: MacMillan, 1929), Ak. A34/B50, p. 77.


25. See de Duve, “Act Four” in “Art Was a Proper Name,” in Kant After Duchamp.

26. Kant writes, in § 1 of the “Analytic of the Beautiful”: “[T]he presentation is referred only to the subject, namely, to his feeling of life, under the name feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and this forms the basis of a very special power of discriminating and judging. This power does not contribute anything to cognition, but merely compares the given presentation in the subject with the entire presentational power, of which the mind becomes conscious when it feels its own state.” See Critique of Judgement, § 1, Ak. 204, p. 44 (emphasis added).

27. Jason Gaiger was the first to make this point in an early review of Kant After Duchamp. See his “Art After Beauty: Retrieving Aesthetic Judgment,” Art History 20 (1997), pp. 611–616.


convincing. On Scarre’s account, something may be freely beautiful without being dependently beautiful, but not vice versa; hence free beauty is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of dependent beauty. Other proponents of this view have since included Malcolm Budd, in *Values of Art: Pictures, Poetry and Music* (London: Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1995), pp. 30–31; Paul Guyer, in *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 210–220; and Henry Allison, in *Kant’s Theory of Taste* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 141. Proponents of the view that Scarre was contesting include Donald Crawford, in *Kant’s Aesthetic Theory* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1974); and Eva Schaper, “Free and Dependent Beauty,” in *Studies in Kant’s Aesthetics* (University of Edinburgh Press, 1979).

30. “Now a judgment of taste is an aesthetic judgment, i.e., a judgment that rests on subjective bases, and whose determining basis cannot be a concept and hence also cannot be the concept of a determinate purpose. Hence in thinking of beauty, a formal subjective purposiveness, we are not at all thinking of a perfection in the object, an allegedly formal and yet also objective purposiveness.” See *Critique of Judgement*, § 15, titled “A Judgment of Taste is Wholly Independent of the Concept of Perfection”; Ak. 228, pp. 74–75.


32. Hume comments in the famous anecdote about the key sunk in the barrel of wine: “The great resemblance between mental and bodily taste will easily teach us to apply this story … Where the organs are so fine, as to allow nothing to escape them; and at the same time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in the composition: This we call delicacy of taste, whether we employ these terms in the literal or metaphorical sense.” Hume’s “Of the Standard of Taste,” repr. in Neill and Ridley, *The Philosophy of Art*, p. 260. Hume recognizes no distinction between what Kant distinguishes as aesthetic judgments of taste and of the agreeable—not because he confuses intersubjective validity with mere personal preference, but because he grants no distinction, akin to Kant’s, between reflection and sensation.


36. The resources in Kant’s *Critique of Judgement* for an aesthetics of contemporary art are the topic of Part III of my forthcoming monograph, *Aesthetics After Modernism*.


40. Hence, Kant claims that the aesthetic attributes that yield the aesthetic idea “give the imagination a momentum which makes it think more in response to these objects, though in an undeveloped way, than can be comprehended within one concept and hence in one determinate linguistic expression.” *Critique of Judgement*, § 49, Ak. 315, p. 184.

41. Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, § 1, Ak. 204, p. 44.


44. For a detailed exploration of whether Kant is committed to a representational concept of art, see Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, pp. 290–298.

45. See, for example, my “Kant After LeWitt: Towards an Aesthetics of Conceptual Art,” in *Philosophy and Conceptual Art*, ed. Elisabeth Schellekens and Peter Goldie (Oxford University Press, 2007).

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<end NOTES>